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Written materials and oral presentations offered through the University of Kentucky College of Law Office of
Continuing Legal Education (UKICLE) are designed to assist lawyers in maintaining their professional competence. The Office of Continuing Legal Education and its volunteer speakers and writers are not rendering legal
or other professional services by their participation in continuing legal education activities. Attorneys and others
using information obtained from UKICLE publications or seminars must also fully research original and current
sources of authority to properly serve their or their client's legal interests. The forms and sample documents
contained in our continuing legal education publications are intended for use only in conjunction with the professional services and advice of licensed attorneys. All parties must cautiously consider whether a particular form
or document is suited to specific needs. The legal research presented herein is believed to be accurate, but is not
warranted to be so. These written materials and the comments ofspeakers in presentation ofthese materials may
contain expressions of opinion which do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Continuing Legal
Education, the University of Kentucky, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or other governmental authorities.
UKICLE strives to make its written materials and speaker presentations gender-neutral; however, gender-specific references may remain where it would otherwise be awkward or unclear. It should be understood that in
such references the female includes the male, and vice-versa.
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The University ofKentucky College ofLaw, Office ofContinuing Legal Education (UKICLE) was organized in 1973
as the first permanently staffed, full time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth ofKentucky. It endures with
the threefold purpose: I) to assist lawyers in keeping abreast ofchanges in the law; 2) to develop and sustain practical lawyering
skills; and 3) to maintain a high degree ofprofessionalism in the practice oflaw. Revenues from seminar registrations and publication
sales allow the Office to operate as a separately budgeted, self-supporting program ofthe College. No tax dollars or public funds
are used in the operation ofUKlCLE.
Seminars
UKiCLE provides a variety ofconvenient, practical seminars to satisfy the continuing legal education needs oflawyers.
Seminars range from half-day programs in selected areas to in-depth programs extending over several days. While most seminars
are conducted at the College of Law in Lexington, UKiCLE has a long-standing statewide commitment. Since its first year of
operation, beginning with a criminal law seminar in Madisonville, Kentucky, the Office has continued to bring high-quality
continuing legal education to attorneys in every region ofKentucky.
Publications
Each seminar is accompanied by extensive speaker-prepared course materials. These bound course materials are offered
for sale following seminars and are consistently regarded as valuable, affordable references for lawyers.
Since 1987, UKiCLE has produced a series ofPractice Handbooks and Monographs. Each Practice Handbook is an
extensively referenced, fully indexed practice guide consisting ofseparately authored chapters, allowing for the comprehensive
coverage ofa distinct body of law. Their format permits updating through supplements and revised indexes. Each Monograph
is a concisely written practice guide, often prepared by a single author, designed to cover a topic of narrower scope than the
Handbooks. They are convenient references on topics often not treated elsewhere.
Professional Management
UKiCLE serves the needs ofthe bar from its offices on the University ofKentucky campus inLexington. Its staffmanages
course registrations, publication planning and editing, publication sales, seminar and publication marketing, publication
composition and printing, and seminar content planning, as well as budgeting, accounting and financial reporting. As an "income
based" program, UKlCLE's seminar tuitions and publication sales are budgeted to generate sufficient revenues for selfsupport.
Commitment to Quality and Creativity
UKiCLE is a member ofthe Association for Continuing Legal Education (ACLE). As such, UKI CLE subscribes to the
ACLE Standards in Continuing Legal Education; and the Standards ofFairConduct and Voluntary Cooperation administered under
the auspices of the American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education.
Throughout its existence UKiCLE has been actively involved in the activities and services provided by ACLE. UKlCLE's
association with national and international CLE professionals has afforded it the opportunity to continually reassess instructional
methods, quality in publications, and effective means ofdeliveringCLE services at consistently high levels ofcreativity and quality.
An Integral Part of the Legal Profession's Tradition of Service
An enormous debt is owed to the judges, law professors, and practitioners who generously donate their time and talent
to continuing legal education. Their knowledge and experience are the fundamental ingredients for our seminars and publications.
Without their motivation and freely given assistance in dedication to a distinguished profession, high quality continuing legal
education would not exist.
As a non-profit organization, UKiCLE relies upon the traditional spirit ofservice to the profession that attorneys have
so long demonstrated. We are constantly striving to increase attorney involvement in the continuing education process. If you
would like to participate as a volunteer speaker or writer, please contact us and indicate your areas of interest and experience.
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similar to not-for-profit organizations, paying all direct expenses, salaries and overhead solely from revenues. No public funds or tax dollars are allocated to its
budget. Revenues are obtained from registrant enrollment fees and the sale of
publications. Our sole function is to provide professional development services. In
the event surplus funds become available, they are utilized to offset deficits or
retained in our budget to improve the quality and variety ofservices we provide.
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ABOUT OUR SPEAKERS

SCOTT A. BACHERT is a partner with the Bowling Green, Kentucky firm of Harned, Bachert & Denton where he concentrates
his practice in the areas of bankruptcy, business law, and commercial law. He is also a bankruptcy Panel Trustee for the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Kentucky. Scott received his undergraduate degree from Western Kentucky University
and his J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law where he was admitted to Order of the Coif. He is past
President ofthe Bowling Green-Warren County Bar Association as well as past chair ofthe Law Office Management Section for
the Kentucky Bar Association. Scott also sat on the Legislative Research Commission, Special Study Commission on the
Uniform Commercial Code in 1990. A member of the American and Kentucky Bar Associations; the Defense Research Institute;
and the American Bankruptcy Institute, he is co-author of the chapter entitled "The Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee and the
Bankruptcy Estate" for UKlCLE's publication, Consumer Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 7 Practice.

MICHAEL L. BAKER is with the Covington, Kentucky firm of Ziegler & Schneider, P.S.C., where he concentrates his practice
in the areas of bankruptcy, commercial law, corporate law, real estate, and probate. He is a member of both the Kentucky and the
Ohio bar; received his B.A. from the University of Louisville and was awarded his J.D. degree from Salmon P. Chase College of
Law at Northern Kentucky University. Since 1984, he has been a member of the Panel of Trustees for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, Covington Division. Mike is a member of the Kentucky and Northern Kentucky Bar Associations and serves as Chair
of the Bankruptcy Section for each of those organizations. He was co-founder of the Kentucky Bar Association Bankruptcy
Section, and is co-author of the chapter on "The Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee and the Bankruptcy Estate" from the UKlCLE
publication Consumer Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 7 Practice.

CLAUDE R. JR. ("CHIP") BOWLES is a member with the law firm of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC where he
works out of their Louisville, Kentucky office and concentrates in the area of bankruptcy law. Prior to joining Greenebaum Doll
& McDonald, he served for over seven years as Staff Attorney to the Honorable Henry Dickinson, Bankruptcy Judge for the
Western District of Kentucky. From 1986-1992 he practiced law with the firm of Porter, Wright, Morris and Arthur in
Cincinnati, Ohio. He is a graduate of the University of Kentucky and was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of
Kentucky College of Law. Chip has lectured extensively on the topic of bankruptcy law and is a co-author for Bankruptcy Issues
in Matrimonial Cases: A Practice Guide, published by Prentice Hall in 1992. He has served as Program Chair for four UKlCLE
bankruptcy programs; "Bankruptcy Essentials" in 1992; "Bankruptcy Reform '94" in December 1994; "Consumer Bankruptcy
'96" in December 1996; and "Consumer Bankruptcy Update" in December 1998,2000,2002 & now 2004. He also serves as
Editor for "Broken Bench & Bar" the newsletter for the Bankruptcy Law Section of the Kentucky Bar Association. He was the
Managing Editor and a contributing author for two separate publications for the University of Kentucky College of Law's Office
of Continuing Legal Education: Consumer Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 7 Practice and Consumer Bankruptcy In
Kentucky: Chapter 13 Practice. He also served as an author in those 1996 publications writing chapters entitled, "American
Bankruptcy Law: An Overview", "Creditor Issues In Chapter 13 Cases", "Fee Applications In Chapter 13 Cases", and
"Bankruptcy Ethics."

BEVERLY M. BURDEN has served as a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee for the Eastern District of Kentucky since 1999. From
1987 to 1999, she served as law clerk to Bankrupty Court Judge Joe Lee. She received her undergraduate degree from Morehead
State University and her law degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law (1983). After graduation she served four
years as Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky working in their Consumer Protection Division. Ms.
Burden was the 1997 recipient of the KBA's Justice Thomas B. Spain Award for Outstanding Service in Continuing Legal
Education. She is widely published and has had recent articles published in the Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice; Norton
Bankruptcy Law Advisor; and the Kentucky Bench & Bar.

THOMAS L. CANARY, JR., is a member of the Louisville, Kentucky firm of Mapother & Mapother where he concentrates his
practice in the areas of bankruptcy, collections, and creditors' rights. He received his B.S. in Economics from the University of
Kentucky and was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law. He is admitted to practice law in
the states of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. Tom is a member of both the Kentucky and Indiana bars, and is a frequent presenter at
continuing legal education programs on the topic of bankruptcy law. He is the author of the chapter on "Adversary Proceedings
To Determine Dischargeability of Debts and To Challenge Debtor's General Discharge" in UK/CLE's publication, Consumer
Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 7 Practice.

LAURA DAY DELCOTTO is with the Lexington firm of Wise DelCotto. Formerly the Chair of Stoll, Keenon & Park's
Bankruptcy, Financial Restructuring, and Workout Grouphe has a broad base of experience including representation of debtorsin-possession, borrowers in non-bankruptcy situations, secured and unsecured lenders, committees, trustees, DIP lenders, lessors
and asset purchasers. Ms. DelCotto's primary practice is in Chapter 11 commercial bankruptcy. She is a nationally certified
Business Bankruptcy Specialist by the American Board of Certification. She is a past Chair ofthe KBA's Bankruptcy Law
Section and served on the Joint Local Rules panel for the bankruptcy courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky.
She is a graduate ofthe University of the South and received her J.D. (With distinction) from the University of Kentucky College
of Law.

JOHN S. EGAN is a member of Frost Brown Todd LLC where he practices out ofthe firm's Louisville, Kentucky office. He
represents creditors and borrowers in financial transactions and creditors in bankruptcies, complex foreclosures and
receiverships. He also counsels the Firm's clients on a variety of municipal bond issues, serving as bond counselor
underwriter's counsel. He received both his B.A. and M.A. degrees from The Johns Hopkins University and graduated, with
honors, from Duke Law School. He is an active member ofthe Kentucky, South Carolina, Louisville, and American Bar
Associations and is also a member of the National Association of Bond Lawyers. He is a frequent lecturer at continuing legal
education programs and is widely published.

CHRISTOPHER W. FROST is Frost Brown Todd Professor of Law with the University of Kentucky College of Law. Prior to
joining the College of Law Faculty in 1998, he was on the faculty of the Saint Louis University School of Law from 1990 until
1998, where he taught in the areas of contracts, bankruptcy, commercial law and corporate finance. Professor Frost received a
B.B.A. from the University of Kentucky and was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law,
where he served as Articles Editor for the Kentucky Law Journal and was elected to Order ofthe Coif. Following law school he
practiced bankruptcy and commercial law with the firm of Sidley & Austin in Chicago, Illinois, until joining the law faculty of
Saint Louis University. His articles on corporate reorganizations have been published in journals including the Hastings Law
Journal, the North Carolina Law Review, the Arizona Law Review and the Tulane Law Review.

JOSEPH J. GOLDEN is an Assistant United States Trustee for the U.S. Department of Justice, U. S. Trustees Office for
Kentucky. He received both his undergraduate degree and his law degree from the University of Louisville. For 21 years prior to
being appointed Trustee he was engaged in the private practice oflaw concentrating in the dual areas of bankruptcy and criminal
law. He has served under appointments to three Bankruptcy Rules Committees and as Co-Chair ofthe Bankruptcy Section for
the Louisville Bar Association. As a criminal law practitioner, he was prosecutor for the County Attorney's Office, a Juvenile
Court Judge, Quarterly Court Judge for the felony division, and a Consumer Court Judge, all in Jefferson County, Kentucky. He
has also served as an adjunct professor of law at the University of Louisville School of Law. Joe is a frequent presenter at
continuing legal education programs for the University of Kentucky College of Law as well as other CLE providers. He is the
author of the chapter entitled "Office ofthe United States Trustee" in the UK/CLE publication Consumer Bankruptcy In
Kentucky: Chapter 7 Practice.

ANNA C. JOHNSON received her law degree from Chase College of Law in 1994 and her B.A. from the University of
Charleston. Prior to attending law school she was an elementary and secondary school teacher in West Virginia. After completing
her legal education, she focused her practice on domestic relations, real estate, and creditor work. In 1998 she was appointed as a
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee for the Eastern District of Kentucky and currently concentrates her practice in bankruptcy. Ms.
Johnson practices with her son Charles M. Johnson at Johnson Law Office, P.S.C. in Paris, Kentucky. She is a member and past
President of the Bourbon County Bar, and a member of the Fayette County Bar Association, the Kentucky Bar Association, the
West Virginia Bar Association and is licensed to practice in Kentucky, West Virginia, and the Eastern District of Kentucky.

J.D. KERMODE - Bio not available at time of printing.

WILLIAM W. LAWRENCE is a Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Trustee for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of
Kentucky, and also maintains a general civil practice in Louisville, Kentucky. He received his A.B. degree from Harvard and
was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of Louisville School of Law. He is a past President ofthe Kentucky Bar
Association as well as a past President of the Louisville Bar Association. Bill is a frequent speaker in the area of bankruptcy law,
and is co-author ofthe chapter entitled "Trustee Practice In Chapter 13 Bankruptcies" for the UK/CLE publication Consumer
Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 13 Practice.

JAMES D. LYON is engaged in the private practice oflaw in Lexington, Kentucky where he concentrates in the areas of
bankruptcy, creditors' rights, and debtor-creditor relations. He also serves as a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee. Jim is a graduate
of the University of Kentucky and was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law. He is past
Chair of the Kentucky Bar Association's Bankruptcy Law Section. Jim has lectured on numerous occasions for the University of
Kentucky College of Law's Office of Continuing Legal Education, and he is co-author of the chapter entitled "The Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Trustee and the Bankrupt Estate" for the UK/CLE publication Consumer Bankruptcy In Kentucky: Chapter 7
Practice.

DAVID G. PERDUE - Bio not available at time of printing.

DIANE S. ROBL is the Clerk ofthe U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the W.D. of Ky. She received her B.A. and her M.A. from
Wichita State University. She received her J.D. degree from the Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. Prior
to assuming the position of Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court in 1994, she served as Chief Deputy Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court
and from 1987-1993 as a Career Law Clerk for the U.S. District Court. She is an active member ofthe Kentucky and Louisville
Bar Associations and is a frequent lecturer on bankruptcy practice topics.

GREGORY R. SCHAAF is with the Lexington, Kentucky office of Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC where he
concentrates his practice in the areas of bankruptcy workouts, real estate, and commercial transactions. Gregory received his
B.B. in Accounting and his B.S. in Law Enforcement Administration from Western Illinois University, and was awarded his J.D.
degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law where he was Order of the Coif, a member of the Kentucky National
Moot Court Team, the Kentucky Moot Court Board, a member of the Journal of Mineral Law and Policy, and President of the
Student Bar Association. He is a member of the American Bankruptcy Institute; the Law Society of England and Wales; as well
as the Kentucky and Fayette County Bar Associations. He is also a Certified Public Accountant.

HON. JOSEPH M. SCOTT, JR., is Chief Judge for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court - Kentucky. He formerly practiced law with the
law firm of Stoll, Keenon & Park where he chaired the firm's Bankruptcy Section. Judge Scott received his Bachelor of Business
Administration Degree from the University of Notre Dame and was awarded his J.D. degree from the University of Kentucky
College of Law. He has been very active in the Bankruptcy bar and the American Bankruptcy Institute and is a frequent speaker
on bankruptcy-related topics at continuing education programs.

JOHN R. STONITSCH is the Assistant U.S. Trustee for the Eastern District of Kentucky, serving in Lexington, Kentucky.
From 1973 until 1988 he was in the private practice oflaw where he specialized in bankruptcy law. From 1975-1988 he served
in the panel ofprivate trustees until he was appointed by the Attorney General of the United States in 1988 as the U.S. Trustee
for Region 13, in which position he served until 1995. In 1996 he became Special Assistant U.S. Trustee for Newark, New
Jersey and was Acting U.S. Trustee for Region 3. Mr. Stonitsch has served as an Adjunct Professor for Southwest Missouri State
University, has been active in training and speaking for the U.S. Trustee Program and was the Chairperson for the Standing
Chapter 13 Committee. He has also served as a member ofthe Advisory Committee to the Director ofthe U.S. Trustee Program.
He is licensed to practice law in Missouri, Kansas, and Kentucky.

HON. DAVID T. STOSBERG has been a United States Bankruptcy Court Judge for the Western District of Kentucky since
June of 1989. Prior to his elevation to the bench, Judge Stosberg practiced with the Louisville law firms of Wyatt, Tarrant &
Combs, and Morgan and Pottinger and focused in the areas of commercial law and bankruptcy. He received his undergraduate
degree from Bellannine College in Louisville and his law degree from the University of Kentucky College of Law. Judge
Stosberg has served as a Visiting Bankruptcy Judge in Florida, Tennessee, Indiana and New York. He presently serves on the
Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.

ALAN C. STOUT is a partner in the law firm of Stout and Fanner, with offices in Paducah, Kentucky and Marion, Kentucky.
Mr. Stout concentrates his practice in the areas of bankruptcy and civil litigation. Alan received his B.S. degree from Murray
State University in 1978 and was a graduate of the Chase College of Law at Northern Kentucky University in 1981. He is
admitted to practice law in the states of Kentucky and Illinois, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is a charter member of
the KBA Bankruptcy Section, a member of the American Bankruptcy Institute, and is a past President ofthe National
Association of Bankruptcy Trustees. He has been a Chapter 7 Panel Trustee since 1986. He is a frequent presenter at CLE
programs on bankruptcy law, including the Bankruptcy Case Update for the Consumer Bankruptcy Seminar ofUKICLE.

JERRY TRUITT is the Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the E.D. of Ky. He received both his B.S. and his J.D. degrees
from the University of Kentucky. He is a Fellow in the American College of Bankruptcy and is a Past President of both the
Kentucky Bar and Fayette County Bar Associations. Prior to taking on the position of Clerk for the Bankruptcy Court, he was
engaged in private practice for 25 years in Lexington, Kentucky. He is a frequent speaker at CLE programs on CMlECF and
other bankruptcy practice topics.
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SECTION A(a)

Selected Interim Rules and Forms
Post-Bankruptcy Reform
Christopher W. Frost
Frost, Brown, Todd Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
College of Law
On August 5, 2005, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules published
Interim Rules and Forms to implement the provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Legislation. The rules and forms are proposed for adoption by District Courts under
general or standing orders until final rules and forms can be promulgated under the Rules
Enabling Act. The committee expects that final rules and forms will be available for
comment by August of 2006.
Of course, the 2005 Act made substantial changes to the Code, necessitating
numerous technical changes to the Rules. A redlined version of the full text of the
Interim Rules and a complete set of the forms are available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/interim.html.This material will highlight some of the
more substantive rule changes.
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SECTION A(a)

INTERIM RULES
Rule 1006 -- ChaDf!eS to Implement Filing Fee Waivers. Rule 1006 has been
amended to accommodate the refonn provisions that pennit filing fee waivers. One
consequence of the change is that the provisions now pennit the court to allow
installment payments when the debtor has paid an attorney in connection with the case.
Rule 1006. Filing Fee
(a) GENERAL REQUIREMENT. Every petition shall be accompanied
by the filing fee except as provided in subdivision~ (b) and (c) of this rule. For
the purpose of this rule, "filing fee" means the filing fee prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1930(a)(1)-(a)(5) and any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States under 28 U.S.C. § I930(b) that is payable to the clerk upon the
commencement of a case under the Code.
(b) PAYMENT OF FILING FEE IN INSTALLMENTS.
(1) Application for Pef'fflis-sie1'l to Pay Filing Fee in Installments.
A voluntary petition by an individual shall be accepted for filing if accompanied
by the debtor's signed application, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate
Official Fonn, stating that the debtor is unable to pay the filing fee except in
installments. The applieation shall state the proposea terms ofthe installment
payments ana that the applieaBt has neither paia any money nor transferrea any
property to an attorney fur serv1ees in eonneetion with the ease.

*****

(3) Postponement of Attorney's Fees.
The filing fee All
installments of the filing fee must be paid in full before the debtor or chapter 13
trustee may make further payments pay an to an attorney or any other person who
renders services to the debtor in connection with the case.

w WAIVER OF FILING FEE.

A voluntary chapter 7 petition filed by
an individual shall be accepted for filing if accompanied by the debtor's
application requesting a waiver under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(5, prepared as prescribed
by the appropriate Official Fonn.

A(a) . 1

Rule 1007 - Changes to Debtor's Duties. Rule 1007 was expanded to add
additional debtor's duties under the Reform Act. The changes include the additional
filing responsibilities of debtors under the Act.
Rule l007(b) SCHEDULES~AND STATEMENTS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS REQUIRED.
(b)(I) Except in a chapter 9 municipality case, the debtor, unless the court orders
otherwise, shall file the following schedules, statements, and other documents,
prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms, if any:

®

schedules of assets and liabilities, ;

tID. a schedule of current income and expenditures,;
(Q a schedule of executory contracts and unexpired leases,--aad-;
@ a statement of financial affairs, prepared as presoribed by the
appropriate Offioial fOffilS ;
tID copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment, if
any, with all but the last four digits ofthe debtor's social security
number redacted, received by the debtor from an employer within
60 days before the filing of the petition; and
® a record of any interest that the debtor has in an account or
program of the type specified in § 521(c) ofthe Code.

(2) An individual debtor in a chapter 7 case shall file a statement of
intention as required by § 521(a) 521(2) of the Code, prepared as
prescribed by the appropriate Official Form. A copy of the statement of
intention shall be served on the trustee and the creditors named in the
statement on or before the filing of the statement.

ill

Unless the United States trustee has determined that the credit
counseling requirement of § 109 does not apply in the district, an
individual debtor must file the certificate and debt repayment plan, if any,
required by § 52I(b), a certification under § 109(h)(3), or a request for a
determination by the court under § I09(h)(4).

ill

Unless § 707(b)(2)(D) applies, an individual debtor in a chapter 7 case
with primarily consumer debts shall file a statement of current monthly
income prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form, and, if
the debtor has current monthly income greater than the applicable median
family income for the applicable state and household size, the calculations
in accordance with § 707(b), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate
Official Form.

ill

An individual debtor in a chapter II case shall file a statement of
current monthly income, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official
Form.

A(s) - 2

@ A debtor in a chapter 13 case shall file a statement of current monthly
income, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form, and, if
the debtor has current monthly income greater than the median family
income for the applicable state and family size, a calculation of disposable
income in accordance with § 1325(b)(3), prepared as prescribed by the
appropriate Official Form.

ill An individual debtor in a chapter 7 or chapter 13 case shall file a
statement regarding completion of a course in personal financial
management, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Form.
(c) TIME LIMITS.* In a voluntary case, the schedules.. ana statements, and other
documents required by subdivision (b)(n, (4), (5), and (6), other than the
statement ofifltefltiofl, shall be filed with the petition,er within 15 days thereafter,
except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (d), (e), (t), and (h) of this rule. In
an involuntary case, the list in subdivision (a)(2), and the schedules....-a:HEl
statements, and other documents required by subdivision (b)(l) other than the
statemeflt of ifltefltiofl, shall be filed by the debtor within 15 days of the entry of
the order for relief. The documents required by subdivision (b)(3) shall be filed
with the petition in a voluntary case. The statement required by subdivision (b)(7)
shall be filed by the debtor within 45 days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors under § 341 of the Code in a chapter 7 case, and no later than the last
payment made by the debtor as required by the plan or the filing of a motion for
entry of a discharge under § 1328(b) in a chapter 13 case. Lists, schedules, ana
statements, and other documents filed prior to the conversion of a case to another
chapter shall be deemed filed in the converted case unless the court directs
otherwise. Except as provided in § 1116(3) of the Code, any Afty extension of
time for the filing of the schedules.. ana statements, and other documents maybe
granted only on motion for cause shown and on notice to the United States trustee
and to any committee elected under § 705 or appointed under § 1102 of the Code,
trustee, examiner, or other party as the court may direct. Notice of an extension
shall be given to the United States trustee and to any committee, trustee, or other
party as the court may direct.

*Includes amendments that take effect on December 1, 2005.
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Rule 1017 - Standards and Time Limits on Motions to Dismiss for
Abuse. Rule 1017 has been amended to add time limits for motions to dismiss a case
for abuse under Section 707(b). Except for motions under Section 704(b)(2), such
motion must be brought within 60 days after the first meeting of creditors. The
amendments also require that motions to dismiss under 707(b)(1) and (3) (non-means test
motions) must state the circumstances constituting abuse with particularity.

Rule 1017. Dismissal or Conversion of Case; Suspension
(e) DISMISSAL OF AN INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 7 CASE OR
CONVERSION TO A CASE UNDER CHAPTER 11 or 13 FOR
SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE. The court may dismiss or, with the debtor's consent,
convert an individual debtor's case for substantial abuse under § 707(b) only on
motion by the United States trustee or on the oourt's own motion and after a
hearing on notice to the debtor, the trustee, the United States trustee, and any
other entities as the court directs.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in § 704(b)(2), a A-motion to dismiss a
case for substantial abuse under § 707(b) or (c) may be filed by the United
States trustee only within 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors under § 341(a), unless, on request filed by the United States
trustee before the time has expired, the court for cause extends the time for
filing the motion to dismiss. The URited States trustee party filing the
motion shall set forth in the motion all matters to be considered submitted
to the oourt for its oonsideration at the hearing. A motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b)(l) and (3) shall state with particularity the circumstances alleged
to constitute abuse.
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Rule 1019 - Time Periods for Filing Motions and Complaints. This
amendment provides 60 days from conversion to a Chapter 7 for the parties to file a
motion under 707(b) or (c).
Rule 1019. Conversion of Chapter 11 Reorganization Case, Chapter 12 Family
Farmer's Debt Adjustment Case, or Chapter 13 Individual's Debt Adjustment Case
to a Chapter 7 Liquidation Case
(2) NEW FILING PERIODS. A new time period for filing claims, a motion
under § 707(b) or (c), a claim, a complaint objecting to discharge, or a complaint
to obtain a determination of dischargeability of any debt shall commence under
parsuant to Rules 1017, 3002, 4004, or 4007, provided that a new time period
shall not commence if a chapter 7 case had been converted to a chapter 11, 12, or
13 case and thereafter reconverted to a chapter 7 case and the time for filing
claims, a motion under § 707(b) or (c), a claim, a complaint objecting to
discharge, or a complaint to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any
debt, or any extension thereof, expired in the original chapter 7 case.
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Rule 4002 - Additional Debtor's Obligations. Rule 4002 has been amended to
confonn to the provisions of the Act that require debtors to provide additional documents
and infonnation.
Rule 4002. Duties of Debtor
(b) INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S DUTY TO PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION.

(1) Personal Identification. Every individual debtor shall bring to the meeting of
creditors under § 341:
(A) a picture identification issued by a governmental unit, or other
personal identifying infonnation that establishes the debtor's identity; and
(B) evidence of social security number(s), or a written statement that such
documentation does not exist.

(2) Financial Information. Every individual debtor shall bring to the meeting of
creditors under § 341 and make available to the trustee the following documents
or copies of them, or provide a written statement that the documentation does not
exist or is not in the debtor's possession:
(A) evidence of current income such as the most recent payment advice;
(B) unless the trustee or the United States trustee instructs otherwise,
statements for each of the debtor's depository and investment accounts,
including checking, savings, and money market accounts, mutual funds
and brokerage accounts for the time period that includes the date of the
filing of the petition; and
(C) documentation of monthly expenses claimed by the debtor when
required by § 707(b)(2)(A) or (B).

(3) Tax Return. At least 7 days before the first date set for the meeting of
creditors under § 341, the debtor shall provide to the trustee a copy of the debtor's
Federal income tax return for the most recent tax year ending immediately before
the commencement of the case and for which a return was filed, including any
attachments, or a transcript of the tax return, or provide a written statement that
the documentation does not exist.

Tax Returns Provided to Creditors. Ifa creditor, at least 15 days before the
first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341, requests a copy of the
debtor's tax return that is to be provided to the trustee under subdivision (b)(3),
the debtor shall provide to the requesting creditor a copy of the return, including
any attachments, or a transcript of the tax return, or provide a written statement
(4)
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that the documentation does not exist at least 7 days before the first date set for
the meeting of creditors under § 341.
(5) The debtor's obligation to provide tax returns under Rule 4002(b)(3) and
(b)(4) is subject to procedures for safeguarding the confidentiality of tax
information established by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.
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Rule 4007 - Time Limits on Filing Exceptions to Discharge. The
elimination of most of the "super discharge" under Section 1328(a) gave rise to a need to
establish time limits for filing of exceptions to discharge in Chapter 13 cases. Rule 4007
has been amended to require 523{c) exceptions to discharge be filed in Chapter 13 cases
within 60 days after the first meeting of creditors. This conforms discharge litigation
under Chapter 13 to the time limits imposed under Chapter 7. The hardship discharge
under Section 1328(b) requires a separate timing mechanism for the Section 523(a)(6)
exception to discharge.
Rule 4007. Determination of Dischargeability of a Debt

*****

(c) TIME FOR FILING COMPLAINT UNDER § 523(c) IN A CHAPTER 7
LIQUIDATION, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION, QR: CHAPTER 12
FAMILY FARMER'S DEBT ADJUSTMENT CASE, OR CHAPTER 13
INDIVIDUAL'S DEBT ADJUSTMENT CASE; NOTICE OF TIME FIXED.
Except as provided in subdivision (d), aA complaint to determine the
dischargeability of a debt under § 523{c) shall be filed no later than 60 days after
the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341(a). The court shall give
all creditors no less than 30 days' notice of the time so fixed in the manner
provided in Rule 2002. On motion of a party in interest, after hearing on notice,
the court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion
shall be filed before the time has expired.
(d) TIME FOR FILING COMPLAINT UNDER § 523(6) 523(a)(6) IN
CHAPTER 13 INDIVIDUAL'S DEBT ADJUSTMENT CASE; NOTICE OF
TIME FIXED. On motion by a debtor for a discharge under § 1328(b), the court
shall enter an order fixing the time to file a complaint to determine the
dischargeability of any debt under § 523(6) 523(a)(6) and shall give no less than
30 days' notice of the time fixed to all creditors in the manner provided in Rule
2002. On motion of any party in interest after hearing on notice the court may for
cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion shall be filed
before the time has expired.
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Rule 4008 - Information Requirements for Reaffirmation Agreements.
Section 524 has been substantially revised to control reaffirmation agreements. Among
the many new requirements is a requirement that the debtor sign a statement that the
reaffirmation will not be an undue hardship. If the debtor's monthly expenses plus
payments on post-bankruptcy debts plus other reaffirmation payments exceed the
debtor's monthly income, the debtor must explain how he or she can afford to make the
payments on the reaffirmed debt. Rule 4008 requires the debtor to explain any
discrepancy between the 524 statement and Schedules I and J.
Rule 4008. Discharge and Reaffirmation Hearing
Not more than 30 days following the entry of an order granting or denying a
discharge, or confirming a plan in a chapter 11 reorganization case concerning an
individual debtor and on not less than 10 days notice to the debtor and the trustee,
the court may hold a hearing as provided in § 524(d) of the Code. A motion by
the debtor for approval of a reaffirmation agreement shall be filed before or at the
hearing. The debtor's statement required under § 524(k) shall be accompanied by
a statement of the total income and total expense amounts stated on schedules I
and 1. If there is a difference between the income and expense amounts stated on
schedules I and J and the statement required under § 524(k), the accompanying
statement shall include an explanation of any difference.
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Rule 1020 - Small Business Debtor. Rule 1020 sets out a mechanism to inform
parties whether the debtor is a "small business debtor" under 101(51D) and procedures
under which disputes over whether a debtor meets the definition can be resolved.
Rule 1020. EleetiaB ta be CaBsideFed It Small BasiBess iB It ChltpteF 11
ReaFgltBtzlttiaB Cltse Small Business Chapter 11 Reorganization Case
In a ehBflter 11 reorganization ease, a deMor diat is a small h'Usiness may e1eet to
he eonsidered a small lmsiness hy filing a 'NAllen statement of e1eetion not later dian 60
days after die date of die order for relief.

Ca) SMALL BUSINESS DEBTOR DESIGNATION. In a voluntary chapter 11
case, the debtor shall state in the petition whether the debtor is a small business debtor. In
an involuntary chapter 11 case, the debtor shall file within 15 days after entry of the order
for relief a statement as to whether the debtor is a small business debtor. Except as
provided in subdivision ec}, the status ofthe case with respect to whether it is a small
business case shall be in accordance with the debtor's statement under this subdivision,
unless and until the court enters an order finding that the debtor's statement is incorrect.
eb) OBJECTING TO DESIGNATION. Except as provided in subdivision (c), the
United States trustee or a party in interest may file an objection to the debtor's statement
under subdivision (a) not later than 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of
creditors held under § 341(a) of the Code, or within 30 days after any amendment to the
statement, whichever is later.
ec) APPOINTMENT OF COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS. lithe
United States trustee has appointed a committee ofunsecured creditors under
§ l102(a)(1}, the case shall proceed as a small business case only if, and from the time
when, the court enters an order determining that the committee has not been sufficiently
active and representative to provide effective oversight of the debtor and that the debtor
satisfies all the other requirements for being a small business. A request for a
determination under this subdivision may be filed by the United States trustee or a party
in interest only within a reasonable time after the failure of the committee to be
sufficiently active and representative. The debtor may file a request for a determination
at any time as to whether the committee has been sufficiently active and representative.
(d) PROCEDURE FOR OBJECTION OR DETERMINATION. Any objection or
request for a determination under this rule shall be governed by Rule 9014 and served on
the debtor, the debtor's attorney, the United States trustee, the trustee, any committee
appointed under § 1102 or its authorized agent, or, ifno committee of unsecured creditors
has been appointed under § 1102, on the creditors included on the list filed under Rule
1007(d), and on such other entities as the court may direct.
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Rule 1021 Health Care Business. Rule 1021 provides for the designation in the
petition that the debtor is a "health care business" under Section 101(27A) and provides a
procedure for resolving disputes over the designation.
Rule 1021. Health Care Business Case
(a) HEALTH CARE BUSINESS DESIGNATION. Unless the court orders
otherwise, if a petition in a case under chapter 7, chapter 9, or chapter 11 states that the
debtor is a health care business, the case shall proceed as a case in which the debtor is a
health care business.
(b) MOTION. The United States trustee or a party in interest may file a motion
for a determination as to whether the debtor is a health care business. The motion shall
be transmitted to the United States trustee and served on the debtor, the trustee, any
committee elected under § 705 or appointed under § 1102 of the Code or its authorized
agent, or, if the case is a chapter 9 municipality case or a chapter 11 reorganization case
and no committee of unsecured creditors has been appointed under § 1102, on the
creditors included on the list filed under Rule 1007(d), and such other entities as the court
may direct. The motion shall be governed by Rule 9014.
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Rule 8001 and 8003 - Direct Appeal. Amendments to Rules 8001 and 8003
implement the direct appeal provisions added by the Reform Act.
Rule 8001. Manner of Taking Appeal; Voluntary Dismissal; Certification to Court
of Appeals

*****

(0 CERTIFICATION FOR DIRECT APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEALS
(1) Timely Appeal Required. A certification of a judgment, order, or decree of a
bankruptcy court to a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § l58(d)(2) shall not be

treated as a certification entered on the docket within the meaning of
§ 1233(b)(4)(A) of Public Law No. 109-8 until a timely appeal has been taken in
the manner required by subdivisions (a) or (b) of this rule and the notice of appeal
has become effective under Rule 8002.

(2) Court Where Made. A certification that a circumstance specified in 28 U.S.C.
§ l58(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) exists shall be filed in the court in which a matter is
pending for purposes of28 U.S.C. § l58(d)(2) and this rule. A matter is pending
in a bankruptcy court until the docketing of the appeal of a final judgment, order,
or decree in accordance with Rule 8007(b) or the grant of leave to appeal an
interlocutory iudgment, order, or decree under 28 U.S.C. § l58(a). A matter is
pending in a district court or bankruptcy appellate panel after an appeal of an
interlocutory judgment, order, or decree has been docketed in accordance with
Rule 8007(b) or leave to appeal has been granted under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
(A) Certification by Court on Request or Court's Own Initiative.
(i) BefOre Docketing or Grant of Leave to Appeal.

Only a
bankruptcy court may make a certification on request or on its own
initiative while the matter is pending in the bankruptcy court.
(m After Docketing or Grant ofLeave to Appeal. Only the district
court or bankruptcy appellate panel involved may make a
certification on request of the parties or on its own initiative while
the matter is pending in the district court or bankruptcy appellate
panel.
(B) Certification by All Appellants and Appellees Acting Jointly. A
certification by all the appellants and appellees, if any, acting jointly may
be made by filing the appropriate Official Form with the clerk of the court
in which the matter is pending. The certification may be accompanied by
a short statement of the basis for the certification, which may include the
information listed in subdivision (0(3)(C) of this rule.
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(3) Request for Certification: Filing: Service: Contents.

(A) A request for certification shall be filed, within the time specified by
28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), with the clerk of the court in which the matter is
pending.
(B) Notice of the filing of a request for certification shall be served in the
manner required for service of a notice of appeal under Rule 8004.
(C) A request for certification shall include the following:
(0 the facts necessary to understand the question presented;

(ii) the question itself;
(iii) the relief sought;
(iv) the reasons why the appeal should be allowed and is
authorized by statute or rule, including why a circumstance
specified in 28 U.S.c. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) exists; and
(v) an attached copy of the judgment, order, or decree complained
of and any related opinion or memorandum.
(D) A party may file a response to a request for certification or a crossrequest within 10 days after the notice of the request is served, or another
time fixed by the court.
(E) The request, cross request, and any response shall not be governed by
Rule 9014 and shall be submitted without oral argument unless the court
otherwise directs.
(F) A certification of an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) shall be made
in a separate document served on the parties.
(4) Certification on Court's Own Initiative.

(A) A certification of an appeal on the court's own initiative under 28
U.S.c. § 158(d)(2) shall be made in a separate document served on the
parties in the manner required for service of a notice of appeal under Rule
8004.
The certification shall be accompanied by an opinion or
memorandum that contains the information required by subdivision
(O(3)(C)(i)-(iv) of this rule.
(B) A party may file a supplementary short statement of the basis for
certification within 10 days after the certification.
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Rule 8003. Leave to Appeal

*****
(d) If leave to appeal is required by 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and has not earlier been
granted, the authorization of a direct appeal by a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. §
I58(d)(2) shall be deemed to satisfy the requirement for leave to appeal.
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Selected Forms
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Form B3B
(10/05)

In re:

-=-.,...---:-:--

Case No.

_

_
(if known)

Debtor(s)

APPLICATION FOR WAIVER OF THE CHAPTER 7 FILING FEE
FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO CANNOT PAY THE FILING FEE IN FULL OR IN INSTALLMENTS

Part A. Family Size and Income
I.

Including yourself, your spouse, and dependents you have listed or will list on Schedule I (Current
Income ofIndividual Debtors(s)), how many people are in your family? (Do not include your spouse if
you are separated AND are not filing a joint petition.)
_

2.

Restate the following information that you provided, or will provide, on Line 16 of Schedule I. Attach a
completed copy of Schedule I, ifit is available.
Total Combined Monthly Income (Line 16 of Schedule I);

3.

$,----

State the monthly net income, if any, of dependents included in Question I above. Do not include any
income already reported in Item 2. Ifnone, enter $0.

$---4.

Add the "Total Combined Monthly Income" reported in Question 2 to your dependents' monthly net
income from Question 3.
$,---

5.

Do you expect the amount in Question 4 to increase or decrease by more than 10% during the next 6
months? Yes
No
If yes, explain.

Part B: Monthly Expenses
6.

EITHER (a) attach a completed copy of Schedule J (Schedule of Monthly Expenses), and state your
total monthly expenses reported on Line 18 of that Schedule, OR (b) if you have not yet completed
Schedule J, provide an estimate of your total monthly expenses.
$----

7.

Do you expect the amount in Question 6 to increase or decrease by more than 10% during the next 6
months? Yes
No
If yes, explain.

Part C. Real and Personal Property
EITHER (I) attach completed copies of Schedules A (Real Property) and Schedule B (Personal Property),
OR (2) if you have not yet completed those schedules, answer the following questions.
8.

State the amount of cash you have on hand:

9.

State below any money you have in savings, checking, or other accounts in a bank or other financial
institution.
Bank or Other Financial Institution:

Type of Account such as savings,
checking, CD:

$----

Amount:
$----

$----
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Form B3B Cont.
(10/05)

10. State below the assets owned by you. Do not list ordinary household furnishings and clothing.
Address:

Value: $

Home

_

Amount owed on mortgages and liens: $
Address:

Value: $

Other real estate

_

Amount owed on mortgages and liens: $
Motor vehicle

ModelNear:

_

Value: $

ModelNear:

_

Value: $

_
_

Amount owed: $
Other

Description,

_

Value: $
Amount owed: $

_

_

Amount owed: $
Motor vehicle

_

_
_
_

II. State below any person, business, organization, or governmental unit that owes you money and the
amount that is owed.
Name of Person, Business, or Organization that Owes You
Money

Amount Owed

$---$--~

Part D. Additional Information.
12. Have you paid an attorney any money for services in connection with this case, including the
completion of this form, the bankruptcy petition, or schedules? Yes _ No_
If yes, how much have you paid? $
_
13. Have you promised to payor do you anticipate paying an attorney in connection with your bankruptcy
case? Yes
No
If yes, how much have you promised to payor do you anticipate paying? $
_
14. Have you paid anyone other than an attorney (such as a bankruptcy petition preparer, paralegal,
typing service, or another person) any money for services in connection with this case, including the
completion of this form, the bankruptcy petition, or schedules? Yes _ No_
If yes, how much have you paid? $
_
15. Have you promised to payor do you anticipate paying anyone other than an attorney (such as a
bankruptcy petition preparer, paralegal, typing service, or another person) any money for services in
connection with this case, including the completion ofthis form, the bankruptcy petition, or schedules?
Yes
No
If yes, how much have you promised to payor do you anticipate paying? $
_
16. Has anyone paid an attorney or other person or service in connection with this case, on your behalf?
Yes
No
If yes, explain.
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Fonn B3B Cont.
(10/05)

17. Have you previously filed for bankruptcy relief during the past eight years? Yes _
Case Number (if known) Year filed

Location of filing

No _

Did you obtain a discharge? (ifknown)
Yes

No

Don't know

Yes

No

Don't know

18. Please provide any other infonnation that helps to explain why you are unable to pay the filing fee in
installments.

19. I (we) declare under penalty of perjury that I (we) cannot currently afford to pay the filing fee in full or
in installments and that the foregoing infonnation is true and correct.
Executed on:
Date

Signature of Debtor

Date

Signature of Co-debtor

--_._-_...._..._-..-_.,------ ,---,
DECLARATION AND SIGNATURE OF BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER (See II U.S.C. § 110)

I declare under penalty of perjury that: (I) I am a bankruptcy petition prcparer as defined in II U.S.C. § 110; (2) I prepared
this document for compensation and have provided the de1tor with a copy of this document and the notia:s and infonnation
required under 11 U.S.C. §§ 110(b), I IO(h), and 342(b); and (3) if rules or guidelines hare been promulgated pursuant to II
U.S.C. § I 10(h) setting a maximum fee for services chargeable by bankruptcy petition preparers, I have given the deltor
notice of the maximum amount before preparing any document for tiling for a debtor or accepting any fee from the debtor, as
required under thlt section.
Printed or Typed Name and Title, if any, of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer

Social Security No. (Required bY
II U.S.C. §1I0.)

If the bankruptcy petition preparer is not an individual, state the name, title (if any), address, and social security number of
the officer. principal. responsible person, or partner who signs the document.

Address
x.,--_ _-=_.,--_.....",........,-:----,-

_

Signature of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer

Date

Names and Social Security numbers of all other individuals who prepared or assisted in preparing this document, unless the
bankruptcy petition preparer is not an individual:

If more than one person prepared this document.

attach additional signed sheets conforming to the appropriate
Official Formfor each person.
A bankruptcy petition preparer 's failure to comply with the provisions oftitle I I and the Federal Rules ofBankruptcy
Procedure may result in fines or imprisonment or both. II U.S.c. § 110; 18 U.S.C. § 156.
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Form B3B
(10/05)

United State Bankruptcy Court
_ _ _ _ District of
_

In re:

=-,.--....,..,.

_

CaseNo.

_

Debtor(s)

ORDER ON DEBTOR'S APPLICATION FOR WAIVER OF THE CHAPTER 7 FILING FEE
Upon consideration of the debtor's "Application for Waiver of the Chapter 7 Filing Fee," the court orders
that the application be:
] GRANTED.
This order is subject to being vacated at a later time if developments in the administration of the
bankruptcy case demonstrate that the waiver was unwarranted.
] DENIED.
The debtor shall pay the chapter 7 filing fee according to the following terms:
$

on or before

_

$

on or before

_

$

on or before

_

$

on or before

_

Until the filing fee is paid in full, the debtor shall not make any additional payment or transfer any
additional property to an attorney or any other person for services in connection with this case.
IF THE DEBTOR FAILS TO TIMELY PAY THE FILING FEE IN FULL OR TO TIMELY MAKE
INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS, THE COURT MAY DISMISS THE DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 7
CASE.
SCHEDULED FOR HEARING.
A hearing to consider the debtor's "Application for Waiver of the Chapter 7 Filing Fee" shall be held
_
on
at
am/pm at ~,.--_::--_,.------:
(address of courthouse)
IF THE DEBTOR FAILS TO APPEAR AT THE SCHEDULED HEARING, THE COURT MAY
DEEM SUCH FAILURE TO BE THE DEBTOR'S CONSENT TO THE ENTRY OF AN ORDER
DENYING THE FEE WAIVER APPLICATION BY DEFAULT.
BY THE COURT:
DATE:

_
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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Form B22A (Chapter 7) (10/051
Check the box as directed in Parts I, III, and VI of this statement.
In re

-::-:-:-.,....,-

o Presumption arises
o Presumption does not arise

_

Debtor(s)

Case Number:

_=-:_-:(If known)

_

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND MEANS TEST CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 7

In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 7 debtor, whether or not filing
jointly, whose debts are primarily consumer debts. Joint debtors may complete one statement only.

Part I. EXCLUSION FOR DISABLED VETERANS
If you are a disabled veteran described in the Veteran's Declaration In this Part I, (1) check the box at the beginning of the
Veteran's Declaration, (2) check the "Presumption does not arise" box at the top of this statement, and (3) complete the
verification in Part VIII. Do not complete any of the remaining parts of this statement.
1

o

Veteran's Declaration. By checking this box, I declare under penalty of perjury that I am a disabled veteran (as
defined in 38 U.S.C. § 3741(1» whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a period in which r was on active duty (as
defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1» or while I was performing a homeland defense activity (as defined in 32 U.S.C. §901(1».

Part II. CALCULATION OF MONTHLY INCOME FOR § 707(b)(7) EXCLUSION

2

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 3-11.
b. 0 Married, not filing jointly, with declaration of separate households. By checking this box, debtor declares under
penalty of perjury: "My spouse and I are legally separated under applicable non-bankruptcy law or my spouse and I are
living apart other than for the purpose of evading the requirements of § 707(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code."
Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 3-11.
c. 0 Married, not filing jointly, without the declaration of separate households set out in Line 2.b above. Complete both
Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B (Spouse's Income) for Lines 3-11.
d. 0 Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B ("Spouse's Income") for
Lines 3-11.
Column A
Debtor's
Income

All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received
different amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received
during the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
3

Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

Column B
Spouse's
Income

$

$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
Include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part
V.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Line a

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the
difference on Line 5. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not Include any part of the
operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part V.
5

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract line b from line a

$

$

6

Interest, dividends, and royalties.

$

$

7

Pension and retirement Income.

$

$

8

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents, InclUding child or spousal support. Do not Include contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B is completed.

$

$

A(a) - 21

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column
a. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
9

spouse was a benefit under the Social security Act, do not list the amount of such
compensation in Column A or a, but instead state the amount In the space below:

:I

Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

I

I

Debtor $

Spouse $

I

$

$

$

$

total(s).

$

$

Total Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). If Column a has been completed,
add Line 11, Column A to Line 11, Column a, and enter the total. If Column a has not been
completed, enter the amount from Line 11, Column A.

$

Income from all other sources. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page.
Do not include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as
a victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.
10

I~:

I:

I

Total and enter on Line 10

11

12

I

Subtotal of Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). Add Lines 3 thru 10 in
Column A, and, If Column a is completed, add Lines 3 through 10 in Column a. Enter the

Part III. APPUCATION OF § 707(b)(7) EXCLUSION
13

Annualized Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). Multiply the amount from Line 12 by
$

the number 12 and enter the result.

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for the applicable state and
14

househOld size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.gov!ustl or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:

b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of Section 707(b)(7). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
15

o The
amount on Line 13 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 14. Check the "Presumption does
not arise" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete Part VIII; do not complete Parts IV, V, VI, or VII.
o The amount on Line 13 is more than the amount on Line 14. Complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts IV, V, VI, and VII of this statement only if required. (See Line 15.)

Part IV. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME FOR § 707(b)(2)
16

Enter the amount from Line 12.

$

Marital adjustment. If you checked the box at Line 2.c, enter the amount of the income listed in Line
17
18

11, Column a that was NOT regularly contributed to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents. If you did not check box at Line 2.c, enter zero.

$

Current monthly income for § 707(b)(2). Subtract Line 17 from Line 16 and enter the result.

$

Part V. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
SUbpart A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
19

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and
miscellaneous. Enter "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the
applicable family size and income level. (This information is available at www.usdQirgoy!ust! or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

A(a) - 22

$

20

~ee.1 St..................i...... 11 tltilltle•• EAteF the affial:lAt at l:I=le IRS Hal:lsiAg aAs Utilities
5taAsaFEls allawaAee feF '(el:lF eal:lAl!y aAs faffill'( sii'!e (this iAfeFmatieA is available at www,l:Isde1.aey/l:lsV
eF fFeffi the eleFiE af ttle baAIEFl:Iptey eel:lFt), aEljl:lSft!E1 to sesl:IEt aAy partieR at the allawaAee that IAell:lEles
(Under revision)
pa'1'ffieRts eA seats seel:lreEi 9y '(el:lF heffie, IisteEi iA LiAe 41.

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
21

22

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating
expenses are included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 8. 0 0 0 1 0 2 or more,
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles In the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www,usdoj.gov/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)
Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease
expense for more than two vehicles.) 0 1 02 or more.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car
(available at www.usdoi.goy/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated In Line 41; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 22. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated In Line 41

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

23

$

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the "2 or more" Box in Line 23.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second car
(available at www,usdoj.goy/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in Line 41; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 23. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payments for debts secured by Vehicle 2, if
any, as stated In Line 41

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

$

24

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state, and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self
employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not Include real estate or sales
taxes.

25

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not Include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life insurance for yourself. Do not Include premiums for Insurance on your
dependents, for whole life, or for any other form of Insurance.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not
include payments on past due support obligations Induded In Line 43.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that Is a
condition of employment and for education that is reqUired for a physically or mentally challenged
dependent child for whom no public education providing similar services is available.

$

29

Other Necessary Expenses: chlldcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on chlldcare. Do not Include payments made for children's education.

$

30

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not Include payments for health Insurance listed in Line 33.

$

26

27

28

A(a) - 23

31

32

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly
expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller identification, special long
distance, or Internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not
Include any amount previously deducted.

$

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 19 through 31

$

Subpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b)
Note: Do not Include any expenses that you have listed In Lines 19-31
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. List the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend In each of the following categories and enter the total.
33

a.

Health Insurance

$

b.

Disability Insurance

$

c.

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Lines a, band c

34

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your Immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses.

$

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually
35

incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
36

Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS
Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation

demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.

37

Education expenses for dependent children less than 18. Enter the average monthly
expenses that you actually Incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing elementary and secondary
education for your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee
with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary and
not already accounted for In the IRS Standards.

38

$

$

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by Which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel In the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.

$

39

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute In the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined In 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

40

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Lines 33 through 39

$

Subpart C: Deductions for Debt Payment
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that Is secured by an interest In
property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the
Average Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to
each secured Creditor In the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If
necessary, list additional entries on a separate page. Do not Include Items you have previously

deducted, such as Insurance and taxes.
41
Name of Creditor

Prooertv securing the Debt

a.
b.
c.

60-month Average Payment
$
$

$

Total: Add Lines a band c

A(a) - 24

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 41 are in default, and the
property securing the debt Is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may
include In your deductions 1/60th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amountj in order to maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the
following chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
42

Name of Creditor

Prooertv 5ecurlna the Debt in Default

1/6Oth of the Cure Amount

a.
b.

c.
Total: Add Lines a band c
43

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. If you are eligible to file a case under Chapter 13, complete
the following chart, multiply the amount in Line a by the amount in Line b, and enter the resulting
administrative expense.
Proiected averaoe monthIv Chaoter 13 olan payment.
Current multiplier for your district as determined under
schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States
Trustees. (This information is available at www.usdoj.goy/ustl
or from the clerk of the bankruotcv court.)
Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case

a.
b.

44

c.

S

x
Total: MUltiolv Lines a and b

45

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 41 through 44.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allowed under § 707(b)(2)
46

I

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 32,40, and 45.

$

Part VI. DETERMINAnON OF § 707(b)(2) PRESUMPTION
47

Enter the amount from Line 18 (Current monthly income for § 707(b)(2»

$

48

Enter the amount from Line 46 (Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2»

$

49

Monthly disposable income under § 707(b)(2). Subtract Line 48 from Line 47 and enter the
$

result
50

60-month disposable income under § 707(b)(2). Multiply the amount in Line 49 by the
$

number 60 and enter the result.

Initial presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

51

o The
amount on Line 50 is less than $6,000 Check the "Presumption does not arise" box at the top of page 1 of
this statement, and complete the verification in Part VII. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.
o The
amount set forth on Line 50 Is more than $10,000. Check the "Presumption arises" box at the top of
page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VII. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.
o The
amount on Line 50 is at least $6,000, but not more than $10,000. Complete the remainder of Part
VI (Lines 52 through 54).

52

Enter the amount of your total non-priority unsecured debt

53

Threshold debt payment amount. Multiply the amount in Line 52 by the number 0.25 and enter
the result.

$
$

Secondary presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
54

o The
amount on Line 50 is less than the amount on Line 53. Check the "Presumption does not arise" box at
the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII.
o The amount on Line 50 is equal to or greater than the amount on Line 53. Check the "Presumption
arises" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII. You may also complete
Part VII.

A(a) - 25

Part VII: ADDInONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. List and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707{b){2){A){II)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should
reflect your average monthly expense for each item. Total the expenses.

55

Expense Descriotion

Monthly Amount

a.
b.
c.

$
$
$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VIII: VERIFICAnON
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

56

Date:

Signature:
(Debtor)

Date:

Signature:
(Joint Debtor If anv\

A(a) - 26

Form 822C (Chapter 13) (10/051
In re

..,.--:-:

Check the box as directed In Part II, Line 14 of this statement.

o Disposable income determined under § 132S{b)(3)
o Disposable income not determined under § 132S{b){3)

_

Debtor(s)

case Number:

--=c---,-------(If known)
STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13

In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every IndiVidual Chapter 13 debtor, whether or not filing
·ointlv. Joint debtors may comolete one statement OnlY.
I

Part I. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME

1

2

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.
b. 0 MaFFie8, Ret f.iIlRg jeIRtl';. 6ellll'le. e..I'; 6ellllll" A ("Seitter!. 1. . .IIIe") fer LI. . . 2 18. (Under Revision)
c. 0 Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column 8 ("Spouse's Income") for
Lines 2-10.
ColumnA
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
Column B
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received dlfDebtor's
Spouse's
ferent amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received durIncome
Income
Ing the six months, divide this total by Six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

$

$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the difference on Line 3. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part
III.

3

a.

Gross receipts

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

Rent and other real property Income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not include any part of the operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part III.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

$

5

Interest, dividends, and royalties.

$

$

6

Pension and retirement Income.

$

$

7

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B Is completed,

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

8

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column
B. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Securtty Act

9

10

I

Debtor $

I

Spouse $

Income from all other sources. Specify source and amount. If necessary, list additional
sources on a separate page. Total and enter on Line 9. Do not Include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as a victim of a war crime, crime
against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic terrorism.
a.

$

b.

$

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total(s).

A(a) - 27

11

Total current monthly income. If Column 5 has been completed, add Line 10, Column
A to Line 10, Column 5, and enter the total. If Column 5 has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.

$

Part II. APPLICATION OF § 1325(b)(3)
12

Annualized current monthly Income. MUltiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
enter the result.

$

Applicable median family Income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and house13

hold size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.goyLustl or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:
b. Enter debtor's househOld size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

o The amount on Line 12 Is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13.

Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete Part VI of
this statement; do not complete Parts III, IV, or V.

14

o The amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable Income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III, IV, and V of this statement only if required. (See Une 14.)

Part III. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
SUbpart A: Deductions under standards of the Intemal Revenue service (IRS)
15

16

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and mlscellaneous. Enter the "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and Income level. (This Information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk
of the bankruptcy court.)

$

..eeel Ste"de,d•• he...i". e"d ..tllltl••, EAteF the affiatlAt af the IRS HetlsiAg aAEl I::Itllitles StaA
ElaFEls allaw8F1ee fal' yal:ll' eel:lFlp" aAEl tamil'l slle (this iAfeFl'l'latlaA Is av-ailable at wW'It'.tlsElaj.aa'O'usl1 af
fFem the eleFIE af the baAIEFtlfltE'1 eetlFt), aEljtlsteEl ta EleEluet aA'1 flaFtiaA af the allewaAee that iAeluEles
pa.,'meAts aA Elebts seetiFElEl by '(etll' hame, IIsteEl iA L1Ae 3]. (Under revision)

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance In this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
17

18

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are Included as a contribution to your household expenses In Line 7.
Do 01 02 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www.ysdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: .transportatlon ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehiCles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
01 02 or more.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car (available at WWW.Ysd0j.gov/ysti or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated in Line 37; subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the result in Line 18. Do not enter an amount Ie.. than zero.
a,

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in Line 37

$

c,

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

A(s) - 28

$

$

19

20

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the "2 or more" Box In Line 18.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second car
(available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in Line 37; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 19. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 2,
as stated in Line 37

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Line a.

$

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not InclUde real estate or sales taxes.
$
Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly

21

22

23

24

25

payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not Include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: life Insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life insurance for yourself. Do not Include premiums for Insurance on your dependents, for whole life, or for any other form of Insurance.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not Include payments on past due support obligations Included In Line 39.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that Is a
condition of employment and for education that is reqUired for a physically or mentally challenged dependent child for whom no public education providing similar services is available.

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on chlldcare. Do not Include payments made for children's education.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
26

expend on health ci[lre expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.

Do not Include payments for health Insurance listed In Line 29.
27

28

$

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller identification, special long distance, or Internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not Include any amount previously deducted.

$

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 15 through 27

$

Subpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b)
Note: Do not Include any expenses that you have listed In Lines 15-27
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. List the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend In each of the follOWing categories and enter the total.
29

a.

Health Insurance

b.

Disability Insurance

c.

Health Savings Account

$
$
$
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
30

31

monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your Immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses. Do not Include payments listed In Line 24.

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

$

Home energy costs In excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
32

Enter the average monthly amount by whIch your home energy costs exceed the allowance In the IRS local Standards for Housing and UtilitIes. You must provide your case trustee with documentation

demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.

A(a) . 29

$

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually Incur, not to exceed $125 per child, In providing elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with docu-

33

mentation demonstrating that the amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted for In the IRS StIIndards.

$

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information Is available at www.usdo1.govlust/
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation

34

demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.

$

35

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial Instruments to a charitable organization as defined In 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

36

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Lines 29 through 35.

$

SubpartC: Deductions for Debt Payment
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by an Interest In property that you own, list the name of creditor, Identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor In the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not Include Items you have previously deducted, such as
Insurance and real estate taxes.
37
Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securlna the Debt

60-month Averaae Payment

a.
b.
c.
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed In Line 37 are in default, and the
property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/6Oth of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amount") in order to maintain possession of the property. list any such amounts in the followIng chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
38

Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securina the Debt in Default

1160th of the Cure Amount

a.
b.
c.
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c
39

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount In Line a by the amount in line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.

40

a.

Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

b.

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules Issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This information is available at www.usdoj.govlustl or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

c.

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Lines a and b

41

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of lines 37 through 40.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allowed under § 707(b)(2)
42

I

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 28, 36, and 41.
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$

Part IV. DETERMINATION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME UNDER § 1325(b)(2)
43

Total current monthly income. Enter the 2lmount from Line 11.

$

44

Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
disability payments for a dependent child, included in Line 7, that you received In accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified In § 541(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
from retirement plans, as specified In § 362(b)(19).

$

46

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the amount from Line 42.

$

47

Total adjustments to determine disposable income. Add the amounts on Lines 44, 45, and 46

45

48

and enter the result.

$

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 1325(b)(2). Subtract Line 47 from Line 43 and enter the
result.

$

Part V: ADDITIONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. List and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated In this form, that are reqUired for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(il)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should reflect your average monthly expense for each Item. Total the expenses.
49

Exoense Deserlotion

Monthlv Amount

a.
b.
c.

$
$

$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VI: VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the Information provided in this statement Is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)
50

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)
Joint Debtor If anvl
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Form 23
(10105)

United States Bankruptcy Court

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ District Of
In re

:

_

Case No.

_

Debtor
Chapter

_

DEBTOR'S CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF INSTRUCTIONAL COURSE
CONCERNING PERSONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
[Complete one ofthe following statements.]

o

I/We,

o

IlWe,

. the debtor(s) in the above(Printed Name(s) of Debtor and Joint Debtor, ifany)
I1we completed an instructional
styled case hereby certify that on
(Date)
course in personal financial management provided by
_
(Name of Provider)
an approved personal financial management instruction provider. If the provider furnished a
document attesting to the completion of the personal financial management instructional
course, a copy of that document is attached.
, the debtor(s) in the above-styled
(Printed Names of Debtor and Joint Debtor, if any)
case, hereby certify that no personal financial management course is required because:
[Check the appropriate box.]
I amlWe are incapacitated or disabled, as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h);
I arn/We are on active military duty in a military combat zone; or
I/We reside in a district in which the United States trustee (or bankruptcy administrator) has
determined that the approved instructional courses are not adequate at this time to serve the
additional individuals who would otherwise be required to complete such courses.

o

o

o

Signature of Debtor:
Date:

_
_

Signature of Joint Debtor;
Date:

_
_
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Form 24
(l0/05)

[Caption as described in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7010 or 9004(b), as applicable.]

CERTIFICATION TO COURT OF APPEALS
BY ALL PARTIES
A notice of appeal having been filed in the above-styled matter on
[Date],
_ _ _ _ _-:-:"
, and
, [Names
ofall the appellants and all the appellees, if any], who are all the appellants [and all the
appellees] hereby certify to the court under 28 u.S.C. § I58(d)(2)(A) that a circumstance
specified in 28 U.S.C. § I58(d)(2) exists as stated below.
Leave to appeal in this matter U is U is not required under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

[Iffrom a final judgment, order, or decree] This certification arises in an appeal from a
final judgment, order, or decree of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
_
entered on
[Date].
District of
[Iffrom an interlocutory order or decree] This certification arises in an appeal from an
interlocutory order or decree, and the parties hereby request leave to appeal as required by 28
U.S.c. § 158(a).
(The certification shall contain one or more ofthe following statements, as is appropriate
to the circumstances.]
The judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to which there is no
controlling decision of the court of appeals for this circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United
States, or involves a matter of public importance.

Or
The judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law requiring resolution of
conflicting decisions.

Or
An immediate appeal from the judgment, order, or decree may materially advance the
progress of the case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken.
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Form 24, Cont'd.

Page 2

[The parties may include or attach the information specified in Rule 8001 (f)(3)(C).j

Signed: [If there are more than two signatories, all must sign andprovide the information
requested below. Attach additional signed sheets if needed.]

Attorney for Appellant (or Appellant,
if not represented by an attorney)

Attorney for Appellant (or Appellant
if not represented by an attorney)

Printed Name of Signer

Printed Name of Signer

Address

Address

Telephone No.

Telephone No.

Date

Date
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SECTION A(b)

INTRODUCTION:

On March 18, 2005, after the unanimous adoption by both the Kentucky House of
Representatives and the Kentucky Senate, the Governor signed into law House Bill 248. The
enactment ofthis Bill recites one sentence. That sentence is, "An individual debtor domiciled in this
state is authorized to exempt from property ofsaid debtor's estate the property specified in 11 U.S.C.

§ 522(d)."
With that simple sentence, Kentucky becomes the first state in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals to formally adopt the use of Federal Exemptions as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522. These
exemptions can be used by Debtors who file bankruptcy under any ofthe operative chapters. With
one rare exception, this practitioner believes that the use ofthe Federal Exemptions in bankruptcy
by Kentucky residents (or those who can use Kentucky Exemptions under the new venue statute
enacted in the Bankruptcy Reform Act) are far more generous than the exemptions set forth in KRS
427.010, et seq. For those who have been active in bankruptcy practice for several years, the
adoption ofthe Federal Exemptions is tantamount to a gift from the Almighty. A closer examination
of these Exemptions will reveal why.
This presentation does not intend to cover every Federal Exemption. Several Federal
exemptions have been applicable to Kentucky residents for many years. These include, for example,
the exemption of Social Security proceeds, military pension benefits, proceeds received under the
Jones Act, welfare benefits, and a few others that Kentucky eventually enacted legislation to mirror,
such as wages, unemployment, and other similar benefits. This examination will concentrate on
those set forth in 11 U.S.c. § 522. A quick comparison ofthat statute versus KRS 427 et seq., will
show the differences of25 years of neglect.
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FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS:

This presentation will quickly review those Exemptions set forth in 11 U.S.c. § 522,
including the statute as amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005. A copy of the Statute is attached hereto as an Exhibit. Those practitioners who use
software systems, such as Best Case and others, will find that the Exemptions are already included
in the software package. This presenter assumes that anyone who is going to file a bankruptcy
petition on behalfof a Kentucky resident is using a software package. While not required, I cannot
imagine filing one the old fashioned way, particularly using the CMCEF system that the Court
requires.
To begin the examination, I refer you to 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2), which retains the definition
ofvalue that has been extant in this statute since its inception in 1978. This definition differs from
the values that one must place on the petition as set forth in 11 U.S.c. § 506(a)(2), which mandates
that a debtor in a Chapter 7 or 13 use value, or personal property, which is secured by an allowed
claim shall be determined based on the "replacement value of such property as of the date of the
filing of the petition, without deduction for cost of sale or marketing." Section 522(a)(2) defines
value as the "fair market value as ofthe date ofthe filing ofthe petition or the date that the property
becomes property ofthe estate." This value also differs from that as required to be used in Chapter
13 as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9), as amended, ifthe personal property was purchased within
910 days of the date of the filing of the petition. Counsel is also urged to review 11 U.S.c. §
522(b)(3) with regard to the discussion of what is the debtors domicile for purposes of claiming
exemptions. There is a 730 reach-back period, and if there are multiple jurisdictions involved,
ultimately the Federal Exemptions may also be used. I also would refer, if there is a conflict in a
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joint filing between the use of State Exemptions and Federal Exemptions, the Federal Exemptions
apply.
Retirement funds, including IRAs, 401 funds, 403 funds, 408 funds, 408(a) funds, and
virtually any other fund that is a deferred compensation fund as defined in the Internal Revenue
Code, are also exempt, and any role over of those funds, as long as it is rolled over, and not
distributed, shall also be exempt, subject to maintenance and child support claims, of course. The
position was codified when the Supreme Court ruled that IRA assets are exempt in the Rousey v.
Jacoway, 125 U.S. 1561 (2005), case. Certain exceptions exist to the exemptions, but other than
child support, tax liens will still take precedence over a claimed exemption.
Section 522(d) sets forth the majority of the Exemptions in this Title. Some of these
Exemptions are adjusted for inflation, as are other areas of the Code, including jurisdiction limits
in Chapter 13, wages claims as core priority in § 507, and in other places. The numbers given here
are effective as ofthe presentation rendered today. All ofthese Exemptions became applicable on
June 20, 2005, and continue, notwithstanding the onset and enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005.
These Exemptions include:
(1) a homestead exemption not to exceed $18,450.00 in real property or personal property

that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence (this includes mobile homes). I
always find it curious that a burial plot qualifies for a homestead exemption;
(2) the exemption in an automobile is raised from the Kentucky Exemption of$2,500.00 to
$2,950.00;
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(3) anyone item ofpersonalty in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliance, books, animals, crops or musical instruments that are held primarily for personal, family
or household use by the debtor, or a dependent ofthe debtor. Each one item is limited to $475.00
in value, with an overall maximum of $9,850.00.

Note that the animals, crops, or musical

instruments must be held primarily for personal, family or household use, and not professional use;
(4) a maximum value of$I,225.00 in jewelry held for personal use;
(5) the wildcard is reduced by $25.00, to $975.00; however, to the extent the homestead
exemption is not be used, and a debtor may utilize up to one-half(1/2), or the amount of$9,250.00,
under this section. Thus, a debtor could have as much as $10,500.00 in a wildcard exemption;
(6) the exemption in work tools, implements, and professional books goes from $300.00 to
$1,850.00 in value;
(7) any un-matured life insurance contract owned by the debtor, other than a credit life
insurance contract. I have never seen a cash value to a credit life insurance contract;
(8) the debtors aggregate interest not to exceed $9,850.00 in the cash value of un-matured
life insurance. I would also add that if the cash value has never been taken, I do not believe it can
be invaded by the Trustee. If it has been invaded by the debtor, then the Trustee may have a claim
for any amount above the $9,850.00;
(9) professionally prescribed health aides;
(10) the debtors right to receive Social Security, unemployment or a local public assistance
benefit, a veterans benefit, a disability, illness or unemployment benefit, alimony, child support,
maintenance, a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar plan or
contract on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service;
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(11) the debtors right to receive or property that is traceable to an award under a crime
victims reparation law, wrongful death recovery, life insurance benefit, ifthe debtor was a dependent
on the date ofthe decedent's death, recovery on account ofpersonal bodily injury, not including pain
and suffering or compensation for actual punitive loss in the amount of $15,000.00 and future
earnings recovered by the debtor; and
(12) retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or an account that is exempt
from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.

LIEN AVOIDANCE:
Lien avoidance is not permitted for judicial lien that secures a debt for alimony, child support
or maintenance under the new legislation. Congress further defined the term household good to
include clothing; furniture; appliances; one radio; one television (plasma); one VCR; linens; china;
crockery; kitchenware; educational material for minors; medical equipment and supplies, thank god
for diabetics; furniture exclusively used for minor children or elderly, disabled dependents; personal
effects, including toys and hobby equipment of minor children; one personal computer and related
equipment. Included in this definition is wedding rings ofminor dependents. What is not included
under the term household good are works of art, unless the debtor did it; electronic entertainment
equipment with a fair market value of more than $500.00, except for the one television, one radio
and VCR (note: no DVD); antiques with a market value ofmore than $500; jewelry, except wedding
rings, with a fair market value greater than $500; and a computer, except as otherwise set forth;
motor vehicles, including a tractor or lawn tractor, boat or motorized recreational device, conveyance
vehicle, water craft or aircraft.

A(b)·5

THE MILLION DOLLAR EXCEPTION:

KRS 427.150 does not have a monetary limit on the protection of deferred compensation
funds, although it does have the limitation of the amounts reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and the debtor's dependents. However, 11 U.S.c. § 522(n) limits the amounts that can
be exempt in IRAs, 403s, 401 (k)s and other similar funds to $1,000,000.00. Therefore, ifone should
represent a debtor who (1) is a Kentucky resident; (2) has deferred compensation funds in excess of
$1,000,000.00; and (3) cannot wait 1215 days to establish residency in another state, such as Florida
or Texas, counsel may want to look at the Kentucky Exemptions, rather than Federal.
Counsel is also urged to review 11 U.S.C. § 522(P) and (q). This limits the amount ofthe
homestead exemption that can be claimed, including a burial plot, ifit exceeds $125,000.00, ifthe
debtor has moved in the 1215-day period prior to filing the bankruptcy petition. The principle
exception is ifthe debtor is a family farmer. Then, there is no limitation, and I am looking forward
to see how many "tin millionaires" declare themselves family farmers. The homestead exemption
may also be limited if the Court determines after notice and a hearing that the debtor has been
convicted of a felony, which under the circumstances demonstrate that the filing of the bankruptcy
is an abuse ofthe provision of Title 11.

COMPARISON TO KENTUCKY REVISED CHAPTER 427:

A simple review ofKRS 427.010, et seq., reveals how much more generous the Federal
Exemptions are. Of course, the Kentucky homestead exemption is $5,000.00 under KRS 427.060.
The maximum amount offurniture, clothing andj ewelry that a debtor can exempt is $3,000.00 under
KRS 427.010. Automobiles are limited to $2,500.00. The wildcard exemption is $1,000.00 and
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cannot be expanded by the non-use of the homestead exemption. Work tools and professional
prescribed aides are limited to $300.00. Personal injury recoveries are limited to $7,500.00.
However, the Federal and Kentucky Exemptions mirror each other with respect to future earnings.
Kentucky law also has a 120-day look back period for contributions to pensions, annuities and the
like. There is no monetary limitation on IRAs, as there is under the Federal Exemptions. However,
a side-by-side comparison leaves little doubt that the Federal Exemptions should be applied and used
in virtually every case filed in a Kentucky bankruptcy court.

CONCLUSION:
In preparing for this presentation, I spoke with a member ofthe Kentucky General Assembly

about the enactment ofthis amendment that adopts the Federal Exemptions. I queried as to how this
provision passed both houses unanimously and was signed by the Governor with little or no fanfare.
His astonishment matched my own. Attempts have been made in the last four to five general
assemblies to revise the low levels that exist in the exemptions as they have not changed since 1979.
What is particularly astonishing is the recent history of the legislature and its divisiveness and, of
course, the fact that the Governor is from a party that has not been in power in the Governor's
mansion for more than 30 years. Despite all of these obstacles, the use of Federal Exemptions
perhaps represents the greatest reform for Kentucky residents and Kentucky practitioners,
notwithstanding the enactment ofthe Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005. The use of these exemptions offered genuine relief for debtors. And, if one looks at the
collection activities ofmost creditors, the adoption ofthese exemptions does not unfairly or unjustly
impede their collection activities. The automatic inflation adjustments will raise these exemptions
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over time. Counsel is cautioned to review the exemptions periodically to makes sure what the
appropriate amount ofcoverage is. Ifyour software provider does not have the Federal exemptions
contained in its program, there are many who do, and I urge you to contact those providers
immediately. To not use the Federal Exemptions will be a breach of your duty to your client.
The impact ofthe use ofFederal Exemptions will mean the demise ofsmall asset bankruptcy
cases. Chapter 7 Trustees will have to rely on errors made by creditors and assets with real value
in order to make a distribution to creditors.
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CONFLICT OF INTEREST AFTER THE 2005
LEGISLATION AND OTHER ETHICAL ISSUES
I.

The 2005 Bankruptcy Bill Changes to the Ethical Landscape
A.

Are You a Debt Relief Agency?: II U.S.C. §§ 101(3), (4A) (l2A) 526-528
1.
Definitions:
a.

Debt Relief Agency ("DRA"): 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A)
•

2.

3.

provides "Bankruptcy assistance" to an "Assisted Person"

b.

Assisted Person: 11 U.S.C. § 101(3)

c.

Bankruptcy Assistance: 11 U.S.C. §101(4A)

11 U.S.C. § 526: Restrictions on Debt Relief Agencies
•

526(a)(I) DRA cannot fail to perform promised services

•

526(a)(2) DRA cannot advise clients to make statements which
are untrue or misleading

•

526(a)(4) DRA cannot advise an assisted person to incur "more
debt in contemplation of such person filing a case" (includes
debt to pay legal fees

•

526(b) DRA duties cannot be waived by Assisted Persons

•

526(c) IfDRA violates §§ 526, 527 or 528 of the Code ("DRA
Provisions"), contract is void as to enforcement against
Assisted Person, but the assisted person can enforce it against
the DRA. Further ifDRA intentionally or negligently violates
DRA Provisions, then DRA will be liable for 1) all amounts
charged to Assisted Person; 2) actual damages; 3) reasonable
attorney fees. DRA is also liable for these amounts if Assisted
Person's case is dismissed or converted or DRA intentionally
or negligently violates Code or Rules.

•

526(c)(3) State agencies may enforce DRA Provisions

•

526(d)(2) DRA Provisions do not limit state practice of law
rules

11 U.S.C. § 527: Disclosures for Debt Relief Agencies
•

527(a) Sets specific notice and information requirements
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4.

527(b) provides an exact notice DRA's must provide to
assisted persons.

•

527(c) requires DRA's to provide information to Assisted
Persons to have them properly complete schedules (See 707(b).

•

527(d) requires that DRA's maintain copies of all notices given
for two years after date they are given.

11 U.S.C. § 528: Requirements for Debt Relief Agencies

a.

B.

•

•

528(a)(1) requires contract with Assisted Person to be executed
within 5 days from first day bankruptcy services are provided.

•

528(a)(3), (4) and (b) provides advertising requirements for
DRA.

Important Note: Advertising - Remember the phrase "We are a
debt relief agency. We help people file for bankruptcy relief under
the Bankruptcy Code."

Bankruptcy Planning: The Identifying Marks of a Hog
1.

Prior to the Bankruptcy Bill of 2005, numerous courts attempted to
delineate what constitutes permissible bankruptcy planning. The best
description of the numerous, often conflicting tests, is the simple "pig to
hog" transformation analogy of In re Zouhar, 10 RR. 154 (Bkrtcy. D.
N.M. 1981) ("there is a principle of too much; phrased colloquially when a
pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.")

2.

Cases Discussing Pre-Bankruptcy Planning:
a.

In re Bowyer, 916 F.2d 1056 (5 th Cir. 1990) (Ruled denial of
discharge was appropriate for conversion ofless than $100,000
into homestead. Debtor's income was $240,000 but debtors
claimed to live "modestly".) However, see In re Bowyer 932 F.2d
1100 (5 th Cir. 1991) (On re-hearing circuit court reversed previous
decision and upheld bankruptcy court ruling that debtor should
receive discharge.)

b.

In re Tamecki, 229 F.3d 205 (3fd Cir. 2000) (Discussing dismissal
of Chapter 7 case because of exemption planning.)
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3.

C.

c.

Matter of Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7 th Cir. 1989) (debtors purchase
of $380,000 home and move to new jurisdiction results in loss of
exemption and denial of discharge.

d.

In re Carey, 938 F.2d 1073 (lOth Cir. 1991) (Discussing denial of
discharge from pre-bankruptcy planning.)

e.

Norwest Bank v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8 th Cir. 1988) (doctors are
bad)

f.

Hanson v. First National Bank, 848 F.2d 866 (farmers are good)

g.

Matter of Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5 th Cir. 1983) (conversion of nonexempt assets of approximately $40,000 into homestead results in
denial of discharge)

h.

In re Johnson 80 B.R. 953 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 1987) (Doctors are
good); aff'd, 101 B.R. 997 (D. Minn. 1988) (Ditto), remanded for
further hearings, 880 F.2d 78 (8 th Cir. 1989) (Don't know). on
remand, In re Johnson, 124 B.R. 290 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 1991)
(Whoops, doctors are bad after all.)

1.

In re Covino, 187 B.R. 773 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Fla. 1995) (Discussing
general test of what is permissible exemption planning.)

J.

In re Harker, 181 B.R. 326 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Tenn. 1995)(Refusing to
permit dismissal of case to allow exemption planning.)

k.

In re Beckman, 104 B.R. 866 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Ohio 1989) (1. Guy
Cole) (Discussing fraudulent conveyance issues related to
exemption planning.)

Under the Bankruptcy Bill of 2005 Numerous Additional Restrictions
Have Been Placed on Pre-Bankruptcy Planning
a.

II U.S.c. §§ 522(b)(3) (0) and (P): Limitations on Claiming
Homestead Exemptions

b.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l9): Non-Dischargeable Debts for Certain
Security Law Violations: Sarbanes - Oxley expands again

c.

II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) and (e): Anti KERP Payments and Attack on
Self Settled Trusts

Individual Debtors in Chapter 11: Has Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991)
Been Effectively Repealed?
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D.

1.

11 U.S.C. § 1115 The new property of the estate: post petition earnings

2.

11 U.S.C. §§ 1127 and 1141 Modification of an individual's Chapter 11
Plan post confirmation

3.

11 U.S.C. § 1129 Confirmation Requirements

New Fun and Games in Attempting to Convert Chapter 11 Cases to Chapter 7 or
Appointing a Trustee:

1.
E.

Committee Changes and the Committee Counsel's Information Duties: Mandating
Waiver of the Attorney Client Privilege?

1.
F.

11 U.S.C. § 1102

Chapter 7 Consumer Debt or Representation Conflicts: Investigation of Client.

1.

G.

11 U.S.C. §§ 1104 and 1112

11 U.S.c. § 707(b)
•

707(b)(3) Bad faith filing of petition and rejection of personal
services contract are issues for determining whether Chapter 7
filing would be an abuse.

•

707(b)(4) Court may order sanctions to trustee for 707(b)
motion if Rule 9011 violated.

•

707(b)(4)(C) Signature of attorney on pleading and petitions
certifies that DRAIattorney has: 1) performed a reasonable
investigation into circumstances of pleading or petition; 2) the
pleading or petition is well grounded in fact; and 3) is
warranted in existing law or by a good faith argument for
change of existing law.

•

707(b)(4))D) Signature constitutes certification that
DRAIattorney has no knowledge after inquiry that information
in schedules is incorrect.

•

707(b)(5) Debtors may have opportunity for sanctions against
creditors in very limited circumstances.

Jurisdiction over Your Employment and Malpractice
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1.

II.

28 U.S.C. § 1334(e): Exclusive Jurisdiction overlawsuits involving 11
U.S.c. § 327 and related rule controversies.

Getting Started by Surprise: Ethical issues facing counsel for potential debtors
facing involuntary bankruptcy petitions
Exhibit A
Bowles, Involuntary Fee Slaughter: The Perils of Professional Fees for Representing a
Debtor During the GAP Period, 21 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 24 (2002).

III.

Who Do You Work For? Duty to clients in Chapter 11 Proceedings
Exhibit B
Rapoport and Bowles, Has the DIP's Counsel Become the Ultimate Creditors Lawyer in
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 Am. Bank. Inst. L. Rev. 47 (1997).

Recent Ethical Issues
IV.

Who is the Client: New Cases, New Problems
A.

Service to Two Masters, Not a Good Idea: In re R&R Associates of Hampton, 402
F.3d 257 (1 51 Cir. 2005)

R&R Associates ("R&R") was a general partnership with two general partners, Choate
and Gaudette. R&R's only asset was a single piece of commercial real estate.
In 1990, Gaudette retained a law firm ("Law Firm") to transfer $700,000 of his property
to several family limited partnerships ("FIP"). The Law Firm later helped Choate transfer a
significant amount of assets to other FIP's. Under applicable law, assets and interests in FIPs are
extremely difficult to attach by creditors.
Later, in 1991, R&R was forced to filed a Chapter 11 proceeding. The Law Firm, in its
application to be employed as R&R's chapter 11 counsel, failed to disclose their prior and
ongoing representation of Gaudette and Choate.
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During the course of the R&R chapter 11, the Law Finn stated to the Bankruptcy Court
that Gaudette and Choate had sufficient assets to cover any shortfall in R&R's assets.
Unfortunately, the Chapter 11 was a total failure and was converted to a Chapter 7. Further,
Gaudette and Choate, due in part to their transfers to the FIP's, were in fact unable to cover the
asset shortfall in the R&R estate.
The Chapter 7 Trustee requested the general partner's financial records and the Law Finn
provided the Trustee with these records without disclosing the FLPs existence or the Law Finn's
part in setting up the FLPs.
Ultimately, the Chapter 7 Trustee sued the Law Finn for negligent representation ofR&R
during the Chapter 11 and breach of their fiduciary duties and sought disgorgement of the Law
Finn's $18,887.00 in legal fees paid by R&R to the Law Finn and $412,000.00 in other damages
representing the unpaid claims in the case.
After two Bankruptcy Court opinions and two appeals to the U.S. District Court, (which
ultimately affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of the Trustee's lawsuit) the Trustee
appealed the case to the First Circuit.
The First Circuit reversed the District Court decision finding:
1.

The Law Finn had a duty of "care, candor and unswerving loyalty" to the
Debtor;

2.

The Law Firm breached these duties to R&R by:

3.

a.

Making uninvestigated representations as to the general partners
net worth;

b.

Assisting the general partners in shielding their assets from
creditors;

c.

Failing to advise the Bankruptcy Court oftheir conflicts of interest

Entry ofjudgment was appropriate against the Law Finn in the amount of
all unpaid claims of the R&R Estate ($412,000) was appropriate
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Throughout the First Circuit's opinion, the Court notes that the Law Finn "affinnatively
violated" its fiduciary duty to the Debtor by continuing post-petition to shield personal assets of
the General Partners in the FLPs. Given the serious nature of the sanction this case should serve
as a warning to all attorneys not to shield the assets of potential debtors of a chapter 11 debtor.
B.

Bad Mushrooms, Man! In re Mushroom Transportation Company, Inc., 382 F.3d
325 (3 rd Cir. 2004)

Third Circuit held that Debtor's law finn owes a fiduciary duty to a chapter 11 debtor in
detennining summary judgment motions related to a law finn and bank concerning an attorney's
embezzlement of funds from a debtor.
C.

Disclose, Disclose ... In re Big Rivers Electric Corporation, 355 F.3d 415 (6 th
Cir.2004)

A cautionary tale about why exammers and trustees should not attempt to obtain
undisclosed agreements from creditors in the middle of a case concerning their compensation.
Court found that the examiners undisclosed efforts to obtain a fee enhancement violated the
examiner's duties of loyalty, disclosure and to remain disinterested and ordered disallowance and
disgorgement of all fees even though Examiner brought to the estate an additional
$145,000,000.00 to estate from his efforts.
D.

A Case to Remember In re V&M Management, Inc., 321 F.3d 6 (1 st Cir. 2003)

In V&M, the sole shareholder and fonner director of the debtor subchapter s corporation
filed a state court lawsuit against chapter 11 debtor's law finn and bankruptcy trustee. Case was
removed to Federal Court and was dismissed due to Bankruptcy Court's detennination in the
Chapter 11 case that there was no value to Debtor's equity interest.
E.

And Again, Who is Your Client? Bergin v. Eerie World Entertainment, LLC,
2003 WL 22861948 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003)
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Law firm disqualified as counsel for a chapter 11 debtor for (1) either representing the
debtor's principal [or at least being severely confused as to who his client was]; (2) accepting
payments of professional fees from the debtor's principal; and (3) ignoring causes of actions
against associates of the principal.
F.

Mutiney II: Mutineers Continue to Win. In re The Phoenix Group Corporation,
305 B.R. 447 (Bkrtcy N.D.Tx 2003).

Chapter 11 Debtors' counsel represented the Debtors in a hotly contested Chapter 11
proceeding.
reasons.

Counsel for the Debtors moved twice to be permitted to withdraw for ethical

In one of the motions the Debtors' counsel noted that the Debtors' principal was

demanding that Debtors' counsel take actions and pursues strategies that Debtors' counsel found
to be "legally and ethically improper. The second motion to withdraw was granted.
The Debtors' counsel ultimately filed a final fee application and the principals of their
former client, allegedly on behalf of the Debtors, objected arguing (1) the Debtors' counsel failed
to properly object to the plan of another related Chapter 11 debtor ("Related Case"); and (2) the
Debtors' counsel failed to pursue the appointment of a trustee in the Related Case.
The court overruled the Objection after finding that:

G.

1.

The Debtors could not get along with any attorney, as six of its 20 largest
creditors were law firms;

2.

The Debtors did in fact attempt to require their counsel take improper
actions; and

3.

The Debtors' counsel properly exercised its professional judgment in
deciding not to pursue the actions which were the basis of objection to the
fee application.

Obey Your Master! In re Texasoil Enterprises, Inc., 296 B.R. 431 (BkI.icy.
N.D.Tx 2003)
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Debtors' counsel ordered to disgorge $6,500 of$15,000.00 retainer for failing to have the
Debtors comply with the Court's 11 U.S.c. § 1107 Order which limited the Debtors authority to
operate post petition.
H.

Make (and Disclose) Waivers: In re lore Corporation, 298 B.R. 703 (Bkrtcy. D.
Mont. 2003)

Chapter 11 debtor's law firm's fee application was denied and law firm was ordered to
disgorge all fees and expenses previously paid (except for expenses relating to service of
pleadings under case management order) due to Debtors' counsel's failure to fully disclose
material limitations in a conflict waiver which Debtors' counsel had with the Debtors primary
secured lender. The improper disclosure and conflicts of interest included conflicts with the
secured lender on the details of professional fee carve outs for debtor's counsel.
I.

Paint Your Wagoner as an Adverse Interest: In re Hampton Hotel Investors, L.P.,
289 B.R. 563 (Bkrtcy S.D.N.Y. 2003)

After a chapter 11 case was converted to chapter 7, trustee brought suit against the
chapter 11 Debtor's counsel ("Law Firm") for, among other things, assisting the Debtor's
principals in violating the Debtor's fiduciary duties, including: (1) assisting the.Debtor after the
filing of its chapter 11 in retaining and compensating professionals without court order; (2)
failing to recover assets of the estate; (3) assisting the Debtor in borrowing money, without court
approval, to pay insiders; (4) paying pre-petition debts without court authorization; and (5)
refusing to collect receivables from insiders.
The Law Firm moved to dismiss the complaint under the doctrine of Shearson Lehman
Rutten, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2 nd Cir. 1991) which greatly limits the ability of debtors
to bring suits against parties that assisted the debtor's employees in harming the debtor under the
doctrine of in pari delicto.
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The Bankruptcy Court overruled the dismissal motion finding that the lawsuit against the
Law Firm could proceed under the "Adverse Interest Exception" of Wagoner. The court further
stated that the direct fiduciary duty the Law Firm had to the debtor's bankruptcy estate could also
provide an exception to Wagoner.
J.

A Single Screen: In re Ange1ika Films 57th, Inc., 227 B.R. 29 (Bkrtcy. S.D. N.Y.
1998).

In this case, the debtor's Chapter 11 counsel also represented the debtor's owner in
numerous matters, including his divorce and a related replevin action with his former spouse and
a major creditor of the debtor. The Chapter 11 attorneys were employed over the objection of
the U.S. Trustee and the debtor's former spouse. During the Chapter 11 case, the debtor entered
into an agreement to use its "good faith" efforts to market a valuable lease by a certain date, and
if a motion to assume or assign the lease was not filed by that date, the debtor agreed to the
appointment of a Trustee. After the debtor failed to get an extension of time to market the lease,
the debtor's owner offered to "purchase" the lease for $100,000.00, 20% ofits appraisal value of
$500,000.00. The motion to assume had numerous other provisions favorable to the debtor's
owner. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the motion to assume or assign the lease, finding it was
filed in bad faith, and appointed a Chapter 11 Trustee. The District Court affirmed this decision.
Ultimately, the estate, through the Chapter 11 Trustee, was able to sell the lease for
$1,000,000.00, ten times what the debtor's principal offered to purchase the lease for in the
assumption and assignment motion.

After the sale, the Chapter 11 counsel moved for

approximately $491,000.00 in fees and ultimately entered into a settlement agreement for a
reduced amount of fees with the other parties in the case. The Court, exercising its powers to
review professional fees, denied all fees of the debtor's Chapter 11 counsel in this case, finding
that the Chapter 11 counsel had abandoned its fiduciary duty to the debtor by its actions in this
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case. The Court specifically found that the attorneys had failed to fully inform the Court about
the assumption motion and had represented primarily the debtor's owner's interests throughout
the bankruptcy. This is an important case, because the Court even denied fees that were for
services beneficial to the debtor.
K.

Mutiny or Heroism? In re JLM, Inc., 210 B.R. 19 (BAP 2d Cir. 1997).

Counsel for the Chapter 11 debtor, JLM, Inc., was faced with an objection to its fees by
the debtor's owner for their alleged refusal to obey the orders of the debtor's owners. The facts
of this case are unusual, to say the least. At the commencement of the Chapter 11 case, the
debtor was owned by two individuals who had also filed individual Chapter 11 petitions. The
debtor's stock was pledged by the individuals to the primary secured lender of JLM. Through
the individuals' Chapter 11 plans, the secured lender obtained direct ownership of all of the stock
of JLM. In January of 1996, the secured creditors, some three months after JLM's bankruptcy
and after the secured lender had discovered its security interest in JLM's personal property had
lapsed, ordered the debtor's Chapter 11 counsel to dismiss the JLM Chapter 11 case, so it could
perfect its lapsed security interest. The Chapter 11 counsel refused the direction and vigorously
opposed the secured creditors'/owner's actions to dismiss the case or obtain stay relief to replace
the debtor's management. Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court ruled the secured creditors had the
authority to operate the debtor, but found its actions in attempting to dismiss the Chapter 11
violated its fiduciary duty to all the estate creditors and appointed a Trustee. When debtor's
counsel filed its final fee application, despite almost universal support, the Bankruptcy Court
denied counsel's fees, ruling the Chapter 11 counsel was not entitled to any fees, as it
represented the individuals who previously owned the debtor in opposing the secured creditors'
actions and not JLM. The BAP reversed, finding that JLM's Chapter 11 counsel had apparently
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acted properly in opposing the actions of the secured creditor/owner, and remanded for a
determination of whether the counsel's actions benefited the estate.
L.

The Bad, the Sequel: Hansen, Jones & Leta, PC v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah
1998).

In the main article, Dean Rapoport and I discussed the case of In re Bonneville Pacific

Corporation, 196 B.R. 868 (Bkrtcy. D. Utah 1996) ("Bonnieville"). Approximately a year after
our article was published, the District Court, accepting most of the same facts as set forth in
Bonnieville, reversed the denial of fees under an abuse of discretion standard.
The principal grounds for the District Court's reversal of the Bonnieville decision were
its explicit determination that Chapter II debtor's counsel does not owe a fiduciary duty to a
Chapter II bankruptcy estate and its implicit determination that the debtor's counsel was not as
responsible for the debtor's misconduct, as the Bankruptcy Court had found debtor's counsel to
be in its opinion.
On the legal issue, the Hansen court determined that a Chapter II debtor's counsel's
client is not the bankruptcy estate, because no such entity exists. The Hansen court reviewed in
detail the massive amount of case law and scholarly works on whether the bankruptcy estate
exists and, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. (1984), held that no entity known as the "bankruptcy estate" was
created when a Chapter 11 was filed and that therefore a Chapter II debtor's counsel must owe
its duties to the debtor-in-possession.
Based on this decision, the Hansen court ruled that the Chapter II debtor's counsel had
fulfilled its duties to its clients, the debtor-in-possession. The Hansen court rejected the massive
amount of case law which imposes fiduciary duties on counsel for the debtor-in-possession as
"unhelpful and unnecessary to insure the counsel is independent and aware of his/her duty under
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the Bankruptcy Code and Model rules to represent and assist the debtor-in-possession in the
performance of its duties." 220 B.R. at 460.
The Hansen case's legal reasoning produces some unintended problems, as it indicates
that counsel for the estate may have some duty to the people who make up the debtor-inpossession, as opposed to the bankruptcy estate. This may give some unscrupulous debtors-inpossession the leverage they need to force Chapter 11 counsel to be their "willing" dupes in their
actions to defraud debtors or harm the bankruptcy estate.
The Hansen court's decision may be more explainable on its implicit factual reasoning.
The District Court did not overrule the factual findings of the Bankruptcy Court, but made
additional and more detailed findings which cost counsel for the DIP in a far more sympathetic
light than did the Bankruptcy Court. As an example, the District Court, in footnote 57 to its
opinion, emphasized the fact that the debtor's Chapter 11 counsel was not guilty of assisting in
the debtor's fraud.
In summary, the Hansen decision provides at least a well-reasoned decision which

questions the validity of the theoretical underpinning of the majority line of attorney fiduciary
duty cases.

However, the authors of the attached article disagree with the Hansen court's

decision and still believe that except for the ruling on the unsecured creditors committee's fees,
Bonnieville is the more persuasive opinion.
V.

The Sum of our Damages

A number of recent cases have addressed issues related to lawsuits against Chapter 11
debtors' counsel for breaches of their fiduciary duty. Under amended 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) nearly
all of these cases will have to be heard in Federal Court as the Federal Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims involving 11 U.S.c. § 327 and rules related thereto.
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A.

Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531 (2nd Cir. 2000). (Court permitted breach of

fiduciary duty suit to go forward on complaint that special counsel to the debtor harmed debtor's
bankruptcy estate by actions related to simultaneous representation of creditor claiming estate
assets. Court also held that representing multiple adverse clients is not a cause of action in and
of itself.)
B.

First Interstate Bank: of Az v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F. 983 (9th Cir. 2000).

(Law firm was sued because it hired a judge's law clerk and the clerk continued to work on its
future employer cases in violation of several portions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Code
of Conduct for Law Clerks. After discovery of this problem, the judge recluse himself from the
case and the new judge ordered a new trial, after which the hiring law firm's client received a
less favorable ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that it was the judge's and law clerk's duty to take
proper ethical action, and that law firm had no independent duty to disclose or take steps to
ensure judicial Codes of Conduct are followed. Good case to read if you are hiring a judge's law
clerk.)
C.

In re Verit Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 61 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision

available on WestLaw). (Discussing whether settlement agreement released debtor's pre-petition
attorney from actions for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty cases of action).
D.

ICM Notes, Ltd. v. Andrews & Kurth, LLP, 278 B.R. 117 (S.D. TX. 2002), affd

w/o opinion, 324 F.3d 768 (5 th Cir. 2003).

(Recent case which reaffirms the doctrine that

Chapter 11 professionals do not owe a fiduciary duty to specific creditors. Court dismissed
claim against debtor's counsel for breach of fiduciary duty by creditor which was attempting to
acquire the debtor through a plan of reorganization.)
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E.

Matter of RDM Sports Group, mc., 260 B.R. 915 (Bkrtcy. N.D. GA. 2001).

(Chapter 11 Trustee has right to jury trial in Bankruptcy Court on suit against debtor's
professionals for breach of fiduciary duty).
F.

m re C Power Products, 230 B.R. 800 (Bkrtcy. N.D. TX. 1998). (Discussing

issues related to standing to bring legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims).
G.

Borden v. Clement, 261 B.R. 275 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ala. 2001). (Dismissaloflawsuit

against Chapter 11 debtor's counsel by owner of Chapter 11 debtor, alleging that attorney
breached fiduciary duties to owner and was guilty of malpractice. Important discussion on how
to withdraw from case.)
VI.

Bankruptcy Ethics Cases Are Like a Box of Chocolates: You Never Know What
You Might Find

A.

In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367 (Bkrtcy. D. Minn. 2000).

(Discussing Fifth

Amendment privilege as it relates to documents produced to an individual debtor's Chapter 11
counsel).
B.

In re Mushroom Transportation Company, Inc., 247 B.R. 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000).

(In an interesting twist, discussing whether a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession could be liable for
breach of fiduciary duty by debtor's counsel).
C.

In re Vebeliunas, 231 B.R. 181 (Bkrtcy. S.D. N.Y. 1999).

(Unusual case

disqualifying counsel for Trustee, where Trustee's counsel thought the debtor was a crook).
D.

In re Entertainment, Inc., 225 B.R. 412 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1998). (Case which

discusses why it is a bad idea to file a bankruptcy where the owners of the debtor are at war).
VII.

Getting Out with Your "Professional Life": Options if the People Running Your
Client Go Bad
Exhibit C
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Bowles, Noisy Withdrawals: Urban Bankruptcy Legend or Invaluable Ethical Tool?, 20
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26 (2001).

VIII. The Tort of Deepening Insolvency: Repackaged Lender Liability, or a
Revolutionary New Theory?
A.
Introduction
Deepening Insolvency is a broad and general term which covers a number of different
actions against primarily: (1) secured lenders of a debtor, see Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340 (3 fd Cir. 2001); (2) officers and directors of a
debtor, see In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York Sec. Litigation, 523 F.Supp. 533
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); (3) accountants and financial advisors of the debtor, see Allard v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 924 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); (4) attorneys, see Chern-Age Industries,
Inc., 652 N.W. 2d 756 (S.D. 2002); and (5) most recently "controlling customers". See In re
Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. 781 (Bkrtcy M.D.Tenn. 2005).

B.

What are Deepening Insolvency Claims

At the present time there is no unified theory of what conduct would give rise to a claim
of Deepening Insolvency. However, several theories have arisen.
1.

Lender Deepening Insolvency

In cases involving lenders, one commentator has identified four (4) factors which must be
established by plaintiffs in a Deepening Insolvency case:
a.

fraudulent or wrongful prolongation of an insolvent entities life by
concealing its true financial condition

b.

increased insolvency of the entity by the incurrence of additional
liabilities or dissipation of assets during this period;

c.

los~ of otherwise realizable value by the improper prolongation of
the business; and

d.

harm was suffered by the business entity which was distinct by the
creditors of the entities
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See Rubin, New Liability Under "Deepening Insolvency": A Search for Deep Pockets, 23
ABU 50 (2004). See also In re American Lumber Company, 5 B.R. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).
2.

Officer and Director Deepening Insolvency

In actions for Deepening Insolvency against the managers, officers, directors and other
control persons of a legal entity, court are split on the nature of Deepening Insolvency causes of
action.

3.

a.

Some courts have held that Deepening Insolvency is a separate
cause of action for the "fraudulent promulgation of a corporation's
life beyond insolvency." See In re Investors Funding Corp., 523
F.Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In a recent decision limiting the
theory of Deepening Insolvency, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York added the requirement that the
Plaintiff must also show that "the defendant prolonged the
company is life in breach of a separate duty, or committed an
actionable tort that contributed to the continued operation of a
corporation and its increased debt. See In re Global Services LLC,
316 B.R. 451 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.¥. 2004).

b.

Other courts in D&O cases have held that Deepening Insolvency is
not a separate cause of action but instead a measure of damages.
See generally Bates and McCutchen, Deepening Insolvency: Into
).
the Void, 24 ABI LJ 1 (March 2005)(Discussing

Accountant and Other Debtor Financial Professional's Liability for
Deepening Insolvency
a.

Courts have generally held that Deepening Insolvency is a measure
of damages where a debtor has obtained additional debts due to
improper financial analysis or audits of a debtor. See generally,
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,
267 F.3d 340 (3fd Cir. 2001); Schract v. Braun, 711 F.2d 1343 97th
Cir. 1983); In re Latin Invest. Corp., 168 B.R.1 (Bkrtcy. D. Col.
1993).

b.

Other Courts have held that Deepening Insolvency is a separate
tort and held that demonstrating that an accountants negligence in
discovering a misappropriation of funds led to an improper
prolongation of a corporation's existence to the detriment of both
its creditors and shareholders would be a viable cause of action.
See Allard v. Arthur Andersen, 924 F.Supp 488 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
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4.

Deepening Insolvency for Attorney. A New Name for Malpractice and
Breach of Fiduciary Duties
a.

In an article written years before Deepening Insolvency became a
popular cause of action, Bruce Marshall (now a Bankruptcy Judge
for the District of Nevada) stated that several causes of action
could be asserted against a debtor entities counsel could result in
Deepening Insolvency damages including:
(i)

Liability for handling funds contrary to the interest of a
beneficiary

(ii)

Breach of fiduciary duty to client entity

(iii)

Conflicts of interest

(iv)

Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary by a legal entities
controlling parties

See Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining Lawyer
Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, 6ffiKRLP403
(199&). See also Willner's Fuel Distributors, Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399 (Ak. 1994).
5.

Controlling Customers: New Defendant For the New Economy?

In March of 2005 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee, in In re Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. 781 (Bkrtcy M.D. Tenn. 2005) held that customers
who allegedly controlled a supplier/debtors operations could be liable for the tort of Deepening
Insolvency.

This opinion provides an excellent discussion of the history of "Deepening

Discovery".
C.

How to Defend Against the Unknown?
1.
Duty? What Duty to Prevent Deepening Insolvency?

In re Sharp International Corp., 403 F.3d 43 (2 nd Cir. 2005) (No duty on Lender to
publicly disclose debtors false financial records).
In re Global Services Group LLC, 316 B.R. 451 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.¥. 2004) (No duty not to
lend funds to insolvent company or to immediately liquidate an insolvent business).
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In re Hechinger Inv. Co., 2004 WL 724960 (D. Del. March 28, 2004) (Secured Lender
did not owe a duty to unsecured creditors).
Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 693 (5 th Cir. 1990) (Secured Lender
acting pursuant to loan agreement owed no duty to unsecured vendors of Debtor).
2.

Claim, What Claim?

In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores Inc., 255 B.R. 646 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. 1998)
3.

Proximate Cause: Back to Basics

Citizen's State Bank v. Timm Schmitt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983) (Proximate
cause issues in Deepening Insolvency cases include, (1) injury is tto remote to negligence; (2)
injury is out of proportion to culpability of negligent party; (3) highly extraordinary that
negligence would have caused harm; recovery would be unreasonable burden on defendant; and
(5) recovery could lead to other fraudulent and unreasonable claims).
4.

I've Got Protection!

Production Resources Group LLC v. NCT Group Inc., 2004 WL 2647593 (Del. Chanco
2000) (Directors protected from Deepening Insolvency causes of action under Delaware's
business _ _ rule and corporation indemnification provisions that insulate Directors from
personal liability for breaches of duty of care).
5.

In Pari delicta. No it doesn't involve bedroom photos.

See Shearsen Lehmen Hutten Inc. v. Wagener, 944 F.2d 114 (2 nd Cir. 1991) (In Pari
delicta doctrine precludes legal entity for suing parties for improper conduct it engaged in
through its officers, directors, managers or other controlling parties) contra Scholes
56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995).
1006483_'

B - 19

V.

Lehmann,
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There appears to be a recent trend of creditors using involuntary bankruptcies to resolve their disputes with
debtors. This increase in involuntary bankruptcies has given rise to a large number of problems for both debtor and
creditor attorneys. In the first of what hopefully will be a three-part series discussing the ethics of representing
parties in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, this article addresses fee problems faced by professionals
representing parties faced with an involuntary bankruptcy petition between the involuntary petition's filing and the
adjudication or consent to the entry of the Order of Relief (gap period). [FNl] These fee issues related to
representing parties subject to involuntary bankruptcy proceedings (potential debtors) arise from the lack of
certainty as to how professional fees accrued and/or paid during the gap period are treated in the subsequent
bankruptcy.
Can Anyone Tell Me What the Ordinary Course of Business Is?
In a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code offers a clear, if not particularly precise, statutory
framework as to how and when the debtor's professional can be hired to represent the bankruptcy estate. [FN2] In
involuntary bankruptcies, 11 U.S.C. §327 does not govern professionals' employment during the gap period. [FN3]
Instead, the process for being paid while representing an alleged debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy petition is
indirectly governed by four separate statutes: 11 U.S.c. §§303(f), 502(f), 507(a)(2) and 549.
The primary Bankruptcy Code section addressing how a debtor may hire and pay professionals during the gap
period is 11 U.S.C. §303(f), which authorizes an alleged debtor to operate its business and use, acquire and dispose
of its property as if an involuntary case had not been commenced, unless a court orders otherwise. [FN4] This
provision generally permits a debtor to continue to operate in the ordinary course of its business under the
restrictions of 11 U.S.C. §363, which requires court authorization for the sale, use or lease of property of the debtor
other than in the ordinary course of its business. [FN5]
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However, a debtor's ability to operate its business and pay its gap period creditors is also limited by 11 U.S.c. §§
502(f) and 507(a)(2), which govern the allowance of claims during the gap period. [FN6] Section 502(f) allows
claims "arising out of the ordinary course of the debtor's business or fmancial affairs" during the gap period to be
allowed as a pre-petition claim in a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(2) grants claims allowed under §502(f) a
second priority status, behind administrative expenses. Read together, §§502(f) and 507(a)(2) mean that unsecured
claims that arise in the ordinary course of the debtors' business during the gap period are entitled to a second
priority status. Unsecured claims, which do not arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's business during the gap
period, if allowed at all, will be treated only as general unsecured claims. [FN7]
Finally, 11 U.S.C. §549 provides a fmal limitation on paying professional fees during the gap period. [FN8] It
also provides that the trustee may avoid the property transfers that occur after the commencement of a bankruptcy
case, including an involuntary proceeding if the transfer is only authorized under §303(f), unless said transfer is (1)
made after the commencement of the involuntary case, (2) before the entry of an Order of Relief and (3) made to
the extent of any value of goods or services rendered to a debtor after the commencement of the case. [FN9] The
"safe harbor" provisions of 11 U.S.C. §549(b) do not include providing security or paying any debt that arose
before the commencement of the case.
Based on this patchwork quilt of statutes, it appears that if a potential debtor ultimately files bankruptcy, any
professional fees earned or paid during the gap period are at risk. Unless a court is willing to approve the
application of a chapter 11 debtor's professionals on a nunc pro tunc basis, then that professional will be entitled to
at best a second-level priority claim under 11 U.S.c. §507(a)(2) for any services rendered "in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business." However, even entitlement to that secondtier priority claim is uncertain as courts are
generally split as to whether these gap period professional fees arise "in the ordinary course" of a debtor's business.
Since When Is an Involuntary Bankruptcy Ordinary?
Although there is little direct case law on the subject, courts have still managed to split on the issue of whether
payments or accrual of gap period professional fees arise in the ordinary course of a potential debtor's business for
purposes of 11 U.S.C. §§303(f) and 507(a)(2).
One line of bankruptcy cases, a minority view, holds that generally the professional fees accrued or paid by a
debtor during the gap period do not arise in the ordinary course of business and are not entitled to priority under 11
U.S.c. §507(a)(2).
The leading case in this line of authority is In re Hanson Industries Inc. [FN 10] In Hanson, counsel for the alleged
debtor applied in the potential debtor's bankruptcy for an award of attorney's fees, both as an administrative
expense under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1) or as a second priority administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(2).
The services for which the attorney sought reimbursement primarily were related to "virtually every possible
defense for filing an involuntary *46 petition." [FNll] In reviewing the fee application, the court ultimately found
that the debtor's counsel actions were at best of extremely doubtful value to the bankruptcy estate, and at worst, an
obstruction to the bankruptcy trustee's efforts to administer the estate. The bankruptcy court ultimately determined
that most of the debtor's counsel's work was not beneficial to the estate and denied $48,000 of the $60,000 fee
application. The court noted that "creditors would not ordinarily and reasonably expect a company with virtually
no assets and no business to expend more than $60,000 over a period of 11 weeks in litigation of any sort. Thus,
while some reasonable amount of attorney's fees might be expected to minimally keep certain of the claims of the
company alive, sums in the amount and of the nature involved, and efforts as zealous and determined as these, are
not reasonably justified." [FNI2] The court went on to [md that where a debtor failed to convert its involuntary to a
voluntary chapter 11, or agree to an adjudication of bankruptcy and ultimately had an order of relief entered against
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it, that the gap period professional fees and expenses did not arise in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.
[FN13]
Perhaps the most troubling portion of the Hanson decision is its discussion of why Hanson was distinguishable
from the case of In re Sun Spec Industries, [FNI4] which found professional fees earned during the gap period
arose in the debtor's ordinary course of business and were entitled to priority status. The Hanson court
distinguished Sun Spec by noting that "the debtor chose to voluntarily convert to a chapter II, an option this debtor
rejected." This dicta is problematic as it seems to indicate that professionals are more likely to get paid if a
potential debtor voluntarily enters bankruptcy than if it fights the petition.
Hanson was based on a group of somewhat similar rulings, including In re Rocanville Marketing Corp. [FN15]
and In re N Knitting Service Inc., [FN16] both of which held that professionals working for potential debtors that
opposed an involuntary petition would not be awarded either an administrative expense under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)
or an administrative expense under 11 U.S.c. §507(a)(2) for their work during the gap period. Hanson based its
decision on the cases of Kallen v. Litas [FN 17] and In re Peninsula Roofmg & Sheet Metal Inc. [FN 18] The court
also ruled against professionals on preference actions for fees paid prior to a bankruptcy filing that were found not
to have been paid in the ordinary course of a debtor's business.
The rationale behind the Hanson line of cases is that payments made to professionals during the gap period,
especially payments made to contest an involuntary bankruptcy petition, rarely arise in the ordinary course of
business and that such services are not valuable to the debtor's bankruptcy estate. These cases take a rather strict
approach as to the concept of the ordinary course of business and make it difficult for an attorney representing a
potential debtor to be assured of being paid or even having a priority claim for fees earned during the gap period,
unless the potential debtor agrees to convert to a chapter 11 or is successful in opposing the involuntary bankruptcy
petition.
Since When Is It Not Ordinary to Hire an Attorney to Fight a Lawsuit?
Other bankruptcy courts have rejected the reasoning of Hanson and have allowed professionals to be paid, or at
least be awarded a priority claim, for their services during the gap period. Perhaps the most liberal position on this
matter is taken by the court in In re Rundlett. [FNI9] In Rundlett, the law frrm was paid $50,000 during the gap
period to represent the potential debtor in the involuntary chapter 7 petition filed against her. Approximately three
weeks after they were retained, the debtor converted her case to a chapter 11 proceeding and moved to employ the
law firm as her chapter 11 counsel. The proposed employment application permitted the law frrm to retain the
$50,000 retainer paid to them during the gap period.
Shortly after the employment application was filed, the involuntary chapter 11 was converted to a chapter 7
proceeding, and the debtor's estate was liquidated. The chapter 11 employment application was never ruled upon
by the bankruptcy court before the case was converted back to a chapter 7 proceeding. Certain bank creditors
objected to the $50,000 retainer and moved that it be returned to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
The bankruptcy court rejected this motion, holding that the retainer was authorized under 11 U.S.C. §§303(f) and
329 and was subject only to a review for the reasonableness of the retainer, and any fees charged by debtor's
counsel during the gap period under the provisions of II U.S.C. §329(b). The court held that it had no other duty
or authority to regulate the payment to professionals during the gap period. The Rundlett court ultimately ruled
against the creditors, fmding that they had not proven that either the retainer or the fees were excessive or improper
under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §329(b). [FN20] The court did not discuss the fees' priority under 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(2) nor the possibility of having any of the retainer avoided under the provisions of II U.S.c. §549.
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The Rundlett standard has not been fully adopted by other courts. Instead, a majority finding that gap period
professional fees should be entitled to priority treatment have adopted a "flexible standard" [FN21] for determining
whether gap period fees are entitled to priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(2). The cases of In re May
Lumber Co., [FN22] In re Shah International Inc. [FN23] and In re McNair Inc. [FN24] held that professionals
were entitled to retain compensation earned and/or retainers received [FN25] from the alleged debtors during the
gap period. These courts, however, held that all fees billed and paid during the gap period were subject to review
by the bankruptcy court in the event a debtor "wound up" in bankruptcy. [FN26] These courts recognize the
importance of an alleged debtor being allowed to hire competent counsel to either defend itself against an
involuntary petition or, ultimately, to guide it through a chapter 11 proceeding. As noted by the Shah International
court:
For a debtor to be successful in chapter 11, it is imperative that the debtor have skilled legal counsel. As was
stated in In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181, "It will sometimes be difficult to obtain competent counsel in
anticipation of a bankruptcy proceeding unless the lawyer's [mancial well-being can be assured to some extent."
Equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction (*47Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99,
103, 87 S.Ct. 274, 277, 17 L.Ed.2d 197 (1966», and legal counsel have rights, as do other persons in the case.
One right is a reasonable opportunity to be paid in a bona fide case, whether commenced by a voluntary or an
involuntary petition. A putative debtor should not be prevented from obtaining skilled counsel solely because the
debtor is in bankruptcy only because creditors succeeded in filing an involuntary petition prior to the time the
debtor filed a voluntary petition. [FN27]
The May Lumber line of cases represents the middle ground between the strict limitations on employment of
counsel in Hanson and the virtually unfettered discretion of potential debtors enjoyed under the Rundlett case. May
Lumber places reasonable limits on a potential debtor's ability to direct professionals to guard against the
overzealous advocacy decried in Hanson, yet still permits the potential debtor the right to seek competent counsel
to defend itself or guide it through a bankruptcy in the event it must enter a chapter 11.
Conclusion: What's a Poor Debtor's Attorney to Do?
Given the wide divergence of case law, professionals for an alleged debtor must carefully weigh their options
before accepting the representation. The best of all worlds would be to receive a fair retainer from the alleged
debtor and apply that retainer against all fees earned during the gap period before entering bankruptcy. Even the
Hanson line of cases does not discuss requiring the return of professional fees or a retainer, except in the context of
preference litigation. However, this course of action does have the drawback of possibly presenting an alleged
debtor's bankruptcy counsel with an adverse interest to the debtor should the case ultimately be converted to a
chapter 11, unless counsel seeks specific approval of payments as part of the employment application. However,
this risk is not very different from the risk all chapter 11 attorneys run every day by accepting any fee payment in
the 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing, which could be challenged in any chapter 11 proceeding that bankruptcy
attorneys routinely defend as being made in the ordinary course of business.
Second, in a hotly contested case, the alleged debtor's counsel could move for approval of their fees under the
provisions of §363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under 11 U.S.c. §303(f), in unadjudicated involuntary cases II
U.S.C. §363 still prohibits the sale, use or transfer of a debtor's assets outside the ordinary course of business
without court approval. If there is a question about paying a retainer or fees during the gap period, a bankruptcy
court could authorize the payment to the debtor's counsel under 11 U.S.C. §363 during this gap period, thereby
giving some assurance of being paid for its work during the gap period. Unfortunately, this is a rather cumbersome
and untried procedure that, given the nature of a hotly contested involuntary proceeding, may get lost in the shuffle
and become just another bargaining chip concerning the fate of the entire involuntary case.
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Finally, in the event that the involuntary case ultimately becomes a chapter II proceeding, debtor's counsel can
petition the bankruptcy court for approval of employ-ment nunc pro tunc to the date the involuntary petition was
actually filed, thereby converting the gap period fees to ordinary professional fees under 11 U.S.C. §§330 and 331.
Alternatively, professionals could also seek implicit approval of all payments made during the gap period by full
disclosure in their employment application. This [mal option is apparently one of the most often used by counsel in
involuntary cases, and offers a fair degree of protection. The bankruptcy court will be apprised of all payments of
gap period fees when the application is made for employment, thereby fulfilling a professional disclosure
requirement. The bankruptcy court and all creditors-in-interest can object to those payments as part of the
employment application, and if they fail to do so, they could be estopped from contesting the payment at a later
date. However, absent a specific rmding in a bankruptcy court's order employing counsel that the payments made
during the gap period were made in the ordinary course of a debtor's business and are entitled to priority under 11
U.S.C. §507(aX2), the issue of any gap period retainer or payments will still remain in doubt despite the implied
approval.
In short, the travails of a potential debtor's professionals in an involuntary bankruptcy case are in many instances
far worse than those of professionals in a voluntary case. Indeed, given the uncertainty surrounding the payment of
gap period fees, 11 U.S.C. §327 may appear to be an "easy" and reasonable standard for debtor's counsel to meet
as opposed to the rather threadbare patchwork quilt of statutes governing employing and paying of counsel in gap
period cases.
[FNl]. See 11 U.S.c. §§303 and 502(f).
[FN2]. See 11 U.S.c. §327.
[FN3]. See 11 U.S.C. §327; In re McNair Inc., 116 B.R. 746 (Bankr. S.D. CaL 1990) (order approving
employment of counsel for potential debtor not required under either 11 U.S.C. §327 or 329).
[FN4]. See 11 U.S.C. §303(f), which provides: "Notwithstanding §363 of this title, except to the extent that the
court orders otherwise, and until an order for relief in the case, any business of the debtor may continue to operate,
and the debtor may continue to use, acquire or dispose of property as if an involuntary case concerning the debtor
had not been commenced."
[FN5]. See 11 U.S.C. §363.
[FN6]. See 11 U.S.c. §502(f), which provides that in an involuntary case, a claim arising in the ordinary course of
the debtor's business or [mancial affairs after the commencement of the case but before the earlier of the
appointment of a trustee and the order for relief shall be determined as of the date such claim arises, and shall be
allowed under subsection (a), (b) or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the
same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.
[FN7]. See In re Manufacturer's Supply Co., 132 B.R. 127 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (claims that arise in the gap
period that do not arise in the ordinary course of a debtor's business are general unsecured claims).
[FN8]. See 11 U.S.c. §549(a)(b), which provides: "Except as provided in subsections (b) or (c) of this section, the
trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate (1) made after the commencement of the case and (2)(a) that is
authorized only under §303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or (b) that is not authorized under this title or by the court. In
an involuntary case, the trustee may not avoid under subsection (a) of this section a transfer made after the
commencement of such case but before the order for relief to the extent any value, including services, but not
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including satisfaction or securing of a debt that arose before the commencement of the case, is given after the
commencement of the case in exchange for such transfer, notwithstanding any notice or knowledge of the case that
transferee has."
[FN9]. Id.
[FNlO]. 90 B.R. 405 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
[FNll]. Id. at 408.
[FNI2]. Id. at 408 n.2.
[FN13]. Id. at 414.
[FNI4].3 B.R. 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
[FN15]. 84 B.R. 32 (Bankr. £.0. Pa. 1988).
[FN16]. 22 B.R. 543 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
[FN17]. 47 B.R. 977 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd. on other grounds, 790 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1986).
[FN18]. 9 B.R. 257 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1981).
[FN19]. 137 B.R. 144 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1992).
(FN20]. [d. at 148.
[FN21]. See In re May Lumber Co., 135 B.R. 368 (Bankr. W.O. Mo. 1992); In re Shah International Inc., 94 B.R.
136 (Bankr. E.O. Wis. 1988).
[FN22]. 135 B.R. at 368.
[FN23]. 94 B.R. at 136.
[FN24]. 116 B.R. 746 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990). See, also, In re Matter of Sun Spec Industries, 3 B.R. 703 (Bankr.
S.O.N.Y. 1980); In re Labrum & Ooals LLP, 1998 WL 341933 (Bankr. E.O. Pa. June 25, 1998).
(FN25]. In Shah International, the debtor's counsel were permitted to retain mortgages as a retainer for their fee,
although the court held that the mortgages secured all administrative claims in the chapter 11 cases, not just the
attorney fees of the debtor's counsel. 94 B.R. at 138-139.
(FN26]. The May Lumber court explained the "flexible standard" as follows:
1. A gap debtor may engage counsel of choice;
2. A gap debtor may pay counsel of choice what is mutually agreeable between debtor and counsel;
3. The aforesaid payment is subject to the test of reasonableness under the circumstances, if the debtor winds up
in bankruptcy; and
4. The bankruptcy judge is (hopefully) an expert in the area of reasonableness and thus, all fees are subject to his
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tender mercies.

[FN27]. 94 B.R. at 137-38.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Once upon a time, a hard-working Debtor's lawyer dropped dead from a heart attack on the eighteenth green of
his [FNl] favorite golf course. When he regained his senses, he was sitting at a huge gold desk in a beautiful office.
A white-winged being told him that he had died and that his services were needed in the afterlife. The lawyer,
somewhat surprised at his "[mal reward" and puzzled that people in heaven could go broke, protested that he was
tired of the law and asked that he be assigned to some other task. The winged being said that he understood and
that the lawyer only had to represent one debtor, in full compliance with all ethical rules and decisions, and then he
could rest for all eternity. The winged being then told him that he had 200 interesting prospective clients waiting in
his office. The lawyer, hoping that he could remember his legal ethics course, agreed and went to work. Two weeks
later, the winged being returned to the office and found the totally exhausted lawyer collapsed over his desk. The
lawyer jumped up and screamed that he couldn't represent any of the 200 or so "clients" who had come through his
door because of massive case conflicts, the unethical behavior of the person seeking to file bankruptcy, or conflicts
with one or more of the lawyer's prior clients. The lawyer protested that this wasn't a very fair way to run heaven.
The *48 winged being turned away, revealing a set of well-concealed horns and a long, red, pointed tail, and
sneered as he left: "Who told you this was heaven?" [FN2]
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy ethics problems have confronted attorneys since the time of the earliest English Bankruptcy laws.
[FN3] Numerous cpmmentators have observed that the duties that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on Debtors are
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complex and demanding. [FN4] Although the duties of the Debtor in Possession [FN5] are somewhat well-defined,
[FN6] recently courts have *49 begun to reexamine the extent and scope of the duties owed by the court-appointed
attorneys [FN7] for the Bankruptcy Estate (hereinafter "Estate Counsel") and the Creditors' Committee (hereinafter
"Committee Counsel"). [FN8]
In this Article, we'll discuss the emerging case law concerning the nature and scope of Counsel's duties to the
Bankruptcy Estate. Part I begins this task with a brief overview of the duties of Debtors in Possession in chapter 11
and Debtors in chapter 13 cases. Part II reviews the case law concerning the duties of Estate Counsel and
Committee Counsel, concentrating primarily on the duties of Estate Counsel, and it concludes that there are no
clear answers to the questions about the nature and scope of Estate Counsel's duties. [FN9] Part III discusses the
tension between the fiduciary duties of Estate Counsel in a reorganization and the traditional rules governing
attorney ethics. Part IV creates, from the hazy misconceptions proffered in judicial opinions discussing this issue, a
workable standard for Estate Counsel. That standard starts with the proposition that Estate Counsel represents the
Estate--not its principals, not any of its creditors, but the Estate. [FNIO] Keeping that proposition in mind, we can
then recast *50 questions of alleged Estate Counsel misconduct. We can ask whether Estate Counsel was acting to
benefit the Estate (or, at least, whether Estate Counsel intended to benefit the Estate). We can ask whether, instead,
Estate Counsel had an impermissible conflict of interest (by acting to benefit, e.g., officers, directors, shareholders,
or individual creditors). We can ask whether Estate Counsel's conflict of interest caused it to violate Bankruptcy
Rule 9011. And we might even get some answers.
As a fmal introductory note, we wish to point out that, even though we disagree with the law that some of the
courts used in certain opinions discussing the duties of Debtors in Possession and/or Estate Counsel, few, if any, of
those cases were "wrong" [FN11] on the facts. The judges writing in this area have attempted to uphold high
standards of conduct, both in an effort to address issues in the cases before them and to provide some guidance on
ethical issues for Estate Counsel to follow. Still, the question arises as to whether these individual opinions, when
read together, have built a stairway to a heaven of ethical practice or paved a road to that region of hell where
endless ethical quandaries and impossible conflicting duties torment lawyers as in the story at the beginning of this
Article. [FN12]
1. VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE: THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF A DEBTOR IN POSSESSION IN A
REORGANIZATION CASE
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty? [FN13]

In this oft-cited [FN14] discussion of fiduciary law, Justice Felix Frankfurther set forth the three primary issues in
any discussion of fiduciary duty:
(1) To whom does the fiduciary owe duties?
*51 (2) Does a fiduciary owe fiduciary duties to additional parties besides the beneficiary?
(3) What is the scope of those duties? With Justice Frankfurter's road map in mind, we'll briefly review the
duties that Debtors and/or DIPs owe in bankruptcy cases.
A. An Extremely Brief Overview of Bankruptcy

Under the current Bankruptcy Code, there are five different forms, or chapters, of relief available [FN15] to
entities seeking the protection of bankruptcy law: chapter 7 (Liquidation), [FN16] chapter 9 (Adjustment of Debts
of a Municipality), [FN17] chapter 11 (Reorganization), [FN18] chapter 12 (Adjustment of Debts of a Family
Farmer), [FN 19] and chapter 13 (Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income). [FN20]
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Let's talk ftrst about what we won't be discussing. Chapter 7 cases, which comprise the bulk of bankruptcy filings,
[FN21] don't require the debtor to assume any fiduciary duties, [FN22] and so any further discussion of the chapter
7 debtor's duties is beyond the scope of this Article. [FN23] Chapter 9 municipal filings are exceedingly rare, and
due to the very nature of the Debtor and DIP, are subject to ftduciary issues and concerns that are unique and that
will likewise not be addressed here. [FN24] Chapter 12 bankruptcies are a *52 hybrid form of reorganization, with
characteristics of both chapter 11 and chapter 13 cases. [FN25] For purposes of this Article, however, the fiduciary
duties of a chapter 12 DIP are sufficiently similar to the duties of a chapter II DIP [FN26] that they will be
subsumed in the section discussing the chapter 11 DIP's fiduciary duties. [FN27]
B. Duty of DIPs in Chapter II
It is beyond all speculation that DIPs managing the affairs of a Bankruptcy Estate are fiduciaries. [FN28]
Nonetheless, courts are divided as to (I) the parties to whom the fiduciary duties are owed, [FN29] and (2) the

nature of those duties. [FN30]
1. "I am the Master!" [FN31]
The question as to whom Debtors in Possession owe their fiduciary duties has produced essentially two lines of
case authority. [FN32] The older (minority) line of cases [FN33] holds that a Debtor in Possession has a fiduciary
obligation to the creditors of the Bankruptcy Estate to "protect and conserve the property in his possession for the
beneftt *53 of creditors." [FN34] Under these decisions, DIPs don't owe any fiduciary duties to parties other than
the secured [FN35] and unsecured creditors of the estate. [FN36] These duties, however, don't run to any speciftc
, creditor but rather to the body of secured and unsecured creditors as a whole. [FN37] This line of cases has been
the subject of significant criticism. [FN38]
The majority line of cases takes a far broader view of the parties to whom Debtors in Possession owe fiduciary
duties. [FN39] According to these cases, DIPs are "officers of the court" [FN40] who have a fiduciary duty to act
in the best interests of the Bankruptcy Estate qua Estate, including its creditors, equity interest holders, and
possibly even other parties in interest. [FN41] Even though~~prior to insolvency--officers and directors of a
corporation, [FN42] partners in a partnership, and individuals [FN43] have little or no duty to their *54 creditors,
other than any duties set forth in a creditor's debt instrument, [FN44] the entity's insolvency or its filing of a
bankruptcy petition creates a ftduciary duty in favor of the Bankruptcy Estate's creditors. [FN45] But the creation
of a fiduciary duty to creditors does not exclude a concomitant duty to equity interest holders, or--in the case of an
individual chapter 11 or 12 case--to the Debtor who filed the case. [FN46] Indeed, the Supreme Court, in
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, [FN47] held that the fiduciary duty of a DIP runs to the
equity holders as well as to the creditors. [FN48] The Supreme Court noted the limited nature of that duty, stating:
[T]he fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors.
[R]espondents do not explain why, out of all management powers, control over the attorney-client privilege should
remain with those elected by the corporation's shareholders. Perhaps most importantly, respondents' position
ignores the fact that bankruptcy causes fundamental changes in the nature of corporate relationships. One of the
painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors. In
cases in which it is clear that the estate is not large enough to cover any shareholder claims, the trustee's exercise of
the corporation's attorney-client privilege will benefit only creditors, but there is nothing anomalous in this result;
rather, it is in keeping with the hierarchy of interests created by the bankruptcy laws. [FN49]
The language of Weintraub, in some respects, harmonizes the older "creditor duty only" cases by indicating that
a DIP's duty to equity holders ends in cases where "the *55 estate is not large enough to cover any shareholder
claims." [FN50] In most of the "creditor duty only" cases, the Bankruptcy Estate was already clearly insolvent.
Given the significant amount of case law [FN51] restricting the state law rights of shareholders where the Debtors
are insolvent or the existence of equity is highly questionable, a fmding of "creditor duty only" is understandable.
[FN52]
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2. "What is Thy Bidding, My Master?" [FN53]
It is bad enough that the DIP may not know which interests must be served. But the problem gets worse: the
exact nature and extent of those duties is also open to serious debate. [FN54] Courts considering the question of
whether a chapter 11 DIP has met its fiduciary duties to the Bankruptcy Estate have applied two different
standards: [FN55] the "corporate fiduciary" standard (FN56] and the "common-law trustee" standard. [FN57]
The majority line of cases holds that the fiduciary duties that DIPs owe to the Bankruptcy Estate is similar to the
duties that officers and directors of a solvent corporation owe their shareholders outside bankruptcy. [FN58] Under
this standard, DIPs are *56 prohibited from any form of self-dealing, including taking a corporate opportunity at
the expense of the estate. [FN59] Further, DIPs must exercise reasonable care in making decisions but, once those
decisions have been made, they are protected by the business judgment rule. (FN60] DIPs simply have to act in the
best interests of the Bankruptcy Estate. (FN61]
The standard of care under the "common-law trustee" line of cases isn't that much different from the standard of
care under the "corporate fiduciary" standard--it's just more stringent. The primary differences between the two
standards are: 1) common-law trustees may be liable for ordinary negligence in the performance of their duties, but
more than mere negligence is required under the "corporate fiduciary" standard, (FN62] and 2) common-law
trustees may have a higher duty to reveal information surrounding a proposed transaction. [FN63]
The author of one Note on this issue has argued that the "corporate fiduciary" standard is too lenient, advocating
instead the adoption of the "common-law trustee" standard in order to more completely prevent the DIP from
placing its own self-interest ahead of the interests of the Estate. [FN64] As creative as that suggestion is, we
believe that, in practice, these two different standards are actually applied as if they were the same standard, and
they impose similar duties on the DIP. [FN65]
In one of the leading series of cases under the "corporate fiduciary" line, Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re
Schipper), [FN66] the bankruptcy court, [FN67] district court (FN68] and court of appeals [FN69] all noted that
they would have come to the same result in ruling on *57 a section 363 sale using either the "corporate fiduciary"
or "common-law trustee" standard. Further, the Bankruptcy Code's extreme concern over insider dealing [FN70]
reduces even further any meaningful differences between the two standards. [FN71]
We conclude, then, that the duty of a DIP, like that of a chapter 11 trustee, [FN72] is a strictly enforced version
of the "corporate fiduciary" standard. Although this standard isn't the highest available, it clearly requires DIPs to
place the interests of the Bankruptcy Estate above their own interests, [FN73] and the Code has sufficient
protective mechanisms to ensure compliance. [FN74]
C. Duty of Debtors in Chapter 13

The conduct of a Debtor [FN75] in chapter -13 cases is governed by a fairly comprehensive [FN76] set of
statutory guidelines instead of the somewhat more strict and yet more nebulous concept of "fiduciary duty." In a
chapter 13, the Debtor has no separate affirmative duty to the Bankruptcy Estate (such as recovering preferences,
etc.) other than the general duties required of all Debtors under section 521. [FN77] But chapter 13 Debtors still
have some obligation to creditors. [FN78] In a chapter 13 case, the Debtor can put her interests ahead of the
interests of the creditors and other parties in interest so long as she complies with the provisions of chapter 13 in
formulating a plan (FN79] and acts in "good faith." [FN80]
Chapter 13's good faith standard is really chapter 13's substitute for the DIP's fiduciary duties in chapter 11.
[FN81] Put simply, good faith requires that, under the facts and *58 circumstances of a given chapter 13 case, the
court can fmd that the Debtor's proposed treatment of her creditors is fair and equitable. [FN82] Indeed, given the
mass of litigation surrounding the issue of good faith in chapter 13, it's impossible to devise a more meaningful
defmition. [FN83] For purposes of our discussion, however, it's clear that the chapter 13 Debtor's good faith hurdle
is far lower than the chapter 11 DIP's fiduciary "high-jump bar." [FN84]
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II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF ESTATE COUNSEL (FN85]
It is not easy for a debtor in possession, corporate or individual, to serve two masters--juggling the personal needs
and desires of the debtor itself, with its clear fiduciary responsibilities to unsecured creditors, other parties in
interest and the court.
Nor is the role any easier for the attorney who represents the debtor in possession. [FN86]
The above quotation, although an understatement of classic proportions, aptly illustrates the difficulties faced by
Estate Counsel in all chapter II and 12 cases and, to a greatly reduced extent, by the Debtor's counsel in chapter 13
cases. [FN87] This difficulty *59 arises primarily from the unusual nature of bankruptcy cases.
In the vast majority of American civil litigation, there are generally only two sides to a dispute. Bankruptcy
reorganizations, especially large business chapter lis, can involve dozens, if not hundreds, of different players, all
with different interests. [FN88] But most of the rules governing the ethical conduct of attorneys are still based on
the "advocacy model," [FN89] which is itself premised on the "two-sided" aspects of litigation. (FN90] As
Professor John Ayer has observed, " a n oddity about bankruptcy is that it doesn't fit... the litigation model very
well." [FN91] Although civil litigation has been (accurately) described as "warfare without guns and bombs,"
bankruptcy--with its lengthy negotiations, ever-shifting alliances among various parties, [FN92] and numerous
administrative requirements--can best be described as "diplomacy without embassies or spies." [FN93] It is the sad
lot of the Estate Counsel to attempt to represent the Bankruptcy Estate without either going too far and stepping
into active control of the Estate's business operations [FN94] or doing too little and behaving as a "mere
mouthpiece" of the DIP's management--the actual humans controlling the business operations. [FN95]
A. The Fiduciary Duty to the Bankruptcy Estate in Chapter II Cases

Estate Counsel is supposed to owe its allegiance to the Bankruptcy Estate [FN96] and not to the principals of the
Estate. [FN97] In acting in this capacity, Estate Counsel's duties are "equivalent" to those of the DIP. [FN98] In
particular, Estate Counsel can't close his eyes to *60 matters having legal consequences to the Estate, [FN99]
especially when the DIP may not be acting in the Estate's best interests. [FNlOO]
This fiduciary duty means that Estate Counsel may not act as a hired gun [FNlOI] for the DIP but instead must
consider the instructions that he receives from his client to ensure " t hat he or she is receiving valid instructions
from a competent fiduciary acting within the scope of the fiduciary's trust." [FN102] This charge to "double-check"
the DIP's bona fides poses a number of practical problems, given that the interests of the DIP controlling the Estate
are different from the interests of the Estate itself. Therefore, it's nearly impossible to draw the line as to the
propriety of instructions. [FN103] It is possible, though, to review the existing case law and give some guidance as
to what courts have required Estate Counsel, as fiduciaries, to do in certain discrete areas.
B. Special Issues

1. Duty of Estate Counsel to Investigate the DIP/Bankruptcy Estate
One of the first problems that Estate Counsel must address is how thoroughly it must investigate the Debtor in
Possession's own affairs. [FN104] Although one court has held that "since ... a debtor in possession has no duty to
investigate his own [mancial affairs, it follows that his professionals have no such duty either," [FNI05] this view
is clearly in the minority. The better reasoned majority view holds that Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure ("BRP")
9011 provides a baseline for an attorney's behavior. [FNI06] BRP 9011 requires that the signature of an attorney
on every "petition, pleading, motion, or other paper served or filed in a case under the Code" [FN107] constitutes a
certification that the attorney has *61 reviewed the document and:
that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
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well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation or administration of the case. [FN 108]
What constitutes "reasonable inquiry" is determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. [FN109]
There is a split of authority as to whether reasonable inquiry should be judged from the point of view of a
reasonable bankruptcy practitioner [FNllO] or from a reasonable attorney who doesn't specialize in bankruptcy
practice. [FN 111 ]
2. Duty of Estate Counsel as to Fees, Retainers, and Applications for Employment
All counsel appointed by the bankruptcy court, both Committee Counsel and Estate Counsel, [FNl12] need first
to get hired and, later, get paid. (FN113] The duties associated with motions to appoint counsel and with fee
applications arise from ancient [FN114] concerns that attorneys and other court professionals might loot Estates for
their own benefit and the benefit of insiders. (FNI15]
Under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 327 and BRP 2014, an attorney, before being employee as Estate Counsel
or Committee Counsel, must file an application for employment [FN116] that makes full disclosure of that
attorney's connections with the Debtor, *62 creditors, and other parties in interest. [FNI17] The application, in the
case of Estate Counsel, must also make full disclosure of any "compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such
payment or agreement was made after one year before the date of the filing of the petition, for services rendered or
to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with the case by such attorney, and the sources of such
compensation." [FN 118] Even a brief review of the disinterestedness standard and fee awards is beyond the scope
of this Article, but we feel compelled to remind all Estate and Committee Counsel that they have a fiduciary duty
(FNI19] to make those full and complete disclosures required under 11 U.S.C. § 327 [FN120] and 11 U.S.c. § 329
. [FNI21] If there is any question as to whether certain information is pertinent, attorneys should take the
conservative approach and disclose. [FN122] Although later in this Article we discuss the various forms of
sanctions that courts have imposed on Estate Counsel for violations of their fiduciary duties, [FN 123] one mention
here is particularly apt: two courts of appeal have held recently that the appropriate remedy for an attorney failing
to disclose the source of his retainer is the denial of all requested fees. [FN 124]
The attorney also has a duty not to require the Debtor to pay a retainer so large as to endanger ongoing
operations. [FNI25] In the infamous Bankruptcy Act case of In re Arlan's Department Stores, Inc., [FNI26] Estate
Counsel demanded and received a retainer of $125,000. This fee was paid in cash by Arlan's officials, who
collected the receipts of several Arlan's stores in the Detroit area and flew the money to Estate Counsel's office in
New York City, [FNI27] where a partner of the firm acting as Estate Counsel "counted out five, ten and twenty
dollar bills and apparently quarters, dimes, nickels and pennies as well." [FN128] This retainer represented a
significant amount of the Debtor's available cash and was not disclosed to the bankruptcy court until six months
after the bankruptcy petition was filed. For a number of reasons, [FNI29] including the nature of the retainer, the
*63 Estate Counsel was denied all compensation. [FNI30] Overall, Arlan's stands for the principle that counsel,
especially Estate Counsel, owes two duties in every case: one to the client, and one to the court. [FN13 1]
3. Duty to Address Motions Filed By Creditors
A related issue arises when the DIP instructs Estate Counsel to oppose a motion to convert, a motion for the
appointment of a trustee, [FN132] or a plan of reorganization proposed by a party other than the Debtor. [FNI33]
Estate Counsel must take care, in opposing such motions, not to elevate the interests of the DIP (and its
management) over the interests of the Estate. [FN134] Estate Counsel can't be compensated "for representing the
interests of the debtor or the debtor's directors, officers and/or shareholders in a manner which is adverse to, or
does not benefit, the estate or the creditors." [FN 135]
On the other hand, In re Office Products of America, Inc. [FN136] addresses the flip side of this restriction:
whether Estate Counsel could be compensated for proposing and attempting to obtain confirmation of a plan that
could succeed only through the "cramdown" provisions of section 1129 [FN137] but that was opposed by most of
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the creditors. In refusing to disallow all fees (under a theory that such actions were a breach of Estate Counsel's
fiduciary duty), the court held:
There are serious policy ramifications to such a holding, however, which argue against deciding the case on that
basis. The cramdown provisions of the Code are an expression of congressional intent regarding the importance of
reorganization values even in the face of considerable *64 creditor opposition, provided those creditors' interests
are appropriately protected. Were we to hold here that pursuing those goals over the objections of creditors in and
of itself created a conflict of interest, lawyers would be discouraged from even representing debtors in the face of
creditor opposition (even if the plan could pass muster under § 1I29(b», for fear of not being paid.
Such a result is so antithetical to the structure of the reorganization chapters that we must retreat from such a harsh
ruling. If there is a basis for the trustee's objections to the fees requested, this is not it (at least not under the facts of
this case). [FN138]
The Office Products court, however, went on to disallow Estate Counsel's requested fees for time spent opposing
conversion of the case to Chapter 7.
Although no court has articulated a comprehensive test of when Estate Counsel should follow the instructions of
the DIP in these situations, one court has suggested:
Counsel is charged with a "duty of diligence" and should be expected in every reorganization to make a "seasoned
determination" whether the debtor is capable of achieving successful reorganization. Attorneys will not be
compensated for vain attempts to resuscitate the debtor long after they should have given up the ghost. [FN139]
This test doesn't offer any bright lines, but it does suggest the absolute reaches of permissible conduct. When it
becomes clear that Estate Counsel's efforts can't reasonably benefit the Estate, those efforts must be abandoned.
4. The Duty to "Rat"
One of the most troubling fiduciary duties that Estate Counsel has in a bankruptcy case is the duty to report
improper conduct by the DIP to the Bankruptcy Court or other authorities. [FN140] In one of the earliest articles
on Estate Counsel ethics under the *65 Bankruptcy Code, Professor Ayer suggested that Estate Counsel might have
a duty to report wrongdoing by the DIP even though, at the time Ayer's article, there was no clear case law on the
issue. [FN141] Ayer's prescient statement of the law has been adopted by all courts that have considered this
position. [FN142]
Perhaps the first case to discuss Estate Counsel's duty to report wrongdoing on the part of the DIP was In re
Rusty Jones, Inc., [FNI43] where the court denied 60% of the requested fees of Estate Counsel due to numerous
violations of Counsel's fiduciary duty, [FN144] including Counsel's failure to inform the court of clear insider
misconduct relating to the postpetition operation of the Estate's business. [FN 145] This is scary stuff. Courts want
Estate Counsel to "rat" on the very people who are running the DIP. [FNI46]
Since Rusty Jones, numerous opinions have considered this question and have held that Estate Counsel has
breached, or would breach, the fiduciary duty by failure to disclose [FNI47] misconduct by the DIP in a number of
situations, including:
1. Undisclosed conflict of interest of another professional approved by the court; [FN148] 2.
Unauthorized use of Estate funds by the DIP; [FN149]
*66 3. Undisclosed insider relationship between the DIP and a prospective purchaser of the DIP's assets;
[FN150]
4. Failure to disclose that the DIP was refusing to pursue claims against insiders; [FN 151]
5. Failure to disclose that the DIP was putting its interests ahead of the interests of the Estate; [FN152]
6. Failure to disclose that the DIP was "incompetent"; [FNI53]
7. Failure to disclose conversion of Estate property by the DIP; [FN154] and
8. Failure to disclose concealment of Estate assets. [FN155]
But what acts by a DIP should Estate Counsel disclose? Ayer expressed frustration with that dilemma:
Suppose the client is not engaged in active concealment but has nonetheless engaged in conduct that may
be grounds for creditor action under the Bankruptcy Code: suppose, for example, he has made preferential
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transfers, or that he is running an insolvent administration. By defmition here, creditors could act, but it
may be that they are not acting. Does counsel, in her role as counsel for the DIP, have some obligation to
mobilize them to action? I know of no case that so holds, and it may be that we simply expect less of a
DIP in the exercise of his fiduciary obligation than we do of a trustee. But unless and until we defme the
status ofthe DIP in this situation, counsel's position is, at least, doubtful. [FN156]
*67 Bankruptcy attorneys' problems with the duty to disclose arise not from a fear of losing fees, [FN157]
but rather from a misperception as to the identity of their client. [FN158] But even federal courts have
difficulty with this issue. [FN159]
Practitioners and courts should focus on the fact that the Bankruptcy Estate, not the prepetition debtor
(either the business entity [FNI60] or an individual [FNI61]) is the Estate Counsel's client. [FNI62]
Although this advice is an excellent abstract concept, it's difficult to follow in practice. As the Bankruptcy
Court for New Jersey noted in In re Brennan: [FNI63]
Therefore, whether related parties controlled by the same individuals have the same professionals or
different professionals, the positions asserted by such parties will tend to be the same. In such
circumstances, requiring related parties to have different professionals is often nothing more than insisting
on a deceiving appearance of separateness at great added expense. [FN164]
*685. Duty to Police the DIP
Recently, several courts have begun to impose yet another fiduciary duty on Estate Counsel--that of actively
overseeing or policing the conduct of the Debtor during the pendency of a chapter 11 case. [FNI65] Even though
there is both scholarly authority [FNI66] and case law [FNI67] rejecting this duty as being both unfair and unwise,
the majority of courts that have considered this issue have found such a duty.
One of the first cases recognizing this duty was In re Davison. [FNI68] In Davison, the Bankruptcy Court
denied Estate Counsel all requested fees as a result of Counsel's failure to prevent the Estate from incurring nearly
$800,000 in unpaid postpetition debt. [FNI69] The court held "the manipulation of chapter 11 proceedings so as to
dissipate assets which may otherwise be available to creditors is recognized as a species of misconduct which may
justifY the denial of attorneys' fees or other professional fees." [FNI70] As harsh as this language was, at least the
Davison court didn't expressly hold that there was an affirmative duty to police the DIP. [FNI71]
The first case that found an affirmative duty to police was In re Sky Valley, Inc. [FNl72] In Sky Valley, the DIP
hired a consultant prepetition to manage the Estate's business, a ski and golf resort. [FNI73] There was insufficient
cash flow to pay the consultant, so the DIP decided to compensate the consultant [FNI74] by hiring a real estate
finn in which the consultant had an ownership interest to sell certain real estate that the Debtor owned. [FNI75]
Neither the DIP, nor its Estate Counsel, disclosed to the court that the "consultant" owned an interest in the real
estate firm, and the court approved the employment of the fmu. [FNI76] Subsequently, the real estate fmu sold
some real estate and received sales commissions without making proper application to the court for compensation.
To add *69 insult to injury, the DIP distributed the proceeds of the sale of real estate without the required court
approval. [FN177]
The court reduced Estate Counsel's attorneys' fees by approximately $40,000, citing Counsel's failure to
properly "supervise" the DIP: "In the instant case, Debtor's attorney failed in his responsibility to supervise the
auction process. Funds were expended for improvement of the property. Those expenditures were clearly outside
the ordinary course of business." [FNI78] The court reasoned that Estate Counsel failed to supervise the auction
process and, as a result, funds left the Estate without the requisite court approval. [FNI79] Since Sky Valley was
decided, other cases have reached similar results. In those cases, DIPs were committing outrageous violations of
the Bankruptcy Code and of their fiduciary duties with, at the very least, the quiet acquiescence of the Estate
Counsel. [FN180] Though it would be tempting to dismiss these cases as precedent for sanctioning the attorneys
for malpractice or incompetence, the cases unequivocally held that Counsel has a duty, not merely to advise, but to
police the DIP.
So where does Estate Counsel cross the unmarked line between conceptual control of a reorganization case and
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actually "taking over" the Debtor? There's no case law directly on point, but In re DeVlieg [FNI81] illustrates the
strange course of action that Estate Counsel may be forced to take in fulfilling any duty to police the DIP. The
DeVlieg case arose in the unusual context of the chapter II Trustee seeking to employ former Estate Counsel to act
as special counsel in a lawsuit against various insiders of the Debtor (including the corporate officers and
shareholders who hired the Estate Counsel). [FNI82] The lawsuit involved allegations of fraudulent conveyances
and breaches of fiduciary duty by insiders of the DIP (including the officer who had operated the Estate's business
before the appointment of the Trustee). [FNI83] This lawsuit was filed by Estate Counsel, without the
authorization of the DIP. [FNI84] Not surprisingly, the DIP and other insiders didn't like being sued, and they fired
the Estate Counsel. [FNI85] The U.S. Trustee's Office, upon learning of the reasons for the firing, moved to have
a chapter 11 Trustee appointed to administer the Bankruptcy Estate. [FNI86] The bankruptcy court granted that
motion, and it also granted a later motion by the chapter II Trustee to employ the *70 very same Estate Counsel as
special counsel to prosecute the lawsuit. [FNI87] The defendants in the lawsuit appealed. [FNI88] The district
court, in a careful and detailed opinion, affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding that there was no conflict of
interest between the Estate Counsel and the DIP who operated the Estate's business. [FNI89] But the district court
voiced its discomfort with the entire situation:
Indeed, the purpose behind the no-adverse-interest requirements of §§ 327(a) & (e) is to ensure objective advising
of the bankruptcy trustee. The concern with former counsel for the debtor is that they will not be in a position to
provide such advice. . .. In the present case, this concern does not appear to be implicated; as evidenced by the
timing and apparent circumstances of the filing of the LBO Litigation, RS & W may actually have begun acting in
the interest of the estate (and, in doing so, not necessarily following the direction of its then-client, the debtor) even
before a chapter II trustee had been appointed. Thus, the usual concern with employment of former counsel for the
debtor, residual loyalty to that client, would not appear to be a problem here.... In so noting, however, the Court
does not pass on whether such behavior would comply with applicable standards of professional responsibility.
[FNI90]
This case is distressing because it seems to indicate that, under some situations, Estate Counsel may be permitted
(or even required) to "take over" the operations of a Debtor from those individuals who are acting as the DIP. We
doubt that Estate Counsel's malpractice insurance covers the actual running of the client's affairs, and we think that
it's bad policy in general. [FNI91]
6. Special Issues in Individual Chapter II Cases
Representing a corporation can present numerous problems for Estate Counsel, [FNI92] but representing
individual Debtors in chapter II is even trickier: "The complex fiduciary duties of a chapter II
debtor-in-possession and its counsel can become even more confused when the debtor(s)-in-possession are
individuals." [FNI93] Obviously, there is the metaphysical challenge of realizing that the human who hired you to
file his *71 chapter II petition is not your client in the bankruptcy case. [FNI94] Even though it's fairly easy, at
least in theory, to understand that the president of a corporation or the managing partner of a partnership is not your
client when you are representing the business entity itself, it stretches the bounds of legal fiction to comprehend the
difference between the Bankruptcy Estate of an individual (your client) and the individual himself (not your client).
[FNI95]
A second issue is whether counsel for the pre-Debtor can perform extensive "prebankruptcy planning" to enable
the Debtor to shelter most of its assets from the Estate. Prebankruptcy planning is clearly at odds with the Estate
Counsel's fiduciary duty to the Estate. At some point in the prebankruptcy planning process, the pre-Debtor's
lawyer must fulfill his duty of zealousness to his client. On the other hand, once Estate Counsel is Estate Counsel,
the "pre" in "pre-bankruptcy planning" is over, and hiding (sheltering?) assets is a no-no. There's no clear-cut, easy
balance. NBR teaches the hoary old saw as a guiding principle: "pigs can be greedy, but hogs get slaughtered."
(Not an original tum of phrase, by any means.) We do want to point out one case that gave Estate Counsel plenty
of leeway on the prebankruptcy planning front. [FNI96] Brennan permitted the lawyers to act as Estate Counsel
even though, as part of the pre-Bankruptcy "probate" estate planning, the pre-Debtor, on the advice of counsel,
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placed millions of dollars out of the easy reach of creditors.
7. Fiduciary Duties of Counsel in "Global Settlement" Situations
An increasingly popular activity in bankruptcy cases in recent years has been participating in negotiations that
will result in a global settlement of all issues among the Debtor, its creditors and shareholders, and other related
parties. [FN197] Estate Counsel *72 must remember that the same fiduciary duties applicable to chapter 11
litigation extend to settlement negotiations. [FN198] Whenever Estate Counsel is striking a bargain on behalf of
the Estate, Counsel mustn't "cave" on the Estate's interests simply out of an exhausted need to seal the deal.
(FNI99] This is especially true when Estate Counsel attempts to negotiate payments to parties other than the
Bankruptcy Estate.
C. Sanctions Against Estate Counsel for Breaching His Fiduciary Duties
As a general rule, the sanctioning of an attorney lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. [FN200]
Therefore, a wide range of possible penalties can be imposed on Estate Counsel. [FN201] We can't even begin to
catalogue all of the types of punishment that a court can devise for a counsel who has failed to fulfill his fiduciary
duties. We've noted, though, four broad categories of sanctions (three formal and one informal) that courts have
imposed in these cases.
1. Disqualification
The first and most drastic [FN202] of the sanctions available to a court for abuses of an attorney's fiduciary duty
is disqualification. [FN203] Courts will refrain from disqualifying Estate or Committee Counsel in certain limited
situations where disqualification would work an undue hardship on the Estate, [FN204] but in most cases where
disqualification was appropriate, courts haven't hesitated to impose that sanction. [FN205]
*732. Sanctions Under BRP 9011 and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 [FN206] and BRP 9011 [FN207] are designed to penalize attorneys who file either
groundless or bad faith pleadings. Courts sometimes use these rules as a vehicle for punishing attorneys who
violate their fiduciary obligations in bankruptcy cases. Because the standard of conduct for violating either 28
U.S.C. § 1927 or BRP 9011 is much lower than that required for breaching an Estate Counsel's fiduciary duty,
though, neither of these rules is used with great frequency. [FN208]
3. Reduction or Denial of Fees
A long-forgotten comic once cynically remarked that "shooting an attorney in the heart wouldn't do much
damage, because that organ in attorneys is usually made of stone. If you want to hurt a lawyer, shoot him in his hip
pocket and get his wallet." This joke is in bad taste, [FN209] but it does reveal a long realized truth--taking
someone's money does hurt. [FN21O] In bankruptcy cases, it is also an easily applied sanction because all fees of
Committee Counsel and Estate Counsel must be reviewed and approved before they're paid. [FN211] Courts have
imposed a wide range of monetary sanctions, ranging from minor tweaking of fees [FN2l2] to outright denials of
all requested compensation against Estate Counsel and Committee Counsel who have failed to meet their fiduciary
obligations. [FN213] The exact deductions are generally fact-driven determinations.
The Sixth Circuit in In re Downs, [FN214] however, recently added a new twist to this issue. In Downs, under
rather unusual facts, the bankruptcy court found that counsel for a chapter 7 Debtor had violated section 329 by
failing to fully disclose the source of his $46,000 retainer. [FN215] The bankruptcy court originally denied all of
the Counsel's *74 fees, but upon reconsideration, sanctioned the attorney $20,000 and permitted him to file a fee
application for any fees under II U.S.c. § 330. [FN216] The district court affmned, but the Sixth Circuit reversed,
ruling that all fees had to be denied to an attorney "who exhibits a willful disregard of his fiduciary obligations
under § 329." [FN217] Although this ruling was made in a case involving disclosure of fees under section 329,
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there is a possibility that it could be applied in all cases involving breaches of Estate (or Debtor's) Counsel's
fiduciary duty, [FN218] which would make representing Bankruptcy Estates essentially an "all or nothing" venture.
[FN219]
4. Judicial Distrust
Finally, there's one more form of punishment that deserves mention: the problem of judicial distrust. In
bankruptcy cases, the reputation of an attorney, especially an attorney who regularly represents Debtors, is perhaps
the most valuable asset that the lawyer owns. If a court believes that an attorney has failed to act properly in regard
to his fiduciary duties as Estate Counse~ that belief will make the attorney's future bankruptcy practice that much
more difficult. [FN220] We aren't saying that bankruptcy judges have favorite counselor that they'll only work
well with the "regular" bankruptcy practitioners, but we are saying that bankruptcy judges, like anyone else, will
view an individual or firm with a good (or even unknown) reputation in a better light than they'll view someone
who has previously committed serious fiduciary and/or ethical breaches. [FN22I]
*75 D. Duty of Counsel for Chapter 13 Debtors
As we've already observed, [FN222] the Debtor in a chapter 13 case owes a duty of good faith that is much less
onerous than the duties imposed on a chapter II or chapter 12 DIP. [FN223] It's no surprise, then, that the duties of
Counsel for the chapter 13 Estate are also less exacting than those required of Counsel for a chapter 11 or chapter
12 Bankruptcy Estate. Indeed, Judge Keith Lundin has observed [FN224] that a chapter 13 attorney's primary
obligation, other than properly practicing the law, is to advise the chapter 13 Debtor of her rights and
responsibilities. [FN225] If chapter 13 Counsel totally ignores this duty, he may lose his fees, just as he would by
committing any other type of malpractice. [FN226]
E. Duty as an Officer of the Court
Of all the fiduciary duties that we've discussed, perhaps the oldest and least explored duty is that which all
attorneys owe in their role as "officers of the court." [FN227] *76 The leading description of that duty is found in
the Supreme Court case of Baker v. Humphrey: [FN228]
The legal profession is found wherever ... civilization exists. Without it society could not well go on. But, like all
other great instrumentalities, it may be potent for evil as well as good. Hence the importance of keeping it on the
high plane it ought to occupy. Its character depends upon the conduct of its members. They are the officers of the
law, as well as the agents of those by whom they are employed. Their fidelity is guaranteed by the highest
considerations of honor and good faith, and to these is superadded the sanction of an oath. [FN229]
Although there is no clear or precise defmition of this duty, the case law discussing it uses "duty" as almost a
judicial "smell" test, under which-- apparently--any honorable lawyer would be able to determine if his actions in a
case were appropriate or not. [FN230] Ah, if only all lawyers had the same olfactory ability.
In what has to be the leading discussion of this fiduciary duty, In re Ward, [FN23 I] the Fifth Circuit indicated
that, at a minimum, the duty as an officer of the court would require an attorney in a bankruptcy case to disclose to
the court the existence of any concealed assets [FN232] and probably any criminal activity that the attorney knew
might have taken place. [FN233] Although this duty is similar to the duty to "rat" discussed above, [FN234] it is
different because the lawyer owes it based on his status as an attorney at law, rather than based on any
court-approved appointment in a bankruptcy case. Further, this duty is owed directly to the court qua court, not
indirectly through an Estate Counsel's fiduciary duties vis-a-vis the Bankruptcy Estate. [FN235]

*77 F. Duty to the People: Bankruptcy Crimes and the Bankruptcy Attorney [FN236]
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The ultimate "rules" of bankruptcy ethics can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 through 157, [FN237] which are the
federal statutes directly relating to bankruptcy crimes. For example, section 157 deals explicitly with bankruptcy
fraud and is a recent addition to the federal criminal statutes. [FN238] Understanding what constitutes a bankruptcy
crime is a fairly simple task. It's also an important task-we've seen an increased emphasis in reviewing attorney
conduct in bankruptcy cases for evidence of possible criminal activity. [FN239]
The problem of "criminal" bankruptcy attorneys [FN240] isn't a new issue. [FN241] Nor is it confmed to
inexperienced or "poor" practitioners. [FN242] Although there are few reported cases involving attorneys who
have been convicted of "bankruptcy crimes," several instructive appellate court cases address this topic. [FN243]
By far the largest class of "bankruptcy crimes" for which attorneys have been convicted involve concealing assets
of the Bankruptcy Estate. [FN244] In United States v. Smithson [FN245], United States v. Center, [FN246] United
States v. Knoll, [FN247] and United States v. Parkhill, [FN248] attorneys were convicted of assisting their clients
in concealing assets from the Bankruptcy Estate in a plethora of ways. A brief review of these cases shows that the
attorneys in question were actively involved in the fraud, so their convictions were not unexpected.
*78 Far more troubling is the case of United States v. Zimmerman. [FN249] This case is one chapter of a trilogy
of cases [FN250] involving the ill-fated bankruptcies of Gary and Maree Levine and their furniture business, Sofa
Gallery, Inc. In Zimmerman, an attorney was charged, along with his law fIrm, [FN25l] his law partner, one of his
associate attorneys, [FN252] and certain clients of his law fIrm--with conspiracy to commit criminal fraud in
connection with the hiding of a client's assets from its creditors via the law fIrm's trust account. The attorney in this
case apparently had only minimal connections with the Debtor or the Debtor's counsel but was nevertheless
indicted and ultimately convicted on the strength of two Bankruptcy Court opinions that found that the attorney's
law fIrm was probably conspiring with the Debtor to hide assets. [FN253] The attorney's conviction was
overturned, and the case was remanded for a new trial. But the case still emphasizes the danger in this area even for
lawyers who don't directly oversee bankruptcy cases for their fIrm. [FN254]
G. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: [FN255] Three Bankruptcy Cases That Shook the World [FN256]
So far, our review of the case law on duties toward the Estate has convinced us of two things. First, in the
universe of permissible Estate Counsel conduct, courts have been able to isolate individual examples of good and
bad behavior, but they haven't been able to articulate a coherent, overall standard for attorneys to follow. Second,
the *79 semantic gymnastics that courts have used to justify the imposition of a fIduciary duty going beyond the
Estate to individual creditors have been based on the following false syllogism: It is simply not true that
Major premise 1 (correct): The DIP owes fIduciary duties to the Estate.
Major premise 2 (correct): The Estate Counsel owes fIduciary duties to his/her/its client, the Estate.
Minor premise (questionable at best): If the Estate is insolvent, it's "owned" by its creditors because there is no
value left in the Estate for its shareholders or other equity owners.
Conclusion (false): Therefore, the Estate Counsel owes fIduciary duties directly to each creditor.
We think that the best way to separate the correct assumptions from the unfounded ones requires a review of three
cases: our "good," our "bad," and our "ugly."
I. The Good: Louisiana Bank & Trust v. Anderson. [FN257]
Every so often, bankruptcy issues wander into the "real world" of law. In this case, the issue of whether Estate
Counsel was liable for alleged violations of its fIduciary duty to the creditors of the Bankruptcy Estate managed to
come before the Louisiana Court of Appeals. The facts of the case were fairly straightforward. In May 1982,
Underwater Completion Team, Inc. ("UCT") granted Louisiana Bank & Trust a security interest [FN258] in its
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accounts receivables. On November I, 1982, UCT filed a Chapter 11 case. [FN259] In approving the firm of
Anderson Anderson Hausey Rainack & Stakelum as Estate Counsel, the Bankruptcy Court ordered the law firm to:
(1) "exercise general supervision" of the operation of the Estate's business by the DIP; (2) take responsibility for
the DIP's "strict compliance with the terms of the Court's orders authorizing" the DIP to operate the Estate's
business and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code; and (3) "take all steps necessary to prevent any depletion of
the assets of the Estate ... and ... notifY the Court of any actual or threatened depletion ...." [FN260] Further,
the Court ordered the DIP not to use cash collateral [FN261] without prior Court approval. [FN262] *80
Unfortunately for the bank, the law firm advised UCT that the accounts receivable were not cash collateral because
the bank's security interest was unperfected under Louisiana law. Acting on that advice, UCT used $400,000 of
these receivables for daily operating expenses without first seeking the bank's permission or the court's approval.
[FN263] Unfortunately for the law finn, the Louisiana Supreme Court changed the law on perfection during the
chapter II case, which rendered the law finn's previous advice absolutely wrong. [FN264] The bank then sued the
law finn and others to recover the improperly used receivables. [FN265]
The basis of the suit against the law finn was that it breached the duties (imposed upon it by the bankruptcy
court) to the bank by advising the DIP that it could use funds collected from UCT receivables without court
approval. After reviewing the pleadings, the trial court granted the law finn's motion for summary judgment, ruling
that the DIP's law firm didn't owe the bank any fiduciary duty at all. [FN266] Like the trial court before it, the
Louisiana Court of Appeals found, as a matter of law, that the law firm didn't owe a fiduciary duty directly to the
bank:
We are convinced that should we adopt the construction advocated by Louisiana Bank & Trust, it would turn the
established concept of an attorney obligation to his client on its head. Most particularly, as we appreciate Louisiana
Bank & Trust's argument, should we find that defendants owed an extended duty to it, we would be allowing
Louisiana Bank & Trust to seek damages from an attorney, not its attorney, for the attorney's giving of correct
advice to UCT, at least correct at the time the advice was given. We agree with the fmdings of the trial judge that
the Bankruptcy Court order did not deviate to this extent from the concept of duty established in the Rules of
Professional Conduct for the relationship between an attorney and his client. Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court's dismissal of Louisiana Bank & Trust's claim on a motion for summary judgement was properly entered
since there was no duty on defendants' part which extended to the protection of its client's creditor. [FN267]
This case and another one, In re Derringer, [FN268] together stand for the proposition that Estate Counsel
generally owes no duties directly to third-party creditors. [FN269] Although the *81 fiduciary duty to creditors
generally is still an open question, [FN270] there shouldn't be any duty to a particular creditor. But we also must
point out that the law firm in this case ran a real risk by advising its client that the collateral in question was
defmitely not cash collateral.
2. The Bad: In re Bonneville Pacific Corp. [FN271]
A frequent nightmare for attorneys who represent Estates is discovering that the client for whom they have
worked so hard is being run by a bunch of crooks. The Bonneville [FN272] case is the ultimate example of that
nightmare: the prepetition debtor was not only operated by a group of criminals, [FN273] but these same criminals
were assisted in some respects by the Debtor's prebankruptcy counsel, [FN274] and some of the same questionable
practices may have occurred not just before, but during, the case. [FN275] The court roundly criticized both Estate
Counsel and Committee Counsel for their failure to properly investigate the activities of the Debtor and bring that
information to the court. [FN276]
The prebankruptcy Debtor in Bonneville seems to have been simply playing a large con game, which created
most of its value by engaging in creative trades of either exaggerated or nonexistent assets. [FN277] On December
5, 1991, it fIled a voluntary chapter II petition. The Estate at first attempted to hire its prebankruptcy attorneys as
primary Estate Counsel, but that application was refused by the bankruptcy and district courts and by the court of
appeals, [FN278] although those attorneys were ultimately employed as special counsel. The Debtor's local
bankruptcy counsel was given the task of acting as Estate Counsel. The case then proceeded normally until a series
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of hearings started *82 to paint the picture of a very troubled Debtor. [FN279] The court believed that all of these
events, taken together, should have signaled Estate and Committee Counsel that something was amiss. [FN280]
In spite of these "warnings," the Estate and Committee Counsel still took no action to investigate, even in a
minimal way, the actions of the Debtor. [FN281] On May 14, 1992, the unsecured Creditors' Committee and the
Estate filed a joint motion for extension of the exclusivity period. [FN282] Relying in part on information obtained
from the examiner [FN283] that there was no great problem with current management, the committee and the
Estate urged the extension in the hope that a plan could be proposed to "meet everyone's needs." [FN284] No one
opposed the proposed extension, yet the court refused to grant it and warned Estate Counsel about filing an
incomplete or unconfmnable plan just to preserve exclusivity. [FN285] Four days after this hearing, the Debtor
did file an incomplete and unconfmnable plan. [FN286] Shortly thereafter, what can politely be described as "the
poop hitting the air circulation device" [FN287] occurred.
On June 10, 1992, Committee Counsel filed an application to withdraw as counsel, which the bankruptcy court
granted that same day. [FN288] The reason for withdrawal was the discovery that an attorney who was "of
counsel" with the Committee's Counsel was married to an insider of Bonneville's numerous subsidiaries, who in
turn had participated in a few of Bonneville's questionable transactions. [FN289] On June II, 1992, after fully
reviewing the examiner's report, the court sua sponte ordered the appointment of a trustee. At that point, all of the
Debtor's problems came to light.
This appointment might have ended matters except that the Estate Counsel then filed an application for fees. In
an earlier opinion in the case, [FN290] the court had denied Estate Counsel all fees due to its failure to investigate
the Debtor, its misrepresentation *83 of facts to the court, and its "dereliction of duty." [FN291] Some four years
later, this matter came before the court on a motion for reconsideration filed by former Committee Counsel.
[FN292] The result was a twenty-one page opinion that reaffirmed and expanded upon the court's previous ruling.
[FN293]
What is unusual about the last Bonneville opinion is that the court was critical of the Committee Counsel for its
failure to disclose the DIP's fraud and its "vigorous [] participation in and support of many of the efforts to protect
the insiders" [FN294] in violation of the Committee Counsel's duty to its own client, the unsecured creditors.
[FN295]
We admit that we're not experts on the facts underlying this case. Nonetheless, we believe that, from a review of
other case law in this area, the court's criticism of Committee Counsel was undeservedly harsh. It appears that any
comfort given by Committee Counsel to the Bonneville insiders was part of an effort to gain confmnation of a plan
that would have given the unsecured creditors some distribution, and that the Debtor's collapse would result in a
negligiable return to the unsecured creditors. Unless Committee Counsel had known that its clients' interests were
being harmed by the insiders or unless its knowledge of the fraud was so substantial and direct that it had a duty, as
an officer of the court, to report the fraud, the court's comments concerning Committee Counsel are probably
unwarranted. [FN296]
3. The Ugly: In re Perez [FN297]
In re Perez involved a chapter II case filed by an individual, Gary Ronald Perez. In reversing the confmnation
of his third amended plan of reorganization, which had been confirmed by the bankruptcy court and affmned by
the BAP, the majority opinion of the Ninth Circuit demonstrated a basic misunderstanding of the absolute priority
rule and dabbled in just enough bankruptcy theory to be dangerous.
*84 Along the meandering road to its conclusion reversing confmnation, the Perez majority tarried at what can
best be termed a mirage. The court, after a rather short discussion, held that the Debtor in Possession owed a
fiduciary duty, not to the Estate, or even to the creditors as a whole, but to "a creditor." [FN298] The majority
opinion, betraying a surprising naivete regarding the workings of bankruptcy cases, expressed shock at the idea that
the payment of a creditor's prepetition claim might be delayed during the pendency of the case. [FN299] Making a
cognitive leap backwards, the court then implied that th~ delay wasn't due to the regular progression of
reorganizations. Instead, the court attributed the delay to the tendency of many Debtors to capitalize on the fact that
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creditors have to expend funds on their own counsel to protect their interests in the case, thereby "prolong ing and
complicat ing bankruptcy proceedings" and running up the creditors' costs. [FN300]
After this grandstanding, the court set forth its normative vision of how counsel for the Debtor in Possession
should behave:
Counsel for the estate must keep ftrmly in mind that his client is the estate and not the debtor individually. Counsel
has an independent responsibility to determine whether a proposed course of action is likely to beneftt the estate or
will merely cause delay or produce some other procedural advantage to the debtor. While he must always take his
directions from his client, where counsel for the estate develops material doubts about whether a proposed course
of action in fact serves the estate's interests, he must seek to persuade his client to take a different course or, failing
that, resign. Under no circumstances, however, may the lawyer for a bankruptcy estate pursue a course of action,
unless he has determined in good faith and as an exercise of his professional judgment that the course complies
with the Bankruptcy Code and serves the best interests of the estate.
We make no fmding of wrongdoing here. [!!!] We simply remind counsel that his responsibility is to help lead the
estate on a just, speedy, inexpensive and lawful path out of bankruptcy. Failure to live up to this responsibility may
result in a reduction in allowable fees and other sanctions. [FN30 I]
*85 Because the majority opinion never reached the much more important issue of what "duty to the Estate"
means, [FN302] Perez manages to achieve the impossible. It is both a tautology (counsel representing the DIP must
make sure that the DIP fulftlls its duty to the Estate) [FN303] and a ftction (the court isn't making a fmding of
wrongdoing, but it is excoriating counsel for the DIP anyway). Moreover, Perez leaves unresolved the question of
whether it should be read to overrule the rather more sensible, if more cynical, holding in In re Sidco, Inc. [FN304]
In a variety of respects, Perez certainly is the "ugly" in our trilogy of cases.
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE "NEW" BURDENS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR ESTATE
COUNSEL AND THE ETHICS RULES
One of us (NBR) has already gone on record in claiming that the duty of counsel to "official entities" [FN305]
includes a duty to determine whether the adversary system *86 protects everyone with an interest in the bankruptcy
case. [FN306] There's a tension between a lawyer's duty of zealousness and the duty as an officer of the court.
When the duty of zealousness would require the lawyer to mislead the court, NBR argues that the lawyer's duty as
an officer of the court should be paramount. [FN307]
The adversary system presumes that each interested party is represented by competent, zealous counsel. When
that presumption is true, then the "official entities" can feel free to represent their clients without worrying that they
may be compromising their concomitant duty as officers of the court. When, however, the presumption fails--e.g.,
someone's interest isn't being represented by counsel, or the counsel isn't competent--NBR has suggested that
lawyers have a duty to compensate for the presumption's failure and, thus, have a duty to consider the interests of
those whom the adversary model doesn't protect. [FN308]
What complicates matters in bankruptcy cases is that counsel for the DIP is said to represent the "Estate," and
there's no consensus on exactly what representing the Estate means. The Estate wants to reorganize, but for whose
benefit? The managers? The shareholders? The creditors? Depending on which case or article you read, you get
different answers. [FN309] Moreover, the interests of the Estate's constituents [FN310] will vary during the case,
making the determination of appropriate interests a moving target. [FN311]
As our Parts I and II have shown, several cases have mentioned, without developing the concept, the DIP's
"obligation to the court." [FN312] Other cases have spent time *87 discussing the DIP's duty to the Estate, without
ever defining exactly what that means. [FN313] Still others have focused on the DIP's duty to the unsecured
creditors. [FN314] And some *88 courts (the most well-reasoned ones) reject a unitary defmition of a DIP's duty to
the Estate as being amorphous. [FN315] But until we know what the DIP's duty to the Estate is, it's difficult to
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relate the DIP's duty to the duty of Estate Counsel. [FN316]
We're not surprised by the reluctance to spell out exactly what the "Estate" is--such hesitance is natural. Defining
the Estate as any of the possibilities mentioned brings with it serious consequences:

DEFINITION OPTIONS

CONSEQUENCES

1. "Estate" encompasses the

Estate Counsel has to reconcile vastly

interests of the creditors and

differing interests without being accused

the equity owners.

of conflicts of interest.

2. "Estate" encompasses the

How do we determine solvency--and as of what

interests of creditors and

point? Solvency becomes a factor that

shareholders if it's solvent

leaves Estate Counsel liable based on

but only the interests of

20/20 hindsight.

[FN317]

creditors if it's insolvent.

3. "Estate" encompasses only the
interests of creditors.

Ignores weintraub; still creates unavoidable
conflicts between secured and unsecured
creditors.

4. "Estate" encompasses only the

Ignores Weintraub; still creates conflicts

interests of unsecured

based on (1) differing interests among

creditors.

unsecured creditors and (2) valuation
declines that make unsecured creditors out
of secured creditors.

5. "Estate" is too vague a

What guidance is that? Is that really a
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concept to be defined.

viable construct?

FN317. See Folly, supra note 44. If we really wanted to complicate things, we'd
throw in all of the different ways to determine "solvency," ranging from the
balance-sheet test to the "generally not paying debts as they become due"
standard. Let's face it: solvency is one of the most fluid concepts around.

*89 All of these options pose problems. But until we figure out just what the "Estate" is, courts are going to be
confused about the duties of Estate Counsel. Consequently, any increased risk that Estate Counsel will be held
liable in some courts but not in others will tend to make attorneys squeamish about taking on Estate representation.
[FN318]
We've therefore decided to adopt a combination of Options #1 and #5. We believe that, at least until facts clearly
establish otherwise, the Estate has to include the interests of creditors and owners. Lynn LoPucki and William
Whitford have made a good case for the proposition that the interests of the Estate are not limited to the interests of
its creditors. [FN319] After several groundbreaking studies in this area, they "conclude d that the *90 better view
is that management 'owes' fiduciary duties to both the creditors and the shareholders of an insolvent company, until
their claims or interests are extinguished as part of the reorganization case." [FN320]
Using Option #1 increases the risk that the Estate Counsel will be pulled in several directions at once. Insolvency
(or even borderline solvency) tends to create more risk-tolerance for junior interests than for senior interests. If the
only possibility of gain for the junior interests stems from having the management go to the racetrack and gamble
the company's cash, then the junior interests will be the ones handing management the *91 racing forms and the
senior interests will be the ones blocking management's access to the betting window. [FN321]
But Option #1, by itself, may be too cumbersome for Estate Counsel to use on a daily basis. Estate Counsel can't
each ask each day, "Is my client still arguably solvent, or have my duties switched over to creditors?" Option #5
provides us with a nice fmesse. It's not as good as spelling out the Estate's exact interests, but as long as we can be
clear that the DIP's duty is to the Estate, period, we can start to resolve the problem of fiduciaries that don't behave
as fiduciaries.
We've experimented with other solutions. One of these involved applying Geoffrey Hazard's analysis of
"triangular lawyer relationships" to the duties of Estate Counsel vis-a-vis the DIP and other parties in interest.
[FN322] Hazard drew a distinction between the relationship that ensues when a lawyer represents a client who
owes a fiduciary duty to a third party (the "lawyer--> guardian-->ward" relationship) and the relationship that
ensues when both a third party and the lawyer owe fiduciary duties to the lawyer's *92 client, but the lawyer deals
primarily with the third party (the "lawyer--> corporation <--officer" relationship). [FN323] As Hazard explains,
The difference in the vectors of obligation in these two triangular relationships is important. In the
lawyer-->guardian-->ward triangular relationship, the ward is the dependent person and the obligee of the
guardian, but the guardian is the dependent person and the primary obligee of the lawyer. In the
lawyer-->corporation<--officer relationship, the corporation is the dependent entity and the obligee of both the
lawyer and the corporate officer. This structural difference in obligations can help identify and defme the lawyer's
role in the two triangular relationships. [FN324]
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Hazard fleshes out his innovative theory by contrasting it with the traditional way in which a lawyer's relationships
with others are characterized. He characterizes the three traditional relationships that a lawyer may have as: (1) the
lawyer's relationship to the client (the client as "friend"); (2) the lawyer's relationship to the court (the court as
"father"); and (3) the lawyer's relationship to a third party (the third party as "foe"). (FN325] Deconstructing these
characterizations, [FN326] Hazard rejects these "simplistic nonnative premise s " [FN327] in favor of a "nonnal""antagonistic" dichotomy:
The difference between a "nonnal" triangular relationship and one contaminated by antagonism does not lie in
the structure of the relationship. Until fmally resolved or dissolved, the structure is ambiguously triangular, with the
nonlawyer parties being fellow clients, or antipodal, with the nonlawyer parties being antagonists. The proper
interpretation depends not on structure but on process--what has happened within the relationship. The relevant set
of happenings include, above all, what the lawyer has done in the relationship.

***

The critical problem the lawyer faces in triangular relationships is that his or her professional responsibilities
depend unavoidably on what the other two parties do for and to each other. The lawyer's duty cannot adequately be
defmed, as it nonnally is, by specifying ex ante the identity of "the client." Neither of the "relevant others" is a
legally freestanding person in the standard conceptual sense of "client." ... The corporation is not an individual at
all, but exists only in law and through personification by others who act ex officio. If *93 the other parties to the
relationship conduct themselves as the law contemplates they should, then all the "relevant others" collectively can
be considered "the client." That principle is already well established for corporations, and there seems to be no
reason not to think of guardianships and other triangular relationships in the same way. On the other hand, if the
dominant party is guilty of misconduct toward the dependent one and if the lawyer behaves as though everything
were still nonnal, the lawyer would then have at least an ethical problem and quite possibly legal liability. [FN328]
So how could we use Hazard's triangular relationship approach in analyzing the duties of counsel to the DIP or
trustee? In some sense, the courts that have struggled to fmd a fiduciary duty to creditors have instinctively applied
Hazard's analysis, which changes the lawyer's duty depending on "whether the dominant party [the DIP] is guilty of
misconduct toward the dependent one [the Estate]." [FN329] But those courts have just made the same cognitive
leap that we've been discussing: equating the Estate's interests with those of the Estate's constituents. Even if we
wanted to use Hazard's theory, we'd have to fonn more than a triangle. We'd have to fonn some sort of a pentagon.
[FN330]

N. BACK TO BASICS: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF THE ESTATE COUNSEL'S FIDUCIARY
DUTIES TO CREDITORS
Remember the false syllogism that some courts have created:
Major premise I (correct): The DIP owes fiduciary duties to the Estate.
Major premise 2 (correct): The Estate Counsel owes fiduciary duties to his/her/its client, the Estate.
Minor premise (questionable at best): If the Estate is insolvent, it's "owned" by its creditors because there's no
value left in the Estate for its shareholders (or other equity owners).
*94 Conclusion (false): Therefore, the Estate Counsel owes fiduciary duties directly to each creditor. [FN331]
A correct (if still incomplete) syllogism might be:
Major premise (correct): The Estate's decisions are made by the DIP or, if a trustee is appointed, by the trustee.
Minor premise (correct): Estate Counsel represents the Estate.
Conclusion (correct): Estate Counsel owes a fiduciary duty to the Estate directly, and not to any particular
constituents of the Estate.
If we're right--that the concept of "Estate" includes a multitude of interests and that we need to finesse the concept
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of "Estate" as being a single entity for purposes of functioning on a daily basis--then our syllogism makes the right
choices.
1. How "Specifying" and "Finessing" May Break the Transitive Relationship That Courts Are Establishing
Among the Estate, Constituent Interests of the Estate, and Estate Counsel.
Think of this possible restatement of the DIP's role: the DIP is the inchoate embodiment of the Estate, in much
the same way that corporate management is the inchoate embodiment of the fictional corporation. We acknowledge
that we're already getting a bit fuzzy here, since we're fmessing what that defmition will mean on a day-to-day
basis. [FN332] If the DIP is the embodiment of the Estate, then Estate Counsel must actually represent the Estate
and not just the "ordinary" conception of the DIP. [FN333]
Defming Estate Counsel's client as the Estate itself, and not just the management of the Estate, solves some
thorny problems. [FN334] For one thing, Estate Counsel can apply ethics rules relating to the "organization as
client" to deal with recalcitrant or downright dishonest management. [FN335] For another thing, thanks to
Weintraub, [FN336] Estate Counsel can *95 argue that the attorney-client privilege runs to the Estate and not to its
managers. That way, in those relatively few instances in which a bankruptcy court supplants the DIP with a trustee,
Estate Counsel can fulfill the fiduciary duty to the client (remember: the client is the Estate) by revealing to the
trustee the communications that Counsel has had with the management of the DIP. Those communications are still
privileged because the Estate, and not the DIP's management, holds the privilege. Acknowledging that the Estate
holds the privilege allows the newly appointed trustee to root out mismanagement and fraud without requiring
Estate Counsel to "rat" on its client directly to the court in every circumstance. [FN337]
And what of the Estate Counsel's duty to "rat"? Ratting on misbehaving management isn't ratting on the client
when the Estate itself is the client. Estate Counsel could follow the normal procedure for cajoling corporate
management to toe the line. [FN338] *96 If no one's listening at the Estate level, then Estate Counsel could attempt
to persuade the court to appoint a trustee or could try for a "noisy withdrawal" if the attempt to appoint a trustee is
met with deaf ears. [FN339] At the least, freeing up Estate Counsel from its intimate ties with management will
more easily reconcile Estate Counsel's duty to the client [FN340] with the attorney's duty as an officer of the court.
We have a couple of tools to help us monitor Estate Counsel. For one thing, we could assume that most of the
Estate constituents' interests are being represented, for the most part, by somebody. [FN34 I] Committee Counsel is
supposed to be looking out for the interests of the unsecured creditors. [FN342] If there's an Equity Security
Holders' Committee, [FN343] counsel for that Committee can look after those interests. Secured creditors with
large claims are likely to have their own counsel. What we need to do is to treat Estate Counsel as a conductor,
blending all of the different melodies (interests) in the best interests of the entire opus. If Estate Counsel isn't
blending those melodies, bankruptcy courts have ways of making their displeasure known. [FN344]
*97 For truly recalcitrant Estate Counsel, we also have BRP 9011 [FN345] as a possible sanction. [FN346] If
Estate Counsel is behaving badly, chances are that Counsel is lying on some of the pleadings. BRP 9011 gives the
bankruptcy court the ability to punish counsel for those lies. [FN347]

2. How "Specifying" and "Finessing" Improve on a Bad Lot But Don't Fix It Entirely
Our solution isn't perfect. Far from from it. By fmessing the concept of the "Estate," we're avoiding the hard
questions that still must be resolved. By specifying the concept of the "Estate," we're making the management of
the DIP very nervous about communicating with counsel, given that the Estate, and not the management, owns the
privilege. [FN348]
*98 Courts and academics have struggled with the concept of "specifying" and "fmessing" the Estate. [FN349]
Jay Westbrook has already published one of the best analyses of this struggle. [FN350] He's divided cases that
review the behavior of Estate Counsel into two groups of standards: the "benefit" standard and the "adverse
interest" standard. [FN351] Under the "benefit" standard, courts analyze Estate Counsel's conduct by asking
whether Estate Counsel's actions provided a benefit to the Estate, rather than to factions with a personal interest in
the outcome of the action. Under the "adverse interest" standard, courts review Estate Counsel's behavior to see if
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choices made during the case favored the Estate or an interested party to whom the Counsel might also owe some
loyalty. If Estate Counsel's actions betray a conflict of interest, then Counsel runs the risk of total disqualification.
[FN352]
We're sympathetic with Westbrook's distrust of per se rules as being both too facile and downright threatening to
successful chapter II cases. Certainly his "benefit" approach makes sense. Of all of the alternatives out there, it's
by far the best option. The problem, however, lies in the infmite loop that the "benefit" test creates. Until we pin
down how to measure the benefit to the Estate, which still requires us to pinpoint *99 exactly whose interests
comprise the Estate, we haven't fmished the analysis. We admit that. But we've come closer than most.
CONCLUSION
We're not claiming to have found the perfect solution to the problem of exactly what duties Estate Counsel owes
to individual Estate constituents. But we think that we've found a better one than the hodgepodge of answers
currently out there. To get talented Estate Counsel, we can't greet each potential attorney with:
Hi, there. We want you to represent the Estate, because we think that you have the talent to tum this company
around. We need your expertise to preserve jobs and the general economy of the community. But we need you to
agree to serve the interests of each and every constituent of this bankruptcy case, and somehow we need you to
overcome the overwhelming conflicts of interest that ensue from considering all of these individual interests. Sign
here.
We doubt that many Estate Counsel would want to "sign there." Furthermore, we doubt that many of them realize
that they already have. If the goal of reorganization is, in fact, to tum an ailing business into a healthy one, [FN353]
we need the best brains in the business. Let's let them do their job.
[FNal]. (c)C.R. Bowles, Jr. and Nancy B. Rapoport 1997. All Rights Reserved.
[FNaal]. Law Clerk to the Honorable Henry H. Dickinson, Chief Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Kentucky. Chip wishes to thank Judge Dickinson and most of the Bankruptcy Bar of the
Western District of Kentucky for their help and insights. Chip also wants to thank NBR for agreeing to work with
him on this project, for without her insight and writing skill, none of this would be possible. Finally, he would like
to thank his wife, Linda Bowles, and their son Charles, who allowed him to vanish for large periods of time to
work on this piece.
[FNaaal]. Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Student Affairs, The Ohio State University College
of Law. NBR wishes to acknowledge the able research assistance of Dan Hercl and Lucia Villari, the multifaceted
talents of master librarian Chris Noble, the superb secretarial skills of Michele Whetzel-Newton, who
uncomplainingly worked above and beyond the call of duty to make this article a reality, and the unflagging energy
of Carol Peirano, who sent overnight package after overnight package. She also wishes to thank the following
people who, through e/mail, snail mail, telephone, or, in one case, a trip to the grocery store, helped her to sharpen
her thoughts on this topic: Jack Ayer, the Honorable William T. Bodoh, Randy Barnett, Chip Bowles, Stephen H.
Case, Ted Janger, Charles W. Kettlewell, George W. Kuney, Ronald J. Mann, Catherine E. Vance, Jeffrey D. Van
Niel, and G. Ray Warner. She particularly wants to thank her husband, her parents, and Dean Gregory H. Williams
for being extremely patient as she fmished yet another article that she had originally vowed "could dam well wait
until summer."
[FNI]. Although it's tempting to refer to attorneys in a gender-neutral fashion (i.e., as "it"), such references would
make the reading of this Article difficult. Therefore, we've arbitrarily chosen to deem the attorneys for Debtors,
Debtors in Possession, and Creditors' Committees to be males and to deem all other attorneys to be females.
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[FN2]. One of us (Chip) created this version of the dilemma posed by representing the DIP. Lynn LoPucki created
another wonderful description of the dilemma in his Teacher's Manual for the Debtor Creditor Game 71 (West
1984), called The Debtor's Lawyer as Trojan Horse, reprinted in ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 780 (3d ed.
1996). We'd love to reprint the entire thing, but in the interests of space, we'll just give you a bit of the flavor:
Shares [the sole shareholder of the troubled company, talking to Lawyer] interrupts. "This is ridiculous," he
fumes. "I read in a newspaper article that about 90 percent of all corporations that file under chapter 11 are owned
and managed by a single owner or a family, and that in about 90 percent of the cases the cause of the debtor's
problems is that the businesses have bad managers. What you are telling me is that your code of Professional
Responsibility requires that their lawyers work in the interests of the corporations even if it means working against
the men or women who hired them. Why that means that in at least 81 percent of all chapter 11 proceedings in this
country the attorney for the debtor-in-possession has an 'ethical' duty to work to oust his own client from control."
"Almost correct," says Lawyer, but that guy he's ousting isn't his client.
Id. at 782-83.
[FN3]. For an excellent discussion of American bankruptcy laws and their English antecedents, see Charles Jordan
Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995);
CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1935). In their earliest form, English
Bankruptcy laws were quasi-criminal statutes to protect creditors from debtors.
[FN4]. See, e.g., Robin Phelan & John Penn, Professional Responsibility and the Bankruptcy Lawyer, 32 BULL.
BUS. L. SEC. ST. B. TEX. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Professional Responsibility]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and
Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 287 (1993) [hereinafter Inherent Conflicts]
(noting inherent conflicts exist in representation of DIP under Bankruptcy Code); Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts
Between Management and the Debtor in Possession's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543, 543 (1992)
(discussing management's conflict of interest in chapter 11) [hereinafter Fiduciary Duties]; John D. Ayer, How to
Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L. 1. 355 (1986) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Ethics]; Arnold M.
Quittner, Employment and Compensation of Appointed Professionals, 737 PLVCOM 297 (April-May 1996);
Marcia L. Goldstein, et. aI., Ethical Considerations for Bankruptcy Professionals: Disinterestedness, Conflicts of
Interest, and Retainers, C995 ALI-ABA 397 (1995); Adrianne O'Connell McNamara & Carl A. Eklund, Ethical
Quandaries of a Debtor's Lawyer, 389 PLVREAL 243 (1994); Lillian E. Kraemer, Ethical Issues Involving Case
Professionals and Other Court-Appointed Parties in Chapter 11 Proceedings, C946 ALI-ABA 1 (Sept. 29, 1994).
[FN5]. For purposes of this Article, we'll use the term "Debtor" to refer to the individual and/or entity that filed a
reorganization bankruptcy (essentially, the management and/or owners of the Debtor). We'll use "Debtor in
Possession" or "DIP" to refer to the entity charged with directing the operations of the Bankruptcy Estate. The term
"Bankruptcy Estate" (or "Estate") will denote the entity that owns all of the assets included in the defmition of
"estate" in 11 U.S.C. § 541 (or, where appropriate, § 1306) (1994). And, of course, the "Bankruptcy Code" is
found in title 11 of the United States Code.
[FN6]. See Part I of this Article for a brief description of the extent and nature of the Debtor in Possession's
fiduciary duty. See also Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 543 (noting Supreme Court's observation that officers
and managing employees of DIP can be depended on to carry out fiduciary responsibilities); John T. Roache, Note,
The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 133 (1993) (noting Debtor in
Possession owes fiduciary obligation to all parties who own interest in Estate) [hereinafter Fiduciary Obligations].
[FN7]. Although the bulk of this Article will deal with the duties of counsel for a DIP in a reorganization case or
counsel for a bankruptcy trustee, Committee Counsel have also been found to owe fiduciary duties to the
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Bankruptcy Estate in some recent cases. See In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 196 B.R. 868, 883 (Bankr. D. Utah
1996); infra Part II.G.2. We'll discuss the special ethical concerns of Committee Counsel as part of our general
discussion of Estate Counsel's fiduciary duties. See infra Part II.
(FN8]. In fact, it is with some trepidation that we try to resolve this complicated issue. If Jay Westbrook decided to
defer such a discussion to another day, see Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 290, who are we to broach this
subject? (On the other hand, those who know us well also know that we have more than a modicum of chutzpah.)
[FN9]. See infra notes Part II. It's not surprising that bankruptcy scholars can't agree on the nature and scope of
these duties. We can't even agree on the purpose(s) of bankruptcy law. See John D. Ayer, Through Chapter 11
With Gun or Camera, But Probably Not Both, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 883 (1994); David A. Lander, Musings During a
Symposium Afternoon, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 905 (1994); James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or
Dissipation: The Evidence for Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955 (1994).
(FN10]. Bruce Markell and Ronald Mann have both pointed out that what we're suggesting is akin to Justice
Brandeis's famous conceptualization of "lawyer for the situation." See E/mail correspondence from Bruce A.
Markell to Nancy B. Rapoport 2 (March 28, 1997) [hereinafter Markell Mail] (on file with author); telephone
conversation with Ronald J. Mann, March 31, 1997 (notes on file with author). Our solution does have its roots in
Brandeis's own fmesse. There is a rich literature on "lawyer for the situation." See, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive
Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1504 (1996); Daniel J. Bussel,
Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors' Committees, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1547, 1619 (1996); Anthony
T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DICK. L. REV. 489, 498 (1996); Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of
Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 904
(1995); Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 309
(1995); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 862 n.280 (1992); John S.
Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modem Legal Profession,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 743; Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV.
255,266 n.48 (1990); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV.
717, 721(1988); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 330 (1988);
Robert L. Nelson, Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506
n.14 (1985); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978); Morgan
Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Statute, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 237 (1973); John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17
STAN. L. REV. 683, 698-703 (1965).
[FNll]. We all know that the concepts of right and wrong are extremely fluid (especially for lawyers), but in this
particular context, we mean that courts have, in these cases, removed dishonest DIPs, sanctioned attorneys who did
not faithfully represent the Bankruptcy Estate, and overruled objections where the facts indicated that the DIP
and/or the Estate Counsel were not guilty of improper conduct. But see In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994),
discussed more fully in infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
[FNI2]. Although we share full responsibility for most of the opinions and conclusions in this Article, sometimes
we'll want to draw attention to something written by just one of us. We're doing this primarily because one of us
(NBR) was so tickled by the other one's (Chip's) story at the begirming of this Article that she wanted to make sure
that Chip got full credit for writing that part.
In terms of the stairway (up or down) that these cases have created, we wanted to remind our readers of one of
Karl Llewellyn's most famous quotes: "Within the law, I say, therefore, rules guide, but they do not control
decision. There is no precedent the judge may not, at his heed, either file down to razor thirmess or expand into a
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bludgeon. Why should you expect the ethics of the game to be different from the game itself?" KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 180 (1930).
[FN13]. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
(FN14]. See, e.g., Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 543; Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 144.
[FN15]. See 11 U.S.C. § to9 (1994) (governing what entities may be Debtors under various chapters of
Bankruptcy Code).
[FN16]. See id. §§ 701-766.
(FN17]. See id. §§ 901-946.
[FNI8]. See id. §§ 1101-1174.
[FNI9]. See id. §§ 1201-1231. Chapter 12 is scheduled for repeal on October 1, 1998. See id. § 1221.
[FN20]. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330.
[FN21]. 1,042,110 petitions were filed in the United States for the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1996. Of these
petitions, 712,129 were chapter 7 cases, and 12,859 were chapter 11 cases. The remaining petitions were filed
under chapters 9, 12, or 13. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, reprinted in 29 BCD WEEKLY NEWS &
COMMENT Al (September to, 1996).
[FN22]. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1997); see also In re Doors and More, Inc., 126 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991)
(noting neither Debtor nor Debtor's attorney have any fiduciary obligation to Bankruptcy Estate). There are,
however, some fiduciary duties for chapter 7 Debtors' counsel. See Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re
Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 478-79 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying fees to attorney due to intentional concealment of fee
arrangement with Debtor and dual representations that were not disclosed to court); In re Freedom Solar Ctr., Inc.,
776 F.2d 14,17 (1st Cir. 1985) (fmding only continuing duty of Debtor to be cooperation with trustee); In re Pine
Valley Mach. Inc., 172 B.R. 481, 486 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (noting duty of Debtor); In re Damon, 40 B.R. 367,
376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting forfeiture of attomey fees is mandated if attorney violates duty as officer of
court). These duties generally don't arise in connection with duties to the Bankruptcy Estate, but rather are
fiduciary duties owed to the court under 11 U.S.C. § 329. But see Pine Valley, 172 B.R. at 486 (stating court's only
role is as "look back" review under § 329(b) to determine whether compensation exceeds reasonable value of
services).
[FN23]. We will, of course, be discussing the trustee's duties in chapter 7 cases as compared to the DIP's duties in
chapter 11. See infra note 319 and accompanying text.
[FN24]. For a general discussion of chapter 9 bankruptcy practice, see David S. Kupetz, Municipal Debt
Adjustment under the Bankruptcy Code, 27 URB. LAW. 531 (1995). The thought of considering the ethical and
fiduciary obligations of politicians is truly frightening. Luckily for everyone, Kathleen Clark is an expert in that
area. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer Form Fiduciary
Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57.
[FN25]. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-958, at 48-49 (1986).
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[FN26]. See, e.g., In re Erickson, 183 B.R. 189, 193-94 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (discussing fiduciary duty of
chapter 12 Debtor in Possession); In re French, 139 B.R. 485, 488 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (discussing difference
between individual chapter 12 Debtor and chapter 12 DIP).
[FN27]. See infra Part LB.!.
[FN28]. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (noting obligations of
DIPs as trustees); Gumport v. China Int'l Trust & Inv. (In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir.
1991) (stating officers of DIP are officers of court and have fiduciary duties as such); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461 (6th Cir. 1982) (listing various DIP duties); see also Raymond Nimmer & Richard
Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6
BANK. DEV. J. 1,2 (1989) (arguing that attorneys for DIP have fiduciary duty only to client, not to creditors and
shareholders whose interests may be adverse to Debtor) [hereinafter Chapter 11 Governance]. But see St. Angelo
v. Sidco (In re Sidco, Inc.), 173 B.R. 194, 196 (B.D. Cal. 1994) (discussing fiduciary obligations placed on those
who operate business); infra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary obligations more fully); see also
In re Coin Phones Inc., 148 B.R. 391, 394-95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (fmding third party that contracted to
manage Bankruptcy Estate's business for DIP did not have fiduciary duty to Bankruptcy Estate).
[FN29]. See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text.
[FN30]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 134-35; Chapter 11 Governance, supra note 28, at 8; see also
infra Part I.B.
[FN31]. See Darth Vader, STAR WARS (20th Century Fox 1997) (rerelease).
[FN32]. Although there are two separate and distinct lines of case authority in this area, problems on this issue
rarely arise except in the odd case in which there is a serious question as to whether the Bankruptcy Estate can pay
all of its creditors. Cf. infra notes 48-52, and accompanying text; In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068,
1072 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing options available to maximize assets for creditors and shareholders).
[FN33]. See e.g., Yellowhouse Mach. Co. v. Mack (In re Hughes), 704 F.2d 820,822 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding DIP
has duties of trustee); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 462 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); In re
Anchorage Nautical Tours, Inc., 145 B.R. 637, 644 (9th Cir. BAP 1992) (same); In re Tudor Assocs. Ltd. II, 64
B.R. 656 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (same).
[FN34]. See Weaver, 680 F.2d at 461; cf. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 28 B.R. 740, 760 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983) (stating Debtor has duty not to give away security without bringing in corresponding value for creditors). For
a recent discussion of this line of authority, see Janet M. Meiburger, Directors of Insolvent Corporations Owe
Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, ABI JOURNAL 38 (May 1996).
[FN35]. See Second Nat'l Bank of Nazareth v. Marcincin (In re Nadler), 8 B.R. 330, 333 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)
(noting bankruptcy trustee and/or DIPs will have fiduciary duties to both secured and unsecured creditors). Some
older Bankruptcy Act cases, however, indicate that a DIP's primary duty is to unsecured creditors and that a lesser
duty is owed to secured creditors. See, e.g., In re American Fidelity Corp., 28 F. Supp. 462, 471 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
[FN36]. See Weaver, 680 F.2d at 462 n.8.
[FN37]. See id.
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(FN38]. See, e.g., Central Ice Cream, 836 F.2d at 1072 (noting that risk creditors that face in bankruptcy parallels
risk outside of bankruptcy process); Erica M. Ryland, Note, Bracing for the "Failure Boom": Should a Revlon
Auction Duty Arise in Chapter II?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 (1990).
[FN39]. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (stating duty runs to
shareholders and creditors); Gumport v. China Int'l Trust & Inv.(In re Intermagnetics America, Inc.), 926 F.2d 912,
917 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting duty owed as "officer of the court"); National Convenience Stores Inc. v. Shields (In re
Schepps Food Stores, Inc.), 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding duty is owed to Debtor and its
shareholders and all of Debtor's creditors); In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting
duty to both equity interests and creditors).
(FN40]. See, e.g., Intermagnetics, 926 F.2d at 917 (noting chapter 11 Debtors occupy fiduciary role with respect to
contents of Estate); Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Wooten (In re Evangeline Refming Co.), 890
F.2d 1312, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating those who perform duties in administration of Bankruptcy Estate are
officers of the court); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1988) (same).
[FN41]. See supra note 39 and accompanying text; see also In re DN Assocs., 144 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. D. Me.
1992) (indicating that DIP has fiduciary duties to all constituencies of estate); Harvey R. Miller, Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11: The Fiduciary Relationship Between Directors and Stockholders of Solvent and
Insolvent Corporations, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 1485-86 (1993) (discussing DIP's role in chapter II to
perform all duties of trustee) [hereinafter Miller]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Proper
Role of the Bankruptcy Attorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783, 807-17 (1995) (noting that DIPs may owe some duties to those
who are neither creditors nor owners) [hereinafter Forest].
(FN42]. See, e.g., C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett, 124 B.R. 689, 692 (W.D. Va. 1990) (noting director's duties
limited to shareholders); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (stating directors owe no special duty to
debenture holder). But see Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & ORR., 680 F.2d 933, 940 (3d Cir. 1982)
(fmding that when dealing with equity securities, fiduciary duty will exist). Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated
Dep't Stores, 723 F. Supp. 976, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating duties to creditors limited to those set forth in debt
instrument);
[FN43]. See, e.g., In re Hargis, 73 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); (stating that the individual used filing
of reorganization as a shield from creditors and dismissing proceeding) rev'd on other grounds, 887 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1989).
[FN44]. For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between business organizations and their alleged
fiduciary duties to creditors, see Bruce A. Markell, The Folly of Representing Insolvent Corporations: Examining
Lawyer Liability and Ethical Issues Involved in Extending Fiduciary Duties to Creditors, _ J. BANKR. L.&P. _
(forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Folly].
[FN45]. See Xonics Med. Sys. v. Haverty, 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (stating that position of trust to
creditors is created when corporation becomes insolvent).
[FN46]. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. There appear to be two types of "conflicts" in the literature:
conflicts between the Debtor/DIP/TIE and a particular creditor or equity interest, and conflicts between the
DebtorIDIP/TIB and all creditors or equity interests (or all of the creditors or equity interests, within a single
class). We believe that the conflicts get worse the more particular they are, and that conflicts are less of a problem
the more group-related or generalized they are.
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(FN47]. 471 U.S. 343 (1985). Donald Board does a marvelous job of discussing Weintraub in Donald P. Board,
Retooling "A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself," 72 B.U.L. REV. 243, 266-68 (1992) (reviewing
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1990) (book review».
{FN48]. See id. at 355; see also In re Delta Petroleum, Ltd., 193 B.R. 99, 110 n.22 (D. P.R. 1996) (fmding that
"while the Trustee should be commended for looking out for (the creditors'] interests, he seems to have forgotten
that a course of action which preserves the debtor's viability while substantially guaranteeing the rights of creditors
is preferable. After all, unlike chapter 7 proceedings, chapter 11 proceedings are aimed at preserving the debtor
company wherever possible. It).
{FN49]. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355 (citations omitted).
{FN50]. See id.; see also supra note 32.
(FN51]. See, e.g., Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm.(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801 F.2d 60,65 (2d
Cir. 1986) (restricting shareholders' rights if debtor is insolvent); In re Lifeguard Indus., 37 B.R. 3, 16 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983) (same); Louisiana World Expo v. Federal Ins. (In re Parkway Calabasas Ltd.), 89 B.R. 832, 835-36
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (same).
{FN52]. But see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U.PA. L. REV. 125, 143 (1990) (noting only one of many
attorneys interviewed, who were all representing equity holders' committees, believed shareholders had right to
share in payout) [hereinafter Equity's Share].
Bruce Markell has pointed out that there's been a lot of confusion over what the attorney-client privilege does and
doesn't cover:
Take the base case. Person walks in; talks to lawyer. Lawyer£] says X has to be disclosed. Person walks out,
goes to other lawyer and does not disclose X. Second lawyer files without disclosure. Government fmds out£] and
prosecutes client for concealment. Can the fIrst lawyer be compelled to testify in the criminal trial on the issue of
whether the person/client had the requisite criminal intent[?] Yes. The crime/fraud exception to the
attorney[-]client privilege applies.
Markell Mail, supra note 10, at I (citing 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 7.10[2] [c] (Lawrence P. King ed.,
15th ed. rev. 1996). See United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986).
[FN53]. See Darth Vader, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox 1997) (rerelease).
[FN54]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 133.
[FN55]. See id., at 133-36,144-150; see also Miller, supra note 41, at 1486.
[FN56]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 136; see also Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper),
933 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting lower court's analogy of DIP's general fIduciary standard to duties of a
corporate fIduciary); In re Bellevue Place Assocs., 171 B.R. 615,623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (same).
[FN57]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 136; see also In re Frankel, 77 B.R. 401, 404 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing traditional standard of trustee); Schechter v. Department of Revenue, (In re Markos
Gurnee Partnership), 182 B.R. 211,214 (Bankr. N.D. III 1995) (same).

B·58

5 AMBKRll..R47
5 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 47
(Cite as: 5 Am. Baokr. lost. L. Rev. 47)
[FN58]. See, e.g., Schipper, 933 F.2d at 515 (fmding duty owed by DIP analogous to that of corporate officer to
shareholder); Institutional Continental Airlines v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental Airlines, Inc.), 780 F.2d
1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding DIP must use sound business judgment); In re Bellevue Place Assocs., 171
B.R. 615, 623 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying Schipper to fmd duty analogous to that of corporate fiduciary
duty); National Convenience Stores Inc. v. Shields (In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc.), 160 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1993) (stating that trustee owes certain fiduciary duties similar to director's duties).
[FN59]. See First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tenn-Fla Partners (In re Tenn-Fla Partners), 170 B.R. 946, 969 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1994); see also In re BMW Group I, Ltd., 168 B.R. 731,739 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1994); see also In re
Microwave Prod. of Am., Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 671 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989).
[FN60]. See Schipper, 109 B.R. at 836; see also Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983); In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 104 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); In re After
Six, Inc., 154 B.R. 876, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
[FN61]. See Tenn-Fla Partners, 170 B.R. at 970; S.N.A. Nut, 186 B.R. at 104; In re Forster, 162 B.R. 478,483
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660, 682 (Bankr. D.C. 1992).
[FN62]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 146-47.
[FN63]. See id. at 146-49.
[FN64]. See Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 6, at 146-49. Our opinion that there is little difference in how
bankruptcy courts apply the "common-law trustee" standard and the "corporate fiduciary" standard should not be
taken as criticism of this well-reasoned Note.
[FN65]. Under either line of cases, the DIP is considered to be an officer of the court and, as such, owes fiduciary
duties to the court. See, e.g., Bank v. H & D Entertainment, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass. 1996); In re Tudor
Associates Ltd. II, 52 B.R. 385 (D. Minn. 1985); In re St. Mary's Hosp., 155 B.R. 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); see
also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
[FN66]. 109 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 112 B.R. 917 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.
1991).
[FN67]. See id. at 837 (stating that "[e]ven under the general standard of inherent fairness, which .,. applie[s] to
transactions involving fiduciaries and the entities to which the fiduciary obligation runs, the debtor's conduct passes
muster").
[FN68]. See Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper), 112 B.R. 917,919 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd, 933 F.2d
513 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[t]he bankruptcy court clearly held that a fiduciary duty did exist, noted the
differences between the fiduciary duty in a bankruptcy case and that in a ... corporate setting, and unequivocally
held no breach of any fiduciary duty regardless of which standard applied").
[FN69]. See Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper), 933 F.2d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting duties under
Code are sufficiently demanding so as to not require "common law trustee" duties).
[FN70]. See Gumport v. China Int'I Trust and Inv. Corp. (In re Intermagnetics Am., Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 917 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding insider dealing to be fraudulent); In re Microwave Prods. of Am. Inc., 102 B.R. 666 (Bankr.
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W.D. Tenn 1989) (holding debtor cannot allow insider dealing to go on without prosecution).
[FN71]. See First Union Nat'l Bank v. Tenn-Fla Partners (In re Tenn-Fla Partners), 170 B.R. 946, 970 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1994); see also In re Sal Caruso Cheese, Inc., 107 B.R. 808 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
[FN72]. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (stating "if a debtor
remains in possession ... the debtor's directors bear essentially the same fiduciary obligation ... as would the
trustee...."); see also STN Enters. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 73 B.R. 470 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987).
[FN73]. See, e.g., Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Bonneville
Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
[FN74]. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 1104 (1994) ("Appointment of a Trustee or Examiner"); id. § 1112 ("Conversion or
Dismissal"); see also Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 559-567.
[FN75]. Although defmed separately for purposes of this Article, no one actually refers to individuals who have
filed chapter 13 cases as DIPs. Indeed, in chapter 13 cases, the actual differences between the prepetition Debtor
and the DIP are almost negligible.
[FN76]. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
[FN77]. See II U.S.c. § 521 (1994) (stating that "the first duty is to file ... a list of creditors ... ; second, the debtor
is required to cooperate with the trustee ...; fmally, the debtor must surrender to the trustee all property of the
estate").
[FN78]. See LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 3.25 (Wiley Law Pub. 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
LUNDIN].
[FN79]. For a detailed discussion of the requirements of filing a chapter 13 case and obtaining confirmation of a
chapter 13 plan, see LUNDIN, supra note 78, passim.
[FN80]. See LUNDIN, supra note 78, at §§ 5.16-5.26.
[FN81]. Compare LUNDIN, supra note 78, at § 3.25 (discussing fiduciary nature of chapter 13 Debtor's role in her
case and citing two cases), with id. §§ 5.16-5.26 (discussing chapter 13 DIP's "good faith" requirements and noting
over 320 reported decisions on this issue, including more than 30 courts of appeal decisions); see also In re Harp,
166 B.R. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (addressing differences in duties between individual DIP in chapter II case
and chapter 13 DIP). But see In re Oglesby, 161 B.R. 917 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that there is no good
faith filing requirement in chapter 13).
[FN82]. See LUNDIN, supra note 78, at § 5.16 for a discussion of the shifting nature of the chapter 13 good faith
test.
[FN83]. For an example of how a court of appeals has difficulty in fonnulating a simple and workable good faith
analysis, see In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992).
[FN84]. Compare Society Nat'l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (afflnning
confirmation of third chapter 13 case filed by debtors, even in light of their misconduct in earlier cases); In re
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LeMaire, 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (reversing earlier decision that confmned chapter 13 plan
proposing to pay 62% of judgment debt that itself was based on debtor's attempted murder of creditor); In re
Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990) (confmnation of 15% plan discharging drunk driving claim against
debtor), with supra notes 27-51.
[FN85]. And, to a lesser extent, Committee Counsel. Cf. infra note 256 and accompanying text.
[FN86]. In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (emphasis added); see also In re Delta Petroleum
(p.R.) Ltd., 193 B.R. 99, III (D.P.R. 1996); Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 303.
[FN87]. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. The court in Delta Petroleum makes our point nicely:
The situation is more complicated for trustee's counsel. On one hand, the attorney is retained at the trustee's
request. On the other, the attorney's client is the estate, not the trustee. According to Model Rule 1.13(a), "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(a) (1983). The Model Code provided similar
guidance, in stating that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to
the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-18 (1981). By analogy, in the bankruptcy setting, trustee's
counsel owes a higher fiduciary duty to the estate than to the trustee.
Delta Petroleum, 193 B.R. at III (citations omitted).
[FN88]. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of Potential Conflicts
of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 917-40 (1994) [hereinafter Turning].
[FN89]. See Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation; The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71
(1996); Bankruptcy Ethics, supra note 4, at 392-98; Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Empirical View,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Monroe Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060
(1975); H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975); see also Forest, supra note 41, at 789-806.
[FN90]. See infra notes 294-95, and accompanying text.
[FN91]. See Bankruptcy Ethics, supra note 4, at 392; see also Turning, supra note 88, at 940-65.
[FN92]. See Turning, supra note 88, at 917-26.
[FN93]. We're willing to bet that we didn't come up with this tum of phrase.
[FN94]. See DeVlieg-Bullard v. Natale (In re DeVlieg, Inc.), 174 B.R. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (counsel filed
unauthorized law suit against chapter 11 corporate Debtor's insiders).
[FN95]. See, In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
[FN96]. Cf. infra notes 309-16 and accompanying text (noting that courts lack defmition of "Estate" and this
causes confusion as to duties of Estate Counsel); see In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)
(noting counsel for corporation owes duty to corporation and not principals). But see St. Angelo v. Sidco, Inc. (In
re Sidco, 173 B.R. 194 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (fmding only "weak" authority for fmding any fiduciary duty of Estate
Counsel to Bankruptcy Estate). Sidco may have been overruled by In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994). See
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discussion of Perez, infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
[FN97]. See In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (individual chapter 11); In re Manguff, 147 B.R.
875, 879 (Bankr. D.C. Va. 1992) (chapter 7 trustee's counsel also has fiduciary duty to Bankruptcy Estate); In re
Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321, 343 (Bankr. N.D. IlL 1991) (corporate chapter 11); In re Storms, 101 B.R. 645,
648 (Bankr. S.D. CaL 1989) (individual chapter 11).
[FN98]. See Harp, 166 B.R. at 748; In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. N.D. IlL 1988).
[FN99]. See Consupak, 87 B.R. at 549.
[FNIOO]. See supra Part L and accompanying text. As the court noted in Consupak:
In evaluating the performance of a trustee's attorney, then, it is necessary to determine the extent of duty to advise
a trustee. The lower bounds of that duty are obvious: any attorney must, at a minimum, respond to client requests
for legal advice. Because a trustee's attorney also has duties to the estate and to the court, however, the duty to
advise requires a more active concern for the interests of the estate and of its beneficiaries, the unsecured creditors.

***

A trustee's attorney cannot close his eyes to matters having legal consequences for the estate. Especially where
legally adverse facts come to his attention, the attorney for a trustee must take the initiative to inform his client of
the need for preventative or corrective action.
Id. at 549.
[FN101]. See Forest, supra note 41, at 798-801; In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga
1992) (noting attorney's fiduciary duties).
[FN102]. See In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994).
[FN103]. See infra Part ILBA.
[FN104]. Or the D~btor's (individual) affairs, for that matter. See infra Part ILG.2. (discussing Bonneville as case
in which Estate Counsel simply didn't adequately investigate).
[FN105]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 150 (Bankr. D.N.I. 1995).
[FNI06]. See Knepper v. Skekloff (In re Knepper), 154 B.R. 75 (N.D. Ind. 1993); In re Whitney Place Partners,
147 B.R. 619, 621 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (discussing that attorney will not be liable for negligence).
[FN107]. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
[FN108]. See id.
[FN109]. See Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472,480 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting attorney's
actions were unreasonable but circumstances warranted no imposition of sanction).
[FNllO]. See In re DN Assocs., 144 B.R. 195, 201 (Bankr. D. Me. 1992) (stating fee of $125 per hour for
bankruptcy attorney is permissible).
[FNlll]. See In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R. 619, 622-23 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (fmding no violation of
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BRP 9011 due to lack of experience).
[FN112]. See, e.g., In re National Liquidators, Inc., 182 B.R. 186, 192 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (permitting dual
representation for member and committee); In re Daido Steel Co., Ltd., 178 B.R. 129, 132 (N.D. Ohio 1995)
(fmding it unnecessary to prohibit representation of fIrm that represented committee and purchaser); In re OffIce
Prods. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 983, 989 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (explaining that one of the purposes of full
disclosure is to prevent repeat of "sordid chapters" in history of corporate bankruptcy reorganizations); see also S.
REP. NO. 95-989, at 40 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5826.
[FNl13]. See Downs, 103 F.3d at 472 (6th Cir. 1996); Neben & Starrett v. Chartwell Fin. Corp. (In re Park-Helena
Corp.), 63 F.3d 877,882 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing denial of attorney compensation).
[FN114]. See supra note 113 ; see also In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d 925, 936 (2d Cir. 1979); Robert
M. Lawless et aI., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U.
ILL. L. REV. 847-88.
[FN115]. See In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 252 (1908) (stating that court can reduce fees if there is
opportunity to contest charges).
[FN116]. See C.R. Bowles, Jr., The Problem of Retroactive or Nunc Pro Tunc Employment of Professionals in
Bankruptcy Cases, 1996 ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 219 (1996) (noting rare cases where
counsel may try nunc pro tunc employment application when circumstances permit).
[FN117]. See In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868, 880-81 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996); see also infra Part II.G.2.;
see also In re Rogers-Pyatt Shellac Co., 51 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1931).
[FNl18]. See 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994); see also Downs, 103 F.3d at 477; Park-Helena Corp., 63 F.3d at 877.
[FNl19]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 150 (Bankr. D.N.I. 1995) (stating professionals hired by Debtor in
Possession have fIduciary duty to Estate); In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321, 343 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)
(discussing attorney's fIduciary duty); In re ChurchfIeld Management & Inv. Corp., 100 B.R. 389 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1989) (fmding breach of fIduciary duty).
[FN120]. See supra note 112.
[FN121]. See id.
[FN122]. See Nancy B. Rapoport, Avoiding Judicial Wrath: The Ten Commandments for Bankruptcy
Practitioners, 5 J. BANKR. L. & P. 615, 619-22 (1996) [hereinafter Commandments].
[FN123]. See infra notes 190-96,209-19 and accompanying text.
[FN124]. See supra note 112.
[FN125]. See In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Burke, 147 B.R. 787 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1992) (chapter 12 case).
[FN126]. See Arlan's, 615 F.2d at 925.
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[FNI27]. See id. at 935.
[FNI28]. Id.
[FNI29]. See In re Arlan's Dep't Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d at 925 (providing an excellent discussion of how not to
handle fees and expenses in reorganizations); see also In re Midwestern Cos., 55 B.R. 856 (Bankr. W. D. Mo.
1985) (taking attorney fees without court authorization).
[FN130]. See Arlan's, 615 F.2d at 944. In re Burke, 147 B.R. 787 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992), tells of a smaller, but
far worse, breach of an attorney's fiduciary duty regarding fees. In Burke, Estate's Counsel demanded and received
payment of a nonrefundable retainer of $20,000.00. The $20,000.00 paid by the Debtors represented all of the
Estate's cash. This payment left the chapter 12 Debtors with no way to buy feed for their herd of cattle, which was
subsequently decimated by starvation. After an overwhelmingly unsuccessful attempt at reorganization, the chapter
12 case was converted to a proceeding under chapter 7, and the trustee filed a motion with the court to review the
chapter 12 Estate Counsel's fees and transactions with the Debtor. See id. at 794 ("When last heard of by this
Court, debtors were living in a state of demoralized squalor."). After a lengthy hearing on the fees, the court
leniently allowed Estate Counsel to keep $10,000.00 of the nonrefundable retainer and required Estate Counsel to
turn the remainder over to the trustee. See id.
[FN131]. See Arlan's, 615 F.2d at 932-33 (failure to disclose pertinent information in application for appointment
as Counsel was violation of Counsel's fiduciary duty to court). Cf. Forest, supra note 41, at 789 (stating that duty as
officer of court trumps duty to client).
[FN132]. See In re Office Prods. of Am., Inc., 136 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); In re Davison, 79 B.R. 859
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
[FN133]. DN Assocs., 144 B.R. at 195; Storms, 101 B.R. at 645; Kendavis, 91 B.R. at 742.
[FN134]. See In re Reed, 890 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1989).
[FN135].ld.
[FN136]. 136 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
[FN137]. Id. at 984-991.
[FN138]. Id. at 986-87. The Office Products court also refused to [md that the Estate Counsel in this case actually
represented the officers and directors of the Debtor, stating that such findings should not be "lightly made." Id. at
988.
[FN139]. DN Assocs., 144 B.R. at 220 (Bankr D. Me. 1992), affd, 160 B.R. 20 (D. Me 1993). The court didn't
agree with the applicant's novel argument that, because there was a confirmed plan in place, where Creditor was
obliged to pay administrative claims, standards governing compensation by the Estate didn't pertain. See id. The
applicants were never relieved from their obligation of fidelity to the Debtor in Possession. The context of Casco's
plan obligation to pay administrative fees was the context that the Code provides, which authorizes compensation
for "necessary and reasonable" expenses and fees based on, among other things, the value of those services. Id at
202 n.28.
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[FN140]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 150 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (noting that professionals will be obligated
to report Debtor's breach); In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288, 301 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994) (claiming that attorney, as
fiduciary of Estate, must further Estate's interest); In re Barrie Reed Buick-GMC, Inc., 164 B.R. 378, 381 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1984) (noting the duty of Debtor's counsel to bring breaches of fiduciary to attention of court). See
generally In re Love, 163 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993); In re Granite Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 159 B.R. 840
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993); In re United Utensils Corp., 141 B.R. 306 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992); In re Wilde Horse
Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1992); In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
[FN141]. See Bankruptcy Ethics, supra note 4, at 355.
[FN142]. We've been unable to fmd any reported case where Estate Counsel was sanctioned for wrongly disclosing
DIP misconduct.
(FN143]. 134 B.R. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
(FN144]. See id. at 343.
[FNI45]. See id.
[FN146]. Of course, there is plenty of law regarding the duty of corporate counsel to "rat" on the misconduct of its
management. See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.13 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULE 1.13]; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980); Ellen A. Pansky,
Between an Ethical Rock and a Hard Place: Balancing Duties to the Organizational Client and its Constituents, 37
S. TEX. L. REV. 1167 (1996); Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation: Attorney
Liability Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213 (1996).
[FNI47]. We haven't found any reported bankruptcy case law discussing how Estate Counsel should inform the
bankruptcy court about DIP misconduct. The Estate Counsel could attempt what has become known as "noisy
withdrawal," which requires the lawyer not only to withdraw but to disaffirm any documents that he prepared that
related to the misconduct. See Hazard, supra note 3, at 727- 288 (discussing ABA Professional Ethics Formal
Opinion 93-366, which expressly permitted lawyer to disavow work to prevent its use by client perpetrating a
fraud). In the "real world" of bankruptcy practice, Estate Counsel will actually do this in cases involving serious
client misconduct. But is noisy withdrawal sufficient? What if the judge doesn't smile knowingly and sign the
withdrawal papers? And what if she asks the horrible "Why?" question? Case law is silent. See infra Part IV
(discussing our proposed solution).
[FN148]. See In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 937-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga 1992) (stating Debtor's attorney has
"duty" to inquire about all connections that may reveal adverse interest or render professional "not disinterested"
under §§ 327(a) and 101(14)).
[FN149]. See id. at 939 (discussing attorney's duty to monitor disposition of assets and to assure rights of creditors
are protected).
[FN150]. See CPY Co. v. Ameriscribe Corp. (In re Chas. P. Young Co.), 145 B.R. 131, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (stating transactions with insiders are subject to careful and vigorous scrutiny).
[FN151]. Agresti v. RosenKranz (In re United Utensils Corp.), 141 B.R 306, 309 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992)
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(holding attorney has responsibility and duty to disclose Debtor's failure to fulfill fiduciary duty); see also infra Part
II.R5. (discussing attorney's duty to police DIP).
[FNI52]. See In re Barrie Reed Buick-GMC, 164 RR. 378, 381 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1994) (fmding duty to detect
DIP's failure to preserve assets of estate).
[FNI53]. See In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ga 1994) (denying compensation for attorney's failure
to disclose the DIP's legal incompetency due to his stroke).
[FNI54]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (stating, in dicta, which professionals are
obligated to report Debtor's conversion of estate property).
[FNI55]. See Vining v. Ward (In re Ward), 894 F.2d 771, 776 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating attorney had ethical duty to
disclose Debtor's concealment of assets if such concealment was known to attorney). There is at least one state
court ethics decision that required even former counsel of the Debtors to disclose this type of fraud. See Columbus
Bar Ass'n v. Wright, 568 N.E.2d 1218 (1991) (affirming suspension of attorney who failed to disclose his former
clients' misrepresentations in their bankruptcy petition).
[FNI56]. See Bankruptcy Ethics, supra note 4, at 388-389 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Query
whether Committee Counsel, acting as an advocate for all unsecured creditors, could take over the "distasteful"
actions that Estate Counsel might be reluctant to file. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text (discussing
available tools for monitoring Estate Counsel).
In somewhat disturbing dicta in In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R. 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992), the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia indicated that Estate Counsel may have breached the
"candor" required by its fiduciary duties by not making certain affirmative disclosures concerning the proposed
chapter 11 reorganization plans. Id. at 621.
However, in the courts' zeal to ensure such integrity, it is possible to overlook a simple, basic fact: no matter
who the professionals are, it is the client who makes the ultimate decision as to the positions taken in the matters
for which the professionals are employed. Where the same individuals control related parties, those parties will act
in concert in their mutual interests. Subject to the fiduciary duty of estate professionals and the Rules of
Professional Conduct, attorneys have a duty of loyalty to their clients.
Brennan, 187 RR. at 150.
The court ultimately refused to sanction Estate Counsel under BRP 9011 due to Counsel's "lack of experience" in
chapter 11 practice. Id. at 621. We note that there was apparently no disclosure in this case. Whitney Place,
therefore, can't stand for the horrifying proposition that Estate Counsel must disclose the entire strategy in chapter
11 and chapter 12 proceedings.
[FNI57]. See DeVlieg-Bullard Inc. v. Natale, (In re DeVlieg Inc.), 174 B.R. 497, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (fmding that
purpose behind disinterested requirement is not directly related to fees but rather is intended to ensure objective
advice). See also infra notes 181-91 (discussing DeVlieg).
[FNI58]. See In re Love, 163 B.R. 164 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1993) (disallowing attorneys' fee for failure to disclose
previous representation of DIP's partner in previous proceedings); In re DN Assocs., 144 B.R. 195, 199 (Bankr. D.
Me 1992) (fmding DIP's attorney cannot be compensated for representation of Debtor, Debtor's directors, officers,
or shareholders in matters that did not benefit the estate); Agresti v. RosenKranz (In re United Utensils Corp.), 141
B.R. 306, 308 (Bankr. W.D. Pa 1992) (stating attorney employed by corporation owes allegiance to corporate
entity, not shareholders, directors, officers, employees, or other related parties); In re Rusty Jones, 134 B.R. 321,
343 (Bankr. N.D. III 1991) (stating conflict of interest exists when attorney represents DIP and Debtor's
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shareholders); In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l. Inc., 91 B.R. 742, 751 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (fmding conflict of
interest existed when attorney represented Debtor and Debtor affiliates).
[FNI59]. See In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 301 (Bankr N.D. Ga 1994) ("The unique circumstances ... of a Chapter 11
case place the attorney for the debtor in possession in the unusual position of sometimes owing a higher duty to the
estate and bankruptcy court than to his client") (citing Whitney Place, 146 B.R. 619, 620-21 (N.D. Ga 1992».
[FNI60]. See Barrie Reed Buick-GMC, 164 B.R. 381, 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1994) (disallowing accounting fee
related to services provided to DIP's operation); In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)
(denying fees to realtor who provided services to DIP).
[FNI61]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 150 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (fmding individual DIP owes fiduciary duty
to estate); Love, 163 B.R. at 177 (denying attorney's fee where substantial work had been provided to DIP in his
individual capacity).
[FNI62]. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing confusion as to whom the attorney owes his duty).
[FNI63]. 187 B.R. 135.
[FNI64). Id. at 150.
[FNI65]. See Rivers, 167 B.R. at 288; In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (imposing special
duty on attorney for Debtor to ensure that Debtor is complying with Bankruptcy Code); In re Wilde Horse Enter's,
Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (requiring attorney to take active role in protecting interests of
Estate, beneficiaries, and unsecured creditors); Sky Valley, 135 B.R. at 937 (discussing attorneys' ongoing duty to
investigate professionals hired by Debtor); In re Davison, 79 B.R. 859 (fmding that attorney is not liable for
Debtor's waste of assets unless attorney takes active role in Debtor's wrongful conduct). But see In re Derringer,
132 B.R. 34 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (arguing that Debtor's counsel should not be "policeman; rather, that role
should be left to creditors' committee").
[FNI66]. Professional Responsibility, supra note 4, at 23.
[FNI67]. Derringer, 132 B.R. at 36(requiringactive participation in wrongful conduct by debtor's counsel for
liability).
[FNI68]. See Davison, 79 B.R. at 859.
[FNI69]. See id. at 861.
[FNI70]. rd. at 864 (footnotes omitted).
[FNI71). rd. (stating that court refuses to endorse, by awarding attorney fees, practices that virtually ensure
unsuccessful chapter II proceeding).
[FNI72]. 135 B.R. 925 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992).
[FNI73). See id. at 928
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[FN174]. See id. at 929.
[FN175]. See id.
[FN176]. See id. The court's opinion provided that no compensation be paid without court approval.
[FNl77]. Sky Valley, 135 B.R. at 933-34.
[FN178]. See id. at 939-40. The court denied $19,299 in requested compensation for work on the auction and
reduced other fees by $20,000. Id.
[FN179]. See id at 939.
[FN180]. See, e.g., In re Wilde Horse Enters., Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 838 (Bankr C.D. Cal 1991) (fmding Estate
Counsel allowed DIP to attempt to sell Estate's assets to her boyfriend/landlord for below-market value); In re
Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (fmding chapter 11 individual Debtors took postpetition
vacation to Netherlands, Antilles, and hosted large pregame brunch for their friends before the 1992
Alabama-Auburn football game).
[FN181]. DeVlieg-Bullard, Inc. v. Natale (In re DeVlieg, Inc.), 174 B.R. 497 (N.D. III 1994).
[FN182]. See id. at 497.
[FN183]. See id.
[FN184]. See id. at 503-04.
[FN185]. See id.
[FN186]. DeVlieg, 174 B.R. at 499-500.
[FN187]. See id. at 503.
[FN188]. See id. at 499.
[FN189]. See id. at 503.
[FN190]. Id. at 502 n.7 (citations omitted); see also In re Delta Petroleum (P.R.), Ltd., 193 B.R. 99, liO-II (D.
P.R. 1996) (awarding counsel fees to attorney for services rendered to trustee in bankruptcy proceeding even
though attorney provided services to Debtor in criminal proceeding because of attorney's inability to withdraw
from either case).
[FN191]. See, e.g., Forest, supra nAl, at 823-826 (discussing repercussions oflawyers rendering nonlegal advice).
[FN192]. See, e.g., FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S.
79 (1994) (holding attorney has duty to avoid public harm when he discovers his client is engaging in fraud, and
attorney has duty to investigate information supplied for inclusion into materials intended for public use).
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[FNI93]. See In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993).
[FN194]. Id. at 746 (discussing challenge of serving needs of debtor when attorney's duty is owed to others).
[FN195]. See In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing importance of
attorneys avoiding any appearance of impropriety in bankruptcy context); In re Granite Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,
159 B.R. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993) (stating failure to disclose potential conflicts subjects attorney to risk of court
denying compensation pursuant to § 328).
Perhaps the most difficult issues in individual chapter 11 cases are: (1) whether a Chapter II Debtor's postpetition
income is property of the Estate, see Harp, 166 B.R. at 740; In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990); and (2) for what purposes the individual who filed the Chapter 11 may use Estate assets and/or postpetition
income. See In re Duque, 48 B.R. 965 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (retaining criminal counsel at Estate's expense); In re
Engel, 190 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (retaining criminal counsel); In re Warner, 141 B.R. 762 (M.D. Fla.
1992) (retaining criminal counsel); Harp, 166 B.R. at 740 (personal expenditures). Detailed discussions of these
issues are clearly beyond the scope of this Article, but we want to remind Estate Counsel that they must take care
not to violate their fiduciary duty to the Estate in these areas. See id.. 166 B.R. at 740.
[FN196]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 151-55 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (allowing retention of Estate Counsel
where Counsel's retainer and prepetition claim were paid by Debtor on eve of bankruptcy).
[FN197]. See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 114 B.R. 956,964 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding attorney did not engage in
conflict of interest violation by negotiating settlement on behalf of debtor's president); see also In re Central Ice
Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987) (fmding trustee was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees incurred
defending suits by creditors and shareholders).
[FN198]. See Central Ice Cream, 59 B.R. 476, 489 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (imposing fee sanction upon special
counsel for negotiating settlement for debtor while attempting to obtain a release from a principal shareholder in
exchange for certain direct payment to the shareholder). This section was later reversed by the 7th Circuit in In re
Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1968 (7th Cir. 1987).
[FN199]. Cf. Central Ice Cream, 59 B.R. 476.
[FN200]. Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that bankruptcy
courts enjoy inherent power to sanction attorneys for improper behavior); Futuronics Corp v. Arutt, Nachamie &
Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463,469-70 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) (fmding
bankruptcy court had power to deny compensation based upon violation of Bankruptcy Code provision).
[FN201]. See infra Part II.F. (discussing third-party and criminal liability).
[FN202]. Disqualification, at least from the Debtor's and the Bankruptcy Estate's point of view, is the most drastic.
Fee reduction is probably a more painful sanction to the attorney involved, given that the attorney has expended
uncompensated efforts.
[FN203]. See In re Granite Sheet Metal Works, 159 B.R. 840, 846-47 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993) (disqualifYing
attorney for failure to disclose prepetition representation of Debtor in employment application and affidavit); In re
Rusty Jones, 134 B.R. 321, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating bankruptcy court can disqualifY attorney after
retention and before completion of assignment).
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[FN204]. Rusty Jones, 134 B.R. at 347 (refusing to disqualify attorney because of great hardship that would result).
[FN205]. Granite Sheet Metal Works, 159 B.R. at 848 (fmding that even, though disqualification after significant
services were rendered was a harsh remedy, it was appropriate where attorney's actions reflected allegiance to
Debtor's controlling shareholder rather than Debtor). We've noticed that, in most reported cases in this area, Estate
Counsel have been relieved of their duties long before the court begins to consider imposing any sanctions.
[FN206]. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994); see Knepper v. Skeloff (In re Knepper), 154 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(holding bankruptcy courts have sanctions power under § 1927 for unreasonably multiplying proceedings).
[FN207]. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011; see In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472., 481 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating attorney is
subject to sanction under Rule 9011 when motion is filed that is not "well grounded in fact or warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for extension or modification, or reversal of existing law").
[FN208]. See Downs, 103 F.3d at 481-82, (affrrming bankruptcy court's sanction of chapter 7 Debtor's counsel for
violating 11 U.S.C. § 329 and denial of sanctions under Rule 9011).
[FN209]. Well, not to us, really, but to some people, it might be offensive.
[FN21O]. See, e.g., In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 937-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (punishing less than
diligent attorney by denying portion of fees); In re Rusty Jones, Inc., 134 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991)
(describing attorney fee application as an "unhappy issue").
[FN211]. See 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1994) (prescribing process of compensating officers).
[FN212]. See Sky Valley, 135 B.R. at 925 (denying approximately $40,000 of $339,000 in requested fees); In re
Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (denying $11,309.50 in fees).
[FN213]. See, e.g., In re Wilde Horse Enters.Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (denying attorney's
fee and requiring disgorgement of retainer); In re Churchfield Management & Inv. Corp. 100 B.R. 389, 394-95
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (noting unethical attorney not entitled to any fees).
[FN214]. 103 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 1996).
[FN215]. See id. at 479-80 (noting failure to fully disclose retainer was "willful disregard" of fiduciary duties
imposed by statute). The retainer was paid during a time when the Debtors were attempting to convert their case to
a chapter 11 proceeding. The court ultimately denied the motion to convert. See id. at 479.
[FN216]. Downs, 103 F.3d at 476.
[FN217]. Id. at 479; see also Neben & Starrett, Inc. v. Chartwell Fin. Corp. (In re Park-Helena Corp.), 63 F.3d
877, 882 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding attorney failure to disclose retainer was willful), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 712
(1996).
[FN218]. Heaven forbid. In all seriousness, though, using the sledgehammer of wholesale denial of fees as the sole
appropriate remedy undercuts some necessary judicial flexibility.
[FN219]. See, e.g., In re Office Prods., of Am., Inc. 136 B.R. 983,988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992) (describing that
© 2005 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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under both chapters 7 and 11 reasonable fees may be awarded only for those services "actual, necessary, and/or
beneficial to the estate").
[FN220]. See In re Mangum, 147 B.R. 875, 880 (Bankr. B.D. Va. 1992) (removing counsel from present case and
requiring future filings of petitions to be accompanied by his application to employ counsel).
[FN221]. See infra Part II.G.2., and then ask yourself if you would want to be any of the counsel mentioned in In re
Bonneville Pacific Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
Judge William T. Bodoh visited NBR's Debtor-Creditor class on March 17, 1997, and concluded his remarks with
a story about counsel who had misrepresented the law to him. He emphasized that any counsel who chooses to
misstate either the law or the facts to him can count on the fact that he will never--repeat, never--believe that lawyer
again. See also Commandments, supra note 120, at 619-23.
To beat a dead horse here (and we really mean to do that--this point is important), it's not just the distrust of the
individual judge that should worry the practitioner. Individual judges publish opinions, which means that a lawyer's
reputation can be tarnished far beyond the jurisdiction of the judge who observed the unethical behavior in the first
place.
(FN222]. See supra Part I.e.
[FN223]. See In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (discussing differences between individual
chapter 11 case and chapter 13 case).
[FN224]. LUNDIN, supra note 78, at §1.86.
[FN225]. See id. at §§ 1.86-1.134. For a complete discussion of the ethical obligations of counsel in all consumer
bankruptcy cases, see Carol W. Gustavsen, The Ethical Role of a Debtor's Attorney in a Consumer Bankruptcy
Filing, 6 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 665 (1993). This Article clearly shows that the attorney's primary obligation to
chapter 13 debtors is to keep them from defrauding the court either by concealing assets, improper bankruptcy
planning, or simply disregarding their duties under the Code. See id.
[FN226]. See, e.g., Cohn v. United States Trustee (In re Ostas), 158 B.R. 312,316 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (mandating
that attorney return certain fees due to failure to disclose); In re Damon, 40 B.R. 36,378 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(precluding all fees where attorney failed to disclose fees to court and committed various ethical violations). The
reduced nature of the fiduciary duties of Estate Counsel in a chapter 13 also reflects the reality of Chapter 13
practice: the level of direct supervision that the drafters of the Code might have contemplated is simply impossible,
given the economics of the practice:
Chapter 13 can be a deadly combination for lawyers: high speed, low fees, "small" cases, big emotions,
complicated legal questions, unsophisticated clients, a judiciary intent on moving cases and impatient with
variations and litigation. Substantial rights of debtors and creditors are at issue, but often the time available for an
individual debtor or creditor is minimal. Sophisticated things happen very quickly, but the clients tend to be
unsophisticated. Getting information from an unsophisticated client is hard work; giving effective instructions to an
unsophisticated client is similarly difficult.
The counsel fees in a Chapter 13 case are modest. Creditors' claims are relatively small, and the amount that a
creditor is willing to spend to resolve a claim is usually small. Whatever is to be done on behalf of a debtor or
creditor must be done quickly and efficiently. Lawyers must get it right the first time because the transaction costs
of correcting mistakes may be prohibitive.
LUNDIN, supra note 78, at § 1.86.
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[FN227]. See Vining v. Ward (In re Ward), 894 F.2d 771, 776 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting law fIrm did not have duty
to inform bankruptcy court of existence of judgment because attorneys had not been employed as Estate Counsel);
In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, Inc., 615 F.2d 925, 941 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that attorney seeking fee in bankruptcy
matter has fIduciary obligation to court as offIcer as court); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 B.R. 328, 336
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating public and bar demand offIcers of the court and judiciary adhere to highest standards); In re
Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting those performing duties in administration of
bankruptcy estate are offIcers of the court and may be held to fIduciary standards); In re Damon, 40 B.R. 367, 376
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (mandating forfeiture of fees if attorney violates duty as officer of the court); see also
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
[FN228]. 101 U.S. 494 (1879)
[FN229]. Baker, 101 U.S. at 502. It would be lovely if lawyers really aspired to behave this way, wouldn't it?
[FN230]. See, e.g., Arlan's, 615 F.2d at 925, 937 (refusing to accept that law fInns' action was inadvertent);
Damon, 40 B.R. at 377 (same).
[FN23I]. 894 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1990).
[FN232]. See id. at 776.
[FN233]. See Geoffery C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 701, 721-31 (1993); Meyerhoffer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir. 1974)
(noting that lawyers must strive to avoid even the appearance of impropriety). Counsel may need to report such
crimes to the court in order to permit the court to fulfIll its duty, under 18 U.S.C. § 3057, to report to the U.S.
Attorney that reasonable grounds exist for believing that a bankruptcy crime has been committed. Only judges,
receivers, and trustees have this duty to report. See 18 U.S.c. § 3057 (1994) (governing bankruptcy investigations).
[FN234]. See supra Part II.B.4.
[FN235]. It is this ancient duty that is probably, in our humble opinion, the progenitor of the duty to "rat" in
bankruptcy cases.
[FN236]. For a much more comprehensive discussion of bankruptcy crimes, see I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
" 7.01-7.LH (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1996) [hereinafter Crimes]. For a shorter summary, see Ned
W. Waxman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 BANKR. DEV. L.J. 311, 341 (1995).
[FN237]. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-157 (1994); see also Crimes, supra note 236, at ~ 7.02.
[FN238]. For a view of bankruptcy crimes involving attorneys, see Joan B. Safford, The Slippery Slope: The Road
From Ethical Practice to Attorney Negligence, Contempt or Fraud in Bankruptcy Cases, 1996 Workshop for
Bankruptcy Judges II 277 (1996) [hereinafter Slippery Slope]. For a discussion of 18 U.S.c. § 157, see Maureen
A. Tighe, Criminal Bankruptcy Fraud, 1996 Workshop for Bankruptcy Judges II 297 (1996) [hereinafter Criminal
Fraud]. 18 U.S.C. § 157 is especially broad, so all attorneys who plan to represent a Debtor or DIP should read it.
[FN239]. See Slippery Slope, supra note 238, at 282-85. The facts of several unpublished criminal cases scared the
heck out of us.
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(FN240]. Not bankruptcy attorneys who represent criminals, but attorneys who are crooks.
[FN241]. See United States v. Switzer, 252 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1958) (convicting attorney of conspiracy to transfer
property illegally); Coghlan v. United States, 147 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1945) (convicting attorney of making
false documents and concealing property of debtors).
[FN242]. See United States v. Goodstein, 883 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1989) (convicting attorney who'd had over 40
years ofbankruptcy experience).
[FN243]. See supra note 226.
[FN244]. For an excellent discussion of issues related to the unusual crime committed when "officers of the court"
purchase Estate property (l8 U.S.C. § 154), see Bernard Shapiro and Neil Wyland, Ethical Quandaries of
Professionals in Bankruptcy Cases, 402 PLI/REAL 313, 360 (l994).
[FN245]. 49 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 1995).
[FN246]. 853 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1988).
[FN247]. 16 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1994).
[FN248]. 775 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1985).
[FN249]. 943 F.2d 1204 (lOth Cir. 1991); see also Crimes, supra note 239 at, 7.08.
[FN250]. See United States v. Levine, 970 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brown, 943 F.2d 1246
(lOth Cir. 1991).
[FN251]. See Levine, 970 F.2d at 683-684.
[FN252]. See Brown, 943 F.2d at 1248-49; see also Crimes, supra note 239 at' 7.02. Note to all associates in law
ftrms. This case illustrates the sad but true principle that a defense based on a theory of "just following orders"
does not work any better in criminal prosecutions of bankruptcy crimes than it does in war crime trials.
[FN253]. See Zimmerman 943 F.2d at 1208, 1211 (discussing strength of evidence against Zimmerman).
[FN254]. We believe that the most blatant case of defrauding a bankruptcy estate of its assets is United States v.
Edgar, 971 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1992). In that case, the attorney for the owner of a corporation in a chapter II
proceeding negotiated the sale of the Debtor's business, drew up the paperwork concerning the transfer of the
business, and structured the sale so the assets of the Debtor and the proceeds of the sale paid to the Debtor's owner
would be difficult to trace. See id. at 91. Needless to say, the bankruptcy court was not informed of the Debtor's
president's excellent sales ability until seven months after the completion of the sale. The Court of Appeals for the
Eight Circuit upheld the conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. See id at 96.
The strangest bankruptcy-related crime to result in an attorney's conviction is undoubtedly the crime of
circumventing the blind case--draw system of assigning judges to bankruptcy cases. See United States v. August,
745 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1984). In August, the attorney was having an affair with a Bankruptcy Court "intake" clerk.
The attorney conspired with the intake clerk to ensure that his cases were not assigned to a bankruptcy judge who
was conservative in awarding attorneys' fees. Even though the crime in August is unlikely to be repeated, it does
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illustrate that any attempt to manipulate the bankruptcy system in a questionable manner could lead to federal
criminal charges. This is especially true given the new Justice Department emphasis on bankruptcy crimes. See
Slippery Slope, supra note 238, for a general discussion of the "new" attitude toward bankruptcy crimes involving
attorneys.
[FN255]. You didn't think that we'd let you off without a Clint Eastwood reference, did you? THE GOOD, THE
BAD, AND THE UGLY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1966».
[FN256]. Cf. JOHN REED, TEN DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD (Penguin Books ed., 1966).
[FN257]. 526 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (La. Ct. App. 1988). Please note that neither of us is familiar with Louisiana law,
so our terminology may be somewhat imprecise.
[FN258]. See id at 1387.
[FN259]. See id. Not surprisingly, given its stellar performance in lending, the bank was taken over by the FDIC
during the pendency of this appeal.
[FN260]. See id. at 1387-88. The language of the bankruptcy court's order was so specific about what the law firm
was supposed to do that it clarified, beyond cavil, the extent of the law firm's fiduciary duty to the Bankruptcy
Estate in this case.
[FN261]. See 11 U.S.c. § 363(a)(1994).
[FN262]. See Louisiana Bank & Trust, 526 So. 2d at 1388.
[FN263]. See id. at 1387.
[FN264]. See id; see also Agrico Chern. Co. v. E.K. Paintings, Inc., 432 So. 2d 253, 255 (La. 1983) (reversing rule
oflaw relied upon by Debtors).
[FN265]. See Louisiana Bank & Trust, 526 So. 2d at 1388.
[FN266]. Compare the Louisiana State trial court judge's understanding of this problem with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994), discussed infra notes 297-303.
[FN267]. Louisiana Bank & Trust, 526 So. 2d at 1389-90.
[FN268]. Scheftner v. Foster (In re Derringer), 132 B.R. 34 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991).
[FN269]. State law is all over the map when it comes to bootstrapping the duties of a lawyer representing a
fiduciary to create a duty of the lawyer directly to the beneficiary. Compare Arpadi v. First MSP Corp., 68 Ohio St.
3d 453, 458 (1994) (attorney for a general partnership owed a fiduciary duty to limited partners of general
partnership); Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 4th 463, 477-79 (1995) (same), with Rose v. Summers,
Compton, Wells & Hamburg, P.c. 887 S.W.2d 683,686-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting Arpadi's reasoning and
holding that there was no duty extending from partnership's attorney to individual partners).
[FN270]. See infra, notes 298-308 and accompanying text. The better-reasoned cases refrain from blindly applying
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any hard-and-fast rule, preferring instead to consider the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., McClure v.
Tremaine, 77 Wash. App. 312 (1995) (holding whether attorney-client relationship exists as a matter of substantive
law is to be addressed by tribunal); Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (considering
facts as whole as prelude to decision).
[FN271]. In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996); see also In re Bonneville Pac. Corp.,
147 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (using authority to disgorge attorney of fees), motion to amend denied, 196
B.R.868.
[FN272]. Bonneville, 196 B.R. 868.
[FN273]. We're not kidding. See id. at 870 n.3 (discussing various convictions, indictments, and guilty pleas
entered by debtor's officers and directors to numerous federal felony counts).
[FN274]. See id. at 874 nJ 1 (discussing $30,000,000 Debtor's prebankruptcy counsel paid to Bankruptcy Estate in
settlement of Estate's claims against counsel).
[FN275]. See id. at 875. Most of the debtor's principals--who later had criminal problems--were managing the DIP
postpetition.
[FN276]. See id. at 878.
[FN277]. See Bonneville, 196 B.R. 868, 871 n.6 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
[FN278]. See id. at 873.
[FN279]. The hearings included: (1) a lift-stay motion on a questionable asset, (2) a motion by the debtor for an
injunction to protect the principals of Bonneville from a suit by one of their largest creditors (denied by the
bankruptcy court); and (3) a sua sponte appointment by the bankruptcy court of an examiner to investigate
numerous charges of wrongdoing alleged by various creditors. Id. at 875-77.
[FN280]. See id. at 878.
[FN281]. See Bonneville, 196 B.R. 887. In fact, Estate Counsel informed the court that he was concentrating on
"present tense,... not dwelling on historical events which ... weren't going to change." Id. We read this as
evidence that Estate Counsel was afraid to investigate his client.
[FN282]. See id. at 878.
[FN283]. Even the examiner did not escape the Court's displeasure. See id. at 878-81.
[FN284]. Given the advantage of 20/20 hindsight, it's clear that the parties controlling the bankruptcy were merely
playing for time. We can't tell, though, whether the Committee Counsel knew of the extent of the fraud at that point.
[FN285]. See Bonneville, 196 B.R. at 879.
[FN286]. See id.
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[FN287]. One of us is currently serving as a Brownie troop co-leader. That's why we chose this particular version
of the well-known phrase. It gets by them.
[FN288]. See Bonneville, 196 B.R. at 879.
[FN289]. See id. at 881 n.20.
[FN290]. See In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 147 B.R. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (regarding application for interim
compensation).
[FN291]. Id. at 806.
[FN292]. There is no indication as to why there was a four-year lapse between the entry of the original opinion and
the opinion on reconsideration.
[FN293]. See In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868,868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996).
[FN294]. See id. at 882.
[FN295]. See id. at 883. Although the court clearly stated that its [mdings as to the former Committee Counsel
were mere dicta, we doubt that they'd get much from a fee request in the future. See id.
[FN296]. We have some sympathy for Committee Counsel, but it appears that the language of the opinion and
sanctions were justified as to the Estate Counsel. Other courts have also been wary of the relationship between
Estate Counsel and Committee Counsel. See, e.g., Pierson & Gaylen v. Creel & Atwood (In re Consol. Bankshares,
Inc.), 785 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1986):
Too frequently, court-appointed counsel for debtor and the official creditor committees' interests in a case,
sharing the mutual goal of securing approval for their fees, enter into a conspiracy of silence with regard to
contesting each other's fee applications. (One bankruptcy judge characterized this process as a "massive
backscratching exercise.") This is a violation of their duties as fiduciaries not only to their specific clients but to the
interests of the debtor's estate.
Id. at 1255 (citing In re Arlan's Dept. Stores, 615 F.2d 925, 941 (2d Cir. 1979)).
[FN297]. Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994).
[FN298]. Id. at 1215. For other cases linking corporate counsel's duty to third parties, see Willner's Fuel Distribs.
Inc. v. Noreen, 882 P.2d 399,406 (Alaska 1994) (noting corporate counsel owes fiduciary duty to creditors). But
cf. Skarhrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 700- 04 (1991) (stating no such duty to
individual shareholders).
[FN299]. See Perez, 30 F.3d at 1218; cf. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1943) (in which Claude Rains's character
exclaims something on the order of: "I'm shocked, shocked, that gambling is going on here.")
[FN300]. See Perez, 30 F.3d at 1218. The authors are puzzled by the court's implication that this type of behavior
is somehow different from that usually attributed to wealthy parties in non-bankruptcy cases.
[FN301]. Id. at 1219 (emphasis added).
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[FN302]. Of course, the Perez majority isn't alone in its confusion. See In re Bonneville Pac. Corp., 196 B.R. 868,
883 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996) (perpetuating bootstrapping of the duty of counsel to DIP--now a "fiduciary duty to the
estate"--to DIP's own fiduciary duty to estate). At least the court in In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 149-50 (Bankr.
D.N.I. 1995), recognized that it was bootstrapping: "[T]he fiduciary duty of the debtor's professionals is derivative
of the debtor's fiduciary duty." Id. at 149-50. Perez didn't involve unconscionable attorney conduct but, unlike
Brennan, Perez is a problem for the average bankruptcy practitioner. The estate counsel in Perez wasn't trying to
destroy the estate in a "scorched earth" war as in In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1988), and wasn't manipulating a mentally impaired Debtor-attorney as in In re Rivers, 167 B.R. 288 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1994). Here, Debtor's counsel attempted, with some success, to get confirmation of an individual's chapter 11
plan that paid 100% on the claims of all creditors, even though it didn't pay interest on the claims. Unless Mr.
Perez was hopelessly solvent(i.e., "rich"), this strategy hardly smacks of bad faith or unfair dealings. If counsel's
conduct in Perez is sanctionable or otherwise improper, then it is almost impossible for Estate Counsel to ethically
fulfill its duties in a chapter 11 or chapter 12 case other than by filing plans that call for payments in full with
interest to all creditors.
[FN303]. See Perez, 30 F.3d at 1218-19.
[FN304]. St. Angelo v. Sidco, Inc. (In re Sidco, Inc.), 173 B.R. 194 (ED. Cal. 1994) (affirming bankruptcy
judge's holding that "the notion of a duty by debtor-in-possession's counsel to the debtor-in-possession's creditors
[was] a 'flight into the absurd'''). As the district court in Sidco explained:
[T]he authorities cited by appellant to create a fiduciary duty of counsel to the estate [are] very weak. These
nonbinding cases speak of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the estate in unusual contexts, and not as a general
principle. These cases do not overthrow [the bankruptcy judge's] basic tenet that attorneys for
debtors-in-possession have a fiduciary duty to their client, the debtor-in-possession, not to the creditors and
shareholders whose interests may be adverse to the debtor. In fact, II U.S.c. § 327 guards against concurrent
representation of both the creditor and a debtor-in-possession.

***

Furthermore, it is the debtor-in-possession who ultimately manages the creditors' and shareholders' interests, while
the attorney only advises the debtor. The debtor-in-possession, not the attorney, acts as the trustee to the estate.
Id. at 196-97 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The bankruptcy judge in Sidco also wryly observed that,
because any attorney for the DIP was likely to be carrying out the wishes of the DIP's 90% owner, any lawyer for
the DIP would be as good as any other, and the only way to avoid that type of owner control would be to appoint a
trustee instead of permitting the Debtor to remain in possession. See id. at 195.
[FN305]. See Turning, supra note 88, at 927 (defining "official entities" to include Debtors, creditors' committees,
and parties that are paid by Estate funds).
[FN306]. See Forest, supra note 41, at 789-906 (discussing various possibilities of how much lawyer can advise
her client on extra-legal issues); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 550-51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (discussing
whether attorney must volunteer legal advice or must simply wait for client to ask for her opinion) (emphasis
added).
[FN307]. See Forest, supra note 41, at 789; see also discussion of Arlan's, supra note 126-31 and accompanying
text. In addition, lawyers are subject to ethical rules that imply a duty to the court. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983) (stating that lawyer must disclose, to tribunal, criminal or
fraudulent acts).
[FN308]. The theory behind NBR's "tie-breaker" is that making the duty to the court superior to the duty to the
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client would best preserve the integrity of the entire system. See Forest, supra note 41, at 789.
[FN309]. Compare In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr. N.D. IlL 1990) (explaining that "[c]hapter 11
debtor in possession administers the assets of the estate and any business conducted therein as a fiduciary for both
the equity interests and the creditors[;] . . . [c]ounsel for a Chapter 11 debtor owes a fiduciary duty to the
corporation or partnership as an entity, and represents its interests, not those of its principals."); with In re Harp,
166 B.R. 740, 746-47 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (noting fiduciary responsibilities of DIP require DIP to ensure that
resources benefit "the unsecured creditors and other parties in interest.") (emphasis added).
[FN31O]. We're using "Estate constituents" to mean parties with an interest in the outcome of the case (e.g., parties
in interest under 11 U.S.c. § 1109(b) (1994)) as well as those with outlying interests, such as employees. Cf. Karen
Gross, Taking Community Interests Into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031 (1994);
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U.CHL. L. REV. 775 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. Rev. 815, 815 (1987) ("On what in my view
is a different front, Warren and I also think existing laws do not adequately protect many, such as workers who are
affected when a finn fails."). But see, e.g., Hon. Barry S. Schenner, Response to Professor Gross: Taking the
Interests of the Community Into Account in Bankruptcy--A Modem-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1031 (1994).
[FN311]. See Turning, supra note 88, at 919 (parties in interest may change allegiance several times during case).
[FN312]. See, e.g., Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472,479 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
possible sanctions for attorney's breach of "his fiduciary obligations to the court") (quoting Futuronics Corp. v.
Arutt, Nachamie & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463,471 (2d Cir. 1981)).
[FN313]. See Knepper v. Skekloff (In re Knepper), 154 B.R. 75, 78-79 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (denying fees to DIP's
counsel on the grounds that DIP's counsel should have recognized that reorganization was impossible and thus
should have converted case to one under chapter 7); see also Everett v. Perez (In re Perez), 30 F.3d 1209, 1219
(9th Cir. 1994) (stating "[c]ounsel for the estate must keep finnly in mind that his client is the estate and not the
debtor individually"). Perez reflects the consistent cognitive leap that courts make when they discuss counsel's
"independent responsibility to detennine whether a proposed course of action is likely to benefit the estate or will
merely cause delay or produce some other procedural advantage to the debtor." Id. at 1219. Until we know which
interests comprise the interests of the Estate, Judge Kozinski's majority opinion sheds no light on these duties. Cf.
Jonathan M. Landers & Kathryn A. Coleman, Unexpected Allies: The Bankruptcy Judge and Debtor's Counsel,
112 BANKING L.J. 997, 1002-03 (1995) (noting that Perez and others hold Debtor as fiduciary to creditors, but
"[t]he interests of different creditor constituencies are vastly different...[y]et the debtor has an obligation to
maximize the overall return to creditors on a more or less utilitarian principle--that is, the greatest good for the
greatest number. ").
[FN314]. See In re Wilde Horse Enters., Inc., 136 B.R. 830, 840 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that "[b]ecause
the attorney for the debtor in possession is a fiduciary of the estate and an officer of the Court, the duty to advise
the client goes beyond responding to the client's request for advice.... [and the] attorney has the duty to remind the
debtor in possession, and its principals, of its duties under the Code, and to assist the debtor in fulfilling those
duties."); see also In re Sky Valley, Inc., 135 B.R. 925, 929 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) ("Debtor's attorney's duty as
fiduciary of the estate requires an active concern for the interests of the estate and its beneficiaries.") (citing In re
Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529 (Bankr. M.D. Ill. 1988), In re Whitney Place Partners, 147 B.R. 619, 620 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1992) ("The attorney for the debtor in possession is also a fiduciary to the estate.") (citing In re Doors &
More, Inc., 126 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991)); In re Adam Furniture Indus., Inc., 158 B.R. 291, 301 (Bankr.
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S.D. Ga. 1993) ("Even though the law fInn acts as attorney for the debtor in possession, it also has certain fIduciary
duties to the estate, including insuring that the rights of the creditors are protected.")
In re Doors & More has the misfortune of perpetually being miscited by sloppy judicial clerks. In fact, In re
Doors & More states the basic principles correctly, observing that the Estate encompasses the interests of creditors
and shareholders. In re Doors & More, Inc., 126 B.R. 43,46 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) (citing Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985». It also correctly observes that Estate Counsel is a fIduciary
for the Estate. Id. (citing Shaw & Levine v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. (In re Bohack Corp.), 607 F.2d 258 (2d Cir.
1979) and In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529, 548-49 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988». What In re Doors & More avoids
(but what some judicial clerks have misconstrued) is the transitive reasoning linking the Estate Counsel's fIduciary
duty to its client (the Estate) with any duty to particular interests related to the Estate. It's unfortunate that this
mistake in citing has been perpetuated by those who haven't read Doors & More. On the other hand, those mistakes
have enabled us to write this Article.
Let's discuss some courts who have tried, at least, to "get it right." The bankruptcy court in In re Rivers, 167 B.R.
288 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994), attempted to spell out the concept of the DIP's attorney's fIduciary duty to the Estate:
The role of a court-approved professional employed in a bankruptcy case is to "advise" and "assist" the
fiduciary. The professional's duties run not merely to the person or persons holding the office of the fIduciary but to
the trust to which the fIduciary owes allegiance. Thus in a Chapter 11 case, an attorney for a debtor in possession
must balance a role as counselor to the debtor with the role of officer of the court and fIduciary to the bankruptcy
estate. When the interests of the former conflict with those of the latter, it is the estate and the court to which the
attorney owes his highest allegiance.
Id. at 301. The Brennan court's view on the scope of the fIduciary duties of the DIP's counsel is different: "The
fIduciary duty of the debtor's professionals is essentially to assist the debtor in fulfIlling his fiduciary duty and to
take action if the debtor fails to do so in a manner which is detrimental to the estate." In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135,
150 (Bankr. D.N.I. 1995).
The analytical misstep of Wilde Horse and cases similar to it stems from superimposing the duty of the DIP
(which is a fIduciary of the Estate) to the duty of the DIP's counsel to represent the DIP in all of its fIduciary
splendor. We believe that these courts are confusing the counsel's legitimate duty as officer of the court with the
DIP's fiduciary duty to the Estate. Such a cognitive leap in terms of duties puts too much pressure on the DIP's
counsel and creates infmite loops of conflict. Still, there are those who insist on such a scenario:
A Chapter 11 debtor in possession acts in a fIduciary capacity for the benefit of creditors and other parties in
interest. Counsel for the debtor in possession, therefore, not only has an obligation to the debtor, but also has an
obligation to the debtor's creditors as well. It may be difficult for counsel to satisfy these two roles in a small
business case.... [But] counsel is responsible for seeing that the requirements and obligations imposed on the debtor
in possession by the Code, Rules, and bankruptcy courts are strictly observed. Failure of counsel to fulfIll that
obligation can have severe repercussions.
Hon. A. Thomas Small, Small Business Bankruptcy Cases, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 326-27 (1993)
(citations omitted and emphasis added). If Judge Small can write so forebodingly about the precarious position of
DIP's counsel, how likely is it that fIrms will continue to be willing to represent DIPs in the future? See Folly,
supra note 44.
.
[FN315]. See St. Angelo v. Sidco, Inc. (In re Sidco, Inc.), 173 B.R. 194, 196 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (rejecting overall
theory of DIP's counsel's duty to estate in favor of DIP's counsel's fIduciary duty to DIP itself, and approving
bankruptcy judge's "basic tenet that attorneys for debtors-in-possession have a fiduciary duty to their client, the
debtor-in-possession, not to the creditors and shareholders whose interests may be adverse to the debtor"). For a
more thorough discussion of the status of Sidco in the Ninth Circuit today, see supra note 288 and accompanying
text.
[FN316]. How can Estate Counsel give legal advice in the best interests ofthe Estate if we can't pinpoint what the
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Estate is?
[FN318]. See Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 288 (discussing superior talents of Debtor's counsel and how
dangerous it would be to lose talented lawyers to justified fear of lawsuits), Folly, supra note 44 (questioning
whether ethical and rational lawyers would ever want to represent insolvent corporations).
As usual, Jack Ayer puts it succinctly and accurately:
"We" (meaning: the sovereign, the polity, the system) haven't really made up our mind how far the trustee/DIP
should be able to go in protecting the debtor, at the creditors' expense. It would be possible to design a system of
bankruptcy that served the interest of creditors only. Up to now, we have been unwilling to go that far. But we
seem to have a bit of a bad conscience about it. We'll let the debtor go a ways, but not too far. And we have a way
of changing the rules from case to case--sometimes even mid-case.
Brenda Hacker Osborne, Note, Attorneys' Fees in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: A Case for Modified Procedures,
69 IND. L.J. 581, 589 (1994) [hereinafter Osborne] (quoting John D. Ayer, Professional Responsibility in
Bankruptcy Cases, in BANKRUPTCY ETHICS REVISITED 2-5 to 2-6 (1992». For an interesting comparison of
the "broad fiduciary duty" and the "no fiduciary duty" views, see Stephen McJohn, Claims & Opinions: Person or
Property? On the Legal Nature of the Bankruptcy Estate, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 465, 506-11 n.2l1 (1994) (citing,
as support for the "no fiduciary duty" approach, Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in
Possession in Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323 (1992), and citing, for the "broad fiduciary duty" approach,
John T. Roache, Note, The Fiduciary Obligations ofa Debtor in Possession, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 133 (1993».
[FN319]. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,680-83 (1993) [hereinafter Corporate Governance]
(noting in large reorganizations creditors and shareholders are parties in interest); Equity's Share, supra note 52, at
143 (noting other interests besides creditors share in distribution); Osborne, supra note 318, at 589 n.49 (one of
many manuscripts citing LoPucki & Whitford for the proposition that shareholders also have interest in estate).
Osborne observes that:
Many cases...[state] that the DIP's role in bankruptcy is to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of
creditors.... The DIP does have a duty to [do so,] but this does not mean that creditors must be served to the
detriment of equity. No courts have held that the DIP must select a mode of maximization that harms equity in
order to satisfy creditors faster, when another alternative exists which serves creditors' as well as equity's interests.
Id. at 588 n.47 (emphasis added and citations omitted). But see In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994),
discussed in more detail supra at notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
Jay Westbrook's thoughtful piece on special conflicts issues for the DIP focused on the DIP's "conflicting
obligations" to its creditors and, possibly, its owners. See Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 289-90. "The
Bankruptcy Code never specifies to whom the trustee owes duties, except perhaps in its references to 'parties in
interest,' an undefmed term. If the DIP represents owners, along with creditors, then it has an inherent and recurring
conflict of interest, one that its attorneys must inevitably share." Id. at 290 (footnotes omitted).
In Inherent Conflicts, Westbrook discusses three cases--Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. Unsecured Creditors'
Committee of Diamond Lumber, Inc., 88 B.R. 773 (N.D. Tex 1988), In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, Inc., 91 B.R. 742
(Bankr. N.D. Tex 1988), and In re Chapel Gate Apts., Ltd., 64 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)--that add support
for the proposition that creditors' interests are paramount in a bankruptcy case. See Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4
at 290 & n.lO. The structure of the argument bootstraps the duty that the DIP might owe to creditors and creates a
duty of the DIP's attorney to those selfsame creditors. Id. at 290-91 & note 14 (discussing the debate, and citing
LoPucki & Whitford, Equity's Share, supra note 52, about whether an insolvent DIP owes a duty to the owners or
only to the creditors). But Westbrook correctly rejects this simple analysis:
Indeed, for that reason a decision that DIPs should regard only the interests of creditors by no means resolves the
problem of inherent conflict for the DIP and its counsel. But the existence of cramdown does highlight the statutory
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role of the debtor, just as the provisions relating to interest holders demonstrate that owners have legitimate
interests in Chapter 11 proceedings.
Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 293 n.23 (citing to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), (b)(2)(c) (1994».
(FN320]. Corporate Governance, supra note 319, at 709-10. In a valiant attempt to clarify the muddled law in this
area, they explain:
[T]he cases are unclear as to whom management "owes" fiduciary duties. Most authorities agree that once
insolvency intervenes, creditors can sue for breach of fiduciary duties by directors and officers. There is
considerable wisdom in this point of view. Once insolvency intervenes, it is creditors who will bear the bulk of the
company's losses, so they should be able to initiate legal action when losses result from inappropriate management
behavior. The case for a fiduciary duty to creditors is especially strong in bankruptcy, where creditors' contractual
rights are suspended by the automatic stay. There is a growing number of statements, however, that post-insolvency
fiduciary duties run only to creditors. If that were an accepted statement of current law, it would be possible to
argue that when a conflict of interest arises between creditors and shareholders, management of an insolvent
corporation has a legal obligation to serve the creditors' interests.
We do not believe, however, that these statements should be viewed as establishing current law. First, contrary
statements appear in both the cases and the law reviews. Second, the view that managers of insolvent companies
owe fiduciary duties only to creditors fails to recognize the very real interest that shareholders can have in the
management of those companies. For many insolvent companies a substantial possibility exists for a return to
solvency prior to the confirmation of the plan. Even if the company never returned to solvency, shareholders might
be able to win a share of the distribution under the plan. If the value of those possibilities is reduced by the
wrongful acts of management, shareholders should have a remedy.
Id. at 707-09. In fact, LoPucki and Whitford concluded that "management does not consistently favor or represent
either creditor or shareholder interests [and] the alignment of management is clearly a function of solvency. Id. at
745. According to their study, managers of solvent companies didn't tend to align with creditors, but managers of
insolvent companies tended to align more with creditors than with shareholders. Id at 745-46.
II

[FN321]. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (involving
managements use of Estate funds to gamble in Las Vegas); Corporate Governance, supra note 319, at 683 ("Senior
interests are often in sharp conflict with juniors as to the level of risk an insolvent company should accept in its
investment policy. "). Not surprisingly, junior interests are much less risk-adverse than are senior interests. See id.
at 684-86. Risk-tolerance, thus, may disproportionately harm creditors in favor of shareholders. See id. at 768-69.
For this reason, LoPucki and Whitford suggested transfers of wealth in the form of "risk compensation payments.
See Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy
Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1994). But see Charles W. Mooney, Jr. Hosing Down Senior
Claims With a Quicker and Dirtier Chapter 11,72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1994); see also Lynn M.LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy Reorganization Risks, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1995). But see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Hosing Down Senior Claims With a Quicker and
Dirtier Chapter II, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153 (1994). Those who were more willing to have management engage in
riskier decisions would pay those affected by any downside from the risk. Corporate Governance, supra note 319,
at 788-800. We'll have to set aside for now this intriguing Coasian possibility, as our inquiry in this Article is
different from their focus. What we do draw from LoPucki and Whitford is that we can't simply say that the DIP
owes its duty merely to the creditors. The LoPucki and Whitford studies have done a marvelous job of dispelling
that simplistic notion. See also In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) ("A Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession administers the assets of the estate and any business conducted therein, as a fiduciary for both
the equity interests and the creditors.")
. For other good descriptions of the relationship between risk-tolerance and insolvency, see, e.g., Barry E. Adler,
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking
II
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in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 357-59 (1993).
NBR's personal, Jiminy Cricket-type approach to risk tolerance as it applies to fiduciaries is that everyone is
underemphasizing how a voluntary fiduciary will behave towards its beneficiary. Of course, everyone has his own
personal interests that will pose at least potential conflicts with the interests of the beneficiary itself. Cf. Inherent
Conflicts, supra note 4(discussing compensation as example of conflicts between attorneys own interests and
interests of client). Voluntary fiduciaries, by defmition, understand that they are obligated to put the interests of
their beneficiaries frrst. They agree to that. And, for the most part, they abide by it. It's those few bad actors who
make being a voluntary fiduciary seem difficult.
[FN322]. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987) (examining "the nature ofa lawyer's responsibilities where the lawyer's client
has a special legal relationship with another party that modifies the lawyer's 'normal' professional responsibilities.")
[hereinafter Triangular Relationships]. A special thanks goes to Ray Warner for pointing us in this direction.
[FN323]. See id. at 15-16.
[FN324]. See id. at 16.
[FN325]. See id. at 21-26 (defming three possible relationships lawyer may have).
[FN326]. See id. at 26-31 (fmding established three-tiered conceptual system inadequate where traditionally
disparate relationships overlap, thereby giving rise to "very serious practical and conceptual difficulties").
[FN327]. See Triangular Relationships supra note 322, at 30 (fmding established conceptual system rendered
simplistic by "complex interdependencies in the lawyer-->guardian-->ward and lawyer-->corporation<--corporate
officer situations").
[FN328]. See id. at 40-41 (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted).
[FN329]. See id. at 41.
[FN330]. Bruce Markell has suggested that Hazard's triangulation theory can't work here because the "triangle" is
actually more of a "pentagon": "The lawyer (1) represents the DIP (2), but is hired by the DIP's management (3),
which itself dut[i]es to the DIP's equity holders (4) and likely the DIP's creditors (5)." Markell Mail, supra note 10,
at 2. We could try to sketch this concept as:
Court --> Lawyer --> Estate <-- DIP <-- DIP's management
Creditors
Shareholders
It's clear that this sketch doesn't clarify matters much, but it's more accurate than a simple triangle. Still, Hazard's
triangulation theory gives us a good starting point.
[FN331]. See supra ILG.
[FN332]. See supra note 310 and accompanying text (discussing need for defmitions to be used on day-to-day
basis).
[FN333]. Another way to say the same thing is: Estate Counsel represents the DIP, which is the entity running the
Estate. Because the Estate itself can't hire attorneys or give orders (the Estate is a concept, not a real physical
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being), the "management" of the Estate has to do those things. Usually, "management" is the DIP. Sometimes,
circumstances call for the appointment of a TIE. But, in either event, the DIP is to the Estate what the management
is to a corporation. Therefore, the Estate itself is the ultimate client of the DIP counsel.
[FN334]. See Robert R. Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Gamer v. Wolfmbarger Exception to the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 TULSA L.J. 275, 284 (1995) (stating corporate managers and directors
owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation as a whole); see, e.g., Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 543 (restating issue
of DIP's fmancing duty).
[FN335]. See supra note 146 and accompanying text; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.13 (1983) (considering duty owed by lawyer to organization as client); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSffiILITY EC 5-18 (1980) (considering allegiance owed by "lawyer employed or
retained by a corporation or similar entity"). Of course, that suggestion is by no means a cure-all. Corporate
managers and corporate counsel are understandably perplexed about their fiduciary duties. See Lawrence E.
Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modem Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate
Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477, 508-09 (1995) ("Jay Lorsch ... concludes that corporate directors believe that
their legal duty is to the stockholders, but feel moral obligations to a much broader range of constituents, including
employees, creditors, customers, and sometimes the public.") (citing JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH
MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 37-50
(1989» (footnote omitted); Summerhays, supra note 335, at 289-90 (noting ambiguous nature of fidu.ciary duties
owed within corporations).
But using the Model Rules's "entity" approach only goes so far: "[T]he Model Rules ... provide that the
organization, rather than the owners or managers, is the client. Nonetheless, some have suggested that the attorney
who represents a person in a fiduciary capacity to another may owe duties to the beneficiary of the client's duties."
Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in Representing Limited Liability Companies and
Other Unincorporated Associations and their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON. L. REV. 389, 401-02 (1995)
(citations omitted); see also supra notes 298-308 and accompanying text (noting existence of varying opinions
whether attorney's fiduciary duty to entity runs to human manifestations of corporation).
[FN336]. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
[FN337]. Here's one way to phrase your argument if you're trying to remind recalcitrant Estate Counselor
Committee Counsel of certain of their fiduciary duties:
1. Dicta in Weintraub permits an analogy from corporate counsel outside bankruptcy to Estate Counsel in a
chapter 11 case. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
2. Not only would the Estate hold the privilege in the chapter II case, but the duty of Estate Counsel to the Estate
would be analogous to the duty of corporate counsel toward the organization as client. See, e.g., supra notes
298-308.
3. The duties of Estate Counsel to the Estate can be monitored by asking whether Estate Counsel's behavior is in
the Estate's interests (or, at least, whether the behavior was reasonably intended to be in the Estate's interest). Any
outrageous behavior is probably sanctionable under BRP 9011. See supra Part.n.C.2.
Of course, if you're trying to invent new fiduciary duties for Estate Counsel and Committee Counsel to follow,
you can always cite to Perez, supra Part.II.G.3.
[FN338]. See Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing Model Rule 1.13 and
reasoning that, where lawyer represents both partnership and constituents whose interest lawyer fmds adverse to
organization, lawyer may not represent constituents further because lawyer's loyalty to partnership is paramount);
see also Crandon v. State, 257 Kan, 727, 741-42 (1995) (noting organization's attorney has responsibility to give
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advice; and when necessary to prevent or rectifY unlawful or improper acts of organization or employers); MODEL
RULES Rule 1.13 (describing options available to corporate counsel); MODEL RULES Rule 1.16 (describing
lawyer's option to resign); see generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival
of the Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271 (1984) [hereinafter Rectification] (discussing lawyer's obligations
"when he discovers that a transaction he is handling for a client is tainted with fraud"); see also Richard W. Painter
& Jennifer E. Duggan, Lawyer Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV.
225,263-64 (1996) (discussing attorney's options of resignation or "waving the red flag" (noisy withdrawal».
[FN339]. See Rectification, supra note 339, at 286 (noting attorney's obligations to withdraw if client persists with
fraudulent conduct and if there is a possibility of attorney being adverse witness); Jeffrey Pennelly, Proceedings of
the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients: Report of Working Group on Representing
Fiduciaries, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1045, 1051 (1994) (noting traditional view that lawyer who becomes aware
of breach of responsibility has option to effect "noisy withdrawal""); Mark A. Riekhof, Fraud, Withdrawal &
Disclosure: What to Tell the Lawyer Who Steps Into My Shoes, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1235, 1261 (1994)
(stating Model Rule 1.16, comment 15, allows lawyer to send "signals" to third parties regarding his former client's
fraudulent acts); cf. David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1164 (1993) (noting that, where lawyer learns client intends to engage in prohibited conduct,
attorney must choose between "gatekeeper" strategy, withholding support and thereby making client's
accomplishment of prohibited purpose more difficult, and "whistleblower" strategy, reporting client's wrongful
intentions to regulators); Brian W. Smith & M. Lindsay Childress, Avoiding Lawyer Liability in the Wake of Kaye,
Scholer, 8 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 385, 391 (1993) (noting that, although attorney might have duty to report
misconduct to third parties, duty does not extend to reporting to regulators absent special circumstances); Fred C.
Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1377 (1995)
(calling for reeducation of lawyers to be more objective).
[FN340]. Once it's clear beyond cavil that the Estate is (or isn't) insolvent, then Estate Counsel can fme-tune her
duty, in much the same way that counsel for the corporation originally answers to the Board of Directors until and
unless it's clear that the board wants to do something contrary to the interests of shareholders. Of course, corporate
law is easier here, too. In corporate law, it's not so much a problem of knowing to whom counsel's ultimate duty is
owed. The (solvent) corporation, and thus corporate counsel, owes its duty to the shareholders. The problem for
corporate counsel is isolating exactly what is in the shareholders' best interests. See Folly, supra note 44.
[FN341]. But see Forest, supra note 44, at 832-37 (giving examples of when advocacy model breaks down).
[FN342]. But see supra note 281 (describing tendency of Committee Counsel and Estate Counsel not to contest
each other's fee applications, apparently in violation of their respective fiduciary duties).
[FN343]. See II U.S.C. § 1102 (1994) (allowing for foundation of equity security holders' committee).
[FN344]. We like Westbrook's approach.
The "quantum" cases seem removed from the de facto conflict cases, but they're really not. They focus on "what's
at stake," and that issue in tum depends on the perspective from which the case is viewed, namely, whom the
lawyer represents. To put it the other way around, if the lawyer spends time on "x" matter and "x" matter is only of
value to the owners of the firm, the court may hold that the lawyer's time was of little actual benefit to the creditors,
the only real parties in interest, or it may hold the lawyer must really have been representing the owners and must
lose the entire fee, disqualified for conflict of interest. The first approach is the "benefit" analysis used by Judge
Clark in OPA, while the second is the "adverse interest" approach followed by Judge Jones in Humble Place.
Any per se rule for inherent DIP conflicts has the potential to reduce substantially the pool of debtor-qualified
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lawyers willing to represent Chapter 11 debtors. Not only does it threaten counsel's livelihood, but it puts the
reputations of lawyers at an unreasonable risk. The latter factor will discourage the very lawyers, conscientious and
respectable, whom we would want to have making the tough decisions in the conflict-ridden context of Chapter 11
DIP representation. While the prevention of abuse is important, it cannot justify the cost. The cases just discussed
offer a more sensible and balanced approach. First, where there is no actual representation of ownership interests,
the courts should analyze the performance of DIP counsel on a benefit basis, rather than disqualifying counsel and
denying all compensation. That course is more fair and less likely to chill DIP representation. Second, benefit must
be understood to include the process benefits of competent and effective representation of the DIP. As long as
Congress chooses to keep a debtor-driven system, that sort of advocacy is essential to its success. On that basis, a
finding of no benefit to the estate should be because of over-litigation of futile or hopeless positions, rather than
because the positions taken would benefit the ownership interest as such.
Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 295.
[FN345]. FED. R. BANKR. P. 90B (1994) (providing sanctions including payment of reasonable fees, where it is
found attorney signed document absent factually supported, legally tenable good faith argument).
(FN346]. Along with the other sanctions mentioned in supra notes 190-196,209-219.
[FN347]. See In re Palumbo Family Ltd. Partnership, 182 B.R. 447, 472 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (noting
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 requires court impose "appropriate sanction" where document filed under frivolous or
improper purpose); see also In re Poterek & Sons, Inc., 169 B.R. 896,909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating bad faith
"certainly warrants" sanctions under Rule 9011; however, bad faith not required); In re Food Workshop, Inc., 70
B.R. 962,966 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating Rule 9011 provides for attorney sanctions if attorney "sign[s] and
filers] pleadings, motions and other papers ... without making reasonable inquiry as to whether they are factually
and legally well-grounded").
[FN348]. Of course, that problem didn't trouble the Supreme Court overmuch in Weintraub. See supra notes 47-50
and accompanying text.
There are two main jobs for the Estate in a reorganization: "pie-dividing" issues (who gets what and by what
mechanisms) and "pie-enhancing" issues (how to get more, period). Markell Mail, supra note 52, at 2; see also
e/mail from Edward Janger to Nancy B. Rapoport (March 26, 1997) (on file with author) (discussing the difference
between "size" and "equality"). Our solution doesn't do a thing for "pie-dividing" issues, except to the limited
extent that it keeps Estate Counsel from inappropriately dividing the pie in favor of particular constituents'
interests. But, to the extent that our solution enables the bankruptcy court to watch over Estate Counsel more
closely, it's likely to enhance the pie. Our solution makes it tricky for Estate Counsel to represent the Estate and the
prepetition Debtor, to the extent that those interest may conflict. We leave the implications of that statement for
another day and another article.
Our solution, though, does seem to produce the correct result in our good/bad/ugly trilogy of cases. See Part II.
G., supra. In Louisiana Bank & Trust v. Anderson, 526 So. 2d 1386 (La. Ct. App. 1988), Estate Counsel clearly
represented the Estate and not the DIP's own interests. Recall that the advice that Estate Counsel gave regarding the
use of purported cash collateral was wrong, at least after Louisiana changed its rules on perfection of the collateral.
Nonetheless, the "wrong" advice didn't rise to the level of a BRP 9011 violation. It didn't even come close to a
violation. So, under our solution, the Estate Counsel would have been safe.
If we applied our solution to the facts in In re Bonneville Pacific Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah 1996), we
would have reached the same result that the bankruptcy court did. In Bonneville, it seems clear that the Estate
Counsel was representing the DIP's interests and not the Estate's interests. Why else would Estate Counsel have
submitted several unconfmnable plans or refused to investigate the Debtor's prepetition activities? Moreover,
Estate Counsel seems to have filed several meritless pleadings, which would have violated BRP 9011. Our solution
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would sanction Estate Counsel for violating the duty to the Estate.
And then we come to In re Perez, 30 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, our solution would diverge from the
majority's decision. As we read the facts in Perez, Estate Counsel was at least trying to represent the Estate by
proposing a reasonable (if legally impermissible) plan of reorganization. (In fact, the plan could have been
confIrmed in some other jurisdictions). Therefore, Estate Counsel was attempting to fulfill his duty to the Estate
and shouldn't have been punished so harshly. Even if we wanted to punish Estate Counsel slightly for failing to
present a confIrmable plan, our solution, at the very worst, would result only in a small reduction in fees (if the
appeal were truly frivolous)--not the wholesale denial of fees presented in Perez.
[FN349]. See generally Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4 (considering ethical questions and compensation issues in
bankruptcy).
(FN350]. See id.
[FN351]. See id. at 295.
[FN352]. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1994) (denying compensation for services and reimbursement of expenses where
professional found "not disinterested"); see also Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 295.
[FN353]. See Inherent Conflicts, supra note 4, at 303 (stating reorganization bankruptcy is "fmancial hospital for
sick companies"); see also Folly, supra note 44.
END OF DOCUMENT
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One of the greatest professional nightmares a chapter II debtor's attorney can face is discovering, during a
bankruptcy case, that the people running the debtor are crooks. [FN2] Such a discovery will immediately cause the
attorney to seriously consider whether she should withdraw from representing the debtor. [FN3] Assuming that the
individuals acting as debtors-in-possession (DIPs) do not take steps to rectify their improper actions, this action is
probably inevitable. [FN4] At such a time, many bankruptcy practitioners think in terms of the famous (or
infamous) "noisy withdrawal" as a way out. Unfortunately, there is little authority that describes what constitutes a
noisy withdrawal in a bankruptcy proceeding or that explains exactly how a noisy withdrawal may be
accomplished. This article attempts to address the question of what a noisy withdrawal is, how a noisy withdrawal
can be accomplished and what steps an attorney must take to ensure that her noisy withdrawal is effective.
Please note, for purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the confidences of a chapter 11 client [FN5] will
be revealed if the attorney taKes any action to disclose the fraud to the bankruptcy court. Although an interesting
question, it is beyond the scope of this article to determine whether your client is the chapter 11 bankruptcy estate
[FN6] or the DIP that operates the debtor. [FN7]
Formal Opinion 92-366-the Mother of "Noisy Withdrawals"
The genesis of what constitutes a "noisy withdrawal" can be found in ABA Formal Opinion 92-366. Under that
opinion, a noisy withdrawal is a withdrawal from the representation of a client accomplished by a disavow of work
product provided by the attorney. [FN8] The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concluded
that an attorney could only make a "noisy withdrawal" if the attorney's work product was being used or was
intended to be used in a future fraud or criminal activity. Opinion 92-366 stated that a noisy withdrawal was a
permissive step the attorney could take, not a required step. [FN9] In fact, the ABA Committee further held that if
a fraud had already been completed, or if the attorney did not know or reasonably believe that the client would
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continue the fraud or commit a future fraud through the use of the attorney services or work product, the attorney
could not make a noisy withdrawaL [FNIO]
While Opinion 92-366 is important to understand the ethical framework surrounding a noisy withdrawal, it is not
directly applicable to a typical bankruptcy situation. In a fact pattern presented to the ABA Committee, the fraud
involved the use of an attorney's opinion letter, which was based on false evidence given to the attorney by his
clients. The opinion letter was used to obtain a loan and was not used in proceedings before a court. Indeed,
Opinion 92-366 noted that while the ABA Committee had considered the ramifications of Rule 1.6 [FNll] of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, given the facts submitted to the ABA Committee, it did not have to address
the issue of whether Model Rule 3.3 [FN12] requiring the disclosure of the fraud to the tribunal would require a
noisy withdrawal or even a more explicit disclosure. [FN13]

Strike Up the Band: A Noisy Withdrawal in Bankruptcy
Chapter 11 debtor representations, unlike many legal services provided by attorneys in civil practice, tend to
involve activities that are generally governed by a tribunal, where counsel has been appointed by the bankruptcy
court and all activities of debtor's counsel are technically done before the tribunaL [FN14] Therefore, unlike the
situation governed by Opinion 92-366, Model Rule 3.3 is almost always implicated when the question of client
fraud arises in chapter 11 debtor representation. It is the difficulties in balancing an attorney's duties to keep certain
information confidential under Rule 1.6, with a duty to disclose fraud on a tribunal under Rule 3.3, that places
debtor's counsel in such a difficult position. [FN15]
In many respects, this difficulty is misperceived. The vast majority of cases [FN16] clearly indicates that a chapter
11 debtor's counsel's duty to the court, under either Model Rule 3.3 or under the common-law duty of counsel as an
"officer of the court," will override his duty to maintain client confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6. [FN17]
However, even if counsel for a chapter 11 debtor has a duty to disclose fraudulent activity to a court, there is no
clear-cut rule as to how that disclosure should be made. [FN18] Indeed, although Rule 3.3 does require disclosure
of facts necessary to prevent fraud *27 by a client on a tribunal, attorneys should not ignore the dictates of Model
Rule 1.6 in a frenzied effort to comply with Rule 3.3. [FN19]
Rule 3.3 Comment 11, "Remedial Measures," offers some important guidance on this point. Comment 11 states in
pertinent part that "if perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper course ordinarily
is to redemonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that will
remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advocate should make
disclosure to the court." It would seem from this comment that immediate disclosure of fraud to the court is not the
required or even preferred ethical course of action in a situation where an attorney has knowledge of a client's fraud
and less drastic action than disclosure will be effective in alerting the tribunal of the problem. However, steps must
be taken to remedy any fraud perpetuated by a client on a court. Therefore, given the unique nature of bankruptcy,
where a client refuses to correct the false testimony or disclose the fraud, a noisy withdrawal may very well be the
preferred course of action in order to disclose the fraudulent conduct.

Tuning Your Tuba: How to Properly Make a "Noisy Withdrawal" in Bankruptcy Court
Assuming that a bankruptcy court could be alerted as to a potential "problem" with a debtor, or more importantly,
the people running the debtor as DIP, by a noisy withdrawal, [FN20] such a withdrawal may be the most
appropriate course of action. Given the fact that bankruptcy courts must approve both the hiring and the withdrawal
of debtor's counsel in a chapter 11 proceeding, performing a noisy withdrawal is often easier in a bankruptcy case
than it is in other situations. Further, given the frequent active participation of numerous other groups in a
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bankruptcy proceeding, a proper motion for a noisy withdrawal will more than likely have the desired effect of
alerting the court to a potential fraud on the tribunal than it would in other proceedings. [FN21]

In order to effectively make a noisy withdrawal, counsel should include three things in their pleading in order to
properly alert the court as to the possibility of a serious issue concerning the DIP's activities. First, upon discovery
of the fraud and the failure of the attorney to have the DIP rectify and/or disclose the fraud, counsel should move
on an expedited basis to be permitted to withdraw as counsel for the estate. Delaying withdrawal as debtor's
counsel after determining your clients will not rectify or disclose the fraud [FN22] will not only allow your client's
fraud to continue uninvestigated, but may be a violation of your own fiduciary duty to the bankruptcy estate, [FN23]
as well as your ethical duties under the State Rules of Professional Conduct.
The second element required to make an effective noisy withdrawal is to set forth, as your primary grounds for
withdrawal, that continued representation is impossible under your applicable state rules of ethics. Depending on
the circumstances, you may wish to cite Rule 1.2, [FN24] which prohibits attorneys from assisting a client in a
crime or fraud; Rule 1.16, [FN25] which requires withdrawal of representation when continued representation of a
client will result in a violation of the rules; and/or Rule 3.3, which governs candor to the tribunal. Not only will
invoking these ethics rules make it far more likely that the court will grant the motion to withdraw, it will also
clearly illustrate to the court the underlying reasons for the withdrawal and the need for additional inquiry without
having to directly divulge any client confidential information.
Finally, if necessary under the circumstances of your case, in your motion to withdraw you may also have to
disavow any pleadings based on your client's fraud or on false evidence. [FN26] Whether this should be included
in the motion to withdraw will depend on the individual facts and circumstances of your case, but counsel cannot
continue to allow the court or other third parties in a case to be deceived or defrauded by documents based on false
evidence, perjured testimony or some other variety of a client's fraud.
The Female Nordic Opera Star Begins Her Final Aria: Conclusion
Exposing fraud by a DIP as the chapter II debtor's counsel is a difficult task, especially given the fact that the
people who have committed the fraud are likely the ones who hired you as debtor's counsel and from whom you
take your orders. [FN27] A noisy withdrawal gives you a middle ground on which to fulfill *41 your ethical and
fiduciary duties to the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy estate without having to directly disclose a client's
confidences directly to the tribunal or other parties. Given the nature of bankruptcy, if a noisy withdrawal is not
deemed sufficient by a bankruptcy court, the court has other options, including appointing a trustee or examiner
who can waive the attorney/client privilege and question you about the fraud, thereby bypassing the Rule 1.6
issues, or simply taking you "off the hook" by determining that there is no attorney/client privilege concerning the
actions of the parties that are conducting the fraud (i.e., the DIP) and ordering you to reveal any material facts
concerning fraud to the court or any other appropriate party. Hopefully, the ethical nightmare discussed above will
not happen to you, but in the event that you are faced with such an ethical disaster, be sure to consider the loud,
proud and noisy withdrawal as a way out of your dilemma.
[FN1]. The author would like to thank Tracy Sullivan, an associate at Greenebaum Doll & McDonald PLLC, for
her assistance with this article.
[FN2]. In re Bonneville Pac Corp., 196 B.R. 868 (Bankr. D. Utah); affd., in part, rev'd., in part, Hansen, Jones &
Leta P.e. v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434 (D. Utah 1998).
[FN3]. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(a)(I) requires an attorney to withdraw from representing a
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client "if the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law." Rule 1.2
states that an attorney may not "counsel ... or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent ..."

!
Ii
j

(FN4]. Id. See, also, ABA Fonnal Opinion 92-366 (1992); Rule 3.3, Comment Paragraph 11.
[FN5]. Compare In re Perez, 30 F.3d 1209, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994) (bankruptcy estate is client of chapter 11 debtor's
attorney) with Hansen, 220 B.R. 434, 449 (DIP is client).
[FN6]. See In re Perez, 30 F.3d at 1219; Hansen,

no B.R. at 448-449 (citing cases).

[FN7]. See Hansen, 220 B.R. at 449; In re Sidco Inc., 173 B.R. 194 (E.n. Cal. 1994).
[FN8]. Opinion 92-366. It is important to note that there was strong dissent to this opinion that would have found
that the attorney could not disavow any work product under the facts as presented.
[FN9]. Id. ("A lawyer may disavow any of her work product to prevent its use in the client's continuing or intended
future fraud ..." (emphasis added».
[FNlO]. Id. ("If the fraud is completed and the lawyer does not know or reasonably believe that the client intends to
continue the fraud ... the lawyer may not disavow any work product. ")
[FNll]. (a) A lawyer shall not reveal infonnation relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and
except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such infonnation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantially bodily harm, or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to
establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based on conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
[FNI2]. (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal,
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client,
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to
know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding and apply even if compliance
requires disclosure of infonnation otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall infonn the tribunal to make an infonned decision, whether or not the
facts are adverse.
[FN13]. See, generally, Rapoport and Bowles, "Has the DIP's Attorney Become the Ultimate Creditor's Lawyer. in
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?" 5 Am. Bank. Inst. L.R. 47, 64 n. 140 (1997) (collecting cases where debtor's
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counsel were required to disclose fraud or DIP's breaches of fiduciary duty).
[FN14]. See, generally, In re Ward, 894 F.2d 771,776 (5th Cir. 1990).
(FNI5]. See In re DeVlieg, 174 B.R. 497, 502 n. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (counsel who sued debtor's corporate officers
against their direction was found to have followed duty to estate in filing suit, but court refused to "pass on whether
such behavior would comply with applicable standards of professional responsibility").
[FNI6]. See Note 12, supra.
[FN17]. Opinion 92-366, n. 8 ("Rule 3.3 ... whose text contains an explicit exception to the confidentiality
requirement of Rule 1.6 ...").
[FNI8]. See Rapoport and Bowles, "DIP's Attorney" at 65, n. 147.
(FNI9]. See In re Brennan, 187 B.R. 135, 150 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995) (generally discussing balancing Rule 1.6
concerns with Rule 3.3 duty to courts).
[FN20]. It is important to note that in certain situations (i.e., the debtor's president calling from the airport with $1
million of the debtor's cash and a one-way ticket to the Crook Islands), only immediate and direct disclosure of the
fraud will be an adequate remedy under Rule 3.3.
[FN21]. In a case with competent counsel, a well-done "noisy withdrawal" motion will at least draw motions for
2004 exams of the debtor and more likely motions for the appointment of a trustee or receiver.
[FN22]. Rule 3.3, Comment 11.
[FN23]. See, generally, In re Banie Reed Buick-GMC Inc., 164 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
[FN24]. Rule 1.2, Scope of Representation.
[FN25]. Rule 1.16, Declining or Terminating Representation.
[FN26]. Opinion 92-366.
[FN27]. See "The Debtor's Lawyer as Trojan Horse," reprinted in Warren & Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and
Creditors: Text Cases and Problems (3d ed. 1996), for a discussion of why counsel for the debtor's first duty may
be to oust the person who hired him.
END OF DOCUMENT
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INTRODUCTION:
Among many "reforms" imposed by Congress in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 is that debtors must qualify to file Chapter 7. The inception of a
"means test" to determine the eligibility of a proposed debtor is set forth in 11 U.S.c. § 707. Much
angst, comment, debate and vilification has been made ofthis concept. The implementation ofthe
means test has not been without its own issues. For example, a form was handed out at the Midwest
Regional Bankruptcy Seminar in August of2005, which was declared to be the last and final version
of the worksheet regarding the implementation of this test. Yet, less than two weeks later, interim
rules were implemented including new and revised forms which changed the context ofthe form that
was delivered for the August conference. While this counsel expects that the number ofthose who
will not qualify for Chapter 7 relief under the means test will be few, it does not mean that counsel
will not have to pay considerable attention to the means test. Considerable time will be consumed,
and additional fees will be paid by debtors, strictly to meet, beat or interpret this section. However,
the mastery ofthe means test by counsel should result in the expected result, that is that the number
ofindividuals who will be disenfranchised from filing Chapter 7 will in fact be few. The review and
actions by the debtor(s) in the six months prior to the filing ofthe petition will be determinative of
the effectiveness of the means test. In this regard, I see tremendous opportunities for creative
counsel in guiding clients through this difficult quagmire created by Congress.
Attached to this presentation are several appendices for your review. The first is the form,
as proposed by the Official Forms Committee. This is the interim form and is still subject to being
reviewed as of the time of writing this presentation. There are separate forms for Chapter 7 from
other chapters, and there are separate forms depending upon what the Internal Revenue Service does
with regard to housing expenses, which is still under consideration. It would be my expectation that
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these fonns will be included by your software provider, but they are included for your review, and
we will go through a couple of these fonns. I also attach, as Appendix "B," allowable living
expenses for transportation by the Internal Revenue Service, which is part of the means test. I also
include, as Appendix "C," income, medium family income by the number of earners in a family as
proposed by the United States Census Bureau, and, as Appendix "D," state medium family income
by state, which is broken down by family size, and, as Appendix "E," from the Internal Revenue
Service, the current standards for maximum monthly allowance on housing broken down by county
for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. For updates on any and all of these, I would refer you to the
www.uscourts.gov site, which may send you to other sites, including that of the United States
Trustee. However, as ofthe time ofthe writing ofthis material, those documents were not included
yet on websites, as they were still being developed.

THE MEANS TEST:
In looking at all ofthe fonns, allowances, disallowances, expenditures and income, allowed
and disallowed, it is easy to forget that the means test in its rawest fonn is very simple. It is the
debtor's current monthly income, which is one-sixth (1/6) ofthe last six (6) month's income that the
debtor received from all sources. It matters not whether the income was received within the last
three months. It matters not whether all ofthe income was received in the sixth month. It matters
not when, as long as it was received sometime within the previous six (6) months. Social Security
benefits are excluded from this definition. However, it is the timing ofthis six (6) months that will
make practitioners creative. Do you file before tax season? Do you plan bonuses? Ifmarried, the
income of a spouse who lives with you is included. This may present extremely difficult questions
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and issues to address with clients when the non-filing spouse, who is highly successful, is told that
his or her income must be included for purposes of determining whether the spouse can eliminate
his or her debt load. Congress has allowed some actual pecuniarydeductions in determining whether
the means test will apply. These include amounts reasonably necessary for health and disability
insurance; health savings accounts; expenses incurred to maintain safety from family violence;
deductions for the cost of administering a Chapter 13; the actual expenses for the care or support of
elderly, chronically ill or disabled household members; actual elementary and secondary school
expenses up to $1,500.00 for each dependent child under the age of 18; actual mortgage or housing
expense, if it can be documented; and actual business expenses, if it can be documented.
As stated, the Internal Revenue Service is reviewing the reasonableness of its housing and
its transportation expenses to determine whether they should also be raised. For purposes of
calculating the test, also deducted are secured payments, whether it be inside or outside a Chapter
13; payment on priority claims, divided by 60, so that after one calculates what the monthly income
is, and then deducts all ofthese expenses, the debtor then multiplies that net monthly income number
by 60, and to be disqualified under the means test, the debtor must be able to either pay 25 percent
(25%) ofthe debtor's nonpriority, unsecured debt or $6,000.00, whichever is greater, or be able to
pay $10,000.00. If either of those are met, then the debtor cannot file Chapter 7. In addition,
debtor's counsel must mark on the petition whether the presumption of abuse arises after running
this test. If the presumption of abuse arises, and a Chapter 7 is still filed, then both the Court and
the United States Trustee (and probably the Chapter 7 Trustee) will notify all creditors that the debtor
has filed a Chapter 7 with the presumption that one has abused 11 U.S.c. § 707.
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The debtor can rebut the presumption of abuse by demonstrating "special circumstances,"
such as (1) serious meqical condition, (2) being called to active duty, or (3) to the extent such special
circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments to the current monthly income leaves
no reasonable alternative. See § 707(b)(2)(B). The debtor must also provide the documentation to
justify these additional expenditures. Even if all of these subsections apply, if the debtor is a
disabled veteran and the result is that the indebtedness was incurred while the debtor was on active
duty or performing a homeland defense activity, then the presumption can also be overcome.
Notwithstanding everything I just said, 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3) also allows the Court to
examine whether the debtor has abused Chapter 7 by allowing the Court to determine whether the
debtor filed the petition in bad faith or under the totality of the circumstances the Court should not
grant the relief under Chapter 7. These are the provisions that the United States Trustee will
continue to address to the Court and debtors rather than look at the means test as a way of forcing
people into Chapter 13.

ATTORNEYS LIABILITIES:
The Court, on its own motion, or on the motion ofa party in interest, may file a motion under
Rule 9011 and, should the Court grant the motion, the attorney for the debtor can be ordered to
reimburse the Trustee for any and all reasonable costs, including his own attorneys fees in
prosecuting a motion under 11 U.S.c. § 707. In addition, ifthe Court should find that the attorney
for the debtor violated Rule 9011, the Court, on its own initiative, or on the motion of a party in
interest, may order (1) the assessment ofa "civil penalty"; and (2) the payment ofsuch penalty to the
Trustee or the United States Trustee. The signature of the attorney of the debtor on a petition,
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pleading or written motion, constitutes a certification that the attorney has (1) performed a reasonable
investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to the petition, pleading or written motion; and
(2) determine that the petition, pleading or written motion is well granted in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law
and does not constitute an abuse. The signature of the attorney for the debtor on the bankruptcy
petition constitutes a certification that the attorney has no knowledge, after an inquiry, that the
information in the schedules filed with such petition is incorrect. See § 707(b)(3)(D).
If! can provide comfort, with the exception of a small business person who has fewer than
25 full-time employees and is engaged in commercial or business activity, a movant who files for
sanctions under Rule 9011, and loses, can also be forced to pay attorneys fees to counsel for the
debtor, ifthe Court does not sustain the original motion, and the Court finds that the petition ofthe
movant that filed the original motion violated Rule 9011; or, ifthe attorney who filed the motion did
not comply with the requirements, or the Court finds that the motion was made for the purpose of
coercing a debtor into waiving a right.
Another limitation is that only the Court or the United States Trustee may file a motion to
dismiss under § 707(b) ifthe debtor's income is less than the medium income for the applicable state
in which the bankruptcy is filed.

NECESSITY OF DOCUMENTATION:

The debtor is required to file, with the petition, at the request of any party in interest,
documents that supports income, including tax returns for up to the last four (4) years; pay stubs over
the last six (6) months; and any other data that would prove that the debtor does not qualifY for the
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means test. So, do not wait for the request. Counsel for the debtor has a new standard to meet. That
standard is collecting all of the relevant documentation that either overcomes the presumption of
abuse, or supports the presumption ofabuse. Except for exigent circumstances, it is incumbent upon
counsel for the debtor to collect any and all ofthe necessary documentation regarding the means test.
Since the means test allows for certain expenses, if actually incurred, collect that necessary
documentation as well.
Practitioners in Kentucky are familiar with providing documentation to Trustees. Documents
have routinely been turned over to Chapter 7 Panel Trustees in the Eastern District of Kentucky for
more than two generations. Documentation requests in the Western District of Kentucky, while
more recent, are still fairly common at this point. So, in addition to gathering the documentation that
is turned over to the Chapter 7 Trustee, such as all deeds; mortgages; car titles; bank statements;
most recent tax return; 401 (k), or other pension plan documentation; insurance policies; automobile
leases; and other documentation that supports the value of assets placed on the petition, counsel
should also get the following: (1) copies ofall tax returns for the previous four (4) years (transcripts
will do); (2) copies ofall bills, particularly with regard to mailing addresses for purposes ofnotifYing
creditors of the imposition of the automatic stay; (3) the bills also document the actual payments
necessary for the debtor to maintain either a mortgage, mobile home, automobile, or other actual
expense you are documenting; (4) perhaps a subsection of before, but copies of any bills
documenting dependent expenses, including child care, tuition and book bills; (5) any document that
supports safety under the family violence protection act; (6) documents that itemize those
expenditures necessary to support chronically ill or chronically disabled dependants, particularly
elderly; (7) utility bills, particularly ifthe Internal Revenue Services changes its housing allowance;
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(8) insurance receipts; and (9) any other document that can support an actual expense incurred by
the debtor.
Remember, even if the presumption of abuse arises, counsel can still file a Chapter 7 if
counsel is prepared to document special circumstances. That would require a motion to be filed by
counsel for the debtor asking the Court to determine whether sufficient special circumstances arise
so that the presumption can be overcome. Obviously, all of that will need to be documented.
The impact of this pre-filing discovery mission is that the cost of filing bankruptcy is going
to increase dramatically. Unfortunately, that will convince some people who would otherwise need
to file for bankruptcy to not incur that cost, particularly when you add the additional cost ofbudget
counseling, credit counseling, increased filing fees and other expenses that will certainly increase,
such as security deposits and others that will be associated with the bankruptcy.
But, ifcounsel takes the time to collect all ofthis data, and some ofit is available online, and
therefore can be obtained with the debtor's consent while sitting in your office, then the application
of the means test will become a fairly simple, clerical task. I do not advocate that the office policy
be implemented so that others besides the attorney for the debtor do the means test, particularly in
the beginning. However, I believe that after a practitioner runs through the means test a few times,
it will become apparent when the means test will need to be strongly considered and strategized for,
or when simply parts one and two are filled out, and then you go to the real issue, the debtor's actual
income and expenses, that you place on Schedules I and J.
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FAKE INCOME AND EXPENSES VERSUS ACTUAL INCOME AND EXPENSES:
The means test is ironic in that because it considers income that may have already been
earned, or income that has yet to be earned, and expenses that are simply prescribed, rather than
incurred, it is an implementation ofa test using fake data. But, in addition to completing worksheets
regarding fake data and fake numbers, counsel for the debtor is also required to complete a schedule
ofactual income and actual expenses as ofthe date ofthe filing ofthe petition. See 11 U.S.c. § 521.
Because counsel is still required to fill out schedules that show the actual income and
expenses ofthe debtor, the United States Trustee has indicated it will continue to pursue motions to
dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3), using "the totality ofthe circumstances" test.
Thus, one can infer that even if the means test is beaten back, that the Office of the United
States Trustee may deem a case to be worthy of an abuse and, therefore, file a motion to dismiss
seeking conversion to Chapter 11 or 13. It would be difficult to conceive of a case where the debtor
is not disqualified by the means test that would be required to file Chapter 11, but that is not a
remedy often sought by the Office ofthe United States Trustee. In addition to reviewing the means
test, counsel must gather together the documentation that itemizes the actual income and/or expenses
incurred by the debtor. Many ofthese items will be necessary for implementation ofthe means test,
including income, housing expense, utilities, health insurance and the like. Thus, the additional
burden ofdocumenting the balance ofexpenses, if at all possible, should not be that extraordinarily
difficult.
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CONCLUSION:

Since the forms, including what the income, medium income and other important numbers
will probably be included in software packages, this practitioner believes that the implementation
ofthe means test will exclude only very few and that the angst and turmoil regarding the means test
that has exploded since the enactment of the Bill, has been overstated. That is not to say that for
those few who actually are disqualified from filing under Chapter 7, and must file under Chapter 13,
which particularly when they are presented with some difficult choices, such as automobile
purchases incurred within the previous 910 days, or consumer purchase money security interests
incurred within 910 days, that their cases certainly will be difficult and will need careful pruning and
attention. When counsel carefully gathers the documentation that is necessary to support the
numbers that are placed on the petition, then it is this practitioners belief that the means test will
become just another form that will be overcome fairly quickly. It also offers opportunities for
creative practicing, particularly with regard to the new laws regarding 401(k)s, domestic support
obligations, the maintenance of filing tax returns and payment of taxes and other more substantive
issues that arise as a result ofthis new law. I do look that sanctions upon counsel for either a creditor
or a debtor will be rare and usually will be earned. Courts are reluctant to impose sanctions, but if
counsel has not done homework, has not exercise due diligence and has not taken the time to do the
necessary work themselves, I do foresee that the Court will sanction the unwary counsel. On a final
note, how a bankruptcy petition preparer can do everything that would be necessary and not engage
in the practice oflaw, is beyond me.
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OFFICIAL FORMS
APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
WDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
AUGUST 11,2005
[Please note that two sections ofthe means testingforms
are under study and subject to revision.]
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OFFICIAL FORM 22
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Form B22A (Chapter 7) (10/051

-==:-.-

In re

Check the box as directed In Parts I, III, and VI of this statement.

_

o Presumption arises

Debtor(s)

case Number: _::::-:-

o Presumption does not arise

-:-----

(If knllWn)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND MEANS TEST CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 7

In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 7 debtor, whether or not filing
jointly, whose debts are primarily consumer debts. Joint debtors may complete one statement only.

Part I. EXCLUSION fOR DISABLED VETERANS
If you are a disabled veteran described in the Veteran's Declaration in this Part I, (I) check the box at the beginning of the
Veteran's Declaration, (2) check the "Presumption does not arise" box at the top of this statement, and (3) complete the
verification In Part VIII. Do not complete any of the remaining parts of this statement.
1

o

Veteran's Declaration. By checking this box, I declare under penalty of perjury that I am a disabled veteran (as
defined in 38 U.S.C. § 3741(1» whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a period In which I was on active duty (as
defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(I» or while I was performing a homeland defense activity (as defined in 32 U.S.C. §901(1».

Part II. CALCULAnON OF MONTHLY INCOME fOR § 707(b}(7) EXCLUSION

2

3

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 UnmarrIed. Complete only COlumn A ("Debtor's Income" for Lines 3-11.
b. 0 Married, not filing jointly, with declaration of separate households. By checking this box, debtor declares under
penalty of perjury: "My spouse and I are legally separated under applicable non-bankruptcy law or my spouse and I are
living apart other than for the purpose of evading the requirements of § 707(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code."
Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income" for Unes 3-11.
c.D Married, not filing jointly, without the declaration of separate households set out in Une 2.b above. Complete both
Column A ("Debtor's Income") and COlumn B (Spouse's Income) for Lines 3-11.
d. 0 Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income" and Column B ("Spouse's Incomej for
Llnea3-11.
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
ColumnA
Column B
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received
Debtor's
Spouse's
different amounts of Income during these six months, you must total the amounts received
Income
Income
during the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

$

$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
Include any part of the business expenses enterecl on Line b as a deduction in Part
V.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business Income

Subtract Line b from L.lne a

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the
difference on Line 5. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not Include any part of the
operating expenses enterecl on Line b as a deduction In Part V.
5

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract Line b from Line a

5

$

Interest, dividends, and royalties.

$

$

7

Pension and retirement Income.

$

$

8

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents, Including child or spousal support. Do not Include contributions from the
debtor's spouse If Column B Is completed.

$

$

6
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9

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount In Column A and, if applicable, Column
8. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such
compensation In Column A or B, but instead state the amount In the space below:

II

unemployment compensation dalmed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

I

ISpouse $

Debtor $

I

$

$

$

$

total(s).

$

$

Total Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). If Column B has been completed,
add Une 11, Column A to Line 11, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been
completed, enter the amount from Line 11, Column A.

$

Income from all other sourees. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page.
Do not Indude any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as
10

a victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of International or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.

I:

fB

Total and enter on Une 10

11

12

,

Subtotal of Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). Add Lines 3 thru 10 in
Column A, and, if Column B is completed, add Lines 3 through 10 in Column B. Enter the

Part III. APPLICATION OF § 707{b)(7) EXCLUSION
13

Annualized Current Monthlv Income for § 707(b)(7). Multiply the amount from Line 12 by
the number 12 and enter the result.

$

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for the applicable state and
14

household size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj,goylustl or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:

b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of Section 707(b)(7). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
15

o The
amount on Une 13 is less than or equal to the amount on Une 14. Check the ·Presumption does
not arise" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete Part VIlli do not complete Parts IV, V, VI, or VII.
o The
amount on Line 13 is more than the amount on Line 14. Complete the remaining parts of this
statement.
Complete Parts IV, V, VI, and VII of this statement only if required. (See Line 15.)

Part IV. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME FOR § 707(b)(2)
16

Enter the amount from Line 12.

$

Marital adjustment. If you checked the box at Line 2.c, enter the amount of the income listed in Une
17
18

11, Column B that was NOT regularly contributed to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents. If you did not check box at Line 2.c, enter zero.

$

Current monthly income for § 707(b)(2). Subtract Line 17 from Line 16 and enter the resUlt.

$

Part V. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
SUbpart A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
19

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and
miscellaneous. Enter "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the
applicable family size and income level. (This InformatiOn is available at www,usdoi-gov/usU or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

C - 17

$

20

......1St...II.....1 h.lI.i"l end utilities. EAteF the aFRal:lAt at tAe IRS Hel:lslAg aRs ~tilltles
Steflsarels allewaRee tel" ';el:lF Eal:lAty aAs famil'! size (this IAfaFffiatlElA Is a'lallilble at www.l:Isset.aev/l:Ist1
af frElM ttle eleFI~ ef the baAIEFl:IptE'f eel:llt), aEl;l:lstes tEl EleEll:let aWl paltieR ef the allewaRee tRat IRell:lses
I98Yfl'leflts efl sebts seEl:IreS by ,,.el:lF heFRe, IisteEl IR lifle 41.
(Under reVision)

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of Whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
21

22

23

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating
expenses are Included as a contribution to your household expenses In Line 8. 0 0 0 1 0 2 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs l!r. Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles In the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www.usdoj.goy/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease
expense for more than two vehicles.) 0 1 02 or more,
Enter, in line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First car
(available at www.ysdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehlde 1, as stated In Line 41; subtract Lineb
from Line a and enter the result in Line 22. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership COsts, First Car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in Line 41

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

$

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the -2 or more- Box in Line 23.
Enter, In Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second car
(available at www,ysdoj,gov/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehide 2, as stated in Line 41; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 23. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

$

b,

Average Monthly payments for debts secured by Vehicle 2, if
any, as stated In Line 41

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Line a.

e.

$

24

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state, and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self
employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not Include real estate or sales
taxes.

25

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

26

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for tenn life Insurance for yourself, Do not include premiums for Insurance on your
dependents, for whole life, or for any other form of insurance.

$

27

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are reqUired to pay pur,suant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments, Do not
Include payments on past due support obligations Included In Line 43.

$

28

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that Is a
condition of employment and for education that is required for a physically or mentally challenged
dependent child for whom no public education prOViding similar services is available.

$

29

Other Necessary Expenses: chi/deare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on chlldcare, Do not include payments made for children's education.

$

30

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not Include payments for health insurance listed In Line 33.
$
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31

32

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly
expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller identification, special long
distance, or internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not
Include any amount previously deducted.

$

Totel Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Unes 19 through 31

$

Subpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707{b)
Note: Do not inclUde any expenses that you have listed in Lines 19-31
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. ust the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend In each of the following categories and enter the total.
a.
33

Health Insurance

$

b.

Disability Insurance

$

c.

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Unes a, band c

34

35

36

37

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your Immediate family who Is
unable to pay for such expenses.

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually
incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS
Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Education expenses for dependent children less than 18. Enter the average monthly
expenses that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in proViding elementary and secondary
education for your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee
with documentation demonstrating that the amount dalmed Is reasonable and necessary and
not already accounted for in the IRS Standards.

$

38

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel In the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information Is available at www.usdoj.govlystl
or from the derk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.
$

39

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined In 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

40

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Lines 33 through 39

$

Subpart C: Deductions for Debt Payment
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that Is secured by an interest In
property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the
Average Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to
each secured Creditor In the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If
necessary, list additional entries on a separate page. Do not Include Items you have previously
deducted, such as insurance and taxes.
41
Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securino the Debt

a.

50-month Averaoe Pavment
$
$
$

b.

c.

Total: Add Lines a band c
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$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 41 are in default, and the
property securing the debt Is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may
indude In your deductions 1/60th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the ·cure amountj In order to maintain possession of the propertY. List any such amounts In the
following chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
42

Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securino the Debt in Default

a.
b.
c.

1/60th of the Cure Amount
$

$
$

Total: Add Lines a band c
43

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (Including priority child
support and alimony dalms), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. If you are eligible to file a case under Chapter 13, complete
the following chart, multiply the amount in Line a by the amount in Line b, and enter the resulting
administrative expense.
a.
b.

44

c.

Projected averaae monthly Chaoter 13 olan oaYment.
Current multiplier for your district as determined under
schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States
Trustees. (This Information is available at www.usdoj.goy/ustl
or from the derk of the bankruotcY court.)
Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case

S

x
Total: Multiplv Lines a and b

45

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 41 through 44.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allowed under § 707(b)(2)
46

I

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 32,40, and 45.

$

Part VI. DETERMINATION OF § 707{b){2) PRESUMPTION
47

Enter the amount from Line 18 (Current monthly income for § 707(b)(2))

$

48

Enter the amount from Line 46 (Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2))

$

49

Monthly disposable Income under § 707(b)(2). Subtract Line 48 from Line 47 and enter the
result

$

50

SO-month disposable income under § 707(b)(2). Multiply the amount in Line 49 by the
number 60 and enter the result.
Initial presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

51

$

o The
amount on Line 50 is less than $6,000 Check the "Presumption does not arise'" box at the top of page 1 of
this statement, and complete the verification in Part VII. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.
o The
amount set forth on Line 50 is more than $10,000. Check the "Presumption arises" box at the top of
page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification in Part VII. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.

o The
amount on Line 50 is at least $6,000, but not more than $10,000. Complete the remainder of Part
VI (Lines 52 through 54).
52

Enter the amount of your total non-priority unsecured debt

53

Threshold debt payment amount. Multiply the amount In Line 52 by the number 0.25 and enter
the result.
Secondary presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

54

$
$

o The
amount on Line 50 is less than the amount on Une 53. Check the "Presumption does not arise" box at
the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII.
o The amount on Une 50 is equal to or greater than the amount on Line 53. Check the "Presumption

arises" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII. You may also complete
P2lrt VII.
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Part VII: ADDInONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. Ust and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly Income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should
reflect your average monthly expense for each Item. Total the expenses.
55

Exoense Descriotion

Monthlv Amount

a.
b.
c.

S
S
$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VIII: VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

56

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)
Joint Debtor if anvl
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Form B22A(Alt.) (Chapter 7) (10/051
Check the box as directed In Parts I, III, and VI of this statement.

o Presumption arises
o Presumption does not arise

~==_------

In re

Debtor(s)

case Number:

_

_-===~

(1IIcnown)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND MEANS TEST CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 7 (IF IRS SEPARATES ITS HOUSING ALLOWANCE)
In addition to SChedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 7 debtor, whether or not filing
jointly, whose debts are primarily consumer debts. Joint debtors may complete one statement only.

Part I. EXCLUSION FOR DISABLED VETERANS
If you are a disabled veteran described in the Veteran's Declaration In this Part I, (1) check the box at the beginning of the
Veteran's Declaration, (2) check the "Presumption does not arise" box at the top of this statement, and (3) complete the
verification in Part VIII. Do not complete any of the remaining parts of this statement.
1

D Veteran's Dedaration. By checking this box, I declare under penalty of perjury that I am a disabled veteran (as defined in 38 U.S.C. § 3741(1» whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a period in which I was on active dUty (as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(l» or while I was performing a homeland defense activity (as defined in 32 U.S.C. §901(1».
Part II. CALCULATION OF MONTHLY INCOME FOR § 707{b)(7) EXCLUSION

2

3

Marital/flling status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete onIV Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 3-11.
b. 0 Married, not filing jointly, with declaration of separate households. By checking this box, debtor declares under penalty of perjury: "My spouse and I are legally separated under applicable non-bankruptcy law or my spouse and I are living apart other than for the purpose of evading the requirements of § 707(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code." Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 3-11.
c. D Married, not filing jOintly, without the declaration of separate households set out In Une 2.b above. Complete both
Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B (Spouse's Income) for Unes 3-11.
d. D Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B ("Spouse's Income") for
Une.'-U.
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
ColumnA
Column B
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received difDebtor's
Spouse's
ferent amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received durInClOme
Income
ing the six months, divide this totai by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

!t

!Ii

1$

Is

InClOme from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Une a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
Include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part

V.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Une b from Line a

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Une a and enter the differem:e on Line S. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not Include any part of the operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part V.

5

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract Line b from Line a

5

1$

6

Interest" dividends, and royalties.

!t

Is

7

Pension and retirement Income.

s

Is

S

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, Including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B is completed.

!Ii

Is
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9

10

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount In Column A and, If applicable, Column
6. However, If you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in Column A or 6, but instead state the amount in the space below:

II Unemployment
compensation daimed to I
be a benefit under the Social Security Act Debtor $

I

Spouse $

I:

El

Total and enter on Line 10

11

12

I

$

$

Income from .11 other sources. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page.
Do not include any benefits received under the Sodal Security Act or payments received as
a victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of International or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.

I
$

1$

Subtotal of Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). Add Lines 3 thru 10 in
Column A, and, if Column 6 is completed, add Lines 3 through 10 In Column 6. Enter the
total(s).

$

$

Total Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7). If Column 6 has been completed,
add line 11, Column A to line 11, Column B, and enter the total. If Column 6 has not been
completed, enter the amount from Line 11, Column A.

$

Part III. APPLICATION OF § 707(b)(7) EXCLUSION
13

14

Annualized Current Monthly Income for § 707(b)(7), Multiply the amount from Line 12 by
the number 12 and enter the result.

$

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for the applicable state and
household size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:

b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of Section 707(b)(7). Check the applicable box and proceed as dlrec;ted.
15

o The
amount on Une 13 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 14. Check the "Presumption does
not arise" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete Part Vll1; do not complete Parts IV, V, VI, or VII.
o The
amount on Line 13 is more than the amount on Line 14. Complete the remaining parts of this statement.
Complete Parts IV, V, VI, and VII of this statement only If reqUired. (See Line 15.)

Part IV. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME FOR § 707(b)(2)
16

Enter the amount from Line 12.

$

17

Marital adjustment. If you checked the box at Line 2.c, enter the amount of the income listed in Line
11, Column B that was NOT regularly contributed to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents. If you did not check box at Line 2.c, enter zero.

$

Current monthly Income for § 707(b)(2). Subtract Line 17 from Une 16 and enter the result.

$

18

Part V. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
Subpart A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

19

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and mlscellaneous. Enter WTotal" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and Income level. (This information is available at www,usdo1.govlustl or from the derk of
the bankruptcy court.)

$

20

Local Standards: housing and utilities; utilities/maintenance expense. Enter the amount
of the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Utilities/Maintenance Expense for the applicable county and
family size. (This information is available at www.usdo1.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy
court).

$

C' 23

21

Lefllli StellciaHls. heusilll end utilitie5~ Iftert.e.e/relltal eMl'ell8e, ERter, IR ljRe a eelew,
Wote aMetiRt ef the IRS HetisiRll aRs b1tilities St8RaaFSs; UeFtIl8!le/ReRtal EHpeR5e rer yetlr eBl:lRty aRE! faM
IIr sl!!e (alJaiiaele at 'N'II·/I.!;!sSaj.!ley/!;!sS/ ar WeM the elerk af the eaFlIEfl:lptey eBl:l!t3; eFlter aR URe B the
tetal ef the A'.'erage MeR1:tlI'( Pa~'MeRts fer aFl~' seets 5eEl:lreS BY yel:lr ReMe, as statedlFl UAE 4ia; stietNet
UFle B WeFl'l biRe a aRd ERter the resl:llt ift biAe 21. ge ..el: e..l:e, e..."'Olll..t leN the.. Re,e.
(Under revision)
a.

IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by your
home, if any, as stated in Line 42

$

Net mortgage/rental expense

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.

22

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are included as a contribution to your household expenses In Une 8.
Do 01 02 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information Is available at www,Ysdoj.goy!Ystl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense, (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
01 02 or more.

23

Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership COsts, First Car (available at www,Usdoj,9OV{ystl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court}i enter in Une b the total of the Av·
erage Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated In Line 42; subtract Une b from
Line a and enter the result In Line 23. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in Une 42

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. COmplete this Une
only if you checked the "2 or more Box in Line 23.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, second car
(available at www,ysdQj.gov!usV or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in Line 42i subtract Une b
from Line a and enter the result in line 24. Do not enter an amo!lnt less than zero.
H

24

25

a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 2,
as stated in Une 42

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Une a.

$

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state, and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as Income taxes, self
employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not Include real estate or sales

taxes.
26

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

27

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life insurance for yourself. Do not include premiums for Insurance on your dependents, for whole life or for any other form of insurance.

$

28

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal Qr child support payments. Do not Include payments on past due support obligations Included In Line 44.

$
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29

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that is a
condition of employment and for education that is required for a physically or mentally challenged dependent child for whom no public education prol/iding similar services is available.

$

30

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the al/erage monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. Do not Include payments made for children's education.

$

31

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by Insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not include payments for health Insurance listed In Line 34.

$

32

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller Identification, special long distance, or Internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not Include any amount previously deducted.

$

33

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Unes 19 through 32.

$

SUbpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b)
Note: Do not include any expenses that you have listed In Unes 19-32
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. L.ist the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend in each of the following categories and enter the total.
a.
34

Health Insurance

$

b.

Disability Insurance

$

c.

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Unes a, b, and c

35

36

37

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your Immediate family who Is
unable to pay for such expenses.

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any al/erage monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must prOVide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the i1dditlonal amount claimed 15 reilsonable and necessary.

$

38

Education expenses for dependent children less than 18. Enter the average monthly expenses that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, In provIding elementary and secondary education for your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with
documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary and not
already accounted for In the IRS Standards.
$

39

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information is available at www,ysdoj.qovlyst!
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.
$

40

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute In the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(I)-(2).

$

41

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of L.ines 34 through 40

$
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Subpart C: Deductions for Debt Payment
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that Is secured by an Interest in property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor In the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy ease, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not Include items you have previously deducted, such as
insurance and taxes.
Name of Creditor

42

property Securing the Debt

a.
b.
c.

60-month Average Payment

$
$
$
Total: Add Lines a band c.

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed In Line 42 are in default, and the
property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/60th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the ·cure amount") in order to maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the followIng chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
Name of Creditor

43

Property Securing the Debt in Default

a.

1/60th of the Cure Amount

$
$
$

b.
c.

Total: Add Lines a band c
44

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. If you are eligible to file a case under Chapter 13, complete
the following chart, multiply the amount In Line a by the amount in Line b, and enter the resulting administrative expense.

45

a.

Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

b.

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules Issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This information is available at www.ysdQj,gov/ust! or from
the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

c.

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Totai: Multiply lines a and b

46

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 42 through 45.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allowed under § 707(b)(2)
47

I

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707{b){2). Enter the total of Lines 33, 41, and 46.

$

Part VI. DETERMINAnON OF § 707(b)(2) PRESUMPTION
48

Enter the amount from Line 18 (Current monthly income for § 707(b)(2»

$

49

Enter the amount from Line 47 (Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2))

$

50

Monthly disposable income under § 707{b)(2). Subtract Line 49 from line 48 and enter the
result

$

51

6D-month disposable income under § 707(b){2). Multiply the amount in Line 50 by the number 60 and enter the result.

$

C·26

Initial presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

52

o The
amount on Line S1 is less than $6,000 Check the "Presumption does not arise" box at the top of page 1 of
this statement, and complete the verification in Part VII. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.
o The
amount set forth on Line S1 is more than $10,000. Check the "Presumption arises" box at the top of
page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification in Part vn. Do not complete the remainder of Part VI.
o The amount on Une 51 is at least $6,000, but not more than $10,000. Complete the remainder of Part

53

Enter the amount of your total non-priority unsecured debt

$

54

Threshold debt payment amount. Multiply the amount in Line 53 by the number 0.25 and enter
the result.
Secondary presumption determination. Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

$

VI (Lines 53 through 55).

55

o The
amount on Line 51 is less than the amount on Une 54. Check the "Presumption does not ariseN box at
the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII.
o The
amount on Line 51 is equal to or greater than the amount on Une 54. Check the "Presumption
arises" box at the top of page 1 of this statement, and complete the verification In Part VIII. You may also complete
Part VII.

Part VII: ADDITIONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. List and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated In this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should reflect your average monthly expense for each item. Total the expenses.

56

Expense Description

Monthly Amount

a.
b.
c.

$
$
$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VIII: VERIFICAnON
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

57

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)

(JoInt Debtor If anv1
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Form 8228 (Chapter 11) (10/051

In re

....,.....,.....,...,.

_

Debtor(s)

Case Number: _-==-,...---:

_

(If known)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 11
In addition to Schedules I and J, thiS statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 11 debtor, whether or not filing
jointly. Joint debtors may complete one statement only.

Part I. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME

1

2

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.
b. 0 Married, not filing jointly. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.
c.O Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column 8 ("Spouse's Income") for
I.ines 2-10.
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
ColumnS
COlumnA
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received
Debtor's
Spouse's
different amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received
Income
Income
during the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

5

$

5

$

Net Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b
from Une a and enter the difference on Line 3. Do not enter a number less than zero.

3

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Line a

Net rental and other real property income. Subtract Une b from Une a and enter the
difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental Income

Subtract Une b from Une a

'$

5

5

Interest, dividends, and royalties.

$

$

6

Pension and retirement income.

$

$

7

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's
dependents, Including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the
debtor's spouse If Column 8 is completed.

$

$

5

'5

5

5

$

$

8

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column
8. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such
compensatlon in Column A or 8, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

9

I

Debtor $

11

Spouse $

Income from all other sources. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page.
Do not indude any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as
a Victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.

EI

I:

Total and enter on Line 9

10

l

I

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total{s).
Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Line 10, Column
A to Line 10 Column 8 and enter the total. If Column· 8 has not been comoleted enter the

C·28

D

I--$

amount from Line 10, Column A.

.....~

Part II: VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided In this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

12

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)
(Joint Debtor, If any)

C·29

Form B22C (Chapter 13) (10/051

Check the box as directed In Part II, Line 14 of this statement.

-=-===

In re

o Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)

_

o Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)

Debtor(s)

Case Number:

_~~-=

_

(If known)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13

In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every Individual Chapter 13 debtor, whether or not filing
'ointlv. Joint debtors mav comolete one statement OniV.
I

Part I. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME

1

2

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete onlv Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.
b. 0 ~1aFFieEl, Ret filiAg jelAtly. GO"'l'lete 0,,1', eol""''' A ("Belteer'. IlIee",e") for 1011188 ill !e. (Under Revision)
c. 0 Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B ("Spouse's Income") for
Lines 2-10.
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
ColumnA
Column B
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received dlfDebtor's
Spouse's
ferent amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received durIncome
Income
Ing the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

$

$

$

1$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the difference on Line 3. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part

In.
3

a.

Gross receipts

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not Include any part of the operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part III.
4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental Income

Subtract Line b from LIne a

5

Interest, diVidends, and royalties.

$

$

6

Pension and retirement Income.

$

$

7

RegUlar contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B Is completed.

$

$

$

$

$

$

8

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, If applicable, Column
B. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensatlon In Column A or a, but Instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

9

10

IDebtor $

ISpouse $

Income from all other sources. Specify source and amount. If necessary, list additional
sources on a separate page. Total and enter on Line 9. Do not Include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as a victim of a war crime, crIme
against humanity, or as a Victim of international or domestic terrorism.
a.

$

b.

$

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, If Column
a Is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total(s).
1$

C - 30

!

$

11

Total current monthly income. If Column Bhas been completed, add Line 10, Column
A to Line 10, Column a, and enter the total. If Column a has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.

Part

$

II. APPLICATION OF § 132S(b)(3)

12

Annualized current monthly income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
enter the result.

$

13

Applicable median family Income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and household size. (This Information is available by family size at www,usdoj.gOV1yst! or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:
b, Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
14

o The
amount on Line 12 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete Part VI of
this statement; do not complete Parts III, IV, or V.

o The
amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top Of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.
Complete Parts III, IV, and V of this statement only if reqUired. (See Une 14.)

Part III. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
Subpart

A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue service (IRS)

15

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and mlscellaneous. Enter the "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family Size and income level. (ThiS information is available at www ysclol,govlust/ or from the derk
of the bankruptcy court.)
$

16

"'eel 5I1e"de,ds. hOtisi". end tillilities. EAter tile aFflatlAt af the 11\5 HstlsiAg aRB ~tllltle5 StaR
E1aRls allswaAse feF YStlF eStlAty aRe! family sii!e (tAis iRfeFfflatisR is available at www.!;!sElej.ae,..lYs!:I SF
we", tAe eleFI, sf tile l:laRI(FtI~t€Y ee!;!Ft), ae!jtlstee! te eleeltlet aAY IlsFtisA sf tl\e allewaAEe tl\at iReltlBeS
llaYFAeRts SA Beats seetlreEl l3y YStlF RaFfle, Iistee! iR LIRe 37. (Under revision)

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
17

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are Included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7.
00 01 02 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www,usdoj.qov/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: .transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
2 or more.
01
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car (available at www.usdoj.qov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated in Line 37; subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the result in Line 18. Do not enter an amount less than zero.

o

18

a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in Line 37

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

C - 31

$

Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Une 10, Column
11

A to Line 10, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been completed, enter the
amount from Une 10, Column A,

$

Part II. APPLICATION OF § 1325(b)(3)
12

Annualized current monthly Income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
enter the result.

$

Applicable median family Income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and house13

hold size. (This Information is available by family sIze at www.usdoj.goyJust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:
b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
14

o The
amount on Line 12 Is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of thiS statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 132S(b)(3)" and complete Part VI of
this statement; do not complete Parts III, IV, or V.

o The
amount on Line 12 Is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III, IV, and V of this statement only If reqUired. (see Une 14.)

Part III. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
Subpart A: Deductions under standards of the Internal Revenue service (IRS)
15

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and mlscellaneous. Enter the "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and Income level. (ThiS informatIOn Is available at www.usdoj.gpY!ust! or from the derk
of the bankruptcy court.)

$

.....1 &e.nd.rd.~ ".".inl and ..eilillie••
16

ERteF the amslolRt sf the IRS HSlolSiRg aRs l.ItUitles StaR
EleFSs allswaRee fer YSlolr eSlolRW aRd family siiZe (this iRfermatisfl Is a\'ailaele at wym.lIsSsj.alftJtlsl;{ Sf
fFElm the eleR' sf the BaRllftiptey eStlR), aSjlolsteS te EleEll;lEt aRy !lSfl:jSfl sf the alls....'aFlee that iReltiSes
!laymeFits SR Elebts seetlfE!EI By '(Sl;lF hsme, iisteEl iA lIfle 3;Z. (Under revision)

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
17

Check the number of vehides for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are Included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7.
00 01 02 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles In the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information Is available at www,ysdoj goy/ust/ or trom the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: .transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehldes for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense tor more than two vehides.)
20rmore.
01
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car (available at www.usdoj,gov/yst/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle I, as stated in Line 37; subtract Line b from
Une a and enter the result In Line 18. Do not enter an amount less than zero.

o

18

a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehide I,
as stated In Line 37

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtraet Line b from Une a.

C - 32

$

$

19

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this L.ine
only jf you checked the "2 or more" Box In line 18.
Enter, In line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car
(available at www.usdoj.goy/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in L.ine 37; subtract L.lne b
from Une a and enter the result In line 19. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 2,
as stated in line 37

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract L.lne b from L.Ine a.

$

$

20

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually Incur
for all federal, state and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not Include real estate or sales taxes.
$

21

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not Indude discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life insurance for yourself. Do not Include premiums for Insurance on your dependents, for Whole life, or for any other form of Insurance.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not Include payments on past due support obligations Included In Line 39.

$

22

23

24

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that is a
condition of employment and for education that is required for a physically or mentally challenged dependent child for whom no public education providing similar services is available.

25

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. Do not include payments made for children's education.

$

26

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not Include payments for health Insurance listed in Une 29.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller identification, special long distance, or Internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not Include any amount previously deducted.

$

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of lines 15 through 27

$

27
28

Subpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b)
Note: Do not Include any expenses that you have listed in Unes 15-27
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. L.ist the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend In each of the following categories and enter the total.

29

a.
b.
c.

Health Insurance
Disability Insurance
Health Savings Account

$
$
$
Total: Add lines a, b, and c

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your Immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses. Do not include payments listed In Line 24-

$

31

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

32

Home energy costs In excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

30

C - 33

33

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually Incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed is reilSonable and necessary and not already
accounted for in the IRS Standards.

34

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparelln the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This Information is available at www.ysdo1.aoy/ustl
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You mu5t provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.
$

35

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined In 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

36

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b}. Enter the total of Unes 29 through 35.

$

$

SubpartC: Deductions for Debt Payment
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by an interest in propertY that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the propertY securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor In the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not include Items you have previously deducted, such as
Insurance and real estate taxes.

37

Name of Creditor

PropertY Securing the Debt

a.
b.
c.

60-month Average Payment
$
$
$,

Total: Add Unes a, b, and c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed In Une 37 are in default, and the
propertY securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/6Oth of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amount W) in order to maintain possession of the property. Ust any such amounts In the followIng chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
38

Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securing the Debt in Default

a.
b.
c.

1/60th of the Cure Amount
$
$

$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c
39

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount in Une a by the amount in Line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.

40

a.

projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

b.

Current multlpller for your district as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This Information is available at www.usdQj.gov/ust! or from the
derk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

c.

Average monthly administrative expense Qf Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Unes a and b

41

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Unes 37 through 40.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allbwed under § 707(b)(2)
42

I

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2}. Enter the total of Unes 28, 36, and 4l.

C·34

$

Part IV. DETERMINATION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME UNDER § 132S{b){2)
43

Total current monthly Income. Enter the amount from LIne 11.

$

44

Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
disability payments for a dependent Child, included in Line 7, that you received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptey law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in § S41(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
from retirement plans, as specified in § 362(b)(19).

$

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the amount from Line 42.

$

45
46
47

48

Total adjustments to determine disposable Income. Add the amounts on Lines 44, 45, and 46
$

and enter the result.

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 1325(b)(2). Subtract Line 47 from LIne 43 and enter the
$

result.

Part V: ADDInONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. LIst and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iI)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should refleet your average monthly expense for each item. Total the expenses.
49

Exoense Descrintion

-ik

a.
b.
c.

Monthlv Amount

!I;
~

Total: Add LInes a, b, and c

$

Part VI: VERIFICAnON
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

SO

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)

Joint Debtor

C·35

Ir 8nu>

Form B22C(Alt.) (Chapter 13) (10/051
In re

.."....,_,..,-

Check the box as directed In Part II, Line 14 of this statement.

o Disposable Income determined under § 1325(b)(3)
o Disposable Income not·determlned under § 1325(b)(3}

_

Debtor(s)

case Number:

_=-:'_...,...

_

(If known)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13 (IF IRS SEPARATES ITS HOUSING ALLOWANCE)
In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 13 debtor, whether or not filing
·ointlv. JOint debtors mav comolete one statement onlv.

Part I. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME

1

2

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of thiS statement as directed.
a. 0 unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.
b. 0 Mal'l'le8, Ret flliRg jeifltl·,. Ge...plel:e 8"1, G81"..." A ("geIl1:8.'.1"80...e") fer Un_ Ii 10. (Under revision)
c. 0 Married, filing jOintly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B ("Spouse's Income") for
Un_2-10.
All figures must reflect average monthly Income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
ColumnA
Column B
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received dif·
Debtor's
Spouse's
ferent amounts of Income during these six months, you must total the amounts received durIncome
Income
jng the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Gross wag••, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

$

$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Wne a and enter the difference on Line 3. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
Include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction In Part
III.
3

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Une a

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the difference on Une 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not Include any part of the operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part III.
4

a.

Gross receipts

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

5

Interest. dividends, and royalties.

6

Pension and retirement Income.

7

RegUlar contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, Including child or spousal support. Do not indude contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B is completed.

8

10

!

!Ii

!Ii

$

1$

!Ii

!Ii

!Ii

$

!Ii

$

$

:$

$

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column
B. However, If you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not Ust the amount of such compensation in Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

9

!Ii

I

Debtor $

I

Spouse $

Income from all other sources. Specify source and amount. If necessary, Ust additional
sources on a separate page. Total and enter on Wne 9. Do not Include any benefits received under the SOcial Security Act or payments received as a victim of a war crime, crime
against humanity, or as a victim of International or domestic terrorism.
a.

$

b.

$

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B Is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 In Column B. Enter the total(s).

C' 36

Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Line 10, Column
11

A to Line 10, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.

$

Part II. APPUCATION OF § 132S(b)(3)
12

Annualized current monthly income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
enter the result.

$

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and house13

hold size. (This information Is available by family size at www.ysdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
b. Enter debtor's household size:
a. Enter debtor's state of resIdence:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
14

o The
amount on Line 12 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)· and complete Part VI of
this statement; do not complete Parts III, IV, or V.

o The
amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable Income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III, IV, and V of this statement only If required. (See Line 14.)

Part III. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLOWED UNDER § 707(b)(2)
Subpart A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
15

16

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and miscellaneous. Enter the "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and income level. (This information Is available at www.usdoj.govlusV or from the clerk
of the bankruptcy court.)

$

leeel S.,lIla.1I81 heMalft. aftll ..tili~l_, u~lIltleslMlilftteftafteeeJtl'e"51e. EAteF the ameuAt
ef the IRS HetlsiA!l aAe l:ltlllties SlaAeaf'eS; I:Jtilitieslt4aiAteAaflEe ElEpeASe fef' the alllllleal:lle eetlRty aRe
famil'/ sli!e. ("Rlis iAfaffilatleR Is a'lailal:lle at WWI'ht/s6sj,!lsv}l;/slt Sf' fFem tAe eleAE ef the llaFlkf'upte','

£elif'tT. (Under revision)

$

Local Standards: housing and utilities; mortgage/rental expense. Enter, in Line a below,
the amount of the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage!Rental Expense for your county and family siZe (available at www.usdotgqy/yst/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter on Line b the
total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by your home, as stated in Line 38; subtract
Line b from Line a and enter the result In Line 17. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
17

a.

IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by your
home, If any, as stated In Line 38

$

c.

Net mortgage/rental expense

Subtract Line b from Line a.

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehide operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of Whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
18

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7. 0 a 0 1 0 2 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www,ysdoj,gOV/ysV or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)
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$

19

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownershlP8ease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease ex2 or more.
pense for more than two vehicles.) 0 1
Enter, In Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership COsts, First Car (available at www.usdoj.govLusti or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter In Line b the total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated In Line 38; subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the result in Line 19. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehide 1,
as stated in line 38

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

20

21

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. COmplete this Line
only if you che~ed the "2 or more- Box in Line 20.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership costs, Second Car
(available at www.usdo1.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in Line 38; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 20. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership costs, Second Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 2,
as stated In Line 38

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Line a.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state, and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self
employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not include real estate or sales

taxes.

$

22

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not Include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

23

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life Insurance for yourself. Do not Include premiums for Insurance on your dependents, for whole life or for any other form of Insurance.

$

24

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not include payments on past due support obligations Induded In Line 40.

$

25

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that is a
condition of employment and for education that is required for a physically or mentally challenged dependent child for whom no public education providing similar services is available.

26

Other Necessary Expenses: chUdcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. Do not include payments made for children's education.

$

27

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not Indude payments for health insurance listed in Line 30.

$

28

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly expenses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller Identification, special long distance, or internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not includ_ any amount previously deducted.

$

29

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 15 through 28

$

C - 38

Subpart B: Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b)
Note: Do not include any expenses that you have listed in Lines 15-28
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. Ust the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend In each of the following categories and enter the total.
Health Insurance

$

b.

Disability Insurance

$

c.

Health Savings Account

$

a.
30

Total: Add Unes a, b, and c

$

31

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically III, or disabled member of your household or member of your immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses. Do not Include payments listed In Une 25.

$

32

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

33

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount daimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually Incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted for In the IRS standards.

$

34

35

Additional food and Clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information Is available at www.ysdQj,govlystl
or from the clerk of the bankru.ptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed Is reasonable and necessary.
$

36

continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to eontribute in the
form of cash or flnanclallnstruments to a charitable organization as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

37

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Unes 30 through 36.

$

Subpart

c: D,eductions for Debt Payment

Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that Is secured by an interest In property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment Is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor in the 60 months following the flllng of the bankruptcy case, diVided by 60. If necessary,list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not Include Items you have previously deducted, such as
insurance and real estate taxes.
38
Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securina the Debt

a.
b,
c.

6O-month Averaae Payment
$
$
$

Total: Add Unes a, b, and c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed In Une 38 are In default, and the
property securing the debt Is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/6Oth of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the ·cure amount") In order to maintain possession of the property. Ust any such amounts in the following chart and enter the total. If necessary. list additional entries on a separate page.
39

Name of Creditor

Prooertv Securina the Debt In Default

a.
b.
c.

1160th of the Cure Amount
$
$

$

Total: Add Lines a, b, and c
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$

40

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount In Line a by the amount In Line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.

41

a.

Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

b.

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedutes issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(ThiS Information Is available at WWW,Usdol.gov/yst! or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

c.

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Lines a and b

42

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of lines 38 through 41-

$

$

Subpart D: Total Deductions Allowed 'under § 707(b)(2)
43

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 29, 37, and 42.

$

Part IV. DETERMINATION OF DISPOSABLE INCOME UNDER § 132S(b)(2)
44

Total current monthly income. Enter the amount from Line 11,

$

45

Support Income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
disability payments for a dependent child, Included In Line 7, that you received In accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in § 541(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
frOm retirement plans, as specified In § 362(b)(19).

$

47

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the amount from Line 43.

$

48

Total adjustments to determine disposable income. Add the amounts on Lines 45, 46, and 47

46

49

and enter the result.

$

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 1325(b)(2). Subtract Line 48 from Line 44 and enter the
result

$

Part V: ADDITIONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. List and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should reflect your average monthly expense for each item. Total the expenses.

50

Exoense Descriotion

Monthly Amount

a.
b.

$
$

c.

5
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VI: VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the Information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)

51

Date:

Signature:

Date:

Signature:

(Debtor)
Joint Debtor If any)
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Fonns 22A, 22B, & 23C

COMMITTEE NOTE

A.

Overview

One of the changes in bankruptcy practice introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005 is a definition of"current monthly income," set
out in § 101 (l OA) of the Code. Certain individual debtors in Chapter 7, all individual debtors in
Chapter II, and all Chapter 13 debtors are required to calculate their income under this
definition. Certain Chapter 7 and 13 debtors are further required to calculate deductions from
current, monthly income allowed under the means test of § 707(b)(2)(A). Chapter 7 debtors
subject to the means test may, as a result of these calculations, be subject to a presumption of
abuse. The means test deductions are used in Chapter 13 to calculate disposable income under
§ 1325(b)(2) and (3). To comply with the reporting and calculation requirements involving
current monthly income and the means test, three separate forms have been provided - one for
Chapter 7, one for Chapter 11, and one for Chapter 13. This note first describes the "current
monthly income" calculation that is common to 'all three of the forms, next describes the means
test deductions employed in the Chapter 7 and 13 forms, and finally addresses particular issues
that are unique to each of the separate forms.
B.

Calculation of current monthly income

Current monthly income ("CMf'), as defined in § 101 (lOA), has different purposes in
each of the three chapters in which it is used, but basic computation is the same. CMI is a
monthly average of defined "income" received in the six calendar months prior to the bankruptcy
filing by the debtor and, in a joint case, the debtor's spouse. The "income" to be included in this
average is (1) income from all sources, whether or not taxable, and (2) any amount paid by an
entity other than the debtor (or the debtor's spouse in a joint case) on a regular basis for the
household expenses ofthe debtor, the debtors dependents, and (in a joint case) the debtor's
spouse if not otherwise a dependent. However, the income to be averaged is defined as not
including "benefits received under the Social Security Act" and certain payments received by
victims of terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The forms address the calculation ofCMI, in each chapter, by a series of line entries,
divided into columns providing for separate entries by the debtor and the debtor's spouse. The
calculation line entries are set out in Part II of the Chapter 7 form, and Part I of the forms for
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. These line entries for calculating CMI are introduced by a set of
instructions and check boxes indicating when the "debtor's spouse" column is required to be
completed. The instructions also direct the required averaging of the income reported on the line
entries.
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The line entries specify several common types of income and then include a "catch-all"
line for other types. The specific entry lines address gross wages; business and rental income;
interest, dividends, and royalties; pension and retirement income; and regular contributions to the
debtor's household expenses. Gross wages (before taxes) are required to be entered. Consistent
with usage in the Internal Revenue Manual and the American Community Survey of the Census
Bureau, business and rental income is defined as gross receipts less ordinary and necessary
expenses. Unemployment compensation is given special treatment. Because the federal
government provides funding for state unemployment compensation under the Social Security
Act, there may be a dispute about whether unemployment compensation is a "benefit received
under the Social Security Act." The forms take no position on the merits of this argument, but
give debtors the option of making the argument by reporting unemployment compensation
separately from their current monthly income. The separate reporting allows parties in interest to
determine the materiality of an exclusion of unemployment compensation and to challenge it.
The forms provide instruction for proper totaling of the income lines.
C.

Means test deductions from current monthly income

Deductions from CMI are set out in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv). The forms for Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 have identical sections (Parts V and III, respectively) for calculating these deductions.
The calculations are divided into subparts reflecting three different kinds of allowed deductions.
1.

Deductions under IRS standards

Subpart A deals with deductions from eM!, set out in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), for "the debtor's
applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local
Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other
Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor
resides." The forms provide entry lines for each of the specified expense deductions under the
IRS standards, and instructions on the entry lines identify the web pages where the relevant IRS
allowances can be found. As with all of the deductions in § 707(bX2)(A)(ii), deductions under
the IRS standards are subject to the proviso that they not include "any payments for debts."
The IRS National Standards provide a single allowance for food, clothing, household
supplies, personal care, and miscellany, depending on income and household size. The forms
contain an entry line for the applicable allowance.
The IRS Local Standards provide separate deductions for housing and utilities and for
transportation, with different amounts for different areas of the country, depending on the
debtor's family size and number of the number of the debtor's vehicles. Each of the amounts
specified by the IRS in the Local Standards are treated by the IRS as a cap on actual expenses,
but because § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides for deduction in the "amounts specified under the ...
Local Standards," the forms treat these amounts as allowed deductions.
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[For ase with the aitemate versions of the Chapter 7 Il1td 13 £orms. The Local Standmds
f01 housing and I1tilitics separate this expense category into a utilitieslnlaintemmec component
md a mortgagchentai expense component. The atilitiesfmaintenanee component is a simple
allowmtcc, COvering a ",mieiy ofex:penses invohed in the opaation of4 residence. TIte
mortgagehentai expense conlpollent co",ers the cost ofaeqniring the Icsidenee, for homeowners
with mortgages, the mortgagellental ex:pense funs ilhohes debt payment, since the cost ofa
Inoltgagc is part ofthc ailowmce. Accordingly, the fOlIn requires debtoIs to deduct fiom
allowance £01 mortgage/rental expense the average monthly mortgage payment tprineipalll11d
inlerest), tip to the fall mnomlt of the IRS Illortgagchentai expense. ntis average payment is '"
Icported on the sepmate line of the fonn for dcdnetions ofseeulcd debt pmsl1mt to
§ 767(b)(2)(a)(iii).] (Under revision)

[m nse with the original velsions of the Chapter 7 md 13 fonDS. The Local Standa:rds
fol housing mtd utilities plovide a single expertse aUowmlCe cOvering both the cost ofaequhing
housing (rent or IllOltgagc paynlcnts) mid the cost of utilities, insmancc, md maintenance
connected with the honsittg. Declttise tilis allowance incltldes debt payment; the form directs
debtors to dcdnct any portion offue allowmcc that includes payments on debts sCCtIIed by theh
bontes. The ploper mcnmer ofea:lcttlating this dcdnctioll !jom the bonsillg and utilities allowa:tlce
willltave to be detamined by judicial decisions.]
(Under revision)
The Local Standards for transportation separate this expense category into a vehicle
operation/public transportation component and a component for ownership/lease expense. The
amount of the vehicle operation/public transportation allowance depends on the number of
vehicles the debtor operates, with debtors who do not operate vehicles being given a public
transportation expense. The instruction for this line item makes it clear that every debtor is thus
entitled to some transportation expense allowance. No debt payment is involved in this
allowance. However, for debtors with debt secured by the vehicles that they operate, the
ownership/lease expense does involve debt payment. Accordingly, the fonn requires debtors to
reduce the allowance for ownership/lease expense by the average monthly loan payment amount
(principal and interest), up to the full amount of the IRS ownership/lease expense amount. This
average payment is as reported on the separate line of the fonn for deductions of secured debt
pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii).
The IRS does not set out allowances for "Other Necessary Expenses." Rather, it sets out
a number of categories for such expenses, and describes the nature of the expenses that may be
deducted in each of these categories. Section 707(b)(2)(a)(ii) allows a deduction for the debtor's
actual expenses in these specified categories, subject to its requirement that payment of debt not
be included. Several of the IRS categories deal with debt repayment and so are not included in
the fonns. Several other categories deal with expense items that are more expansively addressed
by specific statutory allowances. The remaining IRS categories are set out in individual line
entries. Instructions on the individual entry lines reflect limitations imposed by the IRS and the
need to avoid inclusion of items deducted elsewhere on the fonus.
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The forms call for a subtotal of the deductions allowed under the IRS standards.
2.

Additional statutory expense deductions

In addition to the IRS expense deductions, subclauses (1), (II), (IV), and (V) of
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) allow six special expense deductions. Each of these additional expense items
is set out on a separate line entry in Subpart B, introduced by an instruction that there should not
be double counting of any expense already included in the IRS deductions. Contributions to
tax-exempt charities provide another statutory expense deduction. Specifically,
§ 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) expressly allows a deduction from CMI for such contributions (up to 15% of
the debtor's gross income), and § 707(b)(1) provides that in considering whether a Chapter 7
filing is an abuse, the court may not take into consideration "whether a debtor ... continues to
make [tax-exempt] charitable contributions." Accordingly, Subpart B also includes an entry line
for charitable contributions. Again, the forms call for the additional statutory expense deductions
to be subtotaled.
3.

Deductions for payment ofdebt

Subpart C of the forms deals with deductions from CMI for payment of secured and
priority debt, as well as a deduction for administrative expenses that would be incurred ifthe
debtor paid debts through a Chapter 13 plan. In accord with § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), the deduction
for secured debt is divided into two entry lines - one for payments that are contractually due
during the 60 months following the bankruptcy filing, the other for amounts needed to retain
necessary collateral securing debts in default. In each situation, the instructions for the entry
lines require dividing the total payment amount by 60, as the statute directs. Priority debt,
deductible pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv), is treated on a single entry line, also requiring division
by 60. The defined deduction for the expenses of administering a Chapter 13 plan is allowed by
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) only for debtors eligible for Chapter 13. The forms treat this deduction in
an entry line that requires the eligible debtor to state the amount of the prospective Chapter 13
plan payment and multiply that payment amount by the percentage fee established for the
debtor's district by the Executive Office for United States Trustees. The forms refer debtors to a
website that will set out this percentage fee. An entry line is provided for subtotaling the debt
payment deductions.
4.

Total deductions

Finally, the forms direct that the subtotals from Subparts A, B, and C be added together to
arrive at the total of allowed deductions from CMI.
5.

Additional claimed deductions

The forms do not provide for deductions from CMI for expenses in categories that are not
specifically identified as "Other Necessary Expenses" in the Internal Revenue Manual. However,
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debtors may wish to claim expenses that do not fall within the categories listed as "Other
Necessary Expenses" in the forms. The forms provide sections (Part VII in the Chapter 7 form
and Part V in the Chapter 13 form) for such expenses to be identified and totaled. Although
expenses listed in these sections are not deducted from CMI for puxposes of the forms'
calculations, the listing provides a basis for debtors to assert that these expenses should be
deducted from CMI under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), and that the results of the forms' calculation are
therefore inaccurate.
D.

The Chapter-specific fonns

I.

Chapter 7

The Chapter 1 fonn has several unique aspects. The form includes, in the upper right
corner of the first page, a check box requiring the debtor to state whether or not a presumption of
abuse exists as a result of the calculations required by the fonn. This check box is intended to
give clerks ofcourt a conspicuous indication of the cases for which they will be required to
provide notice ofa presumption of abuse pursuant to § 342(d).
Part 1 of the form implements the provision of § 707(b)(2)(D) that excludes certain
disabled veterans from any fonn of means testing, making it unnecessary to compute the CMI of
such veterans. Debtors who declare under penalty of perjury that they are disabled veterans
within the statutory definition are directed to verify their declaration in Part VII, to check the ··no
presumption" box at the begilUling of the fonn, and to disregard the remaining parts of the fonn.
Part II of the fonn is the computation of current monthly income e'CMI") as defined in
§ 101(lOA). Section 707(b)(2) eliminates standing to assert the means test's presumption of
abuse if the debtor's annualized CMI does not exceed a defined median state income. For this
purpose, the CMI of the debtor's spouse is added to the debtor's CMI even if the debtor's spouse
is not a joint debtor, unless the debtor declares under penalty of perjury that the spouses are
.
legally separated or living separately other than for purposes of evading the means test.
Accordingly, the calculation ofCMI in Part II directs a computation of the CM! of the debtor's
spouse in all cases of married debtors where the debtor is unable to make the specified
declaration or where the debtors are filing jointly, and the CMI ofboth spouses in these cases is
added for purposes ofdetermining standing under § 707(b)(7).
Part III of the fonn provides for the comparison of the debtor's CMI for purposes of
§ 707(b)(7) to the applicable state median income. It then directs debtors whose income does not
exceed the applicable median to verify the form and check the "no presumption" box at the
beginning of the form, but not to complete the remaining parts of the form. Debtors whose CMI
does exceed the applicable state median are required to complete the remaining parts ofthe form.
Part N of the fonn provides for an adjustment to the CMI of a married debtor, not filing
jointly, whose spouse's CMI was included with the debtor's for purposes ofdetermining standing
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to assert the means test presumption. The means test itselfdoes not charge a married debtor in a
non-joint case with the income of the non-filing spouse, but rather only with contributions made
by that spouse to the household expenses of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, as provided
in the definition of CMI in § 101 (lOA). Accordingly, Part N calls for the combined CMI total of
Part II to be reduced by the amount of the non-filing spouse's income that was not contributed to
the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents.
Part V of the form provides for a calculation of allowed deductions from the debtor's
CMI, as described above.
Part VI provides for a determination of whether the debtor's CMI, less the allowed
deductions, gives rise to a presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2)(A). Depending on the
outcome of this determination, the debtor is directed to check the appropriate box at the
beginning of the form and to sign the verification in Part VITI. Part VII allows the debtor to
claim additional deductions, as discussed above.
2.

Chapter II

The Chapter II form is the simplest of the three, since the means-test deductions of
§ 707(b)(2) are not employed in detennining the extent of an individual Chapter 11 debtor's
disposable income. Rather, § 1129(a)(15) requires payments ofdisposable income "as defined in
section I325(b)(2)," and that paragraph allows calculation ofdisposable income under
judicially-determined standards, rather than pursuant to the means test deductions, specified for
higher income Chapter 13 debtors by § I325(b)(3). However, § 1325(b)(2) does require that
CMI be used as the starting point in the judicial determination ofdisposable income, and so the
Chapter 11 form requires this calculation (in Part I of the form), as described above, together
with a verification (in Part II).
3.

Chapter 13

Like the Chapter 7 form, the form for Chapter 13 debtors contains a number ofspecial
provisions. Because § I325(b)(3) employs the means test deductions for debtors whose CMI
exceeds the applicable state median income, the upper right comer of the first page includes
check boxes requiring the debtor to state whether § 132S(b)(3) applies, thus quickly informing
standing trustees and other interested parties of the need to consider these deductions.
Part I ofthe form is the calculation of CMI, as described above.
Part II ofthe form compares the debtor's CMI to the applicable state median, allowing the
determination of the applicability of the means-test deductions required by § 1325(b)(3).
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Part III provides for calculation of the means-test deductions provided in § 707(b)(2),
described above, as incorporated by § 1325(b)(3) for debtors with CMI above the applicable state
median.
Part IV provides for three adjustments required by special provisions affecting disposable
income. First, § 1325(b)(2) itselfexcludes from CM! in the detennination ofdisposable income
certain "child support payments, foster care payments, [and] disability payments for a dependent
child[.]" Because payments of this kind are included in the definition ofCMI in § 101(10A), a
line entry for deduction of these payments is provided. Second, a line entry is provided for
deduction ofcontributions by the debtor to certain retirement plans, listed in § 541 (b)(7)(B),
since that provision states that such contributions "shall not constitute disposable income, as
defined in section 1325(b)(2)[.]" Third, the same line entry also allows a deduction from
disposable income for payments on loans from retirement accounts that are excepted from the
automatic stay by § 362(b)(19), since § 1322(f) provides that for a ''loan described in section
362(b)(19) ... any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute 'disposable income'
under section 1325."
The Chapter 13 form does not provide a deduction from disposable income for the
Chapter 13 debtor's anticipated attorney fees. There is no specific statutory allowance for such a
deduction, and none appears necessary. Section 1325(b)(l)(B) requires that disposable income
contributed to a Chapter 13 plan be used to pay "unsecured creditors:' A debtor's attorney who
has not taken a security interest in the debtor's property is an unsecured creditor who may be paid
from disposable income.
Part V ofthe form allows the debtor to claim additional deductions, as described above,
and Part VI is the verification.
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Internal "Revenue Service IRS.go,'
DEPUflHtH Of THE THASURY

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Transportation"

I

Ownership Costs

I

First Car

National

a
~

I
I
I

II

$475

II
II

Second Car

$338

Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs
Region

No Car

Northeast Region

$230

New York

$302

Philadelphia

$236

Boston

II

II
II

One Car

I

Two Cars

$298

$393

$384

$479

$298

$392

$259

$284

$380

$286

$380

$251

$345

$329

$422

$312

$376

$469

$212

$247

$276

$303

$397

Cleveland

$198

$293

$387

Cincinnati

$222

$272

$365

St. Louis

$203

$287

$383

Kansas City

$246

$291

$197

$242

$289
$225

$313

Pittsburgh

II

$161

Midwest Region

II

$194

Chicago
Detroit
Milwaukee
Minneapolis-St. Paul

South Region
Washington, D.C.
Baltimore

II

II
II
II

II
II
IIII

$257

I
I
I

$240
II

I

II
II
II

IIII

$341

$384
$336
$407
$334

I
I

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation

I

Atlanta

$283

Miami

$284

Tampa

$255

Dallas-Ft. Worth

$309

Houston

$281

I
I

West Region
Los Angeles
San Francisco

II

II

II
II

$439

II
II

I

$265

$359

$332

$425

$399

$275

$353

$448

$317

$373

$466

$318

$415

II

$189

Seattle

II
II

$258
$295

Denver

II

$462

Portland

Phoenix

$351

$305

$311

II
II
II

1\

$344

$367

II

Anchorage

$258

$246

San Diego

Honolulu

a

I

II

$312

I

$246

$339

II

$335

$427

II
II

$314

$409

$336

$273

II

$326

$302

II

$351

II

II
II

I
I
I

$431
$420
$442

Q1
!

0

• Does not include personal property taxes. (effective January 1, 2005)

For Use with Allowable Transportation Expenses Table
The Operating Costs and Public Transportation Costs sections of the Transportation
Standards are provided by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
following table fists the states that comprise each Census Region. Once the taxpayer's
Census Region has been ascertained, to determine if an MSA standard is applicable, use the
definitions below to see if the taxpayer lives within an MSA (MSAs are defined by county and
city, where applicable). If the taxpayer does not reside in an MSA, use the regional standard.

Northeast Census Region

I

Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey

IMSA

r~. Ya<k

I COUNTIES

IIh1l

I
I

Bronx. O"""ess, Klnss. N....u. New Yori<. 0""'00. Putnam,

~ Queens, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Westchester

~I

I

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation

inNJ: Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth,
Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, Union, Warren

~

Fairfield, Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven

CT:

I~A:

Philadelphia

Ilpike

[;J

Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, Philadelphia

I

PA:

inNJ: Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester,
Salem

I~E:

IINewcastle

I~D: II

Boston

gJ

Bristol, Essex, Hampden, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Suffolk,
Worcester

~

Hillsborough. Merrimack, Rockingham, Strafford

MA:

a

cecii

I

I

NH:

I~T:

Ql
I-'

IIVflndham

IkJlvork
ME:

Pittsburgh

[;J

Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland

I
I

PA:

Midwest Census Region
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa

IMSA
Chicago

I

Detroit

IICOUNTIES (unless otherwise specified)
[[]lCOOk, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake,
/L: McHenry, Will

I~~:

I

I~:

jlKenosha

Lake, Porter

I
I

I

I
I

1\;JIGenesee, Lapeer, Lenawee, Livingston, Macomb, Monroe, Oakland, I
M/: St. Clair, Washtenaw, Wayne

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation

\Milwaukee
MinneapolisSt. Paul

\r;J
~

Anoka, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Isanti, Ramsey, Scott,
MN: Sherburne, Washington, Wright

I~:

I

Cleveland
Cincinnati

Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Racine, Washington, Waukesha

Ilpierce, St. Croix

I~
~

Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, Medina, Portage,
Summit

I
I

Brown, Butler, Clermont, Hamilton, Warren

OH:

[&J

Boone, Campbell, Gallatin, Grant, Kenton, Pendleton

I~~:

Dearborn, Ohio

KY:

I

D~
[]

Crawford, Franklin, Jefferson, Lincoln, St. Charles, St. Louis,
MO: Warren, St. Louis city

a
C1

I

Clinton, Jersey, Madison, Monroe, St.Clair

IL:

Kansas City

~

Cass, Clay, Clinton, Jackson, Lafayette, Platte, Ray

MO:

~

I~s:

IIJOhnSOn, Leavenworth, Miami, Wyandotte

I

South Census Region
Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia,
Vrrginia, Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama

IMSA

II COUNTIES (unless otherwise specified)

Washington,
D.C.

I~c:

I

~

District of Columbia

I
I

Calvert, Charles, Frederick, Montgomery, Prince George's,
MD: Washington

CJ
VA:

Arlington, Clarke, CUlpepper, Fairfax, Fauquier, King George,
Loudoun, Prince William, Spotsylvania, Stafford, Warren, Alexandria
city, Fairfax city, Falls Church city, Fredericksburg city, Manassas
city, Manassas Park city

Fliserkeley, Jefferson

I

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation

I

I

Baltimore

I~I

I~

LJEJ
GA:

IMiami

ITampa
Dallas-Ft.
IIWorth

I

Houston

II~L:

I
Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Carroll, Harford, Howard, Queen Anne's,
Baltimore city
Barrow, Bartow, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb,
Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Newton,
Paulding, Pickens, Rockdale, Spalding, Walton

Iisroward, Miami-Dade

1r€J
IrfJ
IrfJ

Hernando, Hillsborough, Pasco, Pinellas
Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hood, Hunt, Johnson,
Kaufman, Parker, Rockwall, Tarrant
Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Send, Galveston, Harris, Liberty,
Montgomery, Waller

West Census Region:

c
Q1

CA:l

New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, California, Alaska, Hawaii

IMSA

I

IlcOUNTIES (unless otherwise specified)

I
I

II;n CA: IlloS Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino, Ventura
I
San Francisco Il;n CA: IIAlameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo,
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma
Isan Diego
lIin CA: Iisan Diego
I

Ilos Angeles

L : J 1 ; n OR:

~~IaCkamas,
Yamhill

ISeattle
IHonolulu
IAnchorage

IPhoenix

IDenver

ColumbIa, Manon, Muffnomah, Polk, Washington,

I

lin WA: ~Clark
I
Ilin WA: ~Island, King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, Thurston
II in HI: II Honolulu
II in AK: IlAnchorage borough
Ilin AZ: !IMaricopa, Pinal
Ilin CO: !IAdams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, Jefferson, Weld
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Income - Median Family Income by Number of Earners in Family
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I"COme

I Income Home

Overview

Reports

Definitions

Related Topics
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Micro Data Access

Income - Median Family Income by Number of Earners in Family
MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2003 INFLATIONMADJUSTED DOLLARS) BY NUMBER OF
EARNERS IN FAMILY
Median Family Income (dollars)
Geography
10

State

Table 10

Line
Number

Line Description

I

c
en
en

90Mpercent confidence
interval
Estimate
Upper
Lower
Bound
Bound

04000US01
04000US01
04000US01
04000US01
04000US01
04000US02
04000US02
04000US02
04000US02

Alabama
Alabama
Alabama
Alabama
Alabama
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska
Alaska

819121
819121
619121
819121
819121
619121
819121
819121
819121

1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

43307
18730
32060
57484
74346
61117
28484
40479
71030

42168
17296
31140
55267
67515
59519
26835
35566
69009

04000US02
04000US04
04000US04
04000US04
04000US04
04000US04
04000US05
04000US05

Alaska
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Arkansas
Arkansas

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
B19121
819121
819121

5
1
2
3
4
5
1

3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)

95755
47219
29070
32090
63682
78842
41072
21033

87510104000
45844
48594
27806
30334
31230
32950
61489
65875
75844
81840
40355
41789
19449
22617

2

44446
20164
32980
59701
81177
62715
30133
45392
73051

FAQ
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Income - Median Family Income by Number of Earners in Family

Q
01

0)

04000US05
04000US05
04000US05
04000US06
04000US06
04000US06
04000US06
04000US06
04000US08
04000US08
04000US08
04000US08
04000US08
04000US09
04000US09
04000US09
04000US09

Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas
California
California
California
California
California
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Colorado
Connecticut
Connecticut
Connecticut
Connecticut

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

04000US09
04000US10
04000US10
04000US10
04000US10
04000US10
04000US11
04000US11
04000US11
04000US11
04000US11
04000US12
04000US12
04000US12
04000US12
04000US12
04000US13
04000US13

Connecticut
Delaware
Delaware
Delaware
Delaware
Delaware
District of Columbia
District of Columbia
District of Columbia
District of Columbia
District of Columbia
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Georgia

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

1
2
3
4

1 eamer (dollars)
2 eamers (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

30765
51356
68645
56530
24933
40167
72610
84664
59252
27577
39562
69362
86917
69917
30441
46467
83449

29703
49370
63292
55804
23873
39331
71516
82622
55104
22110
36890
65031
83857
67631
27591
43961
81198

5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2

3 or more eamers (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 eamer (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)

97711
61270
36911
41825
74721
90595
50243
10298
32039
92679
81870
47442
29532
34847
62195
75688
50647
20767

92618 102804
59319
63221
34584
39238
38619
45031
72113
77329
86759
94431
46885
53601
7177
13419
29598
34480
88015
97343
71477
92263
46460
48424
28366
30698
33762
35932
61125
63265
73504
77872
49907
51387
19474
22060

5

31827
53342
73998
57256
25993
41003
73704
86706
63400
33044
42234
73693
89977
72203
33291
48973
85700

Income - Median Family Income by Number of Earners in Family

Q

en

...:J

04000US13
04000US13
04000US13
04000US15
04000US15
04000US15
04000US15

Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii
Hawaii

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

3
4
5
1
2
3
4

1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

33117
65488
80084
60647
31130
41778
71158

31739
64054
77210
58387
29184
40222
68674

04000US15
04000US16
04000US16
04000US16
04000US16
04000US16
04000US17
04000US17
04000US17
04000US17
04000US17
04000US18
04000US18
04000US18
04000US18
04000US18
04000US19
04000US19
04000US19
04000US19
04000US19
04000US20
04000US20
04000US20
04000US20
04000US20
04000US21
04000US21

Hawaii
Idaho
Idaho
Idaho
Idaho
Idaho
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Iowa
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kansas
Kentucky
Kentucky

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2

3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)

96967
46783
28552
34331
53252
65776
57385
25115
39407
71054
87032
51338
27086
35764
62967
77261
51336
28019
33697
60055
74822
51157
26750
36298
59874
76760
41898
18138

90566 103368
44656
48910
25877
31227
32029
36633
51393
55111
61971
69581
56029
58741
23880
26350
38152
40662
69250
72858
84539
89525
50620
52056
25751
28421
34843
36685
61416
64518
75022
79500
49769
52903
26102
29936
31801
35593
58481
61629
69956
79688
50076
52238
24716
28784
34128
38468
58066
61682
73688
79832
40559
43237
16243
20033

34495
66922
82958
62907
33076
43334
73642

Income - Median Family Income by Number of Eamers in Family

.

Q

Q1

00

04000US21
04000US21
04000US21
04000US22
04000US22
04000US22
04000US22
04000US22
04000US23
04000US23
04000US23
04000US23
04000US23
04000US24
04000US24
04000US24
04000US24

Kentucky
Kentucky
Kentucky
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Maine
Maine
Maine
Maine
Maine
Maryland
Maryland
Maryland
Maryland

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

31166
55744
75318
41831
17123
29373
60463
74745
48541
25191
34560
58767
71201
69087
28544
45073
83956

04000US24
04000US25
04000US25
04000US25
04000US25

Maryland
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachusetts
Massachusetts

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

5
1
2
3
4

3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

103037
67527
22908
45625
81663

04000US25
04000US26
04000US26
04000US26
04000US26
04000US26
04000US27
04000US27
04000US27
04000US27
04000US27
04000US28

Massachusetts
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Michigan
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Minnesota
Mississippi

819121
819121
819121
819121 .
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5

3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:

103144100969
105319
55018
54160
55876
28086
27012
29160
39681
38870
40492
68092
66935
69249
87639
85353
89925
61417
60001
62833
29489
26327
32651
40864
38789
42939
70330
68636
72024
87106
84364
89848
39182
37991
40373

1

29841
54271
71542
40579
16010
27557
59244
71930
47241
22076
32299
57272
66297
66176
26123
42377
81805

32491
57217
79094
43083
18236
31189
61682
77560
49841
28306
36821
60262
76105
71998
30965
47769
86107

99797 106277
66145
68909
21052
24764
43599
47651
80289
83037
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C':l
en

co

04000US28
04000US28
04000US28
04000US28
04000US29
04000US29
04000US29
04000US29
04000US29
04000US30
04000US30
04000US30
04000US30
04000US30
04000US31
04000US31
04000US31
04000US31
04000US31
04000US32
04000US32
04000US32
04000US32
04000US32
04000US33
04000US33
04000US33
04000US33
04000US33
04000US34
04000US34
04000US34
04000US34

Mississippi
Mississippi
Mississippi
Mississippi
Missouri
Missouri
Missouri
Missouri
Missouri
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Montana
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nebraska
Nevada
Nevada
Nevada
Nevada
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey
New Jersey

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners {dollars}
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)

04000US34
04000US35

New Jersey
New Mexico

819121
819121

5
1

3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:

16773
26534
53676
68111
49441
26653
33969
61373
78933
44503
28482
30259
52075
64438
50756
26588
34138
58424
72357
52502
26134
35773
67971
82839
63439
27059
42669
72755
92826
70263
29974
50963
85379

15621
25429
52328
64382
48128
25672
31781
60276
75096
42838
26156
28957
49975
60563
49577
25414
31384
56564
68623
50672
23010
33684
64348
74225
61450
24325
39870
70494
88064
69169
28308
49641
83659

17925
27639
55024
71840
50754
27634
36157
62470
82770
46168
30808
31561
54175
68313
51935
27762
36892
60284
76091
54332
29258
37862
71594
91453
65428
29793
45468
75016
97588
71357
31640
52285
87099

103128100398
105858
41661
39674
43648
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a
0)

0

04000US35
04000US35
04000US35
04000US35
04000US36
04000US36
04000US36
04000US36
04000US36
04000US37
04000US37
04000US37
04000US37
04000US37
04000US38
04000US38
04000US38
04000US38
04000US38
04000US39
04000US39
04000US39
04000US39
04000US39
04000US40
04000US40
04000US40
04000US40
04000US40
04000US41
04000US41
04000US41
04000US41
04000US41
04000US42
04000US42

New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
NewYork
New York
New York
New York
New York
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Dakota
North Dakota
North Dakota
North Dakota
North Dakota
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Oklahoma
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2

No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)

24094
27543
53629
72547
55309
22193
38718
72064
93617
45540
22102
31730
59807
74205
48386
21531
32496
55682
74256
51522
25798
36010
64289
81088
43259
21421
30994
56631
74409
49800
27080
34999
60883
77097
51339
24535

20590
25404
50831
64971
54546
21399
37671
71050
91648
44209
20690
30879
58011
71265
46010
20036
30414
54528
71262
50668
24901
35107
63076
78258
41783
19942
29691
55098
71275
48401
25273
32378
59907
74544
50688
23743

27598
29682
56427
80123
56072
22987
39765
73078
95586
46871
23514
32581
61603
77145
50762
23026
34578
56836
77250
52376
26695
36913
65502
83918
44735
22900
32297
58164
77543
51199
28887
37620
61859
79650
51990
25327
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a
C)
~

04000US42
04000US42
04000US42
04000US44
04000US44
04000US44
04000US44
04000US44
04000US45
04000US45
04000US45
04000US45
04000US45
04000US46
04000US46
04000US46
04000US46
04000US46
04000US47
04000US47
04000US47
04000US47
04000US47
04000US48
04000US48
04000US48
04000US48
04000US48
04000US49
04000US49
04000US49
04000US49
04000US49
04000US50
04000US50
04000US50

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Rhode Island
Rhode Island
Rhode Island
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Carolina
South Dakota
South Dakota
South Dakota
South Dakota
South Dakota
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Tennessee
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Vermont
Vermont
Vermont

819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121
819121

3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4

5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3

1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)
2 earners (dollars)
3 or more earners (dollars)
Total:
No earners (dollars)
1 earner (dollars)

37553
64661
82485
60165
20389
40389
72026
94013
47081
25385
32068
60408
77172
46824
25579
32423
53967
68788
46654
22105
32434
58778
80756
47479
21107
31550
62047
74430
52481
31726
39371
57347
83556
52895
23932
33255

36499
63661
80456
58020
18549
38356
70362
90615
45815
22796
30527
58941
72814
45351
23330
31115
52274
65293
45533
20785
31207
57134
77902
46609
20082
30937
60978
72559
50919
26815
36579
55525
80761
51435
22050
29630

38607
65661
84514
62310
22229
42422
73690
97411
48347
27974
33609
61875
81530
48297
27828
33731
55660
72283
47775
23425
33661
60422
83610
48349
22132
32163
63116
76301
54043
36637
42163
59169
86351
54355
25814
36880
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a
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~

819121
2 earners (dollars)
4
04000US50 Vermont
819121
3 or more earners (dollars)
04000US50 Vermont
5
819121
Total:
1
04000US51 Virginia
819121
No earners (dollars)
04000US51 Virginia
2
819121
1 earner (dollars)
04000US51 Virginia
3
819121
2 earners (dollars)
4
04000US51 Virginia
819121
3 or more earners (dollars)
04000US51 Virginia
5
819121
Total:
1
04000US53 Washington
819121
No earners (dollars)
2
04000US53 Washington
B19121
1 earner (dollars)
04000US53 Washington
3
B19121
2 earners (dollars)
04000US53 Washington
4
819121
3 or more earners (dollars)
5
04000US53 Washington
819121
Total:
04000US54 West Virginia
1
819121
No earners (dollars)
2
04000US54 West Virginia
819121
1 earner (dollars)
04000US54 West Virginia
3
819121
2 earners (dollars)
4
04000US54 West Virginia
3 or more earners (dollars)
819121
04000US54 West Virginia
5
819121
Total:
1
04000US55 Wisconsin
819121
No earners (dollars)
2
04000US55 Wisconsin
819121
1 earner (dollars)
04000US55 Wisconsin
3
2 earners (dollars)
819121
4
04000US55 Wisconsin
3 or more earners (dollars)
819121
5
04000US55 Wisconsin
Total:
819121
1
04000US56 Wyoming
No earners (dollars)
819121
2
04000US56 Wyoming
819121
1 earner (dollars)
04000US56 Wyoming
3
B19121
2 earners (dollars)
4
04000US56 Wyoming
819121
5
3 or more earners (dollars)
04000US56 Wyoming
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey, 2003

60811
79238
60174
28049
41302
71978
88775
56461
34012
42092
69500
87667
38568
20574
31001
56323
71264
54500
28039
37069
63348
78302
51627
27790
36345
60444
71309

58572
75175
59160
25606
40252
70561
85348
54775
31793
40343
67562
81043
36896
18619
29531
53089
67109
52441
25355
35641
61914
74881
49140
25448
34122
57265
68054

63050
83301
61188
30492
42352
73395
92202
58147
36231
43841
71438
94291
40240
22529
32471
59557
75419
56559
30723
38497
64782
81723
54114
30132
38568
63623
74564

Contact the HHES Information area at 301-763-3242 or visit aSk.census.gov for further information on Income Data.
Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division
Last Revised: June 08, 2005
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Median Family Income (dollars)
Geography 10

State

Table 10

Line
Number

Line Description
Estimate

Q

gO-percent
confidence interval
Lower
Bound

en

~

1

Total:

819119

2

Alabama

819119

04000US01

Alabama

04000US01

I

Upper
Bound

4330742168

44446

2-person families

3922737402

41052

3

3-person families

4584944059

47639

819119

4

4-person families

5108248672

53492

Alabama

819119

5

5-person families

4574541671

49819

04000US01

Alabama

819119

6

6-person families

4719338767

55619

04000US01

Alabama

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4832623994

72658

04000US02

Alaska

819119

1

Total:

6111759519

62715

04000US02

Alaska

819119

2

2-person families

5907055594

62546

04000US02

Alaska

819119

3

3-person families

5813754426

61848

04000US01

Alabama

819119

04000US01

Alabama

04000US01

Income - Median Family Income by Family Size and State

04000US02

Alaska

819119

4

4-person families

6600963320

68698

04000US02

Alaska

819119

5

5-person families

6346057254

69666

04000US02

Alaska

819119

6

6-person families

6067734288

87066

04000US02

Alaska

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6995231404

04000US04

Arizona

819119

1

Total:

4721945844

48594

04000US04

Arizona

819119

2

2-person families

4407942080

46078

04000US04

Arizona

819119

3

3-person families

4803045069

50991

04000US04

Arizona

819119

4

4-person families

5140049307

53493

04000US04

Arizona

819119

5

5-person families

5143644680

58192

04000US04

Arizona

819119

6

6-person families

5710447211

66997

04000US04

Arizona

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5607044848

67292

04000US05

Arkansas

819119

1

Total:

4107240355

41789

04000US05

Arkansas

819119

2

2-person families

3814136820

39462

04000US05

Arkansas

B19119

3

3-person families

4305338909

47197

04000US05

Arkansas

819119

4

4-person families

4961346206

53020

04000US05

Arkansas

819119

5

5-person families

4586137481

54241

04000US05

Arkansas

B19119

6

6-person families

3369429735

37653

04000US05

Arkansas

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5171238347

65077

04000US06

California

819119

1

Total:

5653055804

57256

04000US06

California

819119

2

2-person families

5228051379

53181

04000US06

California

819119

3

3-person families

5852056964

60076

C':l
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n
en
en

04000US06

California

819119

4

4-person families

6291661101

64731

04000US06

California

819119

5

5-person families

5557953063

58095

04000US06

California

819119

6

6-person families

5371051184

56236

04000US06

California

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5897056183

61757

04000US08

Colorado

819119

1

Total:

5925255104

63400

04000US08

Colorado

819119

2

2-person families

5360949180

58038

04000US08

Colorado

819119

3

3-person families

6063957249

64029

04000US08

Colorado

819119

4

4-person families

6748761727

73247

04000US08

Colorado

819119

5

5-person families

6129653531

69061

04000US08

Colorado

819119

6

6-person families

6161955822

67416

04000US08

Colorado

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7112962264

79994

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

1

Total:

6991767631

72203

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

2

2-person families

5838655192

61580

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

3

3-person families

7380569971

77639

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

4

4-person families

7959976187

83011

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

5

5-person families

8594477920

93968

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

6

6-person families

7365745504

101810

04000US09

Connecticut

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

8570070144

101256

04000US10

Delaware

819119

1

Total:

6127059319

63221

04000US10

Delaware

819119

2

2-person families

5282950096

55562

04000US10

Delaware

819119

3

3-person families

6221356925

67501

Income - Median Family Income by Family Size and State

04000US10

Delaware

819119

4

4-person families

7484969870

79828

04000US10

Delaware

819119

5

5-person families

7144966449

76449

04000US10

Delaware

819119

6

6-person families

7235162721

81981

04000US10

Delaware

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6287831019

94737

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

1

Total:

5024346885

53601

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

2

2-person families

5391350674

57152

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

3

3-person families

4359238254

48930

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

4

4-person families

5058842495

58681

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

5

5-person families

4437531241

57509

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

6

6-person families

5150724286

78728

04000US11

District of Columbia

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4458318283

70883

04000US12

Florida

819119

1

Total:

4744246460

48424

04000US12

Florida

819119

2

2-person families

4248841382

43594

04000US12

Florida

819119

3

3-person families

4829446667

49921

04000US12

Florida

819119

4

4-person families

5616354683

57643

04000US12

Florida

819119

5

5-person families

5576352537

58989

04000US12

Florida

819119

6

6-person families

5512251589

58655

04000US12

Florida

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5872352315

65131

04000US13

Georgia

819119

1

Total:

5064749907

51387

04000US13

Georgia

819119

2

2-person families

4513543430

46840

04000US13

Georgia

819119

3

3-person families

5019548081

52309

C
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0)

04000US13

Georgia

819119

4

4-person families

5667453960

59388

04000US13

Georgia

819119

5

5-person families

6060456674

64534

04000US13

Georgia

819119

6

6-person families

5393947977

59901

04000US13

Georgia

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

48117 42254

53980

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

1

Total:

6064758387

62907

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

2

2-person families

5185548395

55315

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

3

3-person families

6317958218

68140

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

4

4-person families

6913365984

72282

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

5

5-person families

6923463272

75196

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

6

6-person families

6662846742

86514

04000US15

Hawaii

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

04000US16

Idaho

819119

1

Total:

4678344656

48910

04000US16

Idaho

819119

2

2-person families

4247740868

44086

04000US16

Idaho

819119

3

3-person families

4716243081

51243

04000US16

Idaho

819119

4

4-person families

5172248932

54512

04000US16

Idaho

819119

5

5-person families

5340350974

55832

04000US16

Idaho

819119

6

6-person families

5611450156

62072

04000US16

Idaho

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4943830612

68264

04000US17

Illinois

819119

1

Total:

5738556029

58741

04000US17

Illinois

819119

2

2-person families

4985548290

51420

04000US17

Illinois

819119

3

3-person families

5798756124

59850

10116274994

127330

CD
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04000US17

Illinois

819119

4

4-person families

6914166676

71606

04000US17

Illinois

819119

5

5-person families

6768762478

72896

04000US17

Illinois

819119

6

6-person families

6075054256

67244

04000US17

Illinois

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6423351852

76614

04000US18

Indiana

819119

1

Total:

5133850620

52056

04000US18

Indiana

819119

2

2-person families

4503643815

46257

04000US18

Indiana

819119

3

3-person families

5484852723

56973

04000US18

Indiana

819119

4

4-person families

5978157336

62226

04000US18

Indiana

819119

5

5-person families

5706353008

61118

04000US18

Indiana

819119

6

6-person families

5711553347

60883

04000US18

Indiana

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5847144465

72477

04000US19

Iowa

819119

1

Total:

5133649769

52903

04000US19

Iowa

819119

2

2-person families

4538643064

47708

04000US19

Iowa

819119

3

3-person families

5336650040

56692

04000US19

Iowa

819119

4

4-person families

5900155904

62098

04000US19

Iowa

819119

5

5-person families

5793353423

62443

04000US19

Iowa

819119

6

6-person families

5915256548

61756

04000US19

Iowa

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7172049104

94336

04000US20

Kansas

819119

1

Total:

5115750076

52238

04000US20

Kansas

819119

2

2-person families

4457843246

45910

04000US20

Kansas

819119

3

3-person families

5200349915

54091

CD
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04000US20

Kansas

819119

4

4-person families

5948456222

62746

04000US20

Kansas

819119

5

5-person families

6124057706

64774

04000US20

Kansas

819119

6

6-person families

6135848803

73913

04000US20

Kansas

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5720535199

79211

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

1

Total:

4189840559

43237

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

2

2-person families

3746635751

39181

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

3

3-person families

4332540759

45891

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

4

4-person families

4774244131

51353

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

5

5-person families

5157248715

54429

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

6

6-person families

4992635606

64246

04000US21

Kentucky

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5032733032

67622

04000US22

Louisiana

819119

1

Total:

4183140579

43083

04000US22

Louisiana

819119

2

2-person families

3832736345

40309

04000US22

Louisiana

819119

3

3-person families

4018537791

42579

04000US22

Louisiana

819119

4

4-person families

5132548785

53865

Q4000US22

Louisiana

819119

5

5-person families

4860744554

52660

Q4000US22

Louisiana

819119

6

6-person families

4227030140

54400

04000US22

Louisiana

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4708036409

57751

04000US23

Maine

819119

1

Total:

4854147241

49841

04000US23

Maine

819119

2

2-person families

4258140771

44391

04000US23

Maine

819119

3

3-person families

5388251381

56383

0
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04000US23

Maine

819119

4

4-person families

5619654260

58132

04000US23

Maine

819119

5

5-person families

5224341357

63129

04000US23

Maine

819119

6

6-person families

6154650481

72611

04000US23

Maine

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6131944915

77723

04000US24

Maryland

819119

1

Total:

6908766176

71998

04000US24

Maryland

819119

2

2-person families

58077 55258

60896

04000US24

Maryland

819119

3

3-person families

6854064013

73067

04000US24

Maryland

819119

4

4-person families

8515682011

88301

04000US24

Maryland

819119

5

5-person families

7540568991

81819

04000US24

Maryland

819119

6

6-person families

7789373641

82145

04000US24

Maryland

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

8320371914

94492

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

1

Total:

6752766145

68909

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

2

2-person families

5281651052

54580

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

3

3-person families

6711264891

69333

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

4

4-person families

8378180993

86569

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

5

5-person families

8659283068

90116

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

6

6-person families

8818080213

96147

04000US25

Massachusetts

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

8384663054

04000US26

Michigan

819119

1

Total:

5501854160

55876

04000US26

Michigan

819119

2

2-person families

4711045868

48352

04000US26

Michigan

819119

3

3-person families

5687154960

58782
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04000US26

Michigan

819119

4

4-person families

6509363236

66950

04000US26

Michigan

819119

5

5-person families

6604763345

68749

04000US26

Michigan

819119

6

6-person families

6853662450

74622

04000US26

Michigan

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5509650867

59325

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

1

Total:

6141760001

62833

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

2

2-person families

5292249756

56088

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

3

3-person families

6400562316

65694

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

4

4-person families

7329070177

76403

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

5

5-person families

6767164442

70900

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

6

6-person families

6789860557

75239

04000US27

Minnesota

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6592753072

78782

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

1

Total:

3918237991

40373

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

2

2-person families

3606834743

37393

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

3

3-person families

3931736842

41792

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

4

4-person families

4739844461

50335

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

5

5-person families

4125239109

43395

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

6

6-person families

4122438187

44261

04000US28

Mississippi

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4065726455

54859

04000US29

Missouri

819119

1

Total:

4944148128

50754

04000US29

Missouri

819119

2

2-person families

4443742309

46565

04000US29

Missouri

819119

3

3-person families

4913447044

51224
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04000US29

Missouri

819119

4

4-person families

6052858362

62694

04000US29

Missouri

819119

5

5-person families

5606552365

59765

04000US29

Missouri

819119

6

6-person families

6007745725

74429

04000US29

Missouri

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4676334428

59098

04000US30

Montana

819119

1

Total:

4450342838

46168

04000US30

Montana

819119

2

2-person families

4112539304

42946

04000US30

Montana

819119

3

3-person families

4463540833

48437

04000US30

Montana

819119

4

4-person families

5437251218

57526

04000US30

Montana

819119

5

5-person families

4752242545

52499

04000US30

Montana

819119

6

6-person families

4705340128

53978

04000US30

Montana

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

3741228648

46176

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

1

Total:

5075649577

51935

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

2

2-person families

4565844341

46975

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

3

3-person families

5507951647

58511

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

4

4-person families

5781454575

61053

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

5

5-person families

5411651008

57224

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

6

6-person families

6029750631

69963

04000US31

Nebraska

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5464538537

70753

04000US32

Nevada

819119

1

Total:

5250250672

54332

04000US32

Nevada

819119

2

2-person families

4679644359

49233

04000US32

Nevada

819119

3

3-person families

5313949450

56828
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04000US32

Nevada

819119

4

4-person families

6544261619

69265

04000US32

Nevada

819119

5

5-person families

5011946568

53670

04000US32

Nevada

819119

6

6-person families

5924042262

76218

04000US32

Nevada

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5201333449

70577

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

1

Total:

6343961450

65428

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

2

2-person families

5310050797

55403

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

3

3-person families

6530760996

69618

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

4

4-person families

7599472034

79954

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

5

5-person families

8573178226

93236

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

6

6-person families

8011366041

94185

04000US33

New Hampshire

819119

7

7-or-mare-person families

9546373567

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

1

Total:

7026369169

71357

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

2

2-person families

5672254876

58568

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

3

3-person families

7148169123

73839

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

4

4-person families

8348280482

86482

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

5

5-person families

8732281751

92893

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

6

6-person families

7977372729

86817

04000US34

New Jersey

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7222257901

86543

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

1

Total:

4166139674

43648

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

2

2-person families

4061238605

42619

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

3

3-person families

4040037060

43740
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04000US35

New Mexico

819119

4

4-person families

4530843170

47446

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

5

5-person families

4376837327

50209

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

6

6-person families

4138924844

57934

04000US35

New Mexico

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4474230981

58503

04000US36

New York

819119

1

Total:

5530954546

56072

04000US36

New York

819119

2

2-person families

4712346020

48226

04000US36

New York

819119

3

3-person families

5513353649

56617

04000US36

New York

819119

4

4-person families

6620664557

67855

04000US36

New York

819119

5

5-person families

6783364692

70974

04000US36

New York

819119

6

6-person families

6470559591

69819

04000US36

New York

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

6110053996

68204

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

1

Total:

4554044209

46871

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

2

2-person families

4118439898

42470

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

3

3-person families

4531043584

47036

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

4

4-person families

5800055981

60019

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

5

5-person families

4713141418

52844

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

6

6-person families

4779738385

57209

04000US37

North Carolina

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4099636572

45420

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

1

Total:

4838646010

50762

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

2

2-person families

4270441015

44393

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

3

3-person families

5109346886

55300
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04000US38

North Dakota

819119

4

4-person families

5665252244

61060

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

5

5-person families

5932054954

63686

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

6

6-person families

5136536323

66407

04000US38

North Dakota

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7526067018

83502

04000US39

Ohio

819119

1

Total:

5152250668

52376

04000US39

Ohio

819119

2

2-person families

4302741907

44147

04000US39

Ohio

819119

3

3-person families

5403851840

56236

04000US39

Ohio

819119

4

4-person families

6264261099

64185

04000US39

Ohio

819119

5

5-person families

6329460190

66398

04000US39

Ohio

819119

6

6-person families

6184655473

68219

04000US39

Ohio

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5531849266

61370

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

1

Total:

4325941783

44735

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

2

2-person families

4124439506

42982

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

3

3-person families

4189539780

44010

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

4

4-person families

4922446733

51715

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

5

5-person families

4514940529

49769

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

6

6-person families

4642338758

54088

04000US40

Oklahoma

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5647428665

84283

04000US41

Oregon

819119

1

Total:

4980048401

51199

04000US41

Oregon

819119

2

2-person families

4415542462

45848

04000US41

Oregon

819119

3

3-person families

5354651317

55775
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04000US41

Oregon

819119

4

4-person families

5949055609

63371

04000US41

Oregon

819119

5

5-person families

5180348396

55210

04000US41

Oregon

819119

6

6-person families

5257949688

55470

04000US41

Oregon

819119

7

7-or-mare-person families

6055852637

68479

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

1

Total:

5133950688

51990

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

2

2-person families

4391542954

44876

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

3

3-person families

5500653403

56609

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

4

4-person families

6290161223

64579

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

5

5-person families

6181459080

64548

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

6

6-person families

5499751352

58642

04000US42

Pennsylvania

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5262244121

61123

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

1

Total:

6016558020

62310

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

2

2-person families

5113149418

52844

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

3

3''Person families

6362157828

69414

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

4

4-person families

7203268469

75595

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

5

5-person families

6954964200

74898

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

6

6-person families

7591061036

90784

04000US44

Rhode Island

819119

7

7-or-mare-person families

9187936244

04000US45

South Carolina

819119

1

Total:

4708145815

48347

04000US45

South Carolina

819119

2

2-person families

4356940609

46529

04000US45

South Carolina

819119

3

3-person families

4377040370

47170

147514
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04000US45

South Carolina

819119

4

4-person families

5741054505

60315

04000US45

South Carolina

819119

5

5-person families

5952454426

64622

04000US45

South Carolina

819119

6

6-person families

5651239805

73219

040OOUS45

South Carolina

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

3814732776

43518

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

1

Total:

4682445351

48297

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

2

2-person families

4188040919

42841

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

3

3-person families

4706644592

49540

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

4

4-person families

5559552710

58480

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

5

5-person families

5897453419

64529

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

6

6-person families

5773254212

61252

04000US46

South Dakota

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4623519384

73086

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

1

Total:

4665445533

47775

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

2

2-person families

4136540018

42712

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

3

3-person families

4964246004

53280

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

4

4-person families

5487152937

56805

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

5

5-person families

5963655186

64086

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

6

6-person families

5161442607

60621

04000US47

Tennessee

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5852344096

72950

04000US48

Texas

819119

1

Total:

4747946609

48349

04000US48

Texas

819119

2

2-person families

4435743260

45454

04000US48

Texas

819119

3

3-person families

4850246261

50743
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04000US48

Texas

819119

4

4-person families

5218251024

53340

04000US48

Texas

819119

5

5-person families

4783344764

50882

04000US48

Texas

819119

6

6-person families

4538342233

48533

04000US46

Texas

819119

7

7-or-mare-person families

4503939888

50190

04000US49

Utah

819119

1

Total:

5248150919

54043

04000US49

Utah

819119

2

2-person families

4389541819

45971

04000US49

Utah

819119

3

3-person families

5408948114

60064

04000US49

Utah

819119

4

4-person families

5710354452

59754

04000US49

Utah

819119

5

5-person families

6271556327

69103

04000US49

Utah

819119

6

6-person families

5857250443

66701

04000US49

Utah

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7805566053

90057

04000US50

Vermont

819119

1

Total:

5289551435

54355

04000US50

Vermont

819119

2

2-person families

4528343556

47010

04000US50

Vermont

819119

3

3-person families

5376550627

56903

040DOUS50

Vermont

819119

4

4-person families

6475861795

67721

04000US50

Vermont

B19119

5

5-person families

6320354658

71548

04000US50

Vermont

819119

6

6-person families

6051551966

69064

04000US50

Vermont

B19119

7

7-or-mare-person families

7580964630

86988

04000US51

Virginia

B19119

1

Total:

6017459160

61188

04000US51

Virginia

B19119

2

2-person families

5321751546

54888

04000US51

Virginia

B19119

3

3-person families

5973057271

62189
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00
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04000US51

Virginia

819119

4

4-person families

7065768064

73250

04000US51

Virginia

819119

5

5-person families

6666063411

69909

04000US51

Virginia

819119

6

6-person families

7712469475

84773

04000US51

Virginia

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

7397559535

88415

04000US53

Washington

819119

1

Total:

5646154775

58147

04000US53

Washington

819119

2

2-person families

5095149285

52617

04000US53

Washington

819119

3

3-person families

5867255979

61365

04000US53

Washington

819119

4

4-person families

6622362966

69480

04000US53

Washington

819119

5

5-person families

58977 56039

61915

04000US53

Washington

819119

6

6-person families

6269544623

80767

04000US53

Washington

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

5495246605

63299

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

1

Total:

3856836896

40240

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

2

2-person families

3345431556

35352

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

3

3-person families

4201237573

46451

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

4

4-person families

5153448271

54797

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

5

5-person families

4557539736

51414

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

6

6-person families

3863919856

57422

04000US54

West Virginia

819119

7

7-or-more-person families

4537225759

64985

04000US55

Wisconsin

819119

1

Total:

5450052441

56559

04000US55

Wisconsin

819119

2

2-person families

4741645488

49344

04000US55

Wisconsin

819119

3

3-person families

5944256936

61948
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04000US55

Wisconsin

B19119

4

4-person families

6394759748

68146

04000US55

Wisconsin

B19119

5

5-person families

6228858236

66340

04000US55

Wisconsin

B19119

6

6-person families

5587848963

62793

04000US55

Wisconsin

B19119

7

7-or-more-person families

5572536583

74867

04000US56

Wyoming

819119

1

Total:

5162749140

54114

04000US56

Wyoming

B19119

2

2-person families

4845544784

52126

04000US56

Wyoming

B19119

3

3-person families

4711043853

50367

04000US56

Wyoming

B19119

4

4-person families

6200558361

65649

04000US56

Wyoming

B19119

5

5-person families

5980156106

63496

04000US56

Wyoming

B19119

6

6-person families

5636945628

67110

4069834494

46902

B19119
Wyoming
7-or-more-person families
04000US56
7
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2003
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Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division
Last Revised: June 08, 2005
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Kentucky - Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Housing and Utilities (effective 1/112005)

Maximum Monthly Allowance

I
o
00
~

County

II

II

Family of2
or less

Family of3

II

I

Family of4
or more

IAdair County

67711

79 7 11

916

IAllen County

73211

861 11

990 1

!Anderson County

84311

99111

1, 140 1

785

11

9021

1

IBallard County
IBarren County
IBath County

I
II

667

770 11

906 11

1,0421

II

701 11

825 11

949

IBell County

II

637 11

750

862 1

11

1

IBoone County
IBourbon County
IBoyd County
IBoyle County

II

1, 106 11

11
1,301 11

1.497\

II

853

11

1,003 11

1, 154 1

IBracken County

II
II
II
II
II
II
II

732

1\
I[

IBreathitt County

IBreckinridge County
IBullitt County
IButler County
ICaldwel1 County

ICalloway County
Icampbell County

I

II

745

11

876 11

1,008 1

\I

807 11

950 11

1,092 1

11

693 11

861

11

815

990

1

938 1

69411

11
81611

89411

1,05111

69211

81411

936

808\1

1

68611

929

1

84411

993

1, 1421

962 11

1, 131 11

1,301\

II

II

I

11

939

1

1,209 1
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ICarlisle County
lcarroll County
lcarter County
Icasey County
IChristian County

IClark County

66111
I
===82=211
I

7781 I
9671 I

895J
1, 112 1
863 1

60711
!l====7=53II

7511
715 1
8861

:~==63=811

:~==8=5211
576 11

IClay County
IClinton County

ICrittenden County

I

ICumberland County

IDaviess County
IEdmonson County

Cl:l

1,1531
7791
7751

7271

8361

699 1

8041

I

1,058\

920 1

72411

851 1

979 1

61211
617 11

720 1

828 1

726 1

834 1

1, 138 1

I

96711
673 11

792 1

1,308 1
911 1

I

717 11

844 1I

970 1

1

853 11

1,1541

I

\GaJlatin County

I

643 11

1,003 1I
756 1I

IGarrard County

I

81011
790 11

9531 I
929 1I

1, 096 1
1, 068 1

88811

1, 045 1

1, 202 1

71211
699 11

8371

9631

823\
7351

9461

IEstill County

00

1,0191

78211

1Elliott County
C')

57311
61811
594 11

1,0021
6781
674 1

8221

!Fayette County

IFleming County
IFloyd County

IFranklin County

IFulton County
IGrant County

IGraves County
IGrayson County
IGreen County

IGreenup County
IHancock County

IHardin County
IHarlan County
IHarrison County
I

II
II

II

I

II

62511
737 11

I

772 11

II

85311
631 11

I

I
II
II

780 11

I

8701

8461

8671

9971

9081
1,0031II

1,0441

7421
918 1

8531

I

1,1541
1,0561

I
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IHart County

IHenderson County
IHenry County

65411
I
===82==711
I

I===8:::::1811
I

9631I

1, 107 1
845 1

7341 I
8241

IJackson County

===5=3911

6341

IJefferson County

===94=511

IJessamine County

;:::===8=9711
71511
r====9==;801l

1,1111
1,056 1

IHopkins County

IJohnSon County

8681

69811

821 1I

9441

70311

8271

9511

74411

875 1I

1,0071

749 1

8611

II

63611
553 11

650 1I

7481

II

647 11

761 1I

8751

I

605 11

711 1

818 1

60511
===69=:811

711 1

8181

821 1

944 1

644 11
===75=:;311

757 1

87 11
1,019 1

73111
===85=:;711

860 1
1, 009 1

1Lawrence County

ILewis County

ILincoln County

I

I

IliVingston County

ILogan County
ILyon County
IMadison County
IMagoffin County
IMarion County

1,2141

7551

ILaurel County

ILetcher County

7291
1, 278 1

64211

IKnox County

1Leslie County

9481

1,3261

ILarue County
ILee County

I

8411
1,1531

IKenton County
IKnott County

:f

8851
1, 119 1

973 1I

624 11
===700=11

1Hickman County

c

769 1I

9681

!

i

886 1

9891
1,1601

I
II

702 11

826 1

689 11

811 1

IMarshali County

II

798 11

939 1

1,0801

IMartin County

1

751 11

8831

1,0151

79211

I
983 1I
II

1, 072 1
1, 130 1

IMason County

IMcCracken County
I

I
II
II
II

835 11

II

9321

950 1
933 1

I
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!McCreary County

IMcLean County
IMeade County
IMenifee County

I

IMonroe County

IOhio County
IOldham County

c

IOwen County

g:

IOwsley County

IPendleton County
IPerry County
!Pike County

IPowell County

IPulaski County
IRobertson County

IRockcastle County
IRowan County
IRussell County

IScott County
IShelby County

ISimpson County
ISpencer County

807 1I

927 1

83611

984 1I

6251(

7351 I

1, 131 1
846 1

I

758 11

8921 I

1,026 1

I

59211
674 11

I

I
I

t

696\ I

8011
9121

765 11

7931
901 1

1, 036 1

I

635 11

747\

8601

II

668 11

9041

II

775 11

7861
911 1

1,0481

II

698 11

821 1

9441

IMorgan County

INelson County
INicholas County

743 1

I

IMontgomery County

!Muhlenberg County

646 1

1

IMercer County
IMetcalfe County

54911
686 11

I

675 11

794 1

914 1

II

1, 189 11

1, 399 1

1,6091

I

782 11

920 1

I

525 11

617 1

I

810 11

953 1

I

1, 058 1
710 1

I

729 11

858 1

1, 096 1
987 1

I

765 11

901 1

1, 036 1

71211

8371

I===68=011
633 11
I
===6=9811
I

963 1

800

1

920 1

7441 I
8211 I

856 1

II

721 11
===6=2811
.:====9=5511
97111

944 1
975 1

I
I
1.1241 I

1,2921

1,1421

1,3131

8481
739\

850 1

I

803 11

I

9441
1. 189 1

1,0861

1, 011 11
7451l

876\

1,0081

ITaYIOr County

I

I

I

II

III

1,3671

I
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ITodd County

65511

770 11

8861

ITrigg County

737 11

867 11

997 1

ITrimble County

79411
719 11

934 11

1,075 1

846/1

973 1

IUnion County
IWarren County

II

907 11

1,067 11

1,227 1

\Washington County

\I

686 11

807\1

927 1

IWayne County

.IWebster County
iWhitley County
IWolfe County
IWoodford County

a
~

II
II

II
II
II

619 11

728 11

837 1

688 11

810 11

931 1

712 11

83811

964 1

552 11

64911

746 1

975 11

1, 148 11

1, 320 1

AUTOMATIC STAY, REAFFIRMATIONS & REDEMPTIONS
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

Thomas L. Canary, Jr.
Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C.
Louisville, Kentucky

C·87

C - 88

Changes to the Bankruptcy Code
Under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
For Consumer Creditors in Chapter 7
Traps for the Unwary
By
Thomas L. Canary, Jr.
Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C.
Louisville, KY

The passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAP") was a cause for much rejoicing among the creditors' ranks. Gone were the days
of serial filings and "ride through" on secured debts. Now creditors have automatic
termination ofthe stay or the promise of adequate protection if a debtor does not timely
perform his statement of intent. It was believed that creditors would be able to handle
more of their own cases and that reliance on attorneys to get the stay terminated or a
reaffirmation signed were gone. Debtors could now assume leases in Chapter 7
situations. Redemption is now at retail, not wholesale. Those annoying preference
actions that arise out of large Chapter 11 cases just became easier to defend and world
peace is just around the comer.
Upon further reflection, some of this initial euphoria has evaporated. This outline covers
just a very few areas common to secured creditors in Chapter 7 cases. The perspective of
this outline is from that of a creditor's attorney, so some may say that it is jaundice. The
author invites you to read on and draw your own conclusions regarding the changes BAP
has made to the Bankruptcy Code and whether the perceived advantages are fact or
fiction.
Ride Through and Automatic Termination of the Stay
Section 304 ofBAP amended 11 U.S.C. §521(a) (6) by adding the following language to
the end of that subsection:
... in a case under chapter 7 ofthis title in which the debtor is an
individual, not retain possession of personal property as to which a
creditor has an allowed claim for the purchase price secured in whole or
in part by an interest in such personal property unless the debtor, not later
than 45 days after the first meeting of creditors under section 341(a), either

(A)
enters into an agreement with the creditor pursuant to section
524(c) with respect to the claim secured by such property; or
(B)
redeems such property from the security interest pursuant to
section 722.
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If the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period ... the stay under section
362(a) is terminated with respect to the personal property of the estate or of
the debtor which is affected, such property shall no longer be property of the
estate, and the creditor may take whatever action as to such property as is
permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy law, . .. [Emphasis added]
So, conventional wisdom says that the stay is terminated on the 46th day after the
scheduled meeting of creditors unless the debtor reaffirms or redeems, right? Your
author suggests that all may not be as it seems. Let's examine the highlighted language
in amended §521(a) (6).

"in which the debtor is an individual"
lithe Chapter 7 debtor is a corporation, partnership, or the like, creditors do not get the
benefit of the automatic termination of the stay. This could be tricky where the note and
security interest are signed by the debtor as a corporate officer ofthe closely held
corporation, and the note is guaranteed by the debtor, individually. The debtor then files
Chapter 7. This would seem to say that a creditor gets the benefit of the automatic
termination ofthe stay after 45 days since the debtor is an individual, and both the
corporation and the debtor have signed the security interest.
However, does the picture change if only the corporation has given a security interest in
the property? For example, what if the collateral in question is an automobile titled only
in the name of the corporation, but the debtor is a cosigner on the note. The debtor is still
an individual, but does that individual have to possess an interest in the collateral for the
creditor to get the benefit of the automatic termination of the stay? Your author says no.
§521(a) (6) only requires that the debtor be an individual. It does not require that the
collateral be owned by the debtor. In fact, the statute talks about property ofthe estate or
ofthe debtor which is affected by the stay. Additionally, some will argue that the
debtor's possessory or equitable interest of the collateral is sufficient to make the
collateral "property of the estate" under §541(a) (1) mandating termination of the stay.
But assume for the second that the possessory interest is not tantamount to "property of
the estate." The creditor does have an "allowed claim for the purchase price." The debtor
cosigned the note and provided the creditor has filed a proof of claim, it is presumed
under §502(a) that the claim is allowed. §521(a) (6) does NOT say the creditor must
have an allowed secured claim, only an allowed claim for the purchase price. The debt is
not an allowed secured claim since the debt is secured by property that is not property in
which the debtor has an interest (remember; in our example, only the corporation appears
on the certificate of title). However having an allowed secured claim is not a prerequisite
under §521(a) (6).
What are the two things that a debtor must do in order for the stay not to terminate after
45 days: either enter into an agreement to reaffirm under §524 or redeem the lien under
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§722. This debtor can enter into a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor since he is
personally obligated on the note. The fact the collateral is titled in the corporation's
name is immaterial. While the debtor may not be able to redeem the lien on the personal
property since he has no ownership interest in it, that does not negate the effect of
amended §521(a) (6), it only limits his options. As a practical matter, neither could the
corporation redeem the lien ifit were in bankruptcy since §722 is reserved for individual,
not corporate debtors.

"as to which a creditor has an allowed claim"
I think this is where a trap lies for the unwary creditor. A literal reading ofthis provision
means that before a creditor gets the benefit of the automatic termination of the stay, it
must have an "allowed claim." §502(a) states that "[a] claim or interest, proof of which
is filed under section 501 ofthis title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest,
objects." [Emphasis added]. This is the only section ofthe Code that talks about a claim
being allowed. This leads to a series of questions:
1. Must a creditor have filed a claim with the Bankruptcy Court before it can get the
benefit of the automatic termination of the stay?
2. If a creditor does not file such a claim, and yet repossesses after the 45 th day, has
it violated the stay provisions of §362(a)?
3. If a creditor files a claim and an objection is filed, but the debtor does not
reaffirm or redeem within the 45 day period, is the creditor still stayed?
Your author would submit that the answer to all these questions is "yes." The
requirement that a proof of claim be filed is consistent with the language of the statute
and the fact that this property is also abandoned by the trustee after the 45 th day ("such
property shall no longer be property of the estate"). By requiring a creditor to file its
claim, give proof of its perfection and state the amount of it claim, the trustee is given an
opportunity to see ifthe lien can be avoided (if not properly perfected) and to ascertain
whether there may be equity in the property that would inure to the benefit of the
unsecured creditors of the estate.
Recall that under Section 304 ofthe BAP and amended §521 (a)(6), the trustee can file a
motion, before the expiration of the 45 days asking that the stay not be terminated ifhe
feels the property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate [or is it really 30 days?
See the next section of this discussion on the 45 day period]. Unless and until a proof of
claim is filed, the trustee has no accurate way to determine ifthe lien is perfected or the
property of value to the estate. The only disclosure ofthe amount due the creditor prior
to a claim being filed is from the debtor's schedules.
Creditors waiting to file their claims towards the end of the 45 day period should expect
that trustees will file the motion to extend the stay in order to investigate the situation.
The morale ofthis story is that creditors should file their claims as soon in the process as
possible.
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If the trustee does obtain this order, the court must order appropriate adequate protection
of the creditor's interest and may order the debtor to deliver any collateral in the debtor's
possession to the trustee. (NOTE interestingly that this provision does not require the
creditor to turn over the property in its possession. Presumably, this section does not
alter the trustee's rights under §542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). How will the amount of
this adequate protection be determined?
§36l(l) states that the trustee can be required to make cash payments to the creditor to
the extent that the imposition ofthe stay results in a decrease in value of the creditor's
interest in the property. Will this depreciation be set using the NADA retail, wholesale,
midpoint? Will there need to be an appraisal? Most importantly, where will a Chapter 7
trustee get the funds to make these payments if the source of the estate's funding is the
equity in the creditor's collateral?
Remember, §36l(3) prohibits the court from giving the creditor an administrative priority
status for the diminution in value as adequate protection. The "adequate protection"
could be a lien on the proceeds from the sale of the collateral equal to the diminution in
value from the date of the entry of the order for relief until the proceeds are paid.
However, what if the sale of the collateral does not generate proceeds sufficient to make
the adequate protection payments? The creditor should insist that the sale be conditioned
upon payment in full of its interest in the collateral. The creditor should also reserve its
right to object to the trustee's surcharge under 506(c) in the event the sale will not satisfy
the creditor's allowed secured claim. Is the creditor entitled to the time value of its
interest in the collateral pending the conclusion of the sale and distribution of the
proceeds? If that value has been liquidated, then I would argue, ''yes''. While this change
in the law sounds good in theory, like much of the BAPCPA, it fails the reality test.
My conclusion is that creditors must file a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court
before the expiration of the 45 day period set out in amended §52l(6) [or the 30 day
period set out in §52l(a)(2)(B)] before it gets the benefit ofthe automatic termination of
the stay on the 46th [or 30th ] day. It remains to be seen how the court will se the adequate
protection payment amounts and then how they will be paid in a Chapter 7.
Creditors waiting to file their claims towards the end ofthe 45 [or 30] day period should
expect that trustees will file the motion to extend the stay in order to investigate the
situation. The lesson of this story is that creditors should file their claims as soon in the
process as possible.

"for the purchase price"
Even it a creditor meets the thresholds set out above, §521(a) (6) is effective only if the
creditor has a purchase money security interest. As will be set out below, §52l(a) (2) (B)
in conjunction with §362(h) will give any secured creditor, even one not possessing a
pmsi, automatic relief from the stay. If a creditor is going to rely on 52l(a) (6), then it
must possess a claim secured by the purchase price.
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"45 days after the first meeting ofcreditors" [versus §521 (a) (2) (B) and 362(h)J
When does this 45 day period really begin to run? Is it 45 days after the first setting for
the meeting of creditors? Is it 45 days after the first meeting of creditors is actually held?
Is it 45 days after the first meeting of creditor is "concluded" to be consistent with
Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) on objecting to exemptions? How do you square this with
§521(a) (2) (B) which seems to give the same reliefto ALL secured creditors in less
time? Read on McDuffl
Bankruptcy Rule 2003(a) states that the first meeting of creditors in a Chapter 7 case
must be called [not concluded] no fewer than 20 and no greater than 40 days after the
order for relief Bankruptcy Rule 2003(e) states that those first meetings can be
adjourned from time to time by announcement at the meeting of creditors without further
written notice. Ifthe 45 days begins to run from the conclusion of a first meeting of
creditors, how will a secured creditor know when the 45 day period under §521(6) begins
to run without (1) attending the hearing, (b) hiring counsel to appear at the hearing, or (c)
routinely checking PACER to see if the first meeting was concluded? With the additional
burdens being placed on the trustees and debtors under BAP, might it not become
commonplace for the first meetings to be continued? If a creditor is not aware ofthese
possibilities, it could unwittingly violate the stay by repossessing collateral before the
stay has been terminated by operation oflaw under §521(6).
The safe approach will be to begin the 45 day period after the conclusion ofthe first
meeting of creditors. That is a date certain that can be definitively calculated. However,
read the next section and explore the dangers of knowing if and when the debtor has
complied with the statement of intent.
You must also compare this 45 day period with the 30 day period set out in amended
§521 (a)(2)(B) and§362(h) of the Code. As noted above, this section is not limited to
purchase money secured claims. §521(a) (2) (C) makes specific reference to §362(h) and
§362(h) (1) (A) makes specific reference to §521 (a) (2). §362(h) (1) provides for
termination of the stay for "personal property of the estate or of the debtor securing
in whole or in part a claim• .. ". There is no requirement here that the claim be
allowed. Creditors claiming a termination of the stay under this provision are NOT
mandated to file a proof of claim in order to get the benefit of the statute. THIS
DISTINCTION COULD BE HUGE.
Also, the time period under this provision is much more certain. §521 (a)(2)(B) provides
that the stay is terminated and the personal property no longer considered property ofthe
estate within 30 days of the first date set for the meeting of creditors if the debtor does
not fulfill his statement of intent under §521. Some commentators have opined that this
30 day period terminates the stay on personal property securing non-purchase money
loans, only. This distinction is not mentioned anywhere in the amended Code section
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Lastly, §362(h)(2) requires the trustee to make his/her motion to keep the personal
property from being abandoned "before the expiration of the applicable time set by
section 521 (a)(2)". §521(a) (2) (B) sets forth a 30, not a 45, day period
It therefore can be argued that the automatic termination of the stay under §521(a) (6) is a
nullity for the following reasons:

1. The time period in amended §521(a) (2) (B) is 15 day shorter at worst.
2. The time period in amended §521(a) (2) (B) begins on the date first set for the
meeting of creditors and not "after the meeting of creditors" as stated in new
§521(a) (6). Even ifthere were a continuation of the first meeting of creditors
that might delay the application of §521(a) (6), that prohibition does not exist for
amended §521(a) (2) (B). However note that the trustee could request that the
stay remain in effect ifhe thought the property were of consequential value or
benefit to the estate, if that motion is file before the expiration ofthis 30 day
period. §362(h) (2).
3. There is nothing in amended §521(a) (2) (B) indicating that this section is
applicable to non-purchase money situations, only.
4. A creditor does not need to have an allowed claim under §521(a) (2) (B), i.e., the
creditor does not need to file a proof of claim to get the benefit ofthe termination
of the stay.
Perhaps there will be some technical amendment that will clarify this issue. For the time
being, debtors and trustees should expect creditors to start to enforce their state law rights
30 days after the first setting for the meeting or creditors if the debtor does not enter into
a reaffirmation agreement with the creditor nor redeems the lien on the collateral.

"enters into an agreement with the creditor"
This seemingly innocent provision is fraught with peril. When does a debtor "enter into"
a reaffirmation agreement with a creditor? An example will demonstrate this potential
conundrum.
Debtor owes a debt to the creditor secured by the debtor's only automobile. The creditor
sends the debtor a reaffirmation agreement in the mail. This creditor has adopted a
conservative policy to wait until 45 days after the first meeting of creditors before
presuming the stay is terminated. Creditor sends its representative to the first meeting of
creditors to question the debtor about reaffirming the debt and files its claim. The
representative presents the agreement to the debtor and his counsel. The retort is that the
debtor and his counsel are still considering their options. The representative returns
without the agreement being signed. On day 46, the creditor has not received the
reaffirmation agreement back from the debtor so it repossesses the automobile. The
creditor is safe, right? Think again.
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Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.comD defines the phrase "enter into" as: "To
become party to (a contract)" What if the debtor has signed the reaffirmation agreement
within the 45 day period and it is "in the mail" to the creditor. Hasn't the debtor "entered
into" an agreement with the creditor pursuant to section 524(c) by accepting the offer
made by the creditor? What ifthe debtor has signed the reaffirmation agreement and it is
with his attorney pending signature by counsel of new the new Part C - Certification of
Debtor's Attorney (If Any). Has the debtor entered into the reaffirmation agreement at
that point such that he has met his obligation under §521(a) (6)? lfthe debtor signed the
reaffirmation agreement within 30 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors,
does this meet the requirement under §521 (a)(2)(B) that the debtor perform his stated
intent within that time period?
lfthe court were to decide that the debtor's signing the reaffirmation agreement within
the appropriate time period, DOES met this threshold, how is a creditor ever to know
whether it is safe to repossess its collateral or have its counsel file a request/motion with
the court for the entry of an order confirming the termination of the stay under new
§362G)? Couldn't the debtor's attorney use this "method" to thwart the automatic
termination of the stay?
There are two methods a creditor may employ:
1. Attend the first meeting and require that the debtor and his attorney sign the
reaffirmation agreement then and there. Do not let the debtor take the
reaffirmation agreement away from the meeting of creditors. Do not have the
debtor sign the reaffirmation agreement and then hand it to his attorney who will
get back with you. Tell the debtor and his counsel that the reaffirmation offer is
open that day only and if they do not sign the agreement, then the offer is
withdrawn.
If you send the reaffirmation agreement through the mail, either in the letter to the
debtor (or his attorney) or in the reaffirmation agreement itself, state that if the
agreement is not received in the office of the creditor (or its counsel) on a date
certain, then the offer to reaffirm is withdrawn and the creditor will not consider
that the parties have "entered into" any agreement (i.e., there is no "meeting of the
minds" to form a contract). lfthe debtor were to sign the agreement, but the
attorney refused to sign new Part C, you could then move the court to approve the
reaffirmation agreement as provided under §§524(k)(7), (8) and §524(m). Make
is clear that if the debtor wants to reaffirm he must sign creditor's form - no other
form or "offer" from the debtor will be accepted.
2. File the motion to terminate the stay under §362(d). This is not a change in the
law. This is the right that you had prior to BAP and continues after BAP. This
may be the only sure-fire way to safely confirm termination ofthe automatic stay.

"redeems such property"
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Section 304 of the BAP makes it clear that redemption in payments is no longer allowed
and that the redemption sum must be paid "in full at the time of redemption." What if the
order tendered by the debtor does not give a date by when the funds are to be paid? This
is clearly contrary to amended §722, but if the mandate is not in the court's order, how
can the creditor push the issue before the court? The author has seen such orders and will
always object to them, but this begs the question. Ifthe court enters an order allowing
redemption of the personal property, is §521(a) (6) satisfied even if the funds are not paid
upon the entry ofthe order? Has the debtor redeemed the lien by simply filing the
motion? Does this change to §722 found at Section 304 of the BAP now require that the
full redemption amount be paid to the creditor upon the entry ofthe order?
The point here is that there is the possibility of delay in the automatic termination of the
stay if a creditor is not attentive. Debtor's counsel will argue that §521(a) (6) is satisfied
upon the entry ofthe order, not the payment ofthe money to the creditor. This is a
reasonable reading ofthe statute. Unless creditors insist that the funds be paid to the
creditor upon the entry of the order of redemption, or very shortly thereafter, the BAP's
automatic termination of the stay loses some of its teeth.
Also, §506(a)(2) has been added to the Code stating the value with respect to personal
property securing an allowed claim (make sure you have your claim filed) shall be the
replacement value on the date ofthe filing of the petition, without deduction for costs of
sale. If the property in question was for personal, family or household use, then
replacement value shall be deemed to be retail. Expect fights over whether the property
was for personal, family or household use. What if the collateral is a mini-van that is
used to take the kids to school, but doubles as the delivery van for the debtor's small
business? What if the automobile is in the name of the debtor's closely held corporation
and the debtor, but used by the debtor as his family vehicle? Expect the case books to be
rife with decisions on this issue and other inconsistencies created by BAP.
Termination of the Stay But No Resulting Order
Section 106 of the BAP amends §362 to include new subsection G) which reads: "On
request of a party in interest, the court shall issue an order under subsection (c)
confirming that the automatic stay has been terminated." Both §§521(a)(2)(b) and (a)(6)
state that not only will the stay be terminated, but the property no longer considered
property ofthe estate. §362(c) (1) states that the stay against property of the estate
continues until the property is no longer property of the estate. Therefore, a creditor can
make a request to the court that the stay be terminated if the debtor does not perform his
stated intent (but see discussions above on this point).
"Requesting" a termination of stay may seem very straightforward. However, like many
of the provisions ofBAP, there are traps for the unwary.
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At two recent seminars on BAP, most creditors and some members of the bench took the
position that this "request" had to be made by motion. The members of the bench stated
that the only way to "request" the court to do anything is by motion.
This motion will be governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9014. There will be a notice and
opportunity for objection. Generally, the objection time is 15 days. Otherwise, opposing
counsel and the debtor would not get the appropriate notification that the Order was about
to be entered. In the event that the debtor had "entered into" a reaffirmation agreement, it
could be brought to the attention ofthe creditor that it was not entitled to the automatic
termination of the stay.
This motion will need to be done by counsel, and could result in some delay before the
attorney receives the Order from the court.
As stated above, there could be significant uncertainties as to whether the debtor has met
his obligations under either §§521(a) (2) (B) or (a) (6). Counsel maybe hesitant to
declare in a "request" that the debtor has not met his duty to "enter into" a reaffirmation
agreement, especially if counsel did not represent the creditor at the first meeting of
creditors. Some of this hesitation could be alleviated by use of the author's strategies set
out above.
Most certainly, creditors will want an order for their file, stating the stay is terminated.
More importantly, those agents that the creditors hire to take back personal property will
not agree to repossess collateral without either an order from the court or a letter of
indemnity from the creditor. If the uncertainties described above exist, it may be more
prudent for the creditor simply to file a motion to terminate the stay under §362(d).
Any order should be specific to the personal property, identifying it by make, model and
serial or model number. It should recount the reason the stay was terminated in the event
there is a question at a later time. This is true whether the creditor is making a "request"
under §362G) or filing a motion under 362(d).
The order should also state that this property is no longer deemed property of the estate
besides not being bound by the bankruptcy stay. If a trustee is going to later challenge
this, and there is an order that confirms the abandonment, the creditor can argue that any
appeal of that order must be within in the 10 day appellate period set our in Bankruptcy
Rule 8002.
Note that Bankruptcy Rule 8002 states that "[t]he notice of appeal shall be filed with the
clerk within 10 days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order or decree appealed
from." [Emphasis added]. If the creditor relies solely on the automatic termination of the
stay and does not procure an order, then there is a real question as to whether the appeal
time under Bankruptcy Rule 8002 ever begins to run.
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Your author suggests a simple solution to this host of potential pitfalls: hire counsel, and
procure the order or wait until the entry ofthe discharge order and closing of the case. It
is the remedy for what could be a whole host of ills.
While your author understands that creditors want to save the $150 filing fee, the delays
occasioned with the application of these amended Code sections could outweigh the
perceived savings. Consider these time lines:
New Statute

3

o

40

70

85

90

105

Order for
Relief

First Meeting
of Creditor

Stay Term.
521(a) (2) (B)

Stay Term.
521(a) (6)

Order
521(a) (2) (B)

Order
521(a) (6)

§362(d)

o

30

40

50

Order for
Relief

Creditor's
Attorney Files
Motion for Relief

First Meeting
of Creditors

Order
Entered

If the collateral depreciates faster than $150 per month, it makes more sense to simply
file the motion and not worry about the perils ofthe automatic termination of the stay.
Only time will tell what creditors prefer.
A couple of final notes
Both §§521(a) (6) and 521(a) (2) (B)/362(h) speak in terms ofthe stay being
"terminated." However, §362(d) gives a creditor four remedies: terminating, annulling
modifying or conditioning the stay. If a creditor wants the stay annulled to give the
termination effect back to the date of the filing of the petition, then it will have to file a
motion under §362(d). It cannot rely on §§521(a) (6) or 521(a) (2) (B) since those
statutes only talk in terms of terminating the stay. The same is true if the creditor wants
the stay modified or conditioned.
Secondly, note that there is another fundamental difference between §§521(a) (6) and
521(a) (2) (B)/362(h). §362(h) (1) (A) & (B) include in the statement of intent
reaffirmation, redemption and the assumption of a lease pursuant to §365(P). This last
provision is not found in §521(a) (6). So presumably, if the contract between the debtor
and the creditor is a lease, you can get an automatic termination ofthe stay if you meet all
the requirements of §§521(a) (2) (B) and 362(h) but that is not true if you base the
termination of the stay on §521(a) (6). It appears that this has led some creditors to opine
that if a debtor DOES assume a lease under new section §365(P), that obligation survives
the debtor's discharge. Or does it? This issue is dealt with in the next section on
Reaffirmation Agreements.
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Reaffinnation Agreements - back to the "old days"
The addition of new §524(k) to the Code and the increased disclosures found in that
statute will likely lead to debtor's counsel refusing to sign the affidavit or declaration on
reaffinnation agreements. This in turn could lead to a couple different strategies by
creditors:

Hire counsel to make a motion to approve the reaffirmation agreement
This is what I mean by going back to the old days. The author has had the privilege of
practicing long enough to remember when creditors had to bring motions to approve ALL
reaffinnation agreements. It is the author's opinion that with the changes in the Code
through BAP, fewer debtors' counsel will sign the declarations on reaffinnation
agreements (new Part C found in §524(k)). This will require a motion to be filed for
approval and an order entered before the reaffinnation agreement will have a binding and
enforceable effect post discharge.
New §524(k) of the Code contains significant disclosure requirements. The author has
seen a draft agreement prepared and reviewed by some of the nation's leading creditors'
rights attorneys. It is approximately 8 pages long. The new disclosures under 524(k)
contain a Part C which is a declaration by the debtor's attorney that entering into the
reaffinnation agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's
dependents.
Part D of the reaffinnation agreement is the debtor's statement in support of the
reaffinnation agreement. The debtor must disclose his monthly take home pay, plus any
other income received, and subtracts that sum from his monthly expenses, which includes
payments on (1) post bankruptcy debt, and (2) payments on any other reaffinned debts.
If under that calculation, the debts are greater than the income, then an undue hardship is
presumed and the reaffinnation must be reviewed/approved by the court (unless the
creditor is a credit union as defined under the Federal Reserve Act). The debtor will have
to demonstrate to the satisfaction ofthe court how he proposes to make those payments.
If he cannot, the reaffinnation will not be approved.
Your author has been told by many debtors' counsel that they will not represent the
debtor during the course of negotiations of reaffinnation agreements with the creditor.
They will not then sign the declaration mandated by §524. In that case, even ifthe debtor
shows in Part D ofthe reaffinnation agreement that paying this obligation will not work
an undue burden on him or his dependents, the court will still have to approve the
agreement before it can be enforceable. See new §§524(k) (3) (J) (i) and (k) (7) [Motion
for Court Approval]. Only time will tell how many judges will approve of the debtor reobligating himself where debtor's counsel was unwilling to sign Part C of the
reaffinnation agreement. If Part D does show that reaffinnation ofthe debt WILL work
an undue hardship on the debtor or his dependents, then your author predicts the court
will be loathe to approve ANY such reaffinnation agreement.
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As a consequence, if the creditor is not present at the first meeting of creditors, the
likelihood of having the reaffirmation agreement completed will diminish significantly.
Even then, creditors will need to retain counsel to seek approval of the reaffirmation
agreements if the debtor cannot demonstrate that he can afford to pay the obligation or if
his counsel refuses to sign Part C.
File the motion to terminate the stay to force the issue
Creditors will then need to decide ifthey want to continue to allow the debtor to pay the
obligation without the benefit of an approved reaffirmation agreement or whether they
will need to have the stay terminated. (Funny how that ride through still exists, huh?)
NOTE that in this situation creditors will NOT be entitled to the automatic termination of
the stay under either §521(a) (2) (B) or (a) (6) if the debtor has entered into the agreement
within either the 30 or 45 day periods. Those sections do not require that the
reaffirmation agreement be approved, only that the debtor enters into the agreement with
the creditor. The creditor will need to retain counsel to file the motion to terminate the
stay under §362(d) or wait until the case has been discharged and closed. All this while,
the debtor continues to drive the depreciating asset.

365(P) (2) (A) - must a debtor reaffirm a lease ifhe accepts it?
This new provision allows a debtor to advise a creditor that he desires to reaffirm a lease
in a Chapter 7 proceeding. The creditor then has the right under the statute to condition
the acceptance on the cure of any defaults under the contract. There is NOTHING in this
new subsection that provides for the liability on the "assumed" lease obligation to be
excepted from discharge under §524. Neither is there anything in §524 that states a lease
assumed by a debtor under §365(P) excepted from discharge. Perhaps Congress intended
that an assumption would be tantamount to reaffirmation of the obligation, but this loose
end was not tied. Creditors relying on the assumption of a lease to give that executory
contract post-discharge effect does so at their own peril.
Therefore, your author opines that even ifthe debtor does assume the lease obligation, the
liability on this debt (See §524(a) (2» is dischargeable in the Chapter 7 proceeding. A
debt is a liability on a claim. See §101 (12). Basically a "claim" is a right to payment.
See §101(5). This liability will be discharged if not reaffirmed under §524(c). I do not
see where §365(P) adds anything to the debtor/creditor relationship nor does anything to
preserve that relationship. This changes nothing and only adds to the confusion that is
known as the BAPCPA.
Change in Preference Litigation
There were some substantial changes made to §547 of the Code. It will make the defense
of preference claims easier for the creditor.
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First, the 20 day time period found in §547(c) (3) has been increased to 30 days. This
brings it in line with the time period that a creditor has to perfect its lien on a certificate
of title in Kentucky before the title is printed with the lien being noted. If a creditor files
an application for title and registration, but does not file the motor vehicle lien statement
at the same time, the county court clerk will place a "pending lien flag" in the automated
system (AVIS). That flag will remain active for 30 days. Ifthe creditor files the motor
vehicle lien statement with the county coUrt clerk in that 30 day period, the lien
information is to be put in AVIS and the flag is to be removed. The title will then print in
Frankfort with bearing the creditor's lien information. If motor vehicle lien statement is
not filed in the 30 day period, or ifthe information is not placed in AVIS within 30 days,
the flag is removed by operation ofthe program and the title prints without a lien being
noted.
In the past, there were situations where the information was put in AVIS within day 2130 and the debtor filed bankruptcy 90 days thereafter. Even though the creditor has
complied with state law, they lost before the bankruptcy court. This change clears up this
discrepancy.
Also, it used to be that if a creditor wanted to defend a preference action under §547(c)
(2) it had to show:
1. the alleged preferential transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in
the ordinary course of business between the debtor and the creditor, AND
2. that the payment was made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs,

AND
3.

the payment was made according to ordinary business terms.

It was this last requirement that made the defense of a preference so expensive. It
required the creditor to retain an expert to testify about the ordinary business terms in the
debtor's industry. The retention of the expert often cost more than the monies sought by
the trustee or post-petition committee leading to "forced" settlements.

BAP has changed all this. Now the creditor need only prove either
1. the transfer/payment was made in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs ofthe debtor and the transferee (the creditor), OR
2. made according to ordinary business terms.
If the creditor can show that the payments in the preference period were no different than
payments made to it by the debtor in the period 6, 12 or 18 months before the bankruptcy
filing by the debtor, then the creditor may prevail without the necessity of hiring an
expert. NOTE: this 6, 12 or 18 month period is what is reviewed by the author. It is not
mandated by the statute and is not the only way to examine this issue.
Secondly, creditors will no longer be forced to defend many ofthese actions in foreign
jurisdictions. Many businesses are incorporated, for instance, in Delaware. If the
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preference action relative to the bankruptcy filing were commenced there, creditors
would have to hire local counsel to defend them.
28 U.S.C. §1409 has been changed to relieve creditors having smaller, alleged
preferences from defending from afar. If an action is commenced to recover a money
judgment or of property worth less than $1,000, or a consumer debt ofless than $15,000,
or a debt (excluding a consumer debt) against a noninsider of less than $10,000, then it
can be commenced ONLY in the district court for the district in which the defendant
resides. There remains a question in my mind whether a trustee or post-petition
committee will be able to add alleged preferential transfers together to meet this
threshold, or whether each transfer will stand on its own for jurisdictional purposes. This
is another one of those questions that will be answered over time.
Conclusion
At first blush the BAP seemed to be a very creditor friendly bill. However, sloppy
drafting and inconsistent/conflicting sections have taken much ofthe steam out ofthis
locomotive. Only time will tell how the bench and bar will react to these changes.
Rumors abound about a "technical amendment bill" (read "fix the screw ups bill") to
explain some of these inconsistencies. At last word, no such bill is in the works.
BAP does graft many creditor-friendly provisions onto the existing Code. Until some of
this drama has played out, creditor would be wise to tread carefully.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS CHANGES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

James D. Lyon
Attorney at Law
Lexington, Kentucky
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Domestic relations changes under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005

1. PRIORITY. Claims for support or maintenance arising out of a domestic relations
order are now of the first priority, above even administrative claims. llUSC 507(a)(I)
(A) and (B) A carve out has been made for the trustee's administrative expenses,
allowing a super priority claim for the trustee who collects the asset. 11 USC 507(a)(1)
(C). This refers back to 11 USC 503(b)(I)(A), costs of preserving the estate, (2),
trustee's commission and (6), fees and mileage under 28 USC 119,

but not to (1)(B),

taxes of the estate.

2. NON-DISCHARGEABILITY.
a. 11 USC 523(A)(5) has been amended to substitute the term "domestic support
obligation" for support, maintenance or alimony. This new term is defined in 101(14A),
and specifically includes all debts in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, owed
to the former spouse or child or to a government unit on a voluntary assignment.

b. 11 USC 523(a)(15), non-dischargeablity of a debt incurred in the course of a
divorce, has been amended to exclude the weighing of equities test, and to delete the
sixty day time limit to file a complaint under 11 USC 523(c).
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3. AUTOMATIC STAY

362(b)(2) excepts from stay several specific actions, including the establishment
of paternity, domestic support orders, child custody or visitation, domestic violence and
the dissolution of a marriage, except for the division of estate property.

4. TRUSTEE'S DUTIES

Chapter 7 trustees have a new duty to give notice to domestic support creditors under 11
USC 704(a)(IO). The trustee is required to notify such a creditor in writing ofthe right to
use support agencies and collection agencies. Also the trustee must provide notice to
those agencies. Also the trustee must provide an explanation of the creditor's right to
payments ofthe claim in the bankruptcy. The trustee must then at the time the discharge
is entered provide notice to the claimant and the State support agencies of any
reaffirmation, the entry of a discharge, the name of all creditors whose claims were not
discharged under 523(a) (2) (4) and (14A), and the current address and employment of
the debtor. The Code provides that the domestic support creditor may then contact such
creditor and request information.
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CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE ISSUES & DUTIES
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

Alan C. Stout
STOUT LAW OFFICE
Marion, Kentucky
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A.

Introduction

The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA or "The Bill")
substantially changes Chapter 7 Trustee duties and obligations. While not as onerous as the burden
placed on debtor attorneys, still the changes will require some modifications in substantive matters
as well as procedures affecting Chapter 7 Trustee practices. Section C contains an outline presented
by Robert H. Waldschmidt and Samuel K Crocker, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustees in Nashville,
Tennessee. These materials were presented at the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees
(NABT) Annual Conference in New York City on August 17,2005. The materials are reprinted with
the permission of NABT, Mr. Waldschmidt and Mr. Crocker. The outline sets forth specific
provisions of The Bill which will affect Chapter 7 Trustees. In addition to the issues raised in the
outline, hereafter are several other provisions which will affect the Chapter 7 Trustees'
administration of cases.
It took Congress 9 years to pass BAPCPA. When it became apparent that the bill had a
chance to pass, attempts were made to make modifications to The Bill ofsome ofthe obvious errors.
A comprehensive Managers' Amendment was proposed in the Senate. However, the Managers'
Amendment died, and failed to pass. Therefore, there are a number of substantive and procedural
changes which need to be made to The Bill. At the time ofthis writing, the Technical Corrections
Bill has been drafted. However, it is uncertain ifthis will pass.

In addition to the materials contained in this outline, anyone wanting to learn more about
impact ofBAPCPA on Chapter 7 Trustee practice, the following is recommended reading:
NABTalk "Impact ofthe 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments on Chapter 7 Trustees",
Samuel K. Crocker and Robert H. Waldschmidt, (Vol. 21, #2 2005)

C - 109

B.

Supplemental Material Regarding Issues Affecting
Chapter 7 Trustees
1. Waiver of Filing Fee (in forma pauperis):

Amended 28 USC § 1930(£)(1) provides for the waiver of Chapter 7 case
filing fees for individuals with less than 150% of the income official poverty line, if the Court
determines the individual is unable to pay the fee in installments. This provision is problematic to
trustees because The Act makes no provision for payments to the trustee in cases where the filing
fees are waived. Trustees are paid compensation of $60.00 for administering cases in which no
assets are available for liquidation. The funding for these fees is derived from the Chapter 7 case
filing fee [see 11 USC §33O(b)(1)] and miscellaneous bankruptcycourt fees described by the Judicial
Conference of the United States [see 11 USC §330(b)(2)].

2. Protecting Patient Records:
The Act adds a new §351to the Code that provides for a procedure for notification and
disposal of patient records in cases where the trustee does not have sufficient funds to pay for the
storage of records in the manner required under applicable federal or state law. This provision has
potential for massive problems for trustees in healthcare bankruptcy cases. For example, under
§351 trustees are required to entertain various costly actions including: storing records for one year;
publishing a notice in one or more appropriate newspapers; notifying every patient and insurance
carrier by mail; communicating certified mail with each appropriate federal agency and destroying
the records. Costs in these cases for these services alone could run in the thousands of dollars. If
trustees do not have the funds to pay for the storage and notice requirements under §351, some
patients records may not be administered properly and could be lost.

3. Exemptions:
As we know, effective June 20, 2005 debtors have the opportunity to "opt in" to the federal
exemptions. The exemption scheme contained in §522 has undergone an extension overhaul under
BAPCPA. Careful analysis of the §522 exemptions is recommended. (See page 8 of the Crocker
and Waldschmidt outline for more detailed analysis of the exemption changes.)

4. Duties of Trustee in regard to the "Means Test":
Implementation of the "Means Test" is principally the responsibility of the U.S. Trustee.
However, Chapter 7 Trustees are expected to assist the U.S. Trustee in collection of verification
information provided by debtor, which will include the following:
a.
Verification ofthe accuracy ofthe debtor's report ofincome by reviewing pay
stubs of employers, and verification of income ofself-employed debtors. This information is to be
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in the fonn ofverification of income and payments received within 60 days prior to the filing date;
also review of income tax returns ofthe debtor;
b.

Verification of the number of dependents claimed;

c.

Verification of debtor's disabled veterans status (if applicable).

The Chapter 7 Trustee may return the above documents to the debtor at the 341 meeting
however, the debtor should be cautious and keep the returns available for inspection pursuant to
§521 (g)(2). The trustee will retain the documents ifthe payment verification and/or tax returns do
not confinn the debtor's scheduled income, appear to disclose non-scheduled assets, the U.S. Trustee
instructs the Chapter 7 Trustee to retain the documents, or if there are any reasons for case
administration for prosecution of abuse. However, all this needs to be done by the trustee while the
trustee makes every effort to protect the privacy ofthe debtor in dealing with tax returns.
The Chapter 7 Trustee will also collect other documents required as a prerequisite to file for
certain exceptions under the mean test provisions. These documents will include receipts for private
schooling and other school expenses and other documentation to support additional food and
clothing and/or home energy expenses in excess of IRS guidelines.
5.

Role of Private Chapter 7 Trustee and Credit Counseling:

The credit counseling is generally considered to be the individual "ticket in" to bankruptcy.
Neither the Chapter 7 nor Chapter 13 Trustees are eligible to serve as credit counselors. While the
Bankruptcy Court Clerk will be responsible for detennining ifthe credit counseling certificate has
been filed, the private trustee will be responsible for confinning that the credit counseling certificate
was issued by an approved credit counselor and ifnot, referring the matter to the UST.
Trustees may also be asked to assist in the monitoring of credit counseling services and
making specific inquires at the 341 meeting of a random sampling of debtors. Any complaints
regarding credit counselors received by Trustees or problems noted by the Trustee will be referred
to the US Trustee .
6.

Role of Private Chapter 7 Trustee and Debtor Education:

The individual debtor will not be granted a discharge until the debtor completes an
instructional core on personal financial management provided by a UST - approved provider. Debtor
educators are required to issue a certificate of course completion to the debtors. The debtor
education requirements are commonly referred to as the individuals "ticket out" of bankruptcy.
Chapter 13 Trustees can be approved as providers ofdebtor education courses for debtors for whom
they serve as case trustees. According to the initial guidelines of the U.S. Trustee's office the
Chapter 7 Trustees will not be expected to monitor the debtors compliance with the filing of the
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debtor education compliance certificate.
7.
Conclusion:
The U.S. Trustee Program regards implementation ofthe BAPCPA as a continuing
partnership with Chapter 7 Panel Trustees. The U.S. Trustee Program has issued written materials
for training ofpanel trustees entitled: BAPCPA Trustee Training - US. Trustees/Trustee Issues and
Guidelines. All Chapter 7 Panel Trustees should carefully review these materials. Additionally, the
UST program is conducting training sessions for panel trustees throughout the state.
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PROVISIONS OF THE BANKRUPTCY BILL
WHICH EFFECT CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES
Robert H. Waldschmidt
Samuel K. Crocker
Nashville, Tennessee
§lOl Definitions
- There are numerous amendments and newly defined "terms"
under §101, including (10) current monthly income, (13A) debtor's principal
residence, (14A) domestic support obligation, (27A) health care business, (27B)
incidental property, (41A) personally identifiable information, and (51A) Small
business debtor. Trustees need to become familiar with all definitions, particularly
where they relate to the administration of a particular estate.
§328 Limitation on compensation of Professionals
- One phrase has been added within §328(a), to specifically allow
professionals to be hired "on a fixed or percentage fee basis" as well as on an
hourly basis, or a contingent fee basis.
§330 Compensation - Trustee commission clarified
- The standard for compensating trustees has been modified to state that
trustees are to be paid on a commission basis. Under section 407 of the Bill, a new
sub-section, §330(a)(7), is created which provides:
(7) In determining the amount of
reasonable compensation to be awarded to a
trustee, the court shall treat such compensation
as a commission, based on §326.
The fee must still be "reasonable" and the court still has discretion to determine
the amount of the fee, but the extent to which the trustee's hours are even relevant is
either eliminated, or severely reduced. Interestingly, §330(a)(3), where the factors for
determining compensation are set forth - including hours and rates - the individuals
included in the subsection are the "examiner, trustee under chapter 11, or professional
person"; Chapter 7 trustees are specifically omitted, and treated separately in
§330(a)(7), thus eliminating the factors set forth in §330(a)(3). This amendment
would seem to overrule the Circuit Decisions which have computed Trustee
compensation pursuant to the lodestar method, adjusted by enhancing factors such as
the complexity of the case and extraordinary results. See Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), followed in In re Miniscribe
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Corporation, 309 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2002).

§341 Meetings of Creditors
- Creditors (and representatives/employees of creditors) in consumer cases are
specifically allowed to participate in §341 hearings without an attorney, under
§341(c). This is limited to creditors "holding a consumer debt", and only applies to
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.

§342 Notice to Creditors
- Creditors who appear often in bankruptcy court can now request that all
notices in all cases be sent to specific addresses, under §342(f). Although debtors
attorneys should be aware of the proper addresses when filing the original petition,
trustees should also be alerted, in order to make sure that any action requiring "notice
and a hearing" is properly served at the correct address. (Even if the debtor provides
an address different than the one given to clerk by the creditor, notices must be sent to
the requested address.) Notice which is given to a creditor at another address is not
effective, under §342(g). (This provision also applies on an individual case basis,
where a creditor requests that notices be sent to a particular address in that case only.)
The amendment only refers directly to notices by the clerk or the debtor, but might be
applied to trustees as well.

§346 Special provisions related to state and local taxes
- Extensive amendments were made to §346, dealing with state and local tax
issues. Many of the changes incorporate reference to federal law; for example, if an
entity is treated as a separate entity under federal tax law, it will be treated the same
under state and local tax laws. Trustees should make their accountants aware of these
changes, since it might require the filing of additional returns in some cases.

§348 Conversion Issues
- In cases converted from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, §348(f)(1)(B) now
specifies that any valuations of property in the chapter 13 do not apply to the chapter 7
case. This overrules a line of cases holding that plan confirmation constitutes an
implied valuation which applies in the Chapter 7 case upon conversion. See In re
Slack, 290 B.R. 282 (Bankr.D.N.J. 2003). Section 348(f)(1)(B) has been amended
further to provide that payments made on secured claims through a Chapter 13 plan do
not reduce the allowed claim in the converted Chapter 7 case. This reverses cases
such as In re Peter, 309 B.R. 792 (Bankr.D.Ore. 2004).
- Under §348(f)(1)(C), a secured creditor that has not received payment in
full of its claim under applicable non-bankruptcy law shall retain a security interest in

C·114

the collateral after conversion to chapter 7. Thus, even if the secured portion of the
claim is paid in the Chapter 13, the creditor will retain a lien on the property after
converSIOn.

§362 Stay Relief
- Under the new §362(c)(3), serial filers will now only obtain limited
automatic stay relief. If a case has been pending and dismissed during the previous
year, the stay expires 30 days after filing, unless additional time is requested, and,
under §362(c)(4) if2 or more cases have been pending during the year, there is no
automatic stay; it can only be imposed by the Court, after notice and a hearing, upon a
showing of good faith to effected creditors. Trustees with equity in assets may find
those assets being repossessed or foreclosed, if they do not take immediate action to
preserve the stay or obtain injunctive relief.
- In rem stay relief can be obtained under §362(d)(4) and enforced in
subsequent cases under §362(b)(20), where property has been transferred to various
debtors who attempt to abuse the stay, with multiple filings involving the same
property. creditors can get relief which will flow with the property in any subsequent
filing involving the same property. If trustees perceive equity in any such properties,
they may need to seek injunctive relief to avoid the loss of value to the estate.
- Under a new §362(b)(24) the stay does not apply to any transfers of property
that are not otherwise avoidable under §544 or §549. This applies to post-petition
foreclosures, where the purchaser has no knowledge of the bankruptcy filing. These
sales have been held void under §362. The purchaser will be able to rely on the goodfaith transferee defense of §549(c) under this amendment. See In re Schwartz, 954
F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992). This may also reverse a line of cases involving re-financing
secured creditors, who close a loan pre-petition, but record their mortgage postpetition. Courts have previously held that, under §362, the post-petition recording is
void, and the claimant's argument that the transfer would not be avoidable under §549
is irrelevant.

- Section 362(h): Under this section the stay is terminated as to "personal
property of the estate securing a claim," if the individual Debtor fails to timely declare
and perform his intentions pursuant to §521(a)(2). Upon such failure, the subject
property is "no longer property of the estate." The Trustee can halt this process by
filing a motion before expiration of the §521(a)(2) deadline, asserting that there is
equity in the property for the bankruptcy estate. See §521(a)(6) below.

§363 Sales of Property
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- Additional language was added to §363(b), to prohibit the trustee from
selling personally identifiable information (defined in §101(41A)), where the debtor
had a policy concerning the protection of that information.

§365 Executory contracts
- Under §365(b), the trustee can cure a default in an executory contract of
residential real property without curing non-monetary defaults, if such cure would be
impossible for the trustee. (This does not apply to non-residential real property, which
requires full performance by the trustee.)
- The 60 day deadline for assuming executory contracts still applies in chapter
7. However, under §365(d) in any chapter (or in chapter 7 if that 60 day period has
been extended), there is now a 120 deadline for assumption of executory contracts
involving non-residential real property where the debtor was lessee - after which time
the lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee shall immediately surrender possession. In
addition, the largest extension that can be granted in any case is 90 days, unless the
lessor consents otherwise.
- If a trustee rejects an executory contract for personal property, and the
debtor wants to retain that property, §365(p) allows for the debtor to assume that
lease, pursuant to the conditions set forth in that subsection.

§366 Utility service
- The term "assurance of payment" which must be shown, in order to keep
utility companies from discontinuing service, is specifically defined in §366(c), using
methods of providing such "assurance". Subsection (B) now prohibits the tender of an
administrative expense priority, in order to comply with this requirement.

§503(b) Administrative expenses:
- Section 503(b)(I)(A)(ii) includes, as administrative expenses, wages and
benefits awarded as a result of violation of federal or state law by the Debtor. It
further provides that the time of the occurrence of the unlawful conduct and the
payments are immaterial, provided that the Court determines payment of such wages
and benefits will not "substantially increase the probability oflayoff or termination of
current employees, or of non-payment of domestic support obligations during the case
under this title;"
- Amended §503(b)(1)(B) includes, as administrative expenses, taxes incurred
by the estate "whether secured or unsecured, including property taxes for which
liability is in rem, in personam, or both." Subsection D exempts governmental units
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from the requirement of filing a request for payment as a condition to allowance of its
administrative expense.
- Section 503(b)(2)(F)(9) expands administrative expenses to include the
value of goods received by the Debtor within 20 days prior to case commencement,
where the goods have been sold to the Debtor in the ordinary course of business.
- Amended §§503(c) and 503(d) deal with payments to insiders under an
employee retention or severance plan, and other transfers or obligations outside the
ordinary course of business which are not justified by the facts and circumstances of
the case. Such payments are not allowed administrative expenses.

§505 Changes in the Determination of Tax Liability by the Bankruptcy
Court:
- Ad valorem property taxes cannot be contested under a new subsection,
§505(a)(2)(C).
- When a trustee requests a determination of taxes under §505(b), notice must
be sent to certain addresses. The bill clarifies that the clerk of the court shall maintain
a listing of those places, as well as additional requirements for notifications which
may be necessary to obtain a §505(b) determination. If no designation of address is
given to the Clerk, the request should be mailed to the same address where the tax
return would be mailed. [This parallels the current tax procedure with the IRS, and
codifies the notice requirements.]
- A technical correction to §505(b)(I)(B)(2) - which allows the trustee to
request a determination that the amount of tax paid is correct - will now protect the
bankruptcy estate, as well as the trustee and the debtor. (Formerly, the "estate" was
not included within the protected entities, and this led to at least one instance where a
trustee obtained a §505 determination, and the taxing authority later filed pleadings
asserting that the estate still owed additional taxes; the trustee was then surcharged for
allowing the estate to be penalized.)

§506 Determination of secured claims:
- Under a new §506(a)(2) the value of personal property shall be the
replacement value, as if the property were purchased (in its present condition) from a
retail merchant - without deduction for costs of sale or marketing.
- The ad valorem property taxes paid by a trustee can now be included in a
trustee's request for a surcharge against secured claims under §506(c).

§507 Priorities:
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- Domestic support claims were elevated, under §507(a)(1) to the number one
position, ABOVE most administrative claims for priority purposes under §507.
However, a "carve-out" provision (subsection (C)) was added to the end of §507(a)(1)
which will allow trustees to pay their administrative fees and expenses as a "superpriority" before payment to the support claimants.
(C) If a trustee is appointed or elected under section
701, 702, 703, 1104, 1202, or 1302, the administrative
expenses of the trustee allowed under paragraphs (1 )(A),
(2), and (6) of section 503(b) shall be paid before payment
of claims under subparagraphs (A) and (B), to the extent
that the trustee administers assets that are otherwise
available for payment of such claims.
This "carve-out" does not include taxes incurred by the estate (allowable under
§503(b)(1)(B)), nor does it include administrative fees or claims from a prior chapter
in a converted case. However, it covers most other costs of administration of a
Chapter 7 liquidation, as well as fees awarded under §330.
- The Wage claim maximum (currently at $4,925) is increased to $10,000
under §507(a)(4). To the extent the maximum is not reached in subsection (a)(4), the
maximum priority on claims for contributions to employee benefit plans, under (a)(5),
is increased up to $10,000.
-

There are minor technical changes to the tax priorities under §507(a)(8).

- a new subsection, §507(a)(10) creates a priority for claims resulting from
death or injuries in which the Debtor was driving a vehicle or vessel while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.

§511 Rate of Interest on tax claims:
- A new section, §511, has been added to provide that, when interest is to be
allowed on tax claims, the applicable rate of interest shall be that rate that applies to
those tax claims under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

§521 Debtor's Duties are dramatically increased, with automatic
dismissal as a "penalty":
- The debtor's initial filings under §521(a)(1) now include statements and
schedules, certificate of alternate options, statement of monthly net income, current
monthly income (different?) Anticipated increases in income/expenses, statement of
intent, a certificate from NBCCA, and 60 days of paystubs from the employer.
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This requirement alone does not effect trustees. However, §521(i)(1)
provides that (in the case of an individual in a voluntary case) if the information is not
completely filed within 45 days, the case will be automatically dismissed on the 46th
day. Apparently, the Clerk will dismiss the case, without prior notice to any parties in
interest.
This could create complications in cases where a Trustee has already
begun to administer assets, and either has funds in the estate, assets under control, or
administrative expenses incurred and unpaid. §521(i)(4) does allow the trustee to
request an extension of the 45 day period, but (1) the Trustee must become aware of
the missing documents in time, (2) the request must be made before the 45 days
expire, and (3) the court must find that the debtor attempted in good faith to file the
information.
A clever debtor could easily use this provision as an "escape valve" to
obtain a dismissal of a case where the Trustee discovers unperfected liens,
unencumbered assets, or fraud by the debtor. (The debtor could hold off filing one
piece of information until the 45 th day, and it anything adverse occurred at the §341
hearing the case could just be dismissed.) Obviously, Congress did not intend to allow
the debtors to use this provision to defeat trustees or creditors, and courts may find a
mechanism to keep these cases from being dismissed.
- The debtor has 45 days (or maybe 30 days under (a)(2)) to reaffirm or
redeem personal property subject to a security interest. However, the new sanctions
under §521(a)(6) could be frightening. If the debtor does not reaffirm or redeem
within 45 days (or 30 days), (1) the stay is lifted to allow the secured creditor to assert
its rights under non-bankruptcy law, and (2) the property is removed from property of
the estate ("the property shall no longer be property of the estate") The stay is also not
in effect pursuant to the new §362(h).
Trustees do have the right to file a request (within the 45 day period)
asserting that the property is of consequential value, in which case the court can retain
the property in the estate, and keep the stay in effect, but only if adequate protection is
provided to the creditor.
- The debtor must provide the trustee with a copy of their last tax return
within 7 days before the date set for the first §341 hearing, under §521(e)(2). If the
debtor fails to do this, the case will be dismissed under §521(e)(2)(B). However, this
dismissal appears to require some action by the trustee, reporting the failure to provide
the tax returns. Thus, the case will probably not be automatically dismissed by the
Clerk, and the Trustee will have some control over this process.
Many districts already have local rules requiring debtors to bring certain
information (including tax returns) with them to the §341 hearing. It is possible that
trustees will only report the failure to provide this information if it is not submitted
before end the meeting of creditors; otherwise, monitoring and receiving this
information, piecemeal, from numerous debtors could become burdensome. Further,
the statute requires that the returns be "provided" to the trustee; it does not require the
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trustee to keep the returns. Thus, as long as the debtors offer their returns to the
Trustee, the Trustees could elect to retain only those returns in cases where the
information could be helpful to the administration of the case.

§522 Exemptions (Additions and Limitations):
- Under a new §522(b)(3)(A), the 180 day domicile requirement has been
increased to 730 days (2 years). The applicable state will be the state where the debtor
has resided for the 730 days prior to filing the petition; if the debtor has moved during
that time period, then the applicable state is the one where the debtor resided for the
greater portion of the 180 days prior to that 730 day period.
It is possible that a debtor will not be able to claim exemptions under any state
law (many states require the debtor to be domiciled within the state at the time the
exemption is claimed). In these cases, the federal exemptions in §522(d) will be
available for the debtor.
- Under §522(b)(3)(c) retirement funds which are exempt under sections 401,
403,408, 408A, 414, 457 or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code are exempt under
bankruptcy law. §522(b)(4) then goes forward to provide specific rules to apply to
determine of funds fit into that category. (This exemption is also carried over into the
list of exempt property under the federal exemptions in §522(d)(12).)
- §522(b)(4)(C) provides that a "direct transfer" of exempt retirement
funds ... "shall not cease to qualify for exemption...by reason of such direct transfer."
Subsection (D) provides that any distribution of exempt retirement funds which
qualifies as an eligible rollover distribution shall not cease to qualify for exemption.
These sections reverse the line of cases holding that exempt pensions lose their
exempt status when withdrawn and placed in another account, In re McCollum, 287
B.R. 750 (Bankr.E.D.Mo. 2002); or when distributed to an ex-spouse through a
QUADRO. See In re Anderson, 269 B.R. 27 (8th Cir. BAP 2001).
- §522(n) limits the amount of funds that can be exempted under §408 or
§408A of the Internal Revenue Code to $1 million. There are exclusions and the
amount can be increased by the Court, "if the interests ofjustice so require".
- §522(0)is another new provision; in subsection (0)(4), if a debtor has
committed a fraudulent conveyance (with intent) during the 10 years prior to the filing
of the petition, then any allowed homestead exemption can be reduced to the extent of
said fraudulent conveyance.
- §522(p) limits a homestead exemption to anyone who has purchased their
real property within 1215 days (3 years, 4 months) prior to the filing of the petition.
The debtor may only claim a homestead exemption of up to $125,000 in property that
was acquired within those 1215 days. (If the debtors sells one residence, purchased

C - 120

outside the 1215 day window, and purchases a new residence - all within the same
state - this limitation does not apply.)
- §522(q) The homestead exemption may also be limited to $125,000 if the
debtor has committed certain tortuous acts defined within the section.

§541 The bankruptcy estate will now exclude additional assets:
- Under §541(b)(5) & (6), funds that are transferred into aan education IRA
under IRC §530(b)(1), or into a tuition credit or certificate, are not property of the
estate if:
(1) the funds are transferred into the fund either (a) outside 720
days prior to the filing or (b) between 365 days and 720 days prior to filing
and the amount of said transfer is not greater than $5,000, and
(2) the beneficiary is a child, step child, grandchild or step
grandchild or the debtor.
- Under the new §541(b)(7) withheld funds for employee benefits, annuities,
and health insurance plans are not property of the estate.
- Under the new §541 (b)(8) assets pledged for non-recourse loans, where the
lender takes possession of the assets, and the debtor's only rights involve redemption,
are not property of the estate.

§546 The reclamation rights of vendors is also enhanced.
- Under §546(c)(I), the time for sellers of goods to give notice of their rights
to reclaim goods is increased to 45 days from receipt of the goods be the debtor (from
10 days), and, if a bankruptcy petition is filed during that 45 day period, the seller has
20 days after the fling to thus perfect their claim. The new subsection (c)(I) further
affirms case law which holds that a prior security interest in reclamation goods trumps
the rights of the reclaiming creditor. See Pester Ref Co. v. Ethyl Corp. (In re Pester
Ref Co.), 964 F.2d 842 (8th Cir. 1992).
- Under §546(c)(2), if the seller fails to give the required Notice under (c)(1),
the seller can still assert a priority, administrative claim under §503(b) - for the goods
shipped within the 20 days prior to the filing, even though they did not perfect their
reclamation claim. See the changes to §503(b)(2)(F)(9).

§547

The defenses to preference recovery are expanded.
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- Under §547(c)(2) the language in the ordinary course of business exception
is modified to include transfers "made according to ordinary business terms", to
expand the defense to include more than just the relationship between the transferor
and transferee. The "and" is replaced by "or" in §547(c)(2)(A), which seems to
indicate that it is sufficient to prove either ordinary course between the parties or
according to ordinary business terms (within the industry). This reverses cases such as
GulfCity Seafoods, Inc. v. Ludvig Shrimp Co., Inc., 296 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2002),
which have required proof of both elements to meet the affirmative defense burden.

- Under §547 (c)(3), the 20 day relation-back period for the perfection of
purchase money security interests is now increased to thirty (30) days from the
possession date. (The only change is the substitution of the number "30" for the
number "20".)
- Under §547(c)(7) trustees cannot recover payments of domestic support
obligations. (Note: after the increase in the priority of support claimants in §507(a)(1),
this seems unnecessary.)
- Under §547(c)(8) payments in the aggregate amount ofless than $5,000, to
creditors in non-consumer cases, cannot be recovered.
- §547(e)(2) is modified to increase the "relation-back" period for purchase
money security interests from 10 days to 30 days.
- Under §547(h) the trustee cannot avoid payments made as part of a
repayment plan to a non-profit credit counseling agency.
- Under §547(i) the DePrizio doctrine is forever abolished, and the only
recovery that a trustee can obtain from an insider preference (outside 90 days but
within 1 year) is directly from the insider.

§548 Fraudulent Conveyance provisions are expanded.
- The one year period within which fraudulent conveyances can be recovered
is increased to 2 years. (In many states, trustees have been using state law, under.
§544(b), to recover fraudulent conveyances outside one year, but this change will now
allow all trustees to use the federal statute going back two years.)
- Under §548(a)(1)(B)(IV), transfers to insiders under employment contracts,
and out of the ordinary course of business, can be avoided. The trustee will still have
to show a lack of fair consideration.
- A new §548(e)(1) is added to create an avoidance action where a debtor
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makes a transfer to a self-settled trust any time within 10 years prior to the filing of the
petition, if that transfer was made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
existing at that time.

§704 Duties of Trustees
- Under §704(a)(10), trustees must provide a specified Notice to all Support
claimants, in any case (asset or no-asset) where such a claimant exists. The exact
information to be supplied is set forth in §704(c), and requires a Notice to the Support
Claimant, a Notice to the State agency where the Claimant resides, and similar Notices
after the entry of the discharge including new information about any non-discharged
debt, reaffirmations, and the address of the employer. This new requirement will be a
burden for trustees, and the methods for implementation could vary greatly around the
country.
- Under §704(a)(11), trustees must assume the role of the Plan Administrator
of an Employee benefit plan, if the debtor held those responsibilities.
- In health care cases, §704(a)(12) now requires trustees to be responsible for
transfers of patients. In a related new section, §351 also requires trustees to preserve
all patient records, to notify all patients of the records, and to proceed through a costly
and difficult process to properly deal with the records. In No Asset cases, this
provision is unworkable; the costs of compliance are enormous. Health Care cases
will not be very attractive to Trustees, and they may need to decline appointment to
avoid devastating consequences.

§707(b) Dismissal for Abuse
- The Means test is not discussed herein; refer to ABI website and numerous
articles for discussion of this test.
- As part of the extensive changes to §707(b), the U.S. Trustee must the filing
of a Report in every case (within 10 days after the §341 hearing) establishing whether
the debtor is within the financial limitations for relief under chapter 7, and whether the
case may be subject to a motion to dismiss. The duties of the UST are incorporated
into a new section 704(b), which is not applicable to case trustees.
- §707(b) does permit panel trustees (and creditors), in cases where the
debtor's income exceeds the median average, to file motions to dismiss in cases.
Although it is doubtful the trustees will pursue motions to dismiss in many instances,
there may be circumstances where the trustee will want to raise the issue, perhaps
where the debtor has substantial exempt assets and the ability to repay creditors, but
somehow survives the needs-based test.
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§724 Lien avoidance is restricted to limit the rights of the trustee to
"avoid" or subordinate tax liens, in order to pay priority claims.
- Subsection (b) specifies that ad valorem taxes on property cannot be
avoided.
- Subsection (b)(2) limits the administrative expenses allowable to be paid for
Chapter 7 expenses (the word "fees" does not appear), and specifically disallows
Chapter 11 expenses to be paid as a "carve-out" from tax liens. This was intended to
prevent a Chapter 11 debtor from accumulating massive post-petition obligations, and
then using §724 to avoid pre-petition tax liens to pay those claims.
- Under §724(e) the trustee must first exhaust all other unencumbered assets,
and recover any allowable §506(c) expenses, before seeking to subordinate tax liens
under the section.

§726 Priorities for distribution in Chapter 7 are clarified.
- under subsection 726(a) all timely-filed priority claims are paid, but this
section also includes tardily-filed claims. The statute has been clarified to specify that
these tardily-filed claims can only be paid if they are filed before the earlier of (1) 10
days after the mailing of the trustee's final report, or (2) the date the trustee
commences final distribution.

§727 Additional Grounds for Objections to Discharge are added.
- The time between filings for chapter 7 cases and receiving a discharge is
increased from six (6) years to eight (8) years. The only change in §727(a)(8) is the
replacement of the number "8" for the number "6".
- Under §727(a)(II), debtors must complete a financial education course as a
condition to their discharge. Section 105 of the bill provides for pilot programs in 6
districts to explore methods for this education, but Section 106 adds this condition to
§727 before the pilot program is complete. The application of this section may be
dependent upon the approval of the U.S. Trustee in each district, and only where the
methods to implement this educational program.

§1112: Conversion or dismissal.
- The statute dealing with conversion or dismissal from Chapter 11 is
radically altered. Under present law the Court has broad, permissive discretion under
§1112(b) to convert or dismiss a Chapter 11 case, including cases where plans cannot
be confirmed and liquidation is in process. See Loop Corp., et al. v. United States
Trustee, et al., 379 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2004). The new §1112(b) essentially shifts the
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burden to the Debtor upon showing of cause for conversion or dismissal.
Additionally, a non-inclusive list of 18 specific examples of cause are stated. This
amendment appears to address the problem of Chapter 11 cases being kept alive by
insiders, who continue getting paid, and wasting assets to the detriment of creditors.
This provision should result in more cases being converted to Chapter 7 before all of
the assets are consumed. Further, with the addition of §1115, post-petition assets
remain part of the estate.

§1115 Property of the Estate
- Under a new §1115, an Individual in a Chapter 11, which converts to
Chapter 7, 12, or 13, has claim to the property or earnings acquired post-petition.
After-acquired, pre-conversion assets in unconfirmed cases are now specifically
property of the estate, subject to administration be the trustee in the converted case.
The confirmation of a Plan can modify this. ( A similar provision already exists in
Chapter 13 - §1306(a), but, since most converted Chapter 13 cases involve a
confirmed Plan which modifies the debtor's rights to property, trustees seldom benefit
from this provision.)

§1326 Limitation on Compensation in Converted Cases
- If the Trustee is awarded a trustee's fee in a case converted due to §707(b),
that awarded is limited, under §1326(b)(3). This amendment had previously
referenced the allowance of a fee notwithstanding the §326 cap, but the Senate Bill
did not include that language. Also, a prior version would have allowed the trustee a
fee in any case converted or dismissed because of the trustee's actions (or threats of
administration of assets), other than under §707(b); that provision also was deleted
from the final Bill. Any payments under this provision are limited to the greater of: (1)
$25 per month, or (2) 5% of the proposed distribution to unsecured creditors, spread
out over the length of the plan. The amendment did not alter the rights of
professionals working for the trustee to be compensated (as provided in §330) as
administrative claims in any converted case. The amendments do not seem to effect
the payment structure of a trustee's fee (if awarded) in cases where the conversion
takes place for other reasons than under §707(b). Under the present language, this
provision will have virtually no effect on Chapter 7 practices, and would tend to
penalize, not reward, Trustees for participating in the §707(b) process.

28 U.S.C. 1409(b) Venue limitations
- Actions to avoid preferences or recover judgments in amounts not
exceeding $10,000, against non-insiders in non-consumer cases, must be brought in
the district where the defendant resides (not the court where the bankruptcy
proceeding is pending). That amount is increased to $15,000 (from $5,000) for
actions to recover a consumer debt. (That minimum is $1,000 for insiders.)
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28 U.S.C. §586(d) Due Process for Trustees
- The procedures for obtaining a fair review in District Court, when a trustee
is suspended or removed from the panel, are included in the bill. These are the same
provisions which were exhaustively discussed and compromised with the EOUST, the
NACTT, and NABT several years ago. [These provisions require the trustee to
exhaust administrative remedies - already established by the Executive Director - and
certain time limitations are set forth in the section.]

C - 126

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE
AS A RESULT OF
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

Materials Prepared By:

Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee, Eastern District ofKentucky
Lexington, Kentucky

Presented By:

Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee, Eastern District ofKentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
William Lawrence
Chapter 13 Trustee, Western District ofKentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
David G. Perdue
Attorney at Law
Winchester, Kentucky
J.D. Kermode
Atkinson, Simms, Kermode
Lexington, Kentucky

Copyright 2005. Beverly M. Burden and UKICLE. All Rights Reserved.

SECTIOND

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN
CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE
AS A RESULT OF
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
by
Beverly M. Burden
Chapter 13 Trustee, Eastern District of Kentucky

Prepared for
BAPCPA: Nuts and Bolts
University of Kentucky College of Law
September 30, 2005

WARNING:
DO NOT RELY ON THIS OUTLINE!
YOU MUST READ THE AMENDED BANKRUPTCY CODE
AND FORMULATE YOUR OWN CONCLUSIONS.
This outline generally reflects my interpretation of the provisio ns of the
BAPCPA to chapter 13 practice. I reserve the right to take a contrary position in
any particular case depending on the facts of that case, and I reserve the right to
argue an interpretation of the law that may differ from that set forth in this outline.
Furthermore, this outline does not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the
other speakers on this panel.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AS A RESULT
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005

A.

TREATMENT OF SECURED CLAIMS ....•........................... D-l

B.

DISPOSABLE INCOME

C.

TREATMENT OF UNSECURED CLAIMS

D-15

D.

OTHER ISSUES

D-17

E.

DISCHARGE

D-20

D-6

APPENDIX
1.

"Cram-Down" Flowchart: Does Section 506 Apply?

2.

Statement of Current Monthly Income and Disposable Income
Calculation - For Use in Chapter 13 Only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-27

3.

Statement of Current Monthly Income and Disposable Income
Calculation - For Use in Chapter 13 Only - IRS Extra

D-33

4.

Forms 22A, 22B, & 23C - Committee Note

D-39

5.

IRS Collection Financial Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-47

6.

National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. D-49

7.

Kentucky - Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses

D-51

8.

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation

D-55

9.

Internal Revenue Manual - Allowable Expense

D-61

SECTIOND

D-25

A) Treatment of Secured Claims
1) § 1325(a)(5) - The plan can be confirmed if, with respect to each allowed secured
claim provided for by the plan a) the creditor has accepted the plan [no change]; or
b) if the debtor keeps the property, the plan provides that:
(i)

the creditor retains the lien until the earlier of:
(01) "the payment of the underlying debt determined under
nonbankruptcy law" or
(02)

the discharge under § 1328;

(03)

and

(ii)

''the value, as ofthe effective date of the plan, of property to
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim" [no change]; and

(iii)

if "property to be distributed pursuant to this subsection is in the form
of periodic payments, such payments shall be in equal monthly
installments"; and

(iv)

(v)

if ''the holder ofthe claim is secured by personal property, the amount
of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to provide to
the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period ofthe
plan";
or

c) the debtor surrenders the collateral.
2) Section 506 is not applicable to certain claims. § 1325(a) unnumbered paragraph
following § 1325(a)(9) provides: "For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506
shall not apply to a claim described in that paragraph if ..."
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a) "910 car claims":
(i)

the creditor has a purchase money security interest,

(ii)

in a motor vehicle (as defined in title 49 U.S.C.),

(iii)

purchased for:

(iv)

(01)

the personal use

(02)

of the debtor,

within 910 days (2-1/2 years) before bankruptcy;

b) "I-year claims":
(i)

the collateral consists of "any other thing of value", and

(ii)

the debt was incurred during the I-year period preceding bankruptcy.

c) 910 car claims and 1-year claims do not have to be paid according to the terms
ofthe contract. Section 506 cannot be used to value the collateral and
bifurcate the claim into a secured and unsecured portion. However, nothing
appears to prohibit a modification of the interest rate or other terms of the note
(such as the length oftime during which payments can be made).
d) If section 506 does not apply to 910 car claims or I-year claims, then it
appears that creditors holding those claims would not be entitled to a contract
rate of interest even though fully secured, nor would creditors holding those
claims be entitled to post-petition attorneys' fees as provided by section
506(b).
e) Also, creditors holding 910 car claims or I-year claims would appear to lack
standing to object to the debtor's disposable income under § 1325(b)(1)
because the creditor would not be a holder of an allowed unsecured claim.
3) In the event a modification of value is permitted, the method of valuation is now
codified as "replacement value."
a) § 506(a), which provides for the bifurcation of a claim into a secured claim to
the extent of the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim as to the
balance, now consists of 2 paragraphs.
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b) § 506(a)(2) provides: "Ifthe debtor is an individual in a case under chapter 7
or 13, such value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim
shall be determined based on the replacement value of such property as ofthe
date of the filing of the petition without deduction for costs of sale or
marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family, or
household purposes, replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant
would charge for property ofthat kind considering the age and condition of
the property at the time value is determined."
c) It appears that the "garage sale" value is no longer appropriate. However, the
end result may be the same ifthe value is instead determined by what a
merchant at a flea market or on E-Bay would charge for similar property.
4) § 348(f)(1)(B): Valuations in chapter 13 do not apply in a case converted to
chapter 7.
5) Payments on secured debts:
a) § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(I): Payments must be in equal monthly installments (i.e.,
the trustee can no longer distribute to the class of secured claims on a pro-rata
basis), and
b) § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II): Ifthe claim is secured by personal property,
payments must be sufficient to provide "adequate protection" "during the
period ofthe plan."
(i)

What constitutes "adequate protection" is described in § 361.

(ii)

Per § 361 [no change], adequate protection may be provided by(01) making periodic payments to the extent that the use ofthe
collateral under § 363(e) results in a decrease in the value of the
creditor's interest in the collateral;
(02) providing an additional or replacement lien to the extent of the
decrease in the value ofthe creditor's interest in the collateral;
(03) granting other relief "as will result in the realization by such entity
ofthe indubitable equivalent of' the creditor's interest in the collateral.

(iii)

An over-secured creditor may not be entitled to pre-confirmation
adequate protection payments ifthe equity cushion is sufficient to protect
the creditor.
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c) As discussed elsewhere in these materials, the requirement that all secured
creditors be paid in equal monthly payments coupled with the requirement
that creditors with security interests in personal property receive adequate
protection payments will make it unlikely that the debtor's attorney fee can be
paid first.
6) § 1326(a)(l), Pre-confirmation adequate protection payments:
a)

Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor must pay postpetition/preconfirmation adequate protection payments directly to a creditor holding an
allowed claim secured by a purchase-money security interest in personal
property, reducing the plan payment by the amount of the adequate protection
payment and providing the trustee with evidence of the payment.

b) Because of the difficulties in accounting for pre-confirmation adequate
protection payments made directly by the debtor to a creditor, expect that
most trustees will seek a local rule or court order that will have the trustee
disburse pre-confirmation adequate protection payments.
c) In order to receive pre-confirmation adequate protection payments, the
creditor must file a proof of claim, which is allowed if not objected to.
7) Pre-confirmation adequate protection payments may differ in amount from postconfirmation payments.
a) The purpose of the pre-confirmation adequate protection payments is merely
to compensate the creditor for the depreciation in property pending
confirmation.
b) Payments made to the secured creditor through the plan must be sufficient to
pay the secured value of the vehicle in full with interest, and those payments
must also provide adequate protection.
c) For example, a creditor secured by a car valued at $10,000 depreciating at the
rate of 1% per month would be entitled to pre-confirmation adequate
protection payments of$100. However, in order to pay the creditor the full
$10,000 at 7% over 55 months, post-confirmation disbursements to the
creditor would need to be about $215 per month.
8) § 1326(a)(4): Within 60 days after filing the petition, the debtor must provide to
a creditor holding a purchase money security interest in personal property
evidence of insurance.
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9) § 524(i) The willful failure of a creditor to credit payments made to the creditor
pursuant to the plan in accordance with the plan constitutes a violation of the
discharge injunction if the failure to properly credit the payments caused a
material injury to the debtor.
10) Interest rate on secured tax debts: If interest is required to be paid on a tax claim,
the interest rate is determined under applicable nonbankruptcy law (i.e., statutory
interest), and the rate of interest payable through a confirmed plan is determined
as ofthe calendar month in which the plan is confirmed. § 511.
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B) Disposable Income
1) § 1325(b)(l)(B): If the trustee or a creditor holding an unsecured claim objects
to confirmation, the Plan must provide that: "all of the debtor's projected
disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period will be
applied to make payments to the unsecured creditors under the plan."
2) Start with "current monthly income" ("CMI") defined in § 101(10A) as:
a)

''the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a
joint case the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive)" for the 6 full calendar
months prior to the petition;

b) include "any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or in a joint
case the debtor and the debtor's spouse) on a regular basis for the household
expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents";
c) Exclude per § 101(lOA):
(i)

benefits received under the Social Security Act (is unemployment
compensation a benefit under the SSA?),

(ii)

payments to victims of war crimes,

(iii)

payments to victims ofterrorism.

d) All income figures must reflect the average monthly income for the six
calendar months ending on the last day of the month prior to bankruptcy.
(i)

For example, regardless of whether a case is filed on November 1 or
November 30, the six-month period prior to bankruptcy will end on
October 31.

(ii)

To arrive at the six-month average income, total all amounts received
during the six-month period and divide by 6.

(iii)
Be prepared to provide to the trustee or UST documentation and/or
worksheets showing the amount and source of each month's income.
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3) Determine which expenses are allowable by comparing the debtor's current
monthly income with the median income for a family of the same size in the state
in which the debtor resides.
a) § 1325(b)(3): "Amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under [§
1325(b)(2)] shall be determined in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B)
of section 707(b)(2) if the debtor has current monthly income, when
multiplied by 12, greater than" the median family income of the applicable
State for the appropriate family size.
b) § 101(39A): "Median Family Income" is the median family income
calculated and reported by the Bureau of the Census, adjusted to reflect
changes in the Consumer Price Index.
(i)

For a single debtor with no dependents, use the Median Family Income
By Number of Earners in Family.

(ii)

For debtors with 2-,3-, or 4-person families, use the Median Family
Income By Family Size.

(iii)

For debtors with 5 or more persons in the family, use the Median
Family Income for a family of 4 and "add $525 per month for each
individual in excess of 4." § 1325(b)(3)(C).

c) If the debtor's CMI is greater than the applicable median income, expenses
will be those allowed in the § 707(b)(2) means test. § 1325(b)(3).
d) If the debtor's CMI is less than median income, presumably the amount of
reasonably necessary expenses is determined in the same manner as under
present law.
4) Deduct allowable expenses from CMI. If expenses are determined under §
1325(b)(3) and § 707(b)(2), the following expenses are allowed. The descriptions
are from the proposed Interim Form Statement of Current Monthly Income and
Disposable Income Calculation For Use In Chapter 13 Only (with IRS housing
and maintenance expenses separated).
a) From CM!, deduct the following expenses that are allowable pursuant to the
IRS Financial Standards.
(i)

The relevant IRS Collection Financial Standards are included in the
Appendix to this outline. The National Financial Standards for food,
household expenses, etc. are determined based on the debtor's family size
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and income level. The income levels are based on "gross monthly
income." As ofthe date this outline was prepared, it was not clear
whether the applicable gross monthly income will be the income set forth
on Schedule I or the "Current Monthly Income" as calculated above.
(ii)

The portion of the Internal Revenue Manual addressing the IRS
Financial Collection Standards is also included in the Appendix. It is
unclear how relevant the IRS' procedures will be in determining 707(b) or
disposable income issues in the context of a bankruptcy case. For
example, according to the IRS Manual, charitable contributions would not
be an allowable expense. However, the drafters of the proposed Interim
Form 22C included a deduction for ongoing charitable contributions, and
an argument could be rmde that the 15% cap of § 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii) still
applies.
National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care,
and miscellaneous. Enter "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable
Living Expenses for the applicable family size and income level. (This information is
available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

Local Standards: housing and utilities; utilities/maintenance expense.
Enter amount from the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Utilities/Maintenance
Expense for the applicable county and family size. (This information is available at
www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court).

Local Standards: housing and utilities; mortgage/rental expense. Enter
amount from the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense for the
applicable county and family size. (ThiS information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt
secured by your home included in Line 37. Subtract the amount of the Line 37
Average Monthly Payment attributable to such debts from the IRS
Mortgage/Rental Expense, but do not list an amount less than zero.
Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public
transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay
the expenses of operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public
transportation. Enter the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses
or for which the operating expenses are included as a contribution to your household
expenses in Line 7.
o 1 2 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & PubliC
Transportation Costs for the applicable number of vehic les in the applicable Metropolitan
Statistical Area or Census Region. (This information is available at www.irs.gov;
www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1.
Enter the number of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may
not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
1 2 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car. (ThiS
information is available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 1
included in Line 37. Subtract the amount of the Line 37 Average Monthly
Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car, but do not list an amount less than zero.
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Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2.
Complete this Line only if you checked the "2 or more" Box in Line 21.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car.
(This information is available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ust! or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 2
included in Line 37. Subtract the amount of the Line 37 Average Monthly
Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS Transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car, but do not list an amount less than
zero.

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that
you actually incur for all federal, state and local taxes, other than real estate and sales
taxes, such as income taxes, self employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare
taxes. Do not include real estate or sales taxes.

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total
average monthly payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as
mandatory retirement contributions, union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include
discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory 401(k) contributions.
Other Necessary Expenses: insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that
you actually pay for term life, dental, vision, long term care, and other types of
insurance not deducted elsewhere in the statement. Do not include automobile,
liability, homeowner's or contents insurance, whole life premiums, or any
amounts included in Lines 26 or 29.
Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total
monthly amount that you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal
or child support payments. Do not include payments on past due support
obligations included in Line 39.

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that
you actually expend on childcare. Do not include payments made for primary and
secondary education.
Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount
that you actually expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance
or paid by a health savings account.
Other Necessary Expenses: business expenses. Enter the average monthly
expenses that you incur in order to operate a business or otherwise produce income. Do
not include any amount previously deducted.

b) Then deduct additional expenses expressly allowed under § 707(b) (these are
not part of the IRS Financial Collection Standards):
Health Insurance, Disability Insurance and Health Savings Account
Expenses. List the average monthly amounts that you actually expend in each of the
following categories and enter the total.
a. Health Insurance
b. Disability Insurance
c. Health Savings Account

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members.
Enter the actual monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and
necessary care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your
household or member of your immediate family who is unable to pay for such expenses.
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Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that
you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act or other applicable federal law.
Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS
Local Standards. Enter the average monthly amount by which your horne energy
costs exceed the allowance in the IRS Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You
must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the
additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average
monthly expenses that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing
elementary and secondary education for your dependent children less than 18 years of
age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating
that the amount claimed is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted for in the IRS Standards.

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by
which your food and clothing expenses exceed the comb ined allowances for food and
apparel in the IRS National Standards, not exceed five percent of those combined
allowances. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to
contribute in the form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as
defined in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

c) Then calculate deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2) for debt payment not
previously deducted under the IRS Financial Standards or elsewhere.
(i)

First, read § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) carefully: "The debtor's average
monthly payment on account of secured debts shall be calculated as the
sum of(I) the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured
creditors in each month ofthe 60 months following the date ofthe
petition; and
(II) any additional payments to secured creditors necessary for the debtor,
in filing a plan under chapter 13 of this title, to maintain possession of the
debtor's primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for
the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, that serves as
collateral for secured debts;
divided by 60."

(ii)

Note that the first part of the equation, the ''total of all amounts
scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the
60 months following the date of the petition," does not have the
qualification that the collateral securing debts contractually due be
necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, nor is
there any requirement that the amounts be reasonable.
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(01) lfthe collateral is to be surrendered in the chapter 13 case, is the
deduction for that debt appropriate?
(02) lfthe deduction is for a "luxury" item such as an ATV, a boat, or
an expensive car, is there a valid good faith objection?
Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by
an interest in property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property
securing the debt, and state the Average Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly
Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor in the 60
months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 50. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not include items you have previously
deducted, such as insurance and taxes.
Name of Creditor

Prooerty Securina the Debt

Ayeraae MonthlY Payment

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 37 are
in default, and the property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the
support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/50th of the amount
that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default (the "cure amount") in order to
maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the following chart and
enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
Name of Creditor

Property Securing the Debt in Default

1/60th of the Cure Amount

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims
(including priority child support and alimony claims), divided by 50.
Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount in line a by the
amount in line b, and enter the resulting administrative expense.
a. Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment. $
b. Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules issued by the
Executive Office for United States Trustees. (This information is available at
www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)
c. Total average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case: $

d) Then deduct certain support income pursuant to § 1325(b)(2) (this income
should have been included when calculating the debtor's eMl and is now
backed out ofthe disposable income equation).
Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster
care payments, or disability payments for a dependent child, included in Line 7, that you
received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably
necessary to be expended for such child.

e) Then deduct contributions to qualified retirement plans and repayment of
loans from retirement plans. (e.g., 401K contributions and loan repayments).
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Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all
contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in §
54l(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans from retirement plans, as specified in §
362(b)(19).

5) CMI minus the above-described deductions = Monthly Disposable Income under
§ 1325(b)(2).
6) Projected Disposable Income to be received in the "applicable commitment
period" will be paid to unsecured creditors.
a) § 1325(b)(4)(A): The "Applicable Commitment Period" is:
(i)
(ii)

3 years, or
not less than 5 years "if the current monthly income of the debtor and
the debtor's spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than ..."
the median family income.

b) The maximum duration of the plan is set forth in § 1322(d):
(i)

"If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse
combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than" the median fumily
income, ''the plan may not provide for payments over a period that is
longer than 5 years."

(ii)

"If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse
combined, when multiplied by 12, is less than" the median family income,
"the plan may not provide for payments over a period that is longer than 3
years," unless the court approves a period that is not longer than 5 years.

c) It is not clear if the "applicable commitment period" is the required duration
of the plan, or if it merely a multiplier to determine the amount of funds
available under the disposable income test to distribute to unsecured creditors.
7) Verification of Income:
a) § 521(a)(1)(B): Debtor must file:
(i)

copies of all "payment advices or evidence of payment received within
60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any
employer of the debtor;"
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(ii)

"a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show
how the amount is calculated"; ("Monthly net income" is not defined. Is it
the amount left over after deducting Schedule J expenses from Schedule I
income? Or is it the calculation of disposable income described above?)
and

"a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income
(iii)
or expenditures over the 12-month period following the date ofthe filing
ofthe petition."
b) It does not appear that the debtor's present income or the debtor's reasonably
anticipated increase in income has any effect on the calculation ofthe debtor's
disposable income.
c) § 521(e)(2)(A): Debtor must provide to the trustee and any requesting
creditor a copy of the debtor's most recent Federal tax return, or at the
debtor's option a transcript of the return.
(i)

The tax return/transcript must be provided to the trustee at least 7 days
before the date first set for the meeting of creditors.

(ii)

If the debtor fails to comply, "the court shall dismiss the case" unless
the debtor demonstrates that noncompliance was due to circumstances
beyond the control of the debtor.

d) § 521 (t)(1)-(t)(3): At the request ofthe court, the U.s. Trustee, or party in
interest, an individual debtor in chapter 7, 11, or 13 must file with the court:
(i)

tax returns/transcripts for "each tax year ofthe debtor ending while the
case is pending";

(ii)

tax returns/transcripts for the preceding 3 years if the returns had not
been filed with the IRS as of the date of the petition but were subsequently
filed;

(iii)

amendments to those tax returns.

e) § 521(t)(4): At the request of the court, the U.S. trustee, or a party in interest,
in a chapter 13 case, the debtor must file annually a statement of income and
expenses for the preceding year, and a statement of monthly income, ''that
shows how income, expenditures, and monthly income are calculated."
(i)

deadlines for filing the 521(t)(4) statement:
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(01) if the plan has not been confirmed, 90 days after the end of the tax
year or one year after the petition date, whichever is later;
(02) after confirmation, annually, "not later than the date that is 45 days
before the anniversary of the confirmation ofthe plan."

§ 521 (g): The statement must disclose:

(ii)

(01)

''the amount and sources of income of the debtor";

(02) "the identity of any person responsible with the debtor for the
support of any dependent of the debtor"; and
(03) ''the identity ofany person who contributed, and the amount
contributed, to the household in which the debtor resides."
It is unclear whether the trustee can use information showing that the
debtor's real income has increased as a basis for seeking an increase in
plan payments, or whether the disposable income test is binding for the
duration of the plan. § 1329(b)(1) does not require that the disposable
income test of § 1325(b) be satisfied to modify a plan after confirmation.

(iii)
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C) Treatment of Unsecured Claims
1) Amended § 1325(b)(I)(B) now provides that the debtor's projected disposable
income to be received in the applicable commitment period will go to unsecured
creditors under the plan.
a) Unsecured creditors include those holding priority claims and those holding
non-priority claims (commonly referred to as general unsecured creditors).
b) Priority claims include administrative expenses: debtor's attorney fee, case
filing fee, chapter 13 trustee's percentage fee, etc.
c) Therefore, the debtor's disposable income (if any, after deducting the secured
debt allowance, pension contributions, pension loan repayments, support
income, and the IRS standard deductions) goes to satisfy administrative
expenses and other priority claims, and anything remaining will go to general
unsecured creditors.
2) The requirement of § 1322(a)(2), that a plan provide for payment in full of all
priority claims, must still be satisfied.
3) The liquidation test of § 1325(a)(4) must still be satisfied.
4) Although the debtor must pay in to the plan sufficient funds to pay the debtor's
attorney's fees in full, the question of when and how the debtor's attorney will be
paid is not so easily resolved.
a) The dual requirement of equal monthly payments in amounts sufficient to
adequately protect secured creditors make it unlikely in most cases that the
attorney will be paid first ahead of secured creditors.
b) The most likely scenario will be that the attorney's fee will be paid
concurrently with secured claims. See § 1326(b)(I) ("Before or at the time of
each payment to creditors under the plan, there shall be paid any unpaid claim
of the kind specified in 507(a)(l) 507(a)(2) of this title.").
c) If there are no secured debts to be paid through the plan, it would seem that
the plan could propose payment of the attorney's fee first, ahead of other
priority creditors and general unsecured creditors.
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d) Similarly, ifthere is only an arrearage claim to be paid but no claims secured
by personal property, there is no requirement that each monthly payment
adequately protect the creditor, so perhaps it may be possible to propose in the
plan that the attorney's fee will be paid in the first x months, after which
disbursements in equal monthly payments will begin on the arrearage claim
(although the creditor may argue that having $0 paid in the first x months
violates the requirement of equal monthly payments).
e) Another option may be to fund all or part of the attorney's fee with funds that
accrue pre-confirmation. Using a prior example, a creditor secured by a car
valued at $10,000 depreciating at the rate of 1% per month would be entitled
to pre-confirmation adequate protection payments of $100. However, in order
to pay the creditor the full $10,000 at 7% over 55 months, post-confirmation
disbursements to the creditor would need to be about $215 per month. If the
debtor is making a monthly plan payment based on disbursements to the
creditor of $215 per month, but only $100 per month is going to the creditor
prior to confirmation, the plan could provide that the difference (less the
trustee's percentage fee, of course) be paid to the attorney.

D·16

D) Other Issues
1) There are no changes to the co-debtor stay of § 1301. "Repeat-filer" joint debtors
who may be stuck with an abbreviated (or non-existent) stay under § 362 may still
be able to stop a foreclosure sale by having only one spouse file a chapter 13 case
and thereby invoking the co-debtor stay.
2) § 1302 imposes on chapter 13 trustees the obligation to provide certain notices to
holders of domestic support obligation claims and to the appropriate child support
enforcement agency at the time of the petition and at the time the debtor receives
a discharge.
3) Filing of prepetition tax returns:

a) New § 1308 provides:
(i)

lfthe debtor has not filed (with the appropriate tax authorities) tax
returns for any of the four tax years preceding the petition, the debtor must
file those tax returns no later than the day before the first date set for the
meeting of creditors.

(ii)

lithe tax returns are not timely filed, the trustee may hold open the
meeting of creditors to allow the debtor additional time to file the returns,
but the additional period shall not extend beyond:
(01) 120 days after the date of the meeting of creditors (for returns that
are past due as ofthe date of the petition); or
(02) the later of 120 days or the expiration ofthe last automatic
extension, whichever is later (for returns that were not past due as of
the date of the petition).

(iii)
Prior to the expiration ofthe deadline, the debtor can request the court
to extend the deadline if the debtor can demonstrate that the failure to file
a return was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control, but the
extended period cannot exceed:
(01) 30 days (for returns that are past due as of the date of the petition);
or
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(02) the applicable extended due date (for returns that were not past due
as of the date ofthe petition).
b) On request of a party in interest or the UST and after notice and hearing, the
court shall dismiss or convert a case for failure to file tax returns as required
by § 1308. § 1307(e).
4) The debtor's failure to pay post-petition domestic support obligations is a new
ground for dismissal or conversion of a chapter 13 case under § 1307(c)(11).
5) Certain domestic support obligations (DSO's) can be separately classified in a
plan.
a) Section 507(a)(I) makes a distinction between DSO's owed directly to a DSO
claim holder and DSO's that have been assigned to a governmental agency.
b) Assigned DSO claims do not have to be paid in full "ifthe plan provides that
all of the debtor's projected disposable income for a 5-year period beginning
on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make
payments under the plan." § 1322(a)(4).
6) Interest on nondischargeable debts can be paid through the plan ifthe debtor has
disposable income available to pay such interest after paying all allowed claims in
full. § 1322(b)(1 0).
7) The confirmation "may be held not earlier than 20 days and not later than 45 days
after the date of the meeting of creditors under section 341 (a), unless the court
determines that it would be in the best interests of the creditors and the estate to
hold such hearing at an earlier date and there is no objection to the earlier date." §
1324(b).
8) § 1326(a)(1): Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor must commence
making payments 30 days after the filing of the petition Actually, the statute says
the debtor shall commence making payments not later than 30 days "after the date
of the filing ofthe plan or the order for relief, whichever is earlier," but how can a
plan be filed earlier than the petition?
9) Compensation for a chapter 7 trustee in a case converted to chapter 13:
a) If a chapter 7 trustee "chases" a debtor into chapter 13 due to § 707(b) issues
and is awarded compensation for so doing, the chapter 7 trustee can be paid
through the plan monthly at a rate of at least $25 per month. § 1326(b)(3).
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b) This provision should not limit a chapter 7 trustee's right to assert a quantum
meruit claim if the case converts from a 7 to a 13 for reasons other than §
707(b) (e.g., where the chapter 7 trustee finds an avoidable lien and the debtor
converts to a chapter 13 in order to retain possession ofthe property).
10) The debtor can modify a plan after confirmation in certain instances to reduce
plan payments as may be necessary to enable the debtor to purchase or maintain
health insurance. § 1329(a)(4).
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E) Discharge
1) § 1328: There are additional conditions that must be satisfied before the
discharge can be entered:
a) § 1328(a): Ifthe debtor owed or owes a debt under a "domestic support
obligation" (child support, for example), the debtor must certify that all
amounts required to be paid have been paid.
b) § 1328(g): The debtor must complete a course in personal financial
management. Proposed Interim Form #23 is a Debtor's Certification of
Completion ofInstructional Course Concerning Personal Financial
Management.
c) § 1328(h): The court must determine, after notice and hearing no more than
10 days before entering the discharge:
(i)

that there is no reasonable cause to believe that § 522(q)(l) applies to
the debtor; that is, that the debtor has claimed under state law certain
exemptions totaling more than $125,000, and
(01) per § 522(q)(l )(A) has been convicted of a felony which shows an
abuse of the bankruptcy laws; or
(02)

per § 522(q)(l)(B) the debtor owes a debt for securities fraud; or

(03) per § 522(q)(l)(B)(iv) the debtor owes a debt arising from "any
criminal act, intentional tort, or willful or reckless misconduct that
caused serious physical injury or death to another individual in the
preceding 5 years."
(ii)

and that there is no reasonable cause to believe that there is a pending
proceeding that might give rise to a § 522(q)(l) situation.

2) The "super-discharge" is greatly diminished. Debts that are nondischargeable in a
chapter 13 case have been expanded and now include:
a) § 1322(b)(5) long-term debts [no change];
b) § 507(a)(8)(C) priority tax debts;
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c) the following obligations that are nondischargeable under § 523(a):
(i)

§ 523(a)(1)(B) - debts arising from unfiled or late-filed tax returns;

(ii)

§ 523(a)(1)(C) debts arising from fraudulent tax returns;

(iii)
§ 523(a)(2) debts obtained by fraud, false financial statements; debts
for luxury goods or cash advances obtained shortly before bankruptcy;
(iv)

§ 523(a)(3) unscheduled debts;

(v)

§ 523(a)(4) debts for defalcation or embezzlement;

(vi)

§ 523(a)(5) debts for "domestic support obligations" (defined in §
lOl(14A));

(vii)

§ 523(a)(8) student loan debts;

(viii)

§ 523(a)(9) DUI debts;

d) § 1328(a)(3) restitution and criminal fines [no change];
e) § 1328(a)(4) restitution or damages awarded as a result ofa willful or
malicious personal injury.
3) § 1328(f): A debtor may not receive a discharge in a chapter 13 ifthe debtor
received a discharge:
a) per § 1328(f)(1), in a chapter 7, llor 12 case filed within 4 years of the filing
ofthe chapter 13; or
b) per § 1328(f)(2), in a chapter 13 case filed within 2 years prior to the current
chapter 13 case.
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In re

--::--:-:--;-,--

_

Debtor(s)

Case Number: _"':':':'",------,,

Check the box as directed in Part II, Line 13 of this statement.

o Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)
o Disposable income not determined under§ 1325(b)(3)

_

(If known)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13 ONLY
In addition to Schedule I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 13 debtor,
whether or not filing jointly. Joint debtors may complete one statement only

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. 0 Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-9.
b.
c.

0
0

Married, not filing jointly. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-9.
Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B (Spouse's Income) for
Lines 2-9.

Column A
Debtor's
Income

All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received different amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received during the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
Wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.
Gross income from the operation of a business, profession or farm.
Interest, dividends and royalties.
Rents and other real property income.
Pension and retirement income.
Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents,
including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the debtor's spouse if
Column B is completed.
.
Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column B.
However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your spouse
was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in
Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

Debtor $

Spouse $

Income from all other sources. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. Do
not include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as a
victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.

I: I

I:

Total and enter on Line 9

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total(s).

Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Line 10, Column
A to Line 10, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.
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$

Column B
Spouse's
Income

Annualized current monthly income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
$

enter the result.

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and household size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:

b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.

D The amount on Line

12 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 132S(b)(3)" and complete Part V of
this statement; do not complete Parts III and IV.

D

The amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable income determined under § 132S(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III and IV of this statement only if required. (See Line 14).

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and miscellaneous. Enter "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and income level. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: housing and utilities. Enter amount from the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards for the applicable county and family size. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or
from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on secured debts, such as mortgage payments, to the extent that they are accounted for in the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards.

$

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
Enter the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7.

DoD

1

D

2 or more.

Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Enter the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
D 1 D 2 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car. (This information is
available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 1 Included in Line 36. Subtract the amount of
the Line 36 Average Monthly Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS Transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car, but do not list an amount less than zero.

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the "2 or more" Box in Line 21.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car. (This information is
available at www.ir.s.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 2 included in Line 36. Subtract the amount of
the Line 36 Average Monthly Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS Transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car, but do not list an amount less than zero.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not include real estate or sales taxes.
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Other Necessary Expenses: ma!1datory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401{k) contributions.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually pay
for term life, dental, vision, long term care, and other types of insurance not deducted elsewhere in the
statement. Do not include automobile, liability, homeowner's or contents insurance, whole life
premiums, or any amounts included in Lines 25 or 28.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not include payments on past due support obligations included in Line 38.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. Do not include payments made for primary and secondary education.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: business expenses. Enter the average monthly expenses that you
incur in order to operate a business or otherwise produce income. Do not include any amount previously deducted.
Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 15 through 26

Health Insurance, Disability Insurance and Health Savings Account Expenses. List the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend in each of the following categories and enter the total.
Health Insurance

$

Disability Insurance

$

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Lines a, band c

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses.

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation

demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in prOViding elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted for in the IRS Standards.

$

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or
from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined in 26 U.S.c. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707{b). Enter the total of Lines 28 through 34.

$
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Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by an interest in property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor in the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not include items you have previously deducted, such as
insurance and taxes.
Name of Creditor

Total: Add Lines a, band c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 36 are in default, and the
property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/60th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amount") in order to maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the following chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
1 60th of the Cure Amount

Name of Creditor

Total: Add Lines a, band c

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$
$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount in line a by the amount in line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.
Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Lines a and b

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 36 through 39.

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 27, 35, and 40.

Total current monthly income. Enter the amount from Line 11.
Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
disability payments for a dependent child, included in Line 7, that you received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in § 541(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
from retirement plans; as specified in § 362(b)(19).

$

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the amount from Line 41.

$

Total adjustments to determine disposable income. Add the amounts on Lines 43, 44, and 45
$

and enter the result.

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 1325(b)(2). Subtract Line 46 from Line 42 and enter the
~~

$
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct.
both debtors must sign.)
Date:

_

Signature: _ _----:-=-----,-----,-

_

(Debtor)

Date:

_

Signatu re:
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----c:-:-c-::---:------:cc:-----:------

Joint Debtor if an
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In re

....,....

_

Debtor(s)

Case Number:

Check the box as directed in Part II, Line 13 of this statement.

D

_-;:;-:--~

_

(If known)

D

Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)
Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13 ONLY IRS EXTRA
In addition to Schedule I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 13 debtor,
whether or not filing jointly. Joint debtors may complete one statement only

Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
0 Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-9.
0 Married, not filing jointly. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-9.
c. 0 Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B (Spouse's Income) for
Lines 2-9.
Column A
Column B
All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received difSpouse's
Debtor's
ferent amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received durIncome
Income
ing the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
a.
b.

Wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.
Gross income from the operation of a business, profession or farm.
Interest, dividends and royalties.
Rents and other real property income.
Pension and retirement income.
Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents,
including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the debtor's spouse if
Column B is completed.
Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column B.
However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your spouse
was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in
Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to
be a benefit under the Social Security Act

Debtor $

Spouse $

Income from all other sources. If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. Do
not include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as a
victim of a war crime, crime against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic
terrorism. Specify source and amount.

I: I

I:

Total and enter on Line 9

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total(s).

Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Line 10, Column
A to Line 10, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.
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$

Annualized current monthly income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
$

enter the result.

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and household size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.qov/ust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:

b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed,

D

The amount on Line 12 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete Part V of
this statement; do not complete Parts III and IV.

D

The amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III and IV of this statement only if required. (See Line 13).

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and miscellaneous. Enter "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable living Expenses for the applicable family size and income level. (This information is available at www,usdoLgov/ust! or from the clerk of
the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: housing and utilities; utilities/maintenance expense. Enter amount
from the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Utilities/Maintenance Expense for the applicable county and
family size. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy
court).

$

Local Standards: housing and utilities; mortgage/rental expense. Enter amount from the
IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense for the applicable county and family size,
(This information is available at www.usdoLqov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not
include payments on any debt secured by your home included in Line 37. Subtract the amount
of the Line 37 Average Monthly Payment attributable to such debts from the IRS Mortgage/Rental Expense, but do not list an amount less than zero.
Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
Enter the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating ex··
penses are included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7.
0 0 1 0 2 or more.

o

Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region, (This
information is available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoLqov/ust! or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Enter the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.)
1 0 2 or more.

o

Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car. (This information is
available at www.irs.qov; www.usdoLqov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 1 included in Line 37. Subtract the amount of
the Line 37 Average Monthly Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS Transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car, but do not list an amount less than zero.
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$

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the "2 or more" Box in Line 21.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car. (This information is
available at www.irs.gov; www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court). Do not include payments on any debt secured by Vehicle 2 included in Line 37. Subtract the amount of
the Line 37 Average Monthly Payment attributable to the vehicle from the IRS Transportation
Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car, but do not list an amount less than zero.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not include real estate or sales taxes.
Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly
payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory
401(k) contributions.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually pay
for term life, dental, vision, long term care, and other types of insurance not deducted elsewhere in the
statement. Do not include automobile, liability, homeowner's or contents insurance, whole life
premiums, or any amounts included in Lines 26 or 29.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not include payments on past due support obligations included in Line 39.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. Do not include payments made for primary and secondary education.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: business expenses. Enter the average monthly expenses that you
incur in order to operate a business or otherwise produce income. Do not include any amount previously deducted.
Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 15 through 27

Health Insurance, Disability Insurance and Health Savings Account Expenses. List the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend in each of the folloWing categories and enter the total.
Health Insurance

$

Disability Insurance

$

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Lines a, band c

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses.

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted for in the IRS Standards.

$
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Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information is available at www.usdoLgov/ustl or
from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
'
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.
$

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(1)-(2).
Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Lines 29 through 35.

Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by an interest in property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor in the 60 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not include items you have previously deducted, such as
insurance and taxes.
Name of Creditor

Total: Add Lines a, band c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 37 are in default, and the
property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/60th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amount") in order to maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the following chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
Name of Creditor

1/60th of the Cure Amount

Total: Add Lines a, band c

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.
Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount in line a by the amount in line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.
Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This information is available at www.usdoLgov/ustl or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Lines a and b

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 37 through 40.

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 28, 36, and 41.
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$
$

Total current monthly income. Enter the amount from Line 11.
Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
disability payments for a dependent child, included in Line 7, that you received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in § 541(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
from retirement plans, as specified in § 362(b)(19).

$

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b){2). Enter the amount from Line 42.

$

Total adjustments to determine disposable income. Add the amounts on Lines 44, 45, and 46
.$

and enter the result.

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 1325(b){2). Subtract Line 47 from Line 43 and enter the
$

result.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct.
both debtors must sign.)
Date:

_

Signature: _ _--=-,---,-

_

(Debtor)

Date:

_

Signature: --,,-:---::--,------:-::_-,----
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Forms 22A, 22B, & 23C

COMMITTEE NOTE

A.

Overview

One of the changes in bankruptcy practice introduced by the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005 is a definition of "current monthly income," set
out in § 10l(10A) of the Code. Certain individual debtors in Chapter 7, all individual debtors in
Chapter 11, and all Chapter 13 debtors are required to calculate their income under this
definition. Certain Chapter 7 and 13 debtors are further required to calculate deductions from
current monthly income allowed under the means test of § 707(b)(2)(A). Chapter 7 debtors
subject to the means test may, as reflected in these calculations, be subject to a presumption of
abuse. To comply with the reporting and calculation requirements involving current monthly
income and the means test, three separate forms have been provided-one for Chapter 7, one for
Chapter 11, and one for Chapter 13. This note first describes the "current monthly income"
calculation that is common to all three of the forms, next describes the means test deductions
employed in the Chapter 7 and 13 forms, and finally addresses particular issues that are unique
to each of the separate forms.
B.

Calculation of current monthly income

Current monthly income ("CMI"), as defined in § 101(lOA), has different purposes in
each of the three chapters in which it is used, but basic computation is the same. CMI is a
monthly average of defined "income" received in the six calendar months prior to the bankruptcy
filing by the debtor and, in a joint case, the debtor's spouse. The "income" to be included in this
average is (1) income from all sources, whether or not taxable, and (2) any amount paid by an
entity other than the debtor (or the debtor's spouse in a joint case) on a regular basis for the
household expenses of the debtor, the debtor's dependents, and (in a joint case) the debtor's
spouse if not otherwise a dependent. However, the income to be averaged is defined as not
including "benefits received under the Social Security Act" and certain payments received by
victims of terrorism, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The forms address the calculation of CMI, in each chapter, by a series of line entries,
divided into columns providing for separate entries by the debtor and the debtor's spouse. The
calculation line entries are set out in Part II of the Chapter 7 form, and Part I of the forms for
Chapter 11 and Chapter 13. These line entries for calculating CMI are introduced by a set of
instructions and check boxes indicating when the "debtor's spouse" column is required to be
completed. The instructions also direct the required averaging of the income reported on the line
entries. The line entries set out all of the common forms of income and then include a
"catch-all" line for other types of income. A line is included for regular contributions of support.
Unemployment compensation is given special treatment. Because the federal government
provides funding for state unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act, there may
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be a dispute about whether unemployment compensation is a "benefit received under the Social
Security Act." The forms take no position on the merits of this argument, but allow debtors to
make the argument by excluding unemployment compensation from current monthly income and
reporting it separately, so that the exclusion may be challenged. The forms provide instruction
for proper totaling of the income lines.
C.

Means test deductions from current monthly income

Deductions from CMI are set out in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv). In Chapter 7, these
deductions result in a net number that may generate a presumption of abuse; in Chapter 13, these
deductions may result in the amount of "disposable income" that a debtor may be required to pay
to unsecured creditors under § 1325(b). The forms for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 have identical
sections (Parts V and III, respectively) for calculating the deductions of § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv).
The calculations are divided into subparts reflecting different kinds of deductions allowed.
1.

Deductions under IRS standards

Subpart A deals with deductions from CMI, set out in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), for "the debtor's
applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local
Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other
Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor
resides. " The forms provide entry lines for each of the specified expense deductions under the
IRS standards, and instructions on the entry lines identify the web pages where the relevant IRS
allowances can be found. As with all of the deductions in § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), deductions under
the IRS standards are subject to the proviso that they not include "any payments for debts."
The IRS National Standards provide a single allowance for food, clothing, household
supplies, personal care, and miscellany, depending on income and household size. The forms
contain a single entry line for the applicable allowance.
The IRS Local Standards provide separate deductions for housing and utilities and for
transportation, with different amounts for different areas of the country, depending on family
size and number of vehicles owned or leased. Each of the amounts specified by the IRS in the
Local Standards are treated by the IRS as a cap on actual expenses, but because §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides for deduction in the "amounts specified under the ... Local
Standards," the forms treat these amounts as allowed deductions.
[If the IRS separates its housing allowance in time for the "IRS Extra" versions to be
used: The Local Standards for housing and utilities separate this expense category into a
utilities/maintenance component and a mortgage/rental expense component. The
utilities/maintenance expense is a simple allowance. However, for homeowners with mortgages,
the mortgage/rental expense involves debt payment. Accordingly, the form requires debtors to
deduct from allowance for mortgage/rental expense the average monthly mortgage payment
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(principal and interest), up to the full amount of the IRS mortgage/rental expense. This average
payment is as reported on the separate line of the form for deductions of secured debt, pursuant
to § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii).]
[If the IRS does not separate its housing allowance in time for the "IRS Extra" versions,
so that the "Plain" versions must be used: The Local Standards for housing and utilities provide
a single expense allowance covering both the cost of acquiring housing (rent or mortgage
payments) and the cost of utilities, insurance and maintenance connected with the housing.
Because this allowance includes debt payment, the form directs debtors not to include their
mortgage payments to the extent covered by the IRS allowance. The proper manner of
calculating this required adjustment of the housing and utilities allowance will have to be
determined by judicial decisions.]
The Local Standards for transportation separate this expense category into a vehicle
operation/public transportation component and a component for ownership/lease expense. The
amount of the vehicle operation/public transportation allowance depends on the number of
vehicles the debtor operates [or "for which the debtor pays the operating expenses"], with
debtors who do not operate vehicles being given a public transportation expense. The instruction
for this line item makes it clear that every debtor is thus entitled to some transportation expense
allowance. No debt payment is involved in this allowance. However, for debtors with debt
secured by the vehicles that they operate, the ownership/lease expense does involve debt
payment. Accordingly, the form requires debtors to deduct from allowance for ownership/lease
expense the average monthly loan payment amount (principal and interest), up to the full amount
of the IRS ownership/lease expense amount. This average payment is as reported on the separate
line of the form for deductions of secured debt, pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(a)(iii).
The IRS does not set out allowances for "Other Necessary Expenses." Rather, it sets out
a number of categories for such expenses, and describes the nature of the expenses that may be
deducted in each ofthese categories. Section 707(b)(2)(a)(ii) allows a deduction for the debtor's
actual expenses in these specified categories, subject to its requirement that payment of debt not
be included. Several of the IRS categories deal with debt repayment and so are not included in
the forms. Several other categories deal with business expenses, and the forms combine these
categories into a single line entry. The remaining IRS categories are each set out in individual
line entries. Instructions on the individual entry lines reflect limitations imposed by the IRS and
the need to avoid inclusion of items deducted elsewhere on the forms.
The forms call for a subtotal of the deductions allowed under the IRS standards.
2.

Additional statutory expense deductions

In addition to the IRS expense deductions, subclauses (I), (II), (IV), and (V) of §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii) allow six special expense deductions. Each of these additional expense items is
set out on a separate line entry in Subpart B, introduced by an instruction that there should not be
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double counting of any expense already included in the IRS deductions. Contributions to
tax-exempt charities provide another statutory expense deduction. Section 1325(b)(2)(A)(ii)
expressly allows a deduction from CMI for such contributions (up to 15% of the debtor's gross
income), and § 707(b)(I) provides that in considering whether a Chapter 7 filing is an abuse, the
court may not take into consideration "whether a debtor ... continues to make [tax-exempt]
charitable contributions." Accordingly, Subpart B also includes an entry line for charitable
contributions. Again, the forms call for the additional statutory expense deductions to be
subtotaled.
3.

Deductions for payment of debt

Subpart C of the forms deals with deductions from CMI for payment of secured and
priority debt, as well as a deduction for the administrative fees that would be incurred if the
debtor made debt payments through a Chapter 13 plan. In accord with § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), the
deduction for secured debt is divided into two entry lines-one for payments that are contractually
due during the 60 months following the bankruptcy filing, the other for amounts needed to retain
necessary collateral for secured debts in default. In each situation, the instructions for the entry
lines require dividing the total payment amount by 60, in accord with the statutory directive.
Priority debt, deductible pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(A)(iv), is treated on a single entry line, also
directing division by 60. The defined deduction for the expenses of administering a Chapter 13
plan, allowed by § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III) for debtors eligible for Chapter 13, is treated in an entry
line that requires the eligible debtor to state the amount of the debtor's prospective Chapter 13
plan payment and multiply that payment amount by the percentage fee established for the
debtor's district by the Executive Office for United States Trustees. The forms refer debtors to a
website that will set out this percentage fee. An entry line is provided for subtotaling the debt
payment deductions.
4.

Total deductions

Finally, the forms direct that the subtotals from Subparts A, B, and C be added together
to arrive at the total of allowed deductions from CMI.
D. The Chapter-specific forms
I.

Chapter 7

The Chapter 7 form has several unique aspects. The form includes, in the upper right
comer of the first page, a check box requiring the debtor to state whether or not a presumption of
abuse exists as a result of the information provided by the form. This check box is intended to
give clerks of court a conspicuous indication of the cases for which they will be required to
provide notice of a presumption of abuse pursuant to § 342(d).
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Part I of the fonn implements the provision of § 707(b)(2)(D) that excludes certain
disabled veterans from any fonn of means testing, making it unnecessary to compute the CMI of
such veterans. Debtors who declare under penalty of perjury that they are disabled veterans
within the statutory definition are directed to verify their declaration in Part VII, to check the "no
presumption" box at the beginning of the fonn, and to disregard the remaining parts of the fonn.
Part II of the fonn is the computation of current monthly income ("CMI") as defined in §
10 I(10A). Section 707(b)(2) eliminates standing to assert the means test's presumption of abuse
if the debtor's annualized CMI does not exceed a defined median state income. For this purpose,
the CMI of the debtor's spouse is added to the debtor's CMI even if the debtor's spouse is not a
joint debtor, unless the debtor declares under penalty of perjury that the spouses are legally
separated or living separately other than for purposes of evading the means test. Accordingly,
the calculation of CMI in Part II directs a computation of the CMI of the debtor's spouse in all
cases of married debtors where the debtor is unable to make the specified declaration or where
the debtors are filing jointly, and the CMI of both spouses in these cases is added for purposes of
detennining standing under § 707(b)(7).
Part III of the fonn provides for the comparison of the debtor's CMI for purposes of §
707(b)(7) to the applicable state median income. It then directs debtors whose income does not
exceed the applicable median to verify the fonn, to check the "no presumption" box at the
beginning of the fonn, but to disregard the remaining parts of the fonn. Debtors whose CMI
does exceed the applicable state median are directed to complete the remaining parts of the fonn.
Part IV of the fonn provides for an adjustment of the CMI of a married debtor, not filing
jointly, whose spouse's CMI was included with the debtor's for purposes of detennining standing
to assert the means test presumption. The means test itself does not charge a married debtor in a
non-joint case with the income of the non-filing spouse, but rather only with contributions made
by that spouse to the household expenses of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, as provided
in the definition ofCMI in § 101 (10A). Accordingly, Part IV calls for the combined CMI total
of Part II to be reduced by the amount of the non-filing spouse's income that was not contributed
to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents.
Part V of the fonn provides for a calculation of allowed deductions from the debtor's
CMI, as described above.
Part VI provides for a detennination of whether the debtor's CMI, less the allowed
deductions, gives rise to a presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2)(A). Depending on the
outcome of this detennination, the debtor is directed to check the appropriate box at the
beginning of the fonn and to sign the verification in Part VII.
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2.

Chapter II

The Chapter II form is the simplest of the three, since the means-test deductions of §
707(b)(2) are not employed in determining the extent of an individual Chapter II debtor's
disposable income. Rather, § 1129(a)(15) requires payments of disposable income "as defined in
section 1325(b)(2)," and that paragraph allows calculation of disposable income under
judicially-determined standards, rather than pursuant to the means test deductions, specified for
higher income Chapter 13 debtors by § 1325(b)(3). However, § 1325(b)(2) does require that
CMI be used as the starting point in the judicial determination of disposable income, and so the
Chapter II form requires this calculation (in Part I of the form), as described above, together
with a verification (in Part II).
3.

Chapter 13

Like the Chapter 7 form, the form for Chapter 13 debtors contains a number of special
provisions. Because § 1325(b)(3) employs the means test deductions for debtors whose CMI
exceeds the applicable state median income, the upper right corner of the first page includes
check boxes requiring the debtor to state whether § 1325(b)(3) applies, thus quickly informing
the standing trustees and interested parties ofthe need to consider these deductions.
Part I of the form is the calculation of CMI, as described above.
Part II of the form compares the debtor's CMI to the applicable state median, allowing the
determination of the applicability of the means-test deductions required by § 1325(b)(3).
Part III provides for calculation of the means-test deductions provided in § 707(b)(2), as
described above, and as incorporated by § 1325(b)(3) for debtors with CMI above the applicable
state median.
Part IV provides for three adjustments required by special provisions affecting disposable
income. First, § 1325(b)(2) itself excludes from CMI as used to determine disposable income
certain "child support payments, foster care payments, [and] disability payments for a dependent
child." Because such payments are otherwise included in the definition of CMI in § 10 I(lOA), a
line entry for deduction of these payments is provided. Second, a line entry is provided for
deduction of contributions by the debtor to certain retirement plans, as listed in § 541 (b)(7)(B),
since that provision states that such contributions "shall not constitute disposable income, as
defined in section 1325(b)." Third, the same line entry also allows a deduction from disposable
income for payments on loans from retirement accounts that are excepted from the automatic
stay by § 362(b)(l9), since § 1322(f) provides that for a "loan described in section 362(b)(l9) ..
. any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute 'disposable income' under section
1325."
The Chapter 13 form does not provide a deduction from disposable income for the
Chapter 13 debtor's anticipated attorney fees. There is no specific statutory allowance for such a
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deduction, and none appears necessary. Section 1325(b)(1)(B) requires that disposable income
contributed to a Chapter 13 plan be used to pay "unsecured creditors." A debtor's attorney who
has not taken a security interest in the debtor's property is an unsecured creditor who may be
paid from disposable income.
Part V of the form is the verification.
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IRS Collection Financial Standards
www.irs.gov; search site for "collection financial standards"
General
Collection Financial Standards are used to help detennine a taxpayer's ability to pay a
delinquent tax liability.
Allowances for food, clothing and other items, known as the National Standards, apply
nationwide except for Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers are
allowed the total National Standards amount for their family siz~ and income level, without
questioning amounts actually spent.
Maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the Local
Standards, vary by location. Unlike the National Standards, the taxpayer is allowed the
amount actually spent or the standard, whichever is less.

Food, Clothing and Other Items

National Standards for reasonable amounts have been established for five necessary
expenses: food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care products and
services, and miscellaneous.
All standards except miscellaneous are derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). The miscellaneous standard has been established by
theIRS.

Alaska and Hawaii

Due to their unique geographic circumstances and higher cost ofliving, separate standards
for food, clothing and other items have been established for Alaska and Hawaii.

Housing and Utilities

The housing and utilities standards are derived from Census and BLS data, and are provided
by state down to the county level.

Transportation

The transportation standards consist of nationwide figures for monthly loan or lease
payments referred to as ownership costs, and additional amounts for monthly operating costs
broken down by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Public
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transportation is included under operating costs. A conversion chart has been provided with
the standards which shows which IRS districts fall under each Census Region, as well as the
counties included in each MSA. The ownership cost portion of the transportation standard,
although it applies nationwide, is still considered part ofthe Local Standards.
The ownership costs provide maximum allowances for the lease or purchase ofup to two
automobiles if allowed as a necessary expense. The operating costs are derived from BLS
data.
If a taxpayer has a car payment, the allowable ownership cost added to the allowable
operating cost equals the allowable transportation expense. If a taxpayer has no car payment,
or no car, only the operating costs portion ofthe transportation standard is used to come up
with the allowable transportation expense.

Recent Revisions

The Local Standards for housing and utilities and transportation were revised on 01/0 l/04 to:
•
•
•

add family size to the housing and utilities allowances (two or less, three, and four
or more);
base automobile ownership/leasing costs on the five-year average of new and used
car financing data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; and,
reflect updated information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The revised Local Standards for housing and utilities and transportation are effective for
financial analysis conducted on or after January 1,2004.
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National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses
Collection Financial Standards for Food, Clothing and Other Items. Due to their unique
geographic circumstances and higher cost ofliving, separate standards have been established
for Alaska and Hawaii.

One Person National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
$1,250
to
$1,666

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

215

231

339

369

543

20

25

36

37

51

60

100

19

40

207

42

Two Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income

services
care
&

$833 to
$1,249

$1,250
to
$1,666

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

$3,334
to
$4,166

337

338

424

439

487

37

38

48

52

53

88

91

125

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over
691

107

108

164

276

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

51

34

services

Total

134

134

134

134

134

$620

$630

$744

$794

$857

Three Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income

lit;~

I

I

._mum.

]~

$833 to
$1,249

$1,250 . $i:667~f:500
to . to
to
$1,666 $2,499:j $3,333
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$3,334
to
$4,166

,~" 'I

1

Pet:~onal

622

778

108

109

204

303

care

Ipro(:lucts &

34

36

79

37

services

Four Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income

~~~~4~j~~~r~I~:~:
525

I

I
Personal care
:lpr<>duc:ts &
services

1

526

43L44!

1

527 .

528

50

54

61

109

169

170

71

174

189

217

317

42

43

45

46

53

62

81

$3,334
to
$4,166

$4,167
to
$5,833

$5,834
and
over

More than Four Persons National Standards
Based on Gross Monthly Income
Item
than
$833
For each
additional
person, add to
four person total
allowance:

$833 to
$1,249

$1,250
to
$1,666

$1,667
to
$2,499

$2,500
to
$3,333

1

I

:

134

l45

$155

166

$177

$188

$199

$209

effective January 1, 2005
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Kentucky - Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Housing and Utilities (effective 1/1/2005)

Maximum Monthly Allowance
County

Family of2

or less

-RY

o. oJ

Ii

Family of 4

or more

843

Et
991

1,140 '

667

785

902

770

906

l,042

:Bath County

11

825

':

IBell County

17

7

:

Adair County

677

Allen County

732

,County

'Ecoun~
arren County
iBoone County
,~

County

1,106

1,

853

1

916
990

,!

1,154

Boyd County

745

876

1,008

•Boyle County

807

~f

1,092

815

938

694

816

939

Bullitt County

894

1,051

1,209

Butler County

692

814

936

~

"County

686

Calloway County

844

993

1,142.

County

962

1,131

1,301:

~

.,

~

County

732

County

693

~

County

,

66

778

895

011 County

822

967

1,112

erCounty

638

751

863

County,

607

715

822

753

886

1,019

852

1,002

1,153

576

678

779

674

775

727

836

!Carlisle County

--

929:.

County
....A..

A~""'''

_ _ _••

unty
Clay County
mtA"

County

Crittenden County

618
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594

6

782

920

1,058

Edmonson County

724

851

979

Elliott County

612

720

828

IEstill County
IFayette County

617

l,iW~

834

Cumberland County
County

l,n,,,>~~

..
i

673

'bCounty

717

Floyd County
Franklin County

1

967

Fulton County

I .",rr",rl1

~r

~

643

792

8
1,

804

1,308

:ED
970

1,154

75

870

County

10

953

1,096

County

790

929

1,068

1,045

1,202\

Grant County

625

~!
735

846

County

737

867

997

County

772

908

1,044

H:miin County

853

1,003

iEcounty

631

742

780

918

1,056

IHart County

654

769

885'

Henderson County

827

973

1,119

Henry County

818

963

1,107

Hickman County

624

734

845

Hopkins County

700

T~~1r~~~

539

~I

948

Graves County
: -ir"'v",,"1

County

IGreen County
r

1

County

\

County

rson County

712
699

963
946

1,

729

945

1,1

1,278

897

1,0

715

841

1,214
968-

980

1,153

1,326

IKnott County

642

755

868

IKnox County

698

821

944

Larue County

703

827

Laurel County

744

8751

County
Johnson County
IK

i

IT
'I

p.nr

l

County

County

636
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.

1,007
861

i

5531

650

748

Leslie County

647

761

875

iLetcher County

605

711

818

Lewis County

605

711

818'

Lincoln County

698

E

944

!Lee County

I~<=ounty
iLogan County
i

r ,vn" r",mfv

,.

,County
~~

County

644

757

753
,1

860

857

1,009

871
1,019
989
-_._..__.....

1,160
~~~-~

950'

702

826

Marion County

689

811

933

Marshall County

798

939

1,080

i1

883

1,015

Martin County
l\A',,~nn

·

~

·

~

County

.

792

McLean County

~f
686

807

Meade County

836

984

1,131

625

735

846

89211

1,026

County

'JCounty

County
Mercer County

·

,~

743
927:

County

592

696

801

ounty

674

793

912

765

901

1,036

635

747

860

668

786

775

911

904:
1,048

,County
Mnrp::m County

<=ounty
,~,~~ ..

;8

1,130

County

,

944

698

i'

675

794

914

1,189

1,399

1,609

782

920

1,058

525

617

710

Pendleton County

810

953

1,096

'Perry County

729

858

Pike County

765

901

Powell County

712

837,

~

680

800

Ohio County
Oldham County

IOwen County
JUl~I":y

County

County
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1':~

963

~obertsonCounty

633

744

Rockcastle County

698

821

Rowan County

721

848

1<""""'11. County

628

739

Scott County

955

1,124

1,292

97

1,142

1,313

803

944

1,086

1,01l

[,189

1,367

745

876

1,008

ddCounty

655

770

886

ITrigg County

737

867

997

Trimble County

794

934

19

846

907

1,067

1,227

686

807

927

Wayne County

619

728

837

Webster

688

810

931

Whitley County

712

838

964

We

552

649

746

975

148

1,320

: ;.... w

County

J

County
Spencer County
lor County

IUnion County

iWarren County

..

i."

County

County
.~

•
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856

~
850

}

Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation
Collection Financial Standards
Financial Analysis - Local Standards: Transportation *
...
~

., Costs

>T

Car

$475

I~~::~~=,"~
$338

Oper "'~;"e Costs & Public Transportation Costs
Rpaion

One Car

$230

Region

"

New York

$298

.

Boston

.

Detroit

..

•

C'.,

Paul

$393

298

$392

$259

284

$380

$161

$286

$380

$251

$345

$257

$329

$422

$3

11:.1.76

$469

$212

$247

$341

Midwest Region

'n''''''J('

Two Cars

$479

)

~.

j[

$2'

Cleveland

$

$293

$387

Cincinnati

$222

$272

$365

St. Louis

$203

$287

$383

Kansas City

lA,I;

$29

$384

South Region

97

$242

$336

$3

$407

$240

$334

$258

$351

$289

D.C.

~

Baltimore
Atlanta

$283

Miami

$284

Tampa

$255

Dallas-Ft. Worth

$309

F)344

$439

$265

$359

$332

$425

11:.1.67

$462

1I:.1.f\5

$399

Houston

$246

West Region

$448

'0'

San Diego

$466

$317

San Francisco
:

$318

$311

D·55

$415

Portland

$189

$246

$339

Seattle

$258

$335

$427

Honolulu

$295

$314

$409

Anchorage

$312

$336

$431

Phoenix

$273

$326

$420

Denver

$442
•..•.........

* Does not include personal property taxes. (effective January 1,2005)
For Use with Allowable Transportation Expenses Table
The Operating Costs and Public Transportation Costs sections of the Transportation
Standards are provided by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
following table lists the states that comprise each Census Region. Once the taxpayer's
Census Region has been ascertained, to determine if an MSA standard is applicable, use the
definitions below to see if the taxpayer lives within an MSA (MSAs are defined by county
and city, where applicable). If the taxpayer does not reside in an MSA, use the regional
standard.
Northeast Census Region
ew Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
ania, New York, New

Bronx, Dutchess, Kings, Nassau, New York, Orange, Putnam,
jiQuetms, Richmond, Rockland, Suffolk, Westchester
Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Hunterdon, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth,
Morris, Ocean, Passaic, Somerset, Sussex, Union, Warren
n"aiIfielld. Litchfield, Middlesex, New Haven

Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, Philadelphia
Atlannc, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester,
stle

Boston

Bristol, Essex, Hampden, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, Suffolk,
Worcester
Hillsborough, Merrimack, Rockingham, Strafford

D·56

Windham

UAllel~e:ny, Beaver,

Butler, Fayette, Washington, Westmoreland

• Midwest Census Region
h Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa

(unless otherwise specified)
Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Grundy, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake,
MclfIenlry Will

Mi

St.

Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, Geauga, Lake, Lorain, Medina, Portage,
Summit
Brown, Butler, Clermont, Hamilton, Warren
Boone, Campbell, Gallatin, Grant, Kenton, Pendleton

St. Louis
J,"-,UUI.UU,

Kansas City

Jersey, Madison, Monroe, St.Clair

Cass, Clay, Clinton, Jackson, Lafayette, Platte, Ray
Johnson, Leavenworth, Miami, Wyandotte

South Census Region

D·57

Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, West
Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama

(unless otherwise specified)
lumbia
D.C.
ert, Charles, Frederick, Montgomery, Prince George's,
hington

Barrow, Bartow, Carroll, Cherokee, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb,
Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton, Gwinnett, Henry, Newton,
Paulding, Pickens, Rockdale, Spalding, Walton

Hernando, Hillsborough, Pasco, Pinellas
Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Henderson, Hood, Hunt, Johu'''m,
Kaufman, Parker, Rockwall, Tarrant

!

Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty,
IM.onl:gOlnery Waller

West Census Region:
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Washington,
regon, Idaho, California, Alaska, Hawaii

Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernadino, Ventura
Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San M.i1lcu, !!
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma
Diego
Portland

Seattle

IC]!admrrlas, Columbia, IVHIClIUU, Nlul1nolnall, Polk, Washington,

Island, King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish, Thurston
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Honolulu

in HI: Honolulu
in

HAllChc)ra!~e borough

Phoenix

Pinal
"n.U4JJJO',

Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, Jefferson, Weld
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Internal Revenue Manual
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5
5.15.1.7 (O~01-2004)
Allowable Expense
Overview
1.

Allowable expenses include those expenses that meet the necessary expense test. The necessary
expense test is defined as expenses that are necessary to providefor a taxpayer's and his or her
family's health and welfare and/or production ofincome. The expenses must be reasonable. The
total necessary expenses establish the minimum a taxpayer and family needs to live.
2. There are three types of necessary expenses:
• National Standards
•
LocalStandards
• Other Expenses
3. National Standards: These establish standards for reasonable amounts for five necessary expenses.
Four ofthem come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Expenditure Survey:
food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, and personal care products and services. The
fifth category, miscellaneous, is a discretionary amount established by the Service. It is $100 for
one person and $25 for each additional person in the taxpayer's household.
Note:
All five standards are included in one total national standard expense.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

Local Standards: These establish standards for two necessary expenses: housing and
transportation. Taxpayers will be allowed the local standard or the amount actually paid,
whichever is less.
A Housing - Standards are established for each county within a state. When deciding if a
deviation is appropriate, consider the cost of moving to a new residence; the increased
cost of transportation to work and school that will result from moving to lower-cost
housing and the tax consequences. The tax consequence is the difference between the
benefit the taxpayer currently derives from the interest and property tax deductions on
Schedule A to the benefit the taxpayer would derive without the same or adjusted
expense.
B. Transportation - The transportation standards consist of nationwide figures for loan or
lease payments referred to as ownership cost, and additional amounts for operating costs
broken down by Census Region and Metropolitan Statistical Area. Operating costs were
derived from BLS data. If a taxpayer has a car payment, the allowable ownership cost
added to the allowable operating cost equals the allowable transportation expense. If a
taxpayer has no car payment only the operating cost portion of the transportation standard
is used to figure the allowable transportation expense. Under ownership costs, separate
caps are provided for the first car and second car. If the taxpayer does not own a car a
standard public transportation amount is allowed.
Other - Other expenses may be allowed if they meet the necessary expense test. The amount
allowed must be reasonable considering the taxpayer's individual facts and circumstances.
Conditional expenses. These expenses do not meet the necessary expenses test. However, they are
allowable ifthe tax liability, including projected accruals, can be fully paid within five years.
National local expense standards are guidelines. If it is determined a standard amount is
inadequate to provide for a specific taxpayer's basic living expenses, allow a deviation. Require
the taxpayer to provide reasonable substantiation and document the case file.
Generally, the total number of persons allowed for national standard expenses should be the same
as those allowed as dependents on the taxpayer's current year income tax return. Verify
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exemptions claimed on taxpayer's income tax return meet the dependency requirements ofthe
IRe. There may be reasonable exceptions. Fully document the reasons for any exceptions. For
example, foster children or children for whom adoption is pending.
9. A deviation from the local standard is not allowed merely because it is inconvenient for the
taxpayer to dispose of valued assets.
10. Revenue officers should consider the length of the payments. Although it may be appropriate to
allow for payments made on the secured debts that meet the necessary expense test, ifthe debt will
be fully repaid in one year only allow those payments for one year.
5.15.1.8 (05-01-2004)
National Standards
1.

2.

National standards include the following expenses:
A Apparel and services. Includes shoes and clothing, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe
repair.
B. Food. Includes all meals, home and away.
e. Housekeeping supplies. Includes laundry and cleaning supplies; other household products
such as cleaning and toilet tissue, paper towels and napkins; lawn and garden supplies;
postage and stationary; and other miscellaneous household supplies.
D. Personal care products and services. Includes hair care products, haircuts and beautician
services, oral hygiene products and articles, shaving needs, cosmetics, perfume, bath
preparations, deodorants, feminine hygiene products, electric personal care appliances,
personal care services, and repair of personal care appliances.
E. Miscellaneous. A discretionary allowance of $1 00 for 0 ne person and $25 for each
additional person in a taxpayer's family.
Allow taxpayers the total national standard amount for their income level.
Example: The taxpayer's expenses are: housekeeping supplies - $150, clothing$150, food - $600, miscellaneous - $400 (Total Expenses - $1,300). The
taxpayer is allowed the national standard of$1,100.

3.

A taxpayer that claims more than the total allowed by the national standards must substantiate and
justify each separate expense ofthe total national standard amounts.
Example: A taxpayer may claim a higherfood expense than allowed
Justification would be based on prescribed or required dietary needs.

5.15.1.9 (05-01-2004)
Local Standards
I.

Local standards include the following expenses:
A Housing and Utilities. The utilities include gas, electricity, water, fuel, oil, bottled gas,
trash and garbage collection, wood and other fuels, septic cleaning, and telephone.
Housing expenses include: mortgage or rent, property taxes, interest, parking, necessary
maintenance and repair, homeowner's or renter's insurance, homeowner dues and
condominium fees. Usually, this is considered necessary only for the place of residence.
Any other housing expenses should be allowed only if, based on a taxpayer's individual
facts and circumstances, disallowance will cause the taxpayer economic hardship.
B. Transportation. Vehicle insurance, vehicle payment (lease or purchase), maintenance,
fuel, state and local registration, required inspection, parking fees, tolls, driver's license,
public transportation. Transportation costs not required to produce income or ensure the
health and welfare of the family are not considered necessary. Consider availability of
public transportation if car payments (purchase or lease) will prevent the tax liability

D - 62

from being paid in part or full. Public transportation costs could be an option if it does not
significantly increase commuting time and inconvenience the taxpayer.
Note:
If the taxpayer has no car payment, or no car, question how the taxpayer travels to and
from work, grocer, medical care, etc. The taxpayer is only allowed the operating cost or
the cost of transportation.

5.15.1.10 (05-01-2004)
Other Expenses
I . Other expenses may be considered if they meet the necessary expense test - they must provi de for
the health and welfare ofthe taxpayer and/or his or her family or they must be for the production
of income. This is determined based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
2. If other expenses are determined to be necessary and, therefore allowable, document the reasons
for the decision in your history.
3. The amount allowed for necessary or conditional expenses depends on the taxpayer's ability to full
pay the liability within five years and on the taxpayer's individual facts and circumstances. If the
liability can be paid within 5 years, it may be appropriate to allow the taxpayer the excessive
necessary and conditional expenses. If the taxpayer cannot pay within 5 years, it may be
appropriate to allow the taxpayer the excessive necessary and conditional expenses for up to one
year in order to modify or eliminate the expense. (See IRM 5.14, Installment Agreements)
Expense Item

Notes/Tips
Expense is Necessary if:
Representation before the Disallow any other
accounting or legal
Service is needed or
Accounting and legal
meets the necessary
fees. Disallow costs
fees.
expense tests. Amount
not related to solving
must be reasonable.
current liability.
If it is a condition of
Disallow any other
employment or meets the charitable
Charitable
necessary expense tests. contributions that are
contributions
Example: A minister is not considered
(Donations to tax
required to tithe
necessary. Example:
exempt organizations)
according to his
Review the
employment contract.
employment contract.
Cost of child care can
vary greatly. Do not
allow unusually large
Child Care(BabyIt meets the necessary
child care expense if
sitting, day care,
expense test. Only
more reasonable
reasonable amounts are alternatives are
nursery and
preschool)
allowed.
available. Consider
the age ofthe child
and if both parents
work.
Court-Ordered
If court ordered and being
Payments(A limony,
paid, they are allowable.
Review the court
If payments are not being
child support,
order.
including orders made made, do not allow the
by the state, and other expense. Child support
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court ordered
payments)

payments for natural
children or legally
adopted dependents may
be allowed.

Dependent Care(For
If there is no alternative
the care ofthe elderly,
to the taxpayer paying the
invalid, or
expense.
handicapped.)

Education

Health Care

Involuntary
Deductions

Life Insurance

Secured or legally
perfected debts
Unsecured Debts

Example: An attorney
must take so many
education credits each
It is required for a
year or they will not
physically or mentally
be accredited and
challenged child and no
could eventually lose
public education
their license to
providing similar services
practice before the
is available. Also allowed
State Bar. A teacher
only for the taxpayer and
could lose their
only if required as
position or in some
condition of employment.
States their pay is
commensurate with
their education credits.
To determine monthly
expenses, the total out
of pocket expenses
Required for the health
would be divided by
and welfare of the family.
12. The Schedule A
Elective surgery would
may also be used to
not be allowed such as
determine the yearly
plastic surgery or elective
expense. Ensure that
dental work. The taxpayel
the amount used is out
must provide proof of
of pocket after
excessive out of pocket
insurance claims are
medical expenses.
paid. Substantiate that
payments are being
made.
To determine monthly
If it is a requirement of expenses, the total out
the job; i.e. union dues, of pocket expenses
uniforms, work shoes.
would be divided by
12.
If there are whole life
policies, these should
be reviewed as an
If it is a term policy on
asset for borrowing
the life of the taxpayer
against or liquidating.
only.
Life insurance used as
an investment is not a
necessary expense.
Taxpayer must
If it meets the necessary substantiate that the
payments are being
expense test.
made.
Examples of
If the taxpayer
substantiates and justifies unsecured debts which
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Taxes

the expense, the minimun: may be necessary
payment may be allowed. expenses include:
The necessary expense Payments required for
test of health and welfare the production of
income such as
and/or production of
payments to suppliers
income must be met.
Except for payments
and payments on lines
required for the
of credit needed for
business and payment
production of income,
payments on unsecured of debts incurred in
debts will not be allowed order to pay a federal
if the tax liability,
tax liability.
including projected
accruals, can be paid in
full within 90 days.
Current taxes are
allowed regardless of
whether the taxpayer
made them in the past
or not. Delinquent
It is for current federal,
state and local taxes
FICA, Medicare, state
are allowable
and local taxes.
depending on the
priority ofthe FTL
and/or Service
agreement with the
state and local taxing
agencies.

Optional Telephones
and Telephone
Services (Cell phone, It must meet the
pager, Call waiting, necessary expense test.
caller identification 01
long distance)
If it is secured by the
Taxpayer must
federal government and substantiate that the
Student Loans
only for the taxpayer's
payments are being
education.
made.
If it meets the necessary
Internet Provider/Eexpense test - generally
mail
for production of income.
If the loan is secured by
the taxpayer's assets when
Repayment of loans those assets are of
made for payment of reasonable value and are
Federal Taxes
necessary to provide for
the health and welfare of
the family.
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Form B22C(Alt.) (Chapter 13) (10/0Sl
In re

-,-,--....,-,

Check the box as directed in Part II, Line 14 of this statement.
_

Debtor(s)

Case Number:

_~,----,-;-

D
D

Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)
Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)

_

(If known)

STATEMENT OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME AND
DISPOSABLE INCOME CALCULATION
FOR USE IN CHAPTER 13 (IF IRS SEPARATES ITS HOUSING ALLOWANCE)
In addition to Schedules I and J, this statement must be completed by every individual Chapter 13 debtor, whether or not filing
'ointlY.
I Joint d e btors may comPlete
I
I
one statement OnlY.

Part I. CALCULATION OF CURRENT MONTHLY INCOME
Marital/filing status. Check the box that applies and complete the balance of this part of this statement as directed.
a. D Unmarried. Complete only Column A ("Debtor's Income") for Lines 2-10.

1

b.
c.

D ~4aFFiee, Ret fiJiR!l jeiRtly. €e...plete e..ly €eht..... A ("gehter's I ..ee...e") fer U .. es 2 19. (Under revision)
D Married, filing jointly. Complete both Column A ("Debtor's Income") and Column B ("Spouse's Income") for
Lines 2-10.
Column A
Debtor's
Income

All figures must reflect average monthly income for the six calendar months prior to filing the
bankruptcy case, ending on the last day of the month before the filing. If you received different amounts of income during these six months, you must total the amounts received during the six months, divide this total by six, and enter the result on the appropriate line.
2

Gross wages, salary, tips, bonuses, overtime, commissions.

Column B
Spouse's
Income

$

$

$

$

Income from the operation of a business, profession, or farm. Subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the difference on Line 3. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not
include any part of the business expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part
III.
3

a.

Gross receipts

b.

Ordinary and necessary business expenses

$

c.

Business income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

Rent and other real property income. Subtract Line b from Line a and enter the difference on Line 4. Do not enter a number less than zero. Do not include any part of the operating expenses entered on Line b as a deduction in Part III.

4

a.

Gross receipts

$

b.

Ordinary and necessary operating expenses

$

c.

Rental income

Subtract Line b from Line a

$

$

5

Interest, dividends, and royalties.

$

$

6

Pension and retirement income.

$

$

7

Regular contributions to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents, including child or spousal support. Do not include contributions from the
debtor's spouse if Column B is completed.

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

8

Unemployment compensation. Enter the amount in Column A and, if applicable, Column
B. However, if you contend that unemployment compensation received by you or your
spouse was a benefit under the Social Security Act, do not list the amount of such compensation in Column A or B, but instead state the amount in the space below:
Unemployment compensation claimed to ,
be a benefit under the Social Security Act Debtor $

9

10

ISpouse $

I

Income from all other sources. Specify source and amount. If necessary, list additional
sources on a separate page. Total and enter on Line 9. Do not include any benefits received under the Social Security Act or payments received as a victim of a war crime, crime
against humanity, or as a victim of international or domestic terrorism.
a.

$

b.

$

Subtotal of current monthly income. Add Lines 2 thru 9 in Column A, and, if Column
B is completed, add Lines 2 through 9 in Column B. Enter the total(s).

Total current monthly income. If Column B has been completed, add Line 10, Column
11

A to Line 10, Column B, and enter the total. If Column B has not been completed, enter the
amount from Line 10, Column A.

$

Part II. APPLICATION OF § 1325(b)(3)
12

Annualized current monthly income. Multiply the amount from Line 11 by the number 12 and
enter the result.

$

Applicable median family income. Enter the median family income for applicable state and house13

hold size. (This information is available by family size at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the
bankruptcy court.)
a. Enter debtor's state of residence:
b. Enter debtor's household size:

$

Application of § 1325(b)(3). Check the applicable box and proceed as directed.
14

o The
amount on Line 12 is less than or equal to the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of
page 1 of this statement that states "Disposable income not determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete Part VI of
this statement; do not complete Parts III, IV, or V.

o The
amount on Line 12 is more than the amount on Line 13. Check the box at the top of page 1 of this
statement that states "Disposable income determined under § 1325(b)(3)" and complete the remaining parts of this
statement.

Complete Parts III, IV, and V of this statement only if required. (See Line 14.)

Part III. CALCULATION OF DEDUCTIONS ALLO\NEP UNDER § 707(b)(2)
Subpart A: Deductions under Standards of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
15

16

National Standards: food, clothing, household supplies, personal care, and miscellaneous. Enter the "Total" amount from IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses for the applicable family size and income level. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk
of the bankruptcy court.)

$

LeeBI StBndBrds. hetlsing Bnd tltilities, tltilities{I'I'IBintenBnee eXl'ense. EAter ti'le aFAeuAt
ef ti'le IRS HeusiA!:I aAe! Utilities StaAe!aFEls; UtilitiesH4aiAteAaAee El<l3eASe fer ti'le al3l3lieaele eeuAty aAe!
faFAily size. (Ti'lis iAfefFAatieA is availaele at V/I'/w.use!ej.Ele·t/ust! er fFeFA ti'le elerl< ef tAe eaAl<rul3tey

eet:trtr. (Under revision)

$

Local Standards: housing and utilities; mortgage/rental expense. Enter, in Line a below,
the amount of the IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense for your county and family size (available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter on Line b the
total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by your home, as stated in Line 38; subtract
Line b from Line a and enter the result in Line 17. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
17

a.

IRS Housing and Utilities Standards; Mortgage/Rental Expense

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by your
home, if any, as stated in Line 38

$

c.

Net mortgage/rental expense

Subtract Line b from Line a.

Local Standards: transportation; vehicle operation/public transportation expense.
You are entitled to an expense allowance in this category regardless of whether you pay the expenses of
operating a vehicle and regardless of whether you use public transportation.
18

Check the number of vehicles for which you pay the operating expenses or for which the operating expenses are included as a contribution to your household expenses in Line 7. Do 01 02 or more.
Enter the amount from IRS Transportation Standards, Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs for
the applicable number of vehicles in the applicable Metropolitan Statistical Area or Census Region. (This
information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

$

19

20

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 1. Check the number
of vehicles for which you claim an ownership/lease expense. (You may not claim an ownership/lease expense for more than two vehicles.) D 1 D 2 or more.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car (available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 1, as stated in Line 38; subtract Line b from
Line a and enter the result in Line 19. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, First Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 1,
as stated in Line 38

$

c.

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 1

Subtract Line b from Line a.

Local Standards: transportation ownership/lease expense; Vehicle 2. Complete this Line
only if you checked the "2 or more" Box in Line 20.
Enter, in Line a below, the amount of the IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car
(available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court); enter in Line b the total of
the Average Monthly Payments for any debts secured by Vehicle 2, as stated in Line 38; subtract Line b
from Line a and enter the result in Line 20. Do not enter an amount less than zero.
a.

IRS Transportation Standards, Ownership Costs, Second Car

$

b.

Average Monthly Payment for any debts secured by Vehicle 2,
as stated in Line 38

$

Net ownership/lease expense for Vehicle 2

Subtract Line b from Line a.

c.

21

$

$

Other Necessary Expenses: taxes. Enter the total average monthly expense that you actually incur
for all federal, state, and local taxes, other than real estate and sales taxes, such as income taxes, self
employment taxes, social security taxes, and Medicare taxes. Do not include real estate or sales
taxes.

$

Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll deductions. Enter the total average monthly

22

payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such as mandatory retirement contributions,
union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as non-mandatory

401(k) contributions.

$

23

Other Necessary Expenses: life insurance. Enter average monthly premiums that you actually
pay for term life insurance for yourself. Do not include premiums for insurance on your dependents, for whole life or for any other form of insurance.

$

24

Other Necessary Expenses: court-ordered payments. Enter the total monthly amount that
you are required to pay pursuant to court order, such as spousal or child support payments. Do not include payments on past due support obligations included in Line 40.

$

25

Other Necessary Expenses: education for employment or for a physically or mentally
challenged child. Enter the total monthly amount that you actually expend for education that is a
condition of employment and for education that is required for a physically or mentally challenged dependent child for whom no public education prOViding similar services is available.

26

Other Necessary Expenses: childcare. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually expend on childcare. DO not include payments made for children's education.

27

Other Necessary Expenses: health care. Enter the average monthly amount that you actually
expend on health care expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance or paid by a health savings account.
Do not include payments for health insurance listed in Line 30.

$

$

Other Necessary Expenses: telecommunication services. Enter the average monthly ex28

29

penses that you actually pay for cell phones, pagers, call waiting, caller identification, special long distance, or internet services necessary for the health and welfare of you or your dependents. Do not in-

clude any amount previously deducted.

$

Total Expenses Allowed under IRS Standards. Enter the total of Lines 15 through 28

$

Subpart 8: Additional Expens.Decauet;ions. under§707(b)
Note: Do not inc:lude any expenses that you have listedinUneslS-28
,
30

Health Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Health Savings Account Expenses. List the
average monthly amounts that you actually expend in each of the following categories and enter the total.
a.

Health Insurance

$

b.

Disability Insurance

$

c.

Health Savings Account

$
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

31

32

$

Continued contributions to the care of household or family members. Enter the actual
monthly expenses that you will continue to pay for the reasonable and necessary care and support of an
elderly, chronically ill, or disabled member of your household or member of your immediate family who is
unable to pay for such expenses. Do not include payments listed in Line 25.

$

Protection against family violence. Enter any average monthly expenses that you actually incurred to maintain the safety of your family under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or
other applicable federal law.

$

Home energy costs in excess of the allowance specified by the IRS Local Standards.
Enter the average monthly amount by which your home energy costs exceed the allowance in the IRS Local Standards for Housing and Utilities. You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

Education expenses for dependent children under 18. Enter the average monthly expenses
that you actually incur, not to exceed $125 per child, in providing elementary and secondary education for
your dependent children less than 18 years of age. You must provide your case trustee with documentation demonstrating that the amount claimed is reasonable and necessary and not already
accounted fOI" in the IRS Standards.

$

Additional food and clothing expense. Enter the average monthly amount by which your food and
clothing expenses exceed the combined allowances for food and apparel in the IRS National Standards, not
to exceed five percent of those combined allowances. (This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ustl
or from the clerk of the bankruptcy court.) You must provide your case trustee with documentation
demonstrating that the additional amount claimed is reasonable and necessary.

$

36

Continued charitable contributions. Enter the amount that you will continue to contribute in the
form of cash or financial instruments to a charitable organization as defined in 26 U.S.c. § 170(c)(1)-(2).

$

37

Total Additional Expense Deductions under § 707(b). Enter the total of Lines 30 through 36.

$

33

34

35

SubpartC: >Deductions for Debt Payment

38

Future payments on secured claims. For each of your debts that is secured by an interest in property that you own, list the name of creditor, identify the property securing the debt, and state the Average
Monthly Payment. The Average Monthly Payment is the total of all amounts contractually due to each Secured Creditor in the 50 months following the filing of the bankruptcy case, divided by 60. If necessary, list
additional entries on a separate page. Do not include items you have previously deducted, such as
insurance and real estate taxes.
Name of Creditor

Property Securinq the Debt

50-month Averaqe Pavment

a.
b.
c.
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Past due payments on secured claims. If any of the debts listed in Line 38 are in default, and the
property securing the debt is necessary for your support or the support of your dependents, you may include in your deductions 1/50th of the amount that you must pay the creditor as a result of the default
(the "cure amount") in order to maintain possession of the property. List any such amounts in the following chart and enter the total. If necessary, list additional entries on a separate page.
39

Name of Creditor

Propertv Securinq the Debt in Default

1/50th of the Cure Amount

a.
b.
c.
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

40

Payments on priority claims. Enter the total amount of all priority claims (including priority child
support and alimony claims), divided by 60.

$

Chapter 13 administrative expenses. Multiply the amount in Line a by the amount in Line b, and
enter the resulting administrative expense.

41

a.

Projected average monthly Chapter 13 plan payment.

$

b.

Current multiplier for your district as determined under schedules issued by the Executive Office for United States Trustees.
(This information is available at www.usdoj.gov/ust/ or from the
clerk of the bankruptcy court.)

x

c.

Average monthly administrative expense of Chapter 13 case
Total: Multiply Lines a and b

42

Total Deductions for Debt Payment. Enter the total of Lines 38 through 41.

$
$

Subpart D: Total Deductions AUow.edul1c1e.r§707(b)(2)
43

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the total of Lines 29, 37, and 42.

$

Part IV. DETERMINATIONOFDISPOSABLI: I,NCOMEUNDER § 1325(b)(2)
,

44

Total current monthly income. Enter the amount from Line 11.

$

Support income. Enter the monthly average of any child support payments, foster care payments, or
45

46
47
48

49

disability payments for a dependent child, included in Line 7, that you received in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, to the extent reasonably necessary to be expended for such child.

$

Qualified retirement deductions. Enter the monthly average of (a) all contributions or wage deductions made to qualified retirement plans, as specified in § 541(b)(7) and (b) all repayments of loans
from retirement plans, as specified in § 362(b)(19).

$

Total of all deductions allowed under § 707(b)(2). Enter the amount from Line 43.

$

Total adjustments to determine disposable income. Add the amounts on Lines 45, 46, and 47
and enter the result.

$

Monthly Disposable Income Under § 132S(b)(2). Subtract Line 48 from Line 44 and enter the
result.

$

Part V: ADDITIONAL EXPENSE CLAIMS
Other Expenses. List and describe any monthly expenses, not otherwise stated in this form, that are required for the
health and welfare of you and your family and that you contend should be an additional deduction from your current
monthly income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). If necessary, list additional sources on a separate page. All figures should reflect your average monthly expense for each item. Total the expenses.
50

Monthlv Amount

Exoense Descriotion
a.
b.
c.
Total: Add Lines a, b, and c

$

Part VI: VERIFICATION
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this statement is true and correct. (If this a joint case,
both debtors must sign.)
51

Date:

_

Date:

_

Signature: ----:c:--:-------(Debtor)

Sig natu re: ---::-:---=-.,..,--

-,------

(Joint Debtor if any)
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SECTIONE

NEW DEFINITION OF WHO MAY BE A DEBTOR:
Amended §109 (attached)
•

§109(a) - no changes

•

§109(b) - minor changes - foreign banks and certain foreign insurance
companies can be debtors

•

§109(c) - (e) - no changes

•

§109(f) - family fishermen can now file chapter 12 bankruptcy

•

§109(g) - no changes

•

§1 09(h) - entirely new section

•

§109(h)(1) - individual cannot be a debtor unless they have received a
briefing from an approved nonprofit credit counseling agency within 180
days prior to filing bankruptcy. This counseling:
~

must outline available credit counseling

~

must assist the individual in analyzing their budget

~

can be in a group setting

~

can be by telephone

~

can be over the internet

•

§1 09(h)(2)(A) - there is an exception if the US Trustee or SA declare that
no agency in the district is able to provide adequate counseling

•

§109(h)(2)(S) -- The US Trustee or SA approves the agencies and must
review their approvals annually, but may disapprove an agency at any
time.

•

§109(h)(3)(A) - Short term exception if debtor files a certification:
~

showing exigent circumstances exist that merit waiver, or

~

showing that debtor requested but was not able to obtain
counseling for 5 days after the request was made, and

~

that is satisfactory to the court

E·l

•

§1 09(h)(3)(B) - If debtor uses the above short term exception, they still
must comply and get the counseling within 30 days (or 45 with a court
ordered extension) after filing for bankruptcy

•

§109(h)(4) - the only real exception is if, after notice and a hearing, the
court determines that the debtor is:
~

so incapacitated that they cannot make rational decisions regarding
finances, or

~

so disabled they are unable to receive the counseling in person, by
phone or over the internet, or

~

in active duty in a military combat zone

NEW NOTICING PROVISIONS:
Amended §342 (attached)
•

§342(a) - no change -- notice of entry of order for relief

•

§342(b) - before case is
including:
~

fiI~d,

clerk has to give notice of chapters-

the purpose, benefits and costs of proceeding under each chapter

~

the types of services that are available from credit counseling
agencies

~

warning that false statements or concealing assets is grounds for a
fine or imprisonment or both

~

warning that all information "supplied by a debtor" in a case may
be examined by the Attorney General

•

§342(c)(1) - if notice is required to be given "by the debtor" to a creditor,
the notice must contain the debtor name, address and last 4 digits of the
SSN

•

§342(c)(2) - if creditor sends 2 notices during 90 days prior to bankruptcy
with account number and with address which creditor requests to receive
correspondence, then any notice required to be sent "by the debtor"
must be sent to this address and must include the account number
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•

§342(c)(2) - if creditor can't send 2 notices during 90 days prior to
bankruptcy due to nonbankruptcy law, then last 2 notices before the 90
days must be reviewed to see if they have an account number and an
address which creditor requests to receive correspondence at, then any
notice required to be sent "by the debtor" must be sent to this address
and must include the account number

•

§342(c)(2) - if the notice is due to an amendment adding a creditor, "the
debtor" must include the full SSN in the notice sent to the creditor, but
must include only the last 4 digits of the SSN in the copy filed with the
court.

•

§342(d) - If the debtor "flunks" the "means test", then, not later than 10
days after the Ch. 7 petition is filed, the clerk's office must send notice to
all creditors that it is presumed that the debtor is abusing the bk laws by
filing chapter 7.

•

§342(e) -In a 7 or 13, a creditor may at any time file a notice with the
court and debtor of an address to be used for the creditor in that case.
~

•

Six days later, the court and debtor/debtor's attorney must be
using the new address for mailings.

§342(f) - Creditor can give any court a preferred address(es) to use for
noticing including a specific subdivision and/or a specific person's
attention
~

Address can be national for all notices and all bk courts

~

Address can be regional for notices in that area

~

Address can be by district/court for cases filed in that area
•

31 days later, notices must go to correct address(es)

•

Specific case addresses trump a national/regional/etc.
address

•

Version 2.7 is changing CM/ECF so that when a party pulls
up a creditor list, the system will check with the BNC to see if
there is a preferred address on file and a pdf document will
be returned momentarily with address labels with the correct
addresses substituted (except for case specific ones). The
BNC's computer will do a comparison, and, If in doubt, the
notice goes to both the address provided by the debtor and
the preferred address.
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~

When a preferred address request is made to our court, we will
either direct the creditor to the BNC website or phone number or we
will forward the request to the BNC.

~

The creditor will be able to sign up directly on-line at the BNC
website.

~

Once the BNC is aware of the request, they will contact the creditor
regarding electronic noticing alternatives (EBN)

~

Available EBN alternatives include EDI (the BNC computer talks to
the creditor computer). Also, e-mail or fax noticing are available.

•

§342(f) - The creditor can withdraw the preferred address

•

§342(g) - If debtor or the court sends a notice and it doesn't comply with
creditor request, then it is ineffective until brought to creditor's attention.
~

Until the specific person or subdivision designated receives the
notice, it will not have been brought to the creditor's attention.

~

What are the consequences if the notice is ineffective?
•

If it is a notice that an order for relief has been entered, the
creditor can violate the automatic stay without fear of any
monetary penalties.

•

For other notices, §342 is silent as to the consequences.

Amended FRBP 2002(g) is effective 12/1/05 (attached)
•

•

FRBP 2002(g)(1):
~

2002 notices must be addressed as last requested in the case by
the entity

~

A proof of claim is a request unless it is filed in a no-asset case

~

A proof of interest filed by an equity security holder is a request

~

Other than those two listed items, it is unclear in both the code and
the amended FRBP what exactly constitutes a request

FRBP 2002(g)(2) - If no request is made, then notice will be sent to
creditor as listed on the creditor matrix or debtor's schedules (whichever
is filed later) or as listed on the list of equity security holders.
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•

FRBP 2002(g)(3) - notice will be sent to both the legal representative of
an infant or incompetent as listed in schedules and to the requested
address unless the legal representative is the one who made the address
change request.

•

§342(g)(4) - The entity and an AO approved notice provider (BNC) can
agree as to where and how notice will be supplied and that will be the
proper means to provide notice.
~

Even if the BNC then doesn't use the agreed upon procedure
(such as a form of EBN), the notice is not invalidated.

NOTE: The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules has determined that the
Act and the rule changes are different and can co-exist (5/10-11/05 Bankruptcy
Noticing Working Group minutes)

NEW DEBTOR (DEBTOR ATTORNEY) DUTIES:
Amended §521 (attached)
•

§521 (a)(1) - Debtor must file the following:
~

a list of creditors,

~

a schedule of assets and liabilities,

~

a schedule of current income and expenses,

~

a statement of financial affairs, and

~

if debtor is an individual with primarily consumer debts, a certificate
showing:
•

that the attorney/petition preparer delivered the §342(b)
Clerk's Notice (re: available chapters, etc.) to the debtor,

•

if pro se, that the debtor received the §342(b) Clerk's Notice
and read it

or

~

copies of all payment "advices" or other evidence of payment by all
employers of debtor for 60 days prior to filing date

~

an itemized statement showing calculations of monthly net income

E-5

);>

a statement disclosing any expected increase in income or increase
in expenses during 12 months after bankruptcy is filed

•

§521 (a)(2)(A) - if an individual's schedules show debts of any kind (used
to be just consumer), which are secured by property of the estate, the
debtor must file a statement of his intention with regard to the property by
the 341 meeting or within 30 days after filing (whichever is earlier)

•

§521 (a)(2)(8) - by 30 days after the "date first set" for the meeting of
creditors (or longer if request is made and granted prior to 30 days
expiring), debtor must perform his stated intentions

•

§521 (a)(2)(C) - Debtors and trustees still retain their rights with regard to
the property, but automatic stay is terminated if debtor fails to perform the
above 2 steps unless:
);>

the trustee proves the property has consequential value to the
estate and adequate protection is provided to the creditor, or

);>

the debtor tries to reaffirm and the creditor refuses

•

§521 (a)(3) - debtor must cooperate with trustee or auditor (if appointed) to
enable them to perform their duties

•

§521 (a)(4) - debtor must turnover all records, documents and papers
relating to the estate to a trustee or auditor (if appointed) regardless of
whether immunity has been granted

•

§521 (a)(5) - debtor must appear at a discharge hearing (if held) and at a
hearing regarding entering into a Reaffirmation Agreement (if debtor is pro
se)

•

§521 (a)(6) - debtor must turnover any personal property secured by a
PMSI within 45 days after the meeting of creditors (code doesn't indicate
if it is the date first set or the conclusion) unless they have entered into
a reaffirmation agreement or redeemed the property. If debtor fails to act
within the 45 days, then the stay is terminated unless the trustee proves
the property has consequential value to the estate and adequate
protection is provided to the creditor.

•

§521 (a)(7) - unless a trustee has been appointed, the debtor must
continue to perform the obligations required of an ERISA administrator for
any employee benefit plan if they or their designee were serving as the
administrator at the time the case was filed.

•

§521 (b) - an individual debtor must file with the court:

E-G

•

)0>

a certificate from the approved credit counseling agency that
describes the services provided to the debtor, and

)0>

a copy of any debt repayment plan developed during the
counseling

§521 (c) - debtor must file a record of any interest the debtor has in:
)0>

an education IRA, or

)0>

a qualified state tuition program

•

§521 (d) -if the debtor fails to timely take any of the actions previously
mentioned, or to assume the lease as referred to in §362(h), then, if the
original lease or agreement entered into by the debtor contains a clause
that states that filing bankruptcy is a default under the lease/agreement,
then nothing in this subsection limits the enforcement of such a provision.

•

§521(e)(1) - states that creditor can get copies of petition, schedules, etc.

•

§521 (e)(2)(A) - at least 7 days prior to the "date first set" for the meeting
of creditors, a debtor must give:
)0>

the trustee a copy of the most recent income tax return that the
debtor filed prior to filing bankruptcy or a transcript of the return,
and

)0>

at the same time, must give a copy of the return/transcript to any
creditor who has requested one

•

§521 (e)(2)(B) - case will be dismissed if debtor doesn't provide tax
return/transcript to trustee unless it is due to circumstances beyond the
debtor's control

•

§521 (e)(2)(C) - case will be dismissed if debtor doesn't provide tax
return/transcript to requesting creditor at same time it is provided to
trustee unless it is due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control

•

§521 (e)(3) - within 5 days of a request by a creditor, court must provide a
copy of the Ch. 13 plan for a reasonable cost

•

§521 (f)(1) - (3) - in all cases (except Ch. 12), at the request (not
automatically) of the court, the US Trustee, or any party in interest, the
debtor must file with the court:
)0>

each federal income tax return/transcript required by applicable
law and filed with the taxing authority for each tax year that ends
while a case is pending.
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•

~

each federal income tax return/transcript required by applicable
law for each tax year that ended 3 years prior to bankruptcy which
had not been filed before the bankruptcy but is filed with the taxing
authority during the bankruptcy.

~

any amendments to the above tax returns

§521 (f)(4) - a Ch. 13 debtor must file a statement under penalty of perjury
of the income and expenses from the tax year just ended, and a statement
of monthly income showing how month income and expenses were
calculated within:
~

90 days after the first tax year ends (or up to 1 year after the case
is filed if there has been no plan confirmed yet), and

~

annually, after the plan is confirmed, until the case is closed
•

•

The annual statements must be filed 45 days before the
anniversary of the confirmation date.

§521 (g)(1) - the statements referred to above must disclose:
~

the amount and sources of income

~

the identity of persons who are also responsible for the support of
any dependent of the debtor

~

the identity of any person who contributed to the household in
which the debtor resides and the amount they contributed

•

§521 (g)(2) - the tax returns/transcripts, amended returns/transcripts, and
statements referred to above can be inspected and copied by the US
Trustee or BA, the trustee, and any party in interest subject to privacy
limitations

•

§521 (h) - if requested by US Trustee or trustee, a debtor must provide
documentation establishing their identity

•

§521 (i)(1) - if the debtor does not file the documentation required by
§521(a)(1) within 45 days, on the 46th day, the case will be automatically
dismissed without following the normal §707(a) procedure of having notice
and a hearing first

•

§521 (i)(2) - even though the case was automatically dismissed, any party
in interest may request that an Order of Dismissal be entered and the
court must do so within 5 days of the request

E-g

•

§521 (i)(3) - if the debtor requests an extension before the 45 days have
expired, the court may grant the debtor up to an additional 45 days to file
the required documents if it is justified

•

§521 (i)(4) - if a trustee files a motion requesting that the case not be
dismissed before the 45 days have expired, the court, after notice and a
hearing, may decline to dismiss the case if:
~

the court finds the debtor made a good faith attempt to provide the
documents, and

~

it is in the best interest of the creditors to administer the case

•

§521 0)(1) - if the debtor doesn't stay current on filing tax
returns/extensions that become due after the bankruptcy is filed, the
taxing authority can request that the case be converted or dismissed

•

§521 0)(2) - if the debtor still isn't current on filing tax returns/extensions
within 90 days after the taxing authority requests dismissal or conversion,
the court will determine what is in the best interest of the creditors and
then convert or dismiss the case

TAX RETURN REQUIREMENTS FOR CH. 13 DEBTORS IN
ADDITION TO THOSE IN §521:
New §1308 (attached)
•

§1308(a) - At least one day before the "date first set" for the meeting of
creditors, the debtor must file with the taxing authorities all tax returns for
all taxable periods ending during the 4 year period ending on the date of
filing of the bankruptcy

•

§1308(b)(1) - if the required tax returns have not been filed by the "date
first set" for the meeting of creditors, the trustee may hold open the
meeting to give the debtor additional time to file as follows:

•

~

an additional 120 days for returns that are past due

~

an additional 120 days or the date that the return is due under the
last automatic extension requested by the debtor (whichever is
later) if the return is not past due

§1308(b)(2) - the court may extend the time 30 days beyond the time
allowed by the trustee for returns that are past due in the following
circumstances:
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•

~

if the debtor can show by a "preponderance of evidence" that the
failure to file a return was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's
control, and

~

if the request for the extension of time, and the holding of the
hearing, and the entry of the order all occur prior to the above
deadlines expiring

§1308(c) - defines "return" broadly to include federal, state, local, and
other tax returns even if prepared by the taxing authorities because the
individual failed to prepare the return

NEW US TRUSTEE AND CASE TRUSTEE DUTIES:
Amended §704 (attached)
•

§704(a)(1) - (9) - Unchanged

•

§704(a)(10) - if someone has a claim against the debtor for domestic
support obligations, the trustee must provide a detailed notice. (the
requirements for this notice are described further down in the
materials under §704(c»

•

§704(a)(11) -- the trustee must perform the obligations required of an
ERISA administrator for any employee benefit plan if the debtor or a
designee of the debtor was serving as the administrator at the time the
case was filed.

•

§704(a)(12) - if the debtor is a health care business that is closing, the
trustee must use their best efforts to transfer patients to an alternate
health care facility that:

•

~

is in the vicinity of the one closing, and

~

provides substantially similar services, and

~

maintains a reasonable quality of care

§704(b)(1) - if the debtor is an individual chapter 7 debtor, the US Trustee
will review all materials filed and, within 10 days after the meeting of
creditors, will file with the court a statement as to whether the case should
be presumed to be an abuse under §707(b) and the court will serve a
copy of the statement on all creditors within 5 days after receiving the US
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Trustee statement. (The code is not clear if it is the "date first set" or
the conclusion of the meeting of creditors that triggers the 10 day
deadline.)
•

§704(b)(2) - within 30 days after the statement referred to above was
filed, the US Trustee must either file a motion to convert or dismiss or
must file a statement as to why such a motion would not be appropriate
even though the debtor's income is above the state medians

•

§704(c)(1)(A) and (B) - although §704(a)(10) only refers to one notice,
this subsection describes 2 notices. If there is a claim against the
debtor for domestic support obligations, then the following notices referred
to in §704(a)(10), must be sent by the trustee:
~

~

•

a notice to the holder of the claim that includes the following:
•

statement that the holder has the right to use the services of
the state child support enforcement agency to collect child
support during and after the bankruptcy case

•

the address and telephone number of the state child support
enforcement agency

•

explanation of the rights of the holder to payment of the
claim while debtor is in Ch. 7 bankruptcy

a notice to the state child enforcement agency that includes the
following:
•

notice that the claim exists, and

•

the name, address and telephone number of the holder of
the claim

§704(c)(1 )(C) - if the debtor receives a discharge, the trustee must send a
notice to the holder of the claim and to the state child support enforcement
agency that includes the following:
~

the fact that a discharge was granted

~

the last known recent address of the debtor

~

the name and address of the last known employer of the debtor

~

the name of each creditor that holds a claim that was not

~

discharged by the bankruptcy or that was reaffirmed by the debtor
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•

§704(c)(2) - the holder of a domestic support obligation or the state child
support enforcement agency can request the last known address of the
debtor from any of the creditors whose claims were not discharged by the
bankruptcy or with whom the debtor reaffirmed a debt and the creditor
cannot be held liable for disclosing the address

OTHER FILING CHANGES EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1, 2005:
Several Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure have been amended and
become effective December 1,2005. (attached)
These are not the new proposed Interim Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
but are amendments to current rules of bankruptcy procedure that went through
the 3-year approval process and become effective December 1, 2005.
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WEBSITES REGARDING THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 2005

u.s. Courts website where proposed Interim Rules and
Forms are located:
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules

IRS Collection Standards site:
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/O..id=96543.00.html

Census Bureau's Median Income by State site:
http://www.census.gov/

American Bankruptcy Institute's site:
http://abiworld.netlbankbill/
Bankruptcy Noticing Center site for registering preferred
addresses:
www.NCRSuscourts.com
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FLOWCHART
Prepared by:

Shaun Stuart, Esq.
U.S. Trustee's Office
Lexington, Kentucky
And
Diane Robl, Esq., Clerk of Court
U.S. Bankruptcy Court
Western District of Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky
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The following code sections were extracted from:

Redline of Titles 11,28, and 18, United States Code,
n'omr-D.'I'ent Ifn'\' (as of January 1, 2005)
as enacted by

The Bankl'uptc}' Abuse PreveDtion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
Pub. L.I09-8, 119 Stat. 23, enaded April 20,2005
(Does not indude 31nfondmeDts to other Jaws)

Last updated on April 20, 2005
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§ 108. Extension of time
(a) If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a
period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date ofthe filing
ofthe petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement of the case; or
(2) two years after the order for relief.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) ofthis section, if applicable nonbaokruptey law, an order entered in a
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual protected under
section 1201 or 1301 ofthis title may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof ofclaim or loss, cure a default, or
perform any other similar act, and such period has not expired before the date ofthe filing ofthe petition, the trustee
may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later 0 f(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement ofthe case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief
(c) Except as provided in section 524 ofthis title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other
than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to which such individual is
protected under section 120I or 1301 ofthis title, and such period has not expired before the date ofthe filing ofthe
petition, then such period does not expire until the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement ofthe case; or
(2) 30 days after notice ofthe termination or expiration ofthe stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or
1301 ofthis title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim.
§ 109. Who may be a debtor
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision ofthis section, only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of
business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title.
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 ofthis title only if such person is not(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan
association, building and loan association, homestead association, a New Markets Venture Capital company as
defined in section 351 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, a small business investment company
licensed by the Small Business Administration under sYllseeti9R (I;) 9F (Ii) 9fsection 301 ofthe Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, credit union, or industrial bank or similar institution which is an insured
bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, except that an uninsured State member
bank, or a corporation organized under section 25A ofthe Federal Reserve Act, which operates, or operates as,
a multilateral clearing organization pursuant to section 409 ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 may be a debtor if a petition is filed at the direction ofthe Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System; or
(3)Wa foreign insurance company, engaged in snch bnsiness in the United States· Of
{m a foreign bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, building and loan
association, S9Rtistilad ass9siaii9R, or credit union, iR8Q8iQ ill SYSS 9\ilsillilSS that has a branch 9'" agency (as
defined in section! $) oftbe Tntemationa! Banking Act of 1978 in the United States.
(c) An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 ofthis title if and only if such entity(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such
chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such
entity to be a debtor under such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5)(A) has obtained the agreement ofcreditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of
each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement ofcreditors
holding at least a majority in amount ofthe claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan
in a case under such chapter;
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(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section
547 of this title.
(d) Only a railroad, a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 ofthis title (except a stockbroker or a
commodity broker), and an uninsured State member bank, or a cOtporation organized under section 25A ofthe Federal
Reserve Act, which operates, or operates as, a multilateral clearing organization pursuant to section 409 ofthe Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 may be a debtor under chapter 11 ofthis title.
(e) Only an individual with regular income that owes, on the date of the filing ofthe petition, noncontingent,
liquidated, unsecured debts ofless than $250,000 8 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts ofless than $750,000,9
or an individual with regular income and such individual's spouse, except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that
owe, on the date ofthe filing ofthe petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts that aggregate less than
$250,000 10 and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts ofless than $750,000 11 may be a debtor under chapter 13 of
this title.
(t) Only a family farmer or family fisherman with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter 12 of
this title.
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision ofthis section, no individual or family farmer may be a debtor under
this title who has been a debtor in a case pending under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure ofthe debtor to abide by orders ofthe court,
or to appear before the court in proper prosecution ofthe case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal ofthe case following the filing ofa
request for relieffrom the automatic stay provided by section 362 ofthis title.
(WI) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) and notwithstanding any other provision of this sectjon an individual
may Pot he a debtgr under this title upless SlIch indiyidual bas durin!' thp "ISMay period Prt~Gqdjng the date gffipng pf
the petjtion by such individual recejved from an approyed nonprofit budget @d credit counseling agency deScribed in
section I I I (a) an individual or group briefinlt <including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that
outlined tht' 01!2mhmjties for ayailable credit CQun§e!ing and assisted§l!chjndjvjdual in perfgrming a related budget
analysis
(2)(6) Ppragrpph (I) shall not anply with remect to a dehtor who resides in a district for which thi' I!nited
States tOIsteC (or the bankmptcy administrator if any) determines that the approved nonprofit budget and credit
counSeling agencieS for Sllch district are not reasonably able to provide adequate services to the additi01al individuals
who \vollld otherwise seek credit counseling from §lIch agencies by reason of the reglliremsnts ofppragraph (I)
(8) The J]njted States tmstee (or the hankpmtcy admini§fratqr jf@y)who makes a determination described in
subparagraph (Al shaH revipv such deternlination oot late,ethan I year afterthe date ofsuch dl~termination and not less
frequentlv than aoouaH}' thereafter Notwithstanding the ')[feeding Sl-ntcnce a oonprofit budget aod 'Wed;t counseling
agency may he disapproved by the J !nited States tmstee /prthe bankmptey admini§!rator if@y)at any tjme
(1)(1) Subjt)ct to subparagraph (B) Ole requirements ofparagraph (J) shall not aPply with respect to a debtor
who §!lbm i!§ to the murt il certificfltion that
m deScribes exigent circum$nces that merit a waiver pEthe requirements of paragraph () ),
Ui> states that the debtor requested cT!'dit CQJJnseljng se'}jces from ao approved nonprofit budget pud
credit counseling agency but Was Unable tp obtaip the services referred to in paragraph (J) during the 5-day
period beginning on the date on which the debtor made that request' @d
fiji) i§ satisfactoW t9 the court
(8) With respect to a debtor an exemption under subparavraph (4) shall cease to apply to that debtor pn the
date on which the debtgr meets the requ ireme n1§ of paragraph (I) hut in no pm may the exemption apply t9 that
debtor after the date that is 30 days after the debtor files a petitiOn except that the C0m for cause may oed er @
additional! 5 davs
(4) The requirements of Paragraph ( I) shall not apply with respect to a debtor whom the C0m determines
aftRr norict' and hRaring is unable to cgmplete tbose requirements beFflu§S1 ofjncapacity disahjlity or active militmy
duty in a rnjlitaQ' cpmbat zone F0rthe pumoses of this paragraph inc;wa£ity means that tbe dd?tpr is impaired by
Wilson of mental illness or mental deficiency so that be is incapable ofreaJizing and making rational decisjons with

Under section 104, Adjustment ofdollar amounts, currently $307,675.
9 Under section 104, Adjustment of dollar amounts, currently $922,975.
10 Under section 104, Adjustment ofdollar amounts, currently $307,675.
11 Under section 104, Adjustment ofdollar amounts, currently $922,975.
8
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respect to hjs fimmcjal respgnsibilities' and ., disability" means that the debtor is sg nhysically inmaired as to be unahle
after reasonable effort to narticimJte in an in person telephgne or Internet briefipg required underoprngraph (J)

§ 110. Penalty for persons who negligently or fraudulently prepare bankruptcy petitions
(a) In this section( 1) "bankruptcy petition preparer" means a person, other than an attorney BF ali ~Byee Bf llB
lUtBAley for the debtor gT an emplgyee QfslJch attorney uuder the direct supervision gfSllCh attomey, who
prepares for compensation a document for filing; and
(2) "document for filing" means a petition or any other document prepared for filing by a debtor in a
United States bankruptcy court or a United States district court in connection with a case under this title.
(b)( I) A bankruptcy petition preparer who prepares a document for filing shall sign the document and print on
the document the preparer's name and address ]fa bankruptcy petitjon preparer is 110t a11 individual then all officer
principal responsible persgn or partner gfth~: bllnkmptcy petitign prepareI' §hal! he required t9=
(A) Sign thi' document for filing' and
(8) mint gn the dgcument the name and address of that gfficer principal rewonsible person or
~

(2) J, 9aRkRifltey fletitiBR flreflaRtr WAB fails tB eeIRfll~' 'NitA pa£.agFaJlA (I) IRay ge "Reli Ret IRere tAllB $~OO
fer eaea sweB mHwre wRless tAe failwre is ~we Ie re&8eRaWe llQWSll.
(2)(Al Before preparimr any dgcument for filing qr acceptinv any fes;§ fcom a delrtgr the banknmtcy petitign
preparer shall provide tg the dehtor a wrinen 11illice which sban be Pn 'In official fOWl nrescrihed hy the Indicial
Conference gUhe lTPited States in ijccordauce with nih> 9909 orthe federal Rules of Banknmtcy Procedure
(8) The notice under subparagraph (Ab:
0) shan jnfgpn the drhtg T 'jn §ip1nltt lant)lIcge that a h3JJkUlptcy petitjgn prepprer i§ not pn attorney
and may ugt praf!ice law or give legal adviCG"
hi> may contajn a descrintign ofesamnles ofleO"al advice that a hanknmtcy petition preraTer is not
fluthgrizf'd to give in addjtiQp to any advice that the propaTer may Dot giyt~ by reasp)] gfsnh§ectiqD (e'f?)- PDd
(iii> s!Ja1b
(l) be signed by thi~ debtor and nnder !?tWalty orperinG' by tbe bijPlsgmtcy petition
prepare£" and
OI) be filed with anY dgcnment for filjng
(c)( I) A bankruptcy petition preparer who prepares a document for filing shall place on the document, after
the preparer's signature, an identifying number that identifies individuals who prepared the document.
(2) (A) SI! hiect to subparngrapb <B) for~ purposes ofthis section, the identifying number ofa bankruptcy
petition preparer shall be the Social Security account number of each individual who prepared the document or assisted
in its preparation.
(R) If a hankmptcy petitign preparer is nP! an indiyjdual th" identifying nnmber gfthe bankmmcy petitign
preparer Shel! be the Sgcia! Security account number gfthe gfficer principe! Wsugnsible pernan or partner gfthe
banknmtcy petition preperer
(J) iI., 9aRlB'Yptlly peiitieR f*llpaRtF wAe fails tB semi'll)' 'l;itH flaragFafB (1) IRay ge fiRe~ RBt mere tkllB $~QO
wr 'aGh sWllh failwfll WRliSS til, failw:c is lHIi tEl Fe&89Aa9li llaWSi.
(d)(.l.) A bankruptcy petition preparer shall, not later than the time at which a document for filing is presented
for the debtor's signature, furnish to the debtor a copy ofthe document.
(~) A baRlu:upt~1 piti:tieA preplWr wBe fails $9 119IRfll)' with flaFa@f:aflh (1) IRa~' blil "Rili Aet IRere tAaa $$00

fer sailH swilH failwH WRlsss tAll failwre is liwe ts re&8eRaele eawse.
(e)( I) A bankruptcy petition preparer shall not execute any document on behalf of a debtor.
(2)(A) A banknm!£y ne1 iti fw preparer mey pp! gffer a pgteptial bapkmmcy debtor anY legal advice ipclnding
any legal advice described in subparagraph (R)
(8) TIle legal advice referred tg in suhparagraph (A) includes advising the debtgr
(j) wbether(J) to file a petition under this title· gr
([I) cgmmencing a case under cbllpter 7 I I I? or 13 i§ apprgnriatefjil whether the debtor's dehts win he diS cbawed ip e Gese IInder thiS title'
(iii) wbether the debtor wi II be able to retain the dehtpr's hgme car gr other property after
commencing i! case Undi~r thi§ title'
(iy) cgncemino-(l) the tpx c9p§egucnccs of e case brought uuder this title' QT
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§ 341. Meetings of creditors and equity security holders
(a) Within a reasonable time after the order for reliefin a case under this title, the United States trustee shall
convene and preside at a meeting of creditors.
(b) The United States trustee may convene a meeting of any equity security holders.
(c) The court may not preside at, and may not attend, any meeting under this section including any final
meeting of creditors Notwithstmding aoy local court mle provision of a State constitution any otherwise apnlicable
Donbankpmtcy 1m or any other requirement that renresenwiop at the me,·ting of creditors under subsectiOn (a) be by
an attorney a creditor holding a consumer debt or ilny representative pith: creditor (which maY include 99 entity or gn
employee of an entity ilnd mgy be 9 representati ve for more than I creditor) shall be permitted to appear at ang
participate in the meeting ofcredjtors in a case Under chapter 7 or 13 either alone or in conjunction with an anomer fqr
the creditor Nothing in this subsection shal! be GOp§tmed to require any creditor to be repre§cnted by an attgrney at apy
megting gfcregitors
(d) Prior to the conclusion ofthe meeting ofcreditors or equity security holders, the trustee shall oraly
examine the debtor to ensure that the debtor in a case under chapter 7 ofthis title is aware of-.
(1) the potential consequences ofseeking a discharge in bankruptcy, including the effects on credit
history;
(2) the debtor's ability to file a petition under a different chapter ofthis title;
(3) the effect of receiving a discharge of debts under this title; and
(4) the effect of reaffirming a debt, including the debtor's knowledge ofthe provisions of section
524(d) ofthis title.
(e) Notwithstanging §uh§ections (a) ang (b) the court gn the requc§t gia Party in intere§t Md after notice and
a hearing for CalISe rna" order that the I Toited States tOlstee Ppt convene a meetipg gf creditQf§ or equity §sicurjty

hglders if the debtor has filed 9 plan a<: to whica the debtor solicited acceptance§ prior to the cgmmencement of the
~

§ 342. Notice
(a) There shall be given such notice as is appropriate, including notice to any holder of a community claim, of
an order for relief in a case under this title.
(b) PFier te ~the commencement of a case under this title by an individual whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the clerk shall give t9 BlIGh indiyidual written notice te sl:l6a iRSiviEfQal tl!at iRsieat8s 8aea eaapter ef
d4is titl~ JlRfii~r wllisll saell i&fiiiviQaal Al1i3' pl'es~~li containing
(J) a briefdescriptjon of
(A) chamers 7 ] I 12 and 13 and the gencgl purpoSt' benefits and CQgs of nf9Creding
under each of those caapters" and
(8) the typ,~§ Qf§eQljcf~s ayajlahle fWID crt~dit cQunseling agFogies' and

§tatemep!§ specjfyipg that
fA) a person who knowingly and fraudulently cpncqals asset§ or makes a false oath or
Stilts'ment under ncPfllty gfQHrjuQ' in eonnrctiQQ with a case under this title Shill! 12,· subjeqt to fine
jmprj§onment or both" and
iB) all jufQnnation suppljed by 9 debtor ip cQnnection with a case under this title i§ Sllbject
t9 examination by the Attorney Gens:;ral
(c){,u Ifnotice is required to be given by the debtor to a creditor under this title, any rule, any applicable law,
or any order ofthe court, such notice shall contain the name, address, and !a§!4 digits gfthg ta."-payer identification
number ofthe debtor, Qat tll~ failare ef sagll &etie~ te s8Rtai& sagll i&fermatieR sllall Ret iHvaliliaw tR~ 1~8al ilfWst ef
(2)

sasl:! Retis8.
flVA) If within the 90 gap before tae commgncement ofg vgluntary case a creditgr Slwpljes the gebtor in at
leam 2 commUnications sent to the debtor with the current gCC91lUt number ofthe debtor and the address at which such
cregitor Nquest§ to receive correspondence tbgu apy notice required by this tid,' to be sent hy the debtor to such
creditor §hall hs:; §ent to such address and Shgll include such account number
(8) Ita creditor wQJlld be in violation gfapnlicable nonbanknmtcy Igw by §enging any such communication
within §uch Q(k1ay pgriog gog if §lIch creditgr suppljG§ the debtor in the last 2 communievtigns with the current account
number of the dehtgr 999 the agdress at which such creditor reguest§ to NC!iiye cortewgndgnce then gny nptjcs:;
requjreg by this title to he sent hy the debtor to such cregitor shgll be §S!ut tp such address ang shall include §!I\;jl
*£9""ot 111lwher
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Ifthe notice coocems an amendment that adds a creditor to the schedules of assets and liahi lities the debtor shall
include the fiJlI tgxp ayer identification number in the notice sent to that creditor hut the debtor shal I include only the
Jag 4 digits oitbe taxpayer identification number in the copy githe notjce filed with the court
(d) In a case under chapter 7 of this title in which the debtor is an indiyidual end in which the presumption of
abuse arises under sectiOn 707/b) the clerk shaH give written notice to all credjtors not laterthap 10 days after the date
oftbe filipg gfthe petition that the presumptign orabuse ha§ arjsen
(e)( I) In p case under "hapter 7 gr 13 ofthis title gfa d(~btor who is pll indiYidual a creditor at any time may
bgth tile with the court and §RIye gn the debtor a notice ofpddress to be used to nroyide notice in such case to such
w;ditor
(2) A Q Y notice in such case requi red to he provided t9 slIch creditpr by the debtor or the court later than 5 dpvs
afteqhe court PUd the debtor receive such creditgr'§ notice ofaddress shall be provided to such address
<O( I) AU eutitv may tile with any hanknmtcy court a notice ofaddre§s to he used by all the hilPkgmtcy c9l!rtS
or by particular hankomtcy courts as so specified hy §uch entity at the time such notice is filed to provide notjcp tg
such entity in al I casps under chaptm 7 and 13 pendjng in the courts with respect to which §uch notig; is filed ip
which such entity i§ a ereditpr
(2) In <my case filed under chapter 7 orl3 any notice required tg be provided by a court with respect to which
a notice is filed under paragraph (I) to such !',Dtity laterthan 30 days after the filing of such notice under paragraph (\)
shall he provided to such addrp§s unless with respect t9 a particular case a djfferent address is ;mccjfied in a notice filed
and scc'ed in accordance with subsection (e)
(3) A notice filed under naragraph ( 1) may he withdrawn by such entity
(gV I) Notice provided to p creditor by the debtor or the court other than in accordance wjth this section
(excluding thjs subsection) shpll not be effective notice until §JJch notice is bronght tp the attention of sllch creditor If
such creditpr de§igpflle§ a persgn or an organj zatigna] suhdivisigp ofsnch creditor to he rt:§ooDsjh1r for receiving
notices nnderthjs title and establishes reasgnablt: procedures so that snch nQticl~S receiyable by sllch cmditorarc to be
delivered to sllch persOD or sllch subdivision then a notice provided to such creditor wher than in accordance with this
section (excluding this sub§ectign) shaH pot be coo§idered tg have heen hrought to tbe attentiop ofsucl! sreditoflmtj!
such notice i§ received hy such persQp or §Jlcb subdivision
(2) A QJopv!ary pepplty may pm he impQRed
creditor for a yiolatiQIl ora §tilY in effect nuder SHctjOll

On a

'62(a) (including a OlooepJly nenalty imposed under sectiQn 362(kll or for failure to comply with section 542 or 543
unless the conduct that is the basis gfsuch Yiolation or of slIcb failure occuI§ after such creditor receiye§ ngtice
effective upder th!§ §Merion of the grder for reljef

§ 343. Examination of the debtor
The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting ofcreditors under section 34 I(a)
ofthis title. Creditors, any indenture trustee, any trustee or examiner in the case, or the United States trustee may
examine the debtor. The United States trustee may administer the oath required under this section.

§ 344. Self-incrimination; immunity
Immunity for persons required to submit to examination, to testifY, or to provide infonnation in a case under
this title may be granted under part V oftitle 18.

§ 345. Money of estates
(a) A trustee in a case under this title may make such deposit or investment ofthe money of the estate for
which such trustee serves as will yield the maximum reasonable net return on such money, taking into account the
safety of such depost or investment.
(b) Except with respect to a deposit or investment that is insured or guaranteed by the United States or by a
department, agency, or instrumentality ofthe United States or backed by the full faith and credit ofthe United States,
the trustee shall require from an entity with which such money is deposited or invested(1) a bond(A) in favor ofthe United States;
(B) secured by the undertaking of a corporate surety approved by the United States trustee
for the district in which the case is pending; and
(C) conditioned on(i) a proper accounting for all money so deposited or invested and for any return on
such money;
(ii) prompt repayment of such money and return; and
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Section 603(e) Effective Date.-The amendments made by this section [adding reference to an auditor in section
52 1(a)(3) and (4)1 shall take effect 18 months after the date of enactment ofthis Act.
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authority as ofthe date ofthe commencement oithe case and that was sub§cquently filed for any t'lx year of
the debtor endin g in the 3-year perigd ending gn the date of the cgmmepeement gfthe case'
m a cgpy gf \'aCh mpendment to anY Federal incgme tax return or trap§cript filed with the court
under paragraph (J ) or (2)' and
(4) in a cfl§e under chapter 13
(A) on the date that is either 90 days after the end of slIch tax year or 1 year after the date of
the commencement ofthe case whichever j§ later if a glan is not copfipped hefore §uch later date'

iY:l4
(m annually after tl1e plan i§ cgnfipned and unti! the case is c1gsed n9t latcrthan the date
that is 4'i day§ befon; the anniversary ofthe cgnfirnlatign ofthe ulan' a statement Under penalty gf
periury ofthe income and expenditures Oftbe debtor dllfin Q the tax year gfthe dehtor mgst recently
concluded before §Pch §tiltement is filed nnder this Paragraph and oOhe mOnthly incoWt' gfthe
debtor that shows how income expenditures and monthly incO!m~ are calculated
(g)( I) A statpment referred t9 in §ub§ect;gn <0(4) shall di§cIosQ:=:
fA) the amount and sources ofthe income 9 fthe debtor
(8) the identity of any persgn re§ponsible with the debtor for the support ofany dependent gfthe
debtor' and
(0 the identity gfany pCf§on who contributed and the amgunt contributed to the hoUsehold in
which the debtor re§ides
(2) The tax wmw§ 3mpndment§ and §tfl!ement gfincome and expepditures described in suhsection§ (e)f2){A)
and <0 shaH he ayailable to the JJnjted States tmstee (or the himknmtcY admipi§1rator irany) the tPJ§1ee and any party
in intenW for inspectign and copyin!1 subject to the requirements gf§ection 3151c) of the Banknmtcy Abuse
Prevention and Cgwmmer Prolpctipn Act gf?QQ5
(b) Ifwqupsted by the pnjted Statf'§ tnl§tee Qr by the tmstec tbc dehtor shall pmvjde-(J) a document tlJat establishes the identity ofth" dehtor including p driver's license passport gr
gthijr document that COntains a phgtOlYTflph gfthe debtor' or
(2) such other personal identifying infoppariQn mlating to the debtor that e§1ablishes the identity gf
the df~btQr

(j)(I) Subject tg namgmph§ (?) and (4) Pnd notwithstanding sectigll ZQ7(a) if an indiyidual debtorjn a
yoluntary case under chapter Z orl 3 fajls to file all gfthe infow1ation required under sllb§ection (3)()) within 45 days
after th., dilte pfthe filing pftlJe wtitign the case shall be automatically dismis§Cd effective gn the 4fitb day after tlJe
date of the filing pfthe petitign
(2) Subject to paragmph (4) and wjth ft'snect to a case described in paragraph (]) any partv in interest may
reqJJe§t the court to cnter an ogier dismissing the case Ifreguc§ffid thn court shall "nter an order gfdismissal rpt Ifltqr
than 5 days after such reqlle§!
n) Suhject 10 Pilragranh (4) gnd npop rtones! ofthe dehtgr mage wjtlJin 45 days afujr the dal2 of the filing pf
the petitiOn deScribed in paragranh (I) the court may aJlow the debtor an pdditi0nal periQd gfnot to exceed 45 dan 10
file the informatign required uDger subsectiOn (a)O) if the comt findsjll§tjfjcatign for e:ytendjng the nerigd furthe

~

(4) Notwithst::JPding aDY gther proyi§ion gfthis §llh§ectiQn Qn the mgtion gfthY tm*Y filed before the
qpiration gfthY imp1jeflble perjod Qftime specified in ramgraph (}) (2) or (3) pnd after ngtice and I' hearing the
court may dcchne tp dismiss tlJe case ifthe conrt finds that the debtor attemnted in gQod ffljth to file aJl the informatign
requjred by subsectign (aW )(B>(jy) and that thi( best interf§ts ofcreditop? wguld be seryed hy administ@tion oftl1e

~

m( I) Notwith§ljmdjng any otlJer proYisjon ofthi§ title jfthe debtor fajl§ to file a tax return that becQmes due
after the cgmmencement gfme cMe or to propedy ohtejl1 an extension 9fthe dul' dMt for filing §ueh Bituro the taxing
authority may request that the emITt cuter an order conyerting or dismissing the case
(2) If the dehtor doe§ not file the required return Qr obtain the pxtl'n§jgp referred to in paragraph (J) within 90
days after a request is filed by the Wing authority undeqhat ParaVrl'ph the cgurt §hal! conYert ordismjss the case
whichever i§in the best jntere§ts of crcditor§ and the e§1.ate
§ 522. Exemptions
(a) In this seetion(1) "dependent" includes spouse, whether or not actually dependent; and
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SUBCHAPTER I-OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION

§ 701. Interim trustee
(a)(1) Promptly after the order for reliefunder this chapter, the United States trustee shall appoint one
disinterested person that is a member ofthe panel ofprivate trustees established under section 586(a)(1) oftitle 28 or
that is serving as trustee in the case immediately before the order for relief under this chapter to serve as interim trustee
in the case.
(2) If none of the members of such panel is willing to serve as interim trustee in the case, then the United
States trustee may serve as interim trustee in the case.
(b) The service ofan interim trustee under this section terminates when a trustee elected or designated under
section 702 ofthis title to serve as trustee in the case qualifies under section 322 ofthis title.
(c) An interim trustee serving under this section is a trustee in a case under this title.

§ 702. Election of trustee
(a) A creditor may vote for a candidate for trustee only if such creditor(1) holds an allowable, undisputed, fixed, liquidated, unsecured claim of a kind entitled to
distribution under section 726(a)(2), 726(a)(3), 726(a)(4), 752(a), 766(h), or 766(i) ofthis title;
(2) does not have an interest materially adverse, other than an equity interest that is not substantial in
relation to such creditor's interest as a creditor, to the interest ofcreditors entitled to such distribution; and
(3) is not an insider.
(b) At the meeting of creditors held under section 341 ofthis title, creditors may elect one person to serve as
trustee in the case ifelection of a trustee is requested by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) ofthis section, and
that hold at least 20 percent in amount ofthe claims specified in subsection (a)(1) ofthis section that are held by
creditors that may vote under subsection (a) ofthis section.
(c) A candidate for trustee is elected trustee if(1) creditors holding at least 20 percent in amount of the claims of a kind specified in subsection
(a)(1) ofthis section that are held by creditors that may vote under subsection (a) ofthis section vote; and
(2) such candidate receives the votes of creditors holding a majority in amount of claims specified in
subsection (a)(l) ofthis section that are held by creditors that vote for a trustee.
(d) If a trustee is not elected under this section, then the interim trustee shall serve as trustee in the case.

§ 703. Successor trustee
(a) Ifa trustee dies or resigns during a case, fails to qualify under section 322 ofthis title, or is removed under
section 324 ofthis title, creditors may elect, in the manner specified in section 702 of this title, a person to fill the
vacancy in the office oftrustee.
(b) Pending election ofa trustee under subsection (a) ofthis section, if necessary to preserve or prevent loss to
the estate, the United States trustee may appoint an interim trustee in the manner specified in section 701(a).
(c) Ifcreditors do not elect a successor trustee under subsection (a) ofthis section or if a trustee is needed in a
case reopened under section 350 ofthis title, then the United States trustee(1) shall appoint one disinterested person that is a member of the panel ofprivate trustees established
under section 586(a)(l) oftitle 28 to serve as trustee in the case; or
(2) may, if none ofthe disinterested members of such panel is willing to serve as trustee, serve as
trustee in the case.

§ 704. Duties of trustee

w..The trustee shall-

(1) collect and reduce to money the property ofthe estate for which such trustee serves, and close
such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests ofparties in interest;
(2) be accountable for all property received;
(3) ensure that the debtor shall perform his intention as specified in section 52 I(2)(B) ofthis title;
(4) investigate the financial affairs ofthe debtor;
(5) if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim
that is improper;
(6) if advisable, oppose the discharge ofthe debtor;
(7) unless the court orders otherwise, furnish such information concerning the estate and the estate's
administration as is requested by a party in interest;
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(8) ifthe business ofthe debtor is authorized to be operated, file with the court, with the United States
trustee, and with any governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or determination ofany tax
arising out of such operation, periodic reports and summaries of the operation of such business, including a
statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States trustee or the court
requires;-aA4
(9) make a final report and file a final account ofthe administration of the estate with the court and
with the United States trustee..;.

(1 Q) if wit1] respect to the debtgrthere is a claim for a dgmgstic support gbligation nmyidg the
anplicable ngtice spl;jcitjed in subsection (c)'
(II) jf at the time oUbe commencement oithe case the debtor (or any entity designated by the
debtor) seryed as the admjnistWgr (a§ defined in sectign 3 oitbe Emplgyee Retirewent Incgme Security Act
of 1974) oran emplgyee benefit plap cgntinue to perform the obligatign§ required oithe administratgr apd
(J 2) u@ all reasonable and best effoft§ to transfer patients from a health carp busine§§ tlJa! is in thr
procqs ofbei!1!' closed to ap appmpriatl;j health care business tbat
(A) isin the yicinity g[tbe 1IG31th care business that is closing'
(8) provides the patient witb scryiccs that are snb§t:mtially simi Jar to those proyided by the
hGalth care business that is in the process ofbGing cJosGd' and
IC) main!1lin§ a reasgnable Qual;ty ofcnre
(b)( I) With rewect to a debtor who is an indiyidual in a Case nnder this chapter
(A) the IInited States tmstee 'or the bankmptc" pdministrator ifan,,) §hall review all wqtyrials filed
by the debtor and not latertbap 10 days after thg date gfthe fim megting ofcreditofS me with the cgnrt a
sWemwt as to whether the dehtor's caSe would be presumed to be an abuSH uuder sectign 7Q7(h)' and
(B) 110t lateqhan 5 days aikr receiving il statement under subparagraph (A) the court §hall provide Il
cgpy of the statement to a1l creditors
(2) The United States tmstee 'or bankmptcy administrator ifan,,) shall not Jaterthan 30 days after the date gf
filjm. a stab-ment under naragmph / I) githyr fily a mgtion to djwiss or coO\:'yr! under section 707(h) or fil y a §tptement
sAAing forth the rGa§ons the United Stilles tQl§tgc (or the bllnkD'Ptcy administrator if any) does npt CQll§ider such a
mgtion to by apprgprjllte if the United Staws tmstee (or the hlloknmtc" administprtor ifan,,) determinyS that thSdebtgr'§ case shQuld be presumed to be an abua? Under section 707(b) apd the prgduct gfthG dehtpr's current monthly
income multiplied by 12 is ngt le§§ than(A) in tht> case nip debtor in a hou§ehold of I person the medilln family income oftlJe applicabls'
State for I earner' or
(B) in tlJe case ofa debtor in a household of) or morejndiyidualS the bj!rhest median family incowe
ofth y Ilnn!icable State [or Il family g[the SaW!" nmuber or fewpr individuals '
(c)/ I) Tn a case described in subsection (a)( I Q) to which §ubseetign (a)(] Q) applje§ the tlllsteC shall
(A)(O pmyid!" written ngtice to the hgJdergfthe claim describtjd in subsectign (a)(l Q) ohlch dlli m
and ofthe right ofsuch holder1g use the services gfthG Statc child suPPort enfi?Tcemgnt agency gS!i1bJi§hed
Under sectjons 464 and 466 of the Socia! Security Act for the State ill which such holder resides for assistance
in co!lyding child suppgrt during Ilud after thy cilSe under this title,
(ji) jncludG in the notice provided nuder c1anse (j) the address end tdgphone pumber gfsuch State
child §JIQP9rt en[orcenWnt agency- apd
include in the notice pmyided uuder clause 0) mJ explanation nUhe rights of such holder to
payment of such claim under this chaptGC
(8)(j) provide wriUgn potice to such State child suppgrt enforceml;jnt (wencr of§nch claim' and
OJ) include ;n thy notice proyided nnder c!;mse (j) the name address and telephgne nnmher g£ such
holder illJd
(C) at such timG as the d!"htor is granted a discharge Under section 727 prgyide written ngtice to sneh
holder and to such SWe child suPPgrt epforcement agency gfW thy grantipg gfthe di§chargG'
00 the last re9!W kngwn address gfthe dGbtgr
Oji) the la§! reernt known namG ilpd address ofthe debtor's employer and
<iY) the name gfeach creditgr that hgld§ a claim that
(J) is Dot discharged undqrparagmph (2) (4) orl14A) gfsection 5"1(a)' or
(II) was reaffinngd by the debtgr nndgr sWion "'''4(c)

om
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(2)(A) TIle hglder oh claim described in subsection (a)(1 Q) or the State child §!!w?Qrt enforcement agency of
the State in which such holder resides may request fmm a creditor described in paragraph (I )(C)(iy) the !ast known
addreSS gftb e debtgr
(B) Notwithstanding any gther provjsion gf law a creditor that makes a disclpsure ofa last knpwn address oh
debtor in connection with a request made under suhparagranh (A) shal! not be Ijahle by reason of making such
disclosure

§ 705. Creditors' committee
(a) At the meeting under section 341 (a) ofthis title, creditors that may vote for a trustee under section 702(a)
ofthis title may elect a committee ofnot fewer than three, and not more than eleven, creditors, each of whom holds an
allowable unsecured claim of a kind entitled to distribution under section 726(a)(2) ofthis title.
(b) A committee elected under subsection (a) ofthis section may consult with the trustee or the United States
trustee in connection with the administration ofthe estate, make recommendations to the trustee or the United States
trustee respecting the performance ofthe trustee's duties, and submit to the court or the United States trustee any
question affecting the administration ofthe estate.
§ 706. Conversion
(a) The debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 ofthis title at any
time, ifthe case has not been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 ofthis
title. Any waiver ofthe right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable.
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this
chapter to a case under chapter II of this title at any time.
(c) The court may not convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 12 or 13 ofthis title unless the
debtor requests OT consents to such conversion.
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision ofthis section, a case may not be converted to a case under another
chapter ofthis title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.
~

707. Dismissal of a case or conY!frsion to a case under cbapter 11 or 13
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause,
inc1uding(I) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure ofthe debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the
court may allow afterthe filing ofthe petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph
(I) of section 521, but only on amotion by the United States trustee.
(b)Lll After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, ~
Ret at tAll t:i'tQllBt er il"'8811st.ieR eftT!lgre (or bsmkPIptcy administgrtQI if any) OT any party in interest, may dismiss a
case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts or with the debtor's
consent convert such a cas,' to a case under chamer J I or Ii Of this title if it finds that the granting of reliefwould be
~ SQ9staBtial. abuse ofthe provisions ofthis chapter. TheRl il9.al.1ge a pl1lilll.eR ia faller 9fgl'3lNiag tAll t:ilillf
Alftllilstilll 9)' tAil lle9teF. In making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this section, the court may not take
into consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable contributions (that meet the definition of
"charitable contribution" under section 548(d)(3» to any qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as that
term is defined in section 548(d)(4».
P)(A)(j) In considering under paragraph (J) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse ofthe provisions
pith;s chapter the court shall pre§ume abuse exists ifthe debtgr'§ C!!P'ept monthly income reduced by the amounts
determined under cli!uSe§ <ii) <iii) and Or) and nm!tjp!ied by 60 is not less than the lesser of
In 25 percent of tile debtor's nonprjoritv unsecured claims in the case or $6 DOD whjcheYer is
greater or
$10 000
liiHD The debtor's monthly expenses §hall be the debtor's app1icabJe monthly expense amounts specified
under the National StaPdard§ and Local St!!!1dards and the debtor'§ actual monthly expenses for the categories §Pecified
as Other Nece§lliiQ! Exnenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area ip which the debtor resides as in
effect on the date oftbe order for relief for the debtor the dependents pfthe debtor and the spouse oftby dgbtor in a
joint case iftbe SPW!§y is npt otberwi§e a dependgnt Such eXPePsys §hal! iprJlldy reMpnably Pecessap- health
in:wmnce disability insurance and health sayings account expenses for the debmr tbq spQuse Qfthe debtor aqhe

an
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(3) failure to file a plan timely under section 1321 of this title;
(4) failure to commence making timely payments under section 1326 of this title;
(5) denial of confirmation of a plan under section 1325 of this title and denial of a request made for
additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
(6) material default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan;
(7) revocation of the order of confirmation under section 1330 of this title, and denial of confirmation
of a modified plan under section 1329 of this title;
(8) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan
other than completion of payments under the plan;
(9) only on request of the United States trustee, failure of the debtor to file, within fifteen days, or
such additional time as the court may allow, after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the
information required by paragraph (1) of section 521;",,*
(10) only on request of the United States trustee, failure to timely file the information required by
paragraph (2) of section 521.~
(J 1) failure of the debtor to P'!Y any domestic support obligation that first becomes payable after the
date of the filing of the petition
(d) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, at any time before the confirmation ofa plan under
section 1325 of this title, on request ofa party in interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the
court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11 or 12 of this title.
(e) Upon the failure oftbe debtor to file a tax return under section 1308 on request ofa party in interest or the
1rnited States tmstee and after notice and a hearing the court shall dismiss a case or convert a case under this chapter t(
a case under cbapter 7 oftbis title whichever is in the best interest of the creditors and tbe estate
(el) The court may not convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title if the
debtor is a farmer, unless the debtor requests such conversion.
(fg) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a case may not be converted to a case under another
chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.
§

1308 Filing ofprepetjtjon tax returns

(a) Not later than the d'!Y before the date on whicb the meeting of the creditors is first scheduled to be held
under section 341 (a) if the debtor was required to file a tax return under applicable nonbanknmtcy law the debtor shall
file wit:b appropriate tax aut:borities all tax returns for all taxahle periods ending dming the 4-year period ending on the
date of the fiUng ofthe petition
(h)(J) Subject to paragraph (2) if the tax returns required by subsection (a) have not been filed by the date on
which t:be meeting of creditors is first scheduled to be held under section 341 (a) the tmstee may hold open that meeting
for a reasonahle period of time to allow the debtor an additional period oftime to file any unfiled returns but such
additional period of time shall not extend beyond(A) for any return t:bat is past due as of the date ofthe filing ofthe petition the date that is 120 days
after the date ofthat meeting- or
(B) for any return t:bat is not past due as oft:be date oft:be filing of the petition the later of
(j) the date that is 120 days after the date ofthat meeting- or
<ij) the date on which the return is due under the last automatic extension of time for filing
that return to which the debtor is entitled and for which request is timely made in accordance with
applicable nonbankmptcy law
(2) After notice and a hearing and order entered before the to]]jng ofany appUcable fiUng period determined
under this subsection if the debtor demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the fajlme to file a return as
required under this subsection is attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor t:be court may extend
the filing period estabUshed by the tmstee under this subsection for
(A) a period of not more than 30 d'!YS for returns described in paragraph (J)' and
(B) a period not to extend after the appUcable extended due date for a return described in paragraph

ID.
(c) For pUIDOses of this section the term "return" includes a return prepared pursuant to subsection (a) or (b)
of section 6020 ofthe Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a similar State or local law or a written stipulation to a
judgment or a final order entered by a nonbankruptcy tribunal
SUBCHAPTER II-THE PLAN
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AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES

EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1, 2005
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E·34

Text ofProposed Amendments to Rules 1007, 3004, 3005,
.4008. 7004, and 9006.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE·"

Rule 1007. Lists,Sc"edul~, andStatements; Time Limits
1

(a) LIST OF CREDITORS AND EQUITY SECURITY

2

HOLDERS,

3

STATEMENT.

AND

CORPORATE

OWNERSHIP

4

(1) Voluntary Case. In a voluntary case, the debtor

5

shall file with the petition a list coqtaining the name and

6

address ofeach CI editor unless the petition is accompanied by

7

a schedule of liabilities entity included or to be included on

8

Schedules D, E. F.G. and H as prescribed by the Official

9

Forms.

If the debtor is a corporation, other than a

10

governmental unit, the debtor shall file with the petition a

11

corporate ownership statement containing the infonnation

12

described in Rule 7007.1.

··Ncw

The debtor shall file a

material is underlined; matter to be omitted is lilted through
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13

supplemental statement promptly upon any change in

14

circumStances that renders the corporateownership statement

15

inaccurate.

16

(2) Involuntary Case. In an involuntary case, the

17

debtor shall file within 15 days after entry of the order for

18

relief; a list containing the name and address ofeach creditor

19

mdcss a schedule of liabilitiall2l3 been filed entity included

20

or to be included on Schedules D, E, F, G, and H as

21

prescribed by the Official Forms.

•• *.*

n
23

(c)

TIME LIMITS.

In a voluntmy case, the The

24

schedules and statements, other than the statement of

25

intention, shall be filed with the petition in a toltmtary ease,

26

o~ if the petition

27

creditors and their addresses, within 15 days thereafter, except

28

as otherwise provided in subdivisions (d), (e), (t), and (h) of

29

this rule. In an involuntary case, the"list in subdivision (a)(2),

is accompanied b, a list ofaH the debtor's
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30

and the schedules and statements, other than the statement of

31

intention; shall be filed by the debtor within 15 days of tile

32

entry of the order for relief. Schedules Lists. schedules. and

33

statemc:nts filed prior to the conversion ofa case to another

34

chapter shall be deemed filed in the converted case unless the

35

court directs otherwise. Any extension of time for the filing

36

of the schedules and statements may be granted only on'

37

motion- for cause shoWliand on notice to the United States

38

trustee and to any committee elected under § 705 orappointed

39

under § 1102 ofthe Code, trustee, examiner, or other party as-

40

the court may direct. Notice of an extension shall be given to

41

the United States trustee and 'to any committee, trustee, or

42

other party as the court may direct.

~

*****

.~

44

(g) PARTNERSHIP AND PARTNERS. The general

45

partners ofa debtor partnership shall prepare and file the list

46

requiredunder subdivision (at the sche:dules ofthe assets and
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47

liabilities, schedule of current income and expenditures,

48

schedule of execUtory·contracts 'andunexpited lenses, and

49

statement of financial affairs 9fthe partnership. The court

50

may order any general partner to file a statement ofpersonal

51

assets and liabilities within such 'time as the court may fix.

COMMITIEE NOTE
Notice to creditors and other parties in interest is essential to the
operation of the bankruptcy system. Sen~g notice requires a
convenient listing ofthe names and addresses ofthe entities to whom
notice must be sent, and virtually all of the bankruptcy cowts have
adopted a local rule requiring the submission ofa list ofthese entities
with the petition and in a particular fonnat. These lists are commonly
called the ''mailing matrix."
Given the universal adoption of these local ruIes,the need for
such lists in all cases is apparent Consequently, the rule is amended
to require the debtor tOS\1bmit such a list at thecomrhencement ofthe
case. This list maybe amended when necessary. See Rule lOO9{a).
The content of the list is descnbed by reference to Schedules D
through H ofthe Official Fonns rather than by reference to creditors
or persons holding claims. The cross reference to the Schedules as
the source of the names for inclusion in the list ensures that persons
such as codebtors or nondebtor parties to executory contracts and
unexpired leases will receive appropriate noti.ces in the case.
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While tins rule renders unnecessary, in part, local roles on the
subject, this rule does not direct any particular fonnat or form for the
list to take. Locall'Ules still maygovemthosepartiC\Jlars ofthe list
Subdivision (c) is amended to ref.lect that subdivision (aXI) no
longer requires the debtor to file a schedule of liabilities with· the
petition in lieu of a Jist of creditors. The filing of the list is
mandatory, and subdivision (b) of the role requires the filing of
schedules. Thus, subdivision (c) no longer needs to account for the
possibility that the debtor can delay filing a schedule of liabilities
when the petition is accompanied by a list ofcreditors. Subdivision
(c) simply addresses the situation in which the debtor does not file
schedules or statements with the petition, and the procedure for
seeking an extension oftime for filing.
Other changes are stylistic.

•• *.*
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
No changes since publication.

Rule 3~. Filing of Claims by Debtor or Trustee
1

.If a creditor fails to file does not timely file a proof of

2

claim under Rule 3002(c) or 3003(c), on or hebe the filst

3

date $d for the Jneeting of aeditors called pmsuant to

4

§ 341 (3) of the Code, the debtor or ~ee may do so in the
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S

name of the eleditoI, file a proofof the cHum within 30 days

6.

after the expiration ofthe time for filing claims prescribed by

7

Rule 3002(c) or 3003(c), whichever is applicable. The clerk

8

shall forthwith mail: give notice of the filing to the creditor,

9

the debtor and the trustee. A ploofofelaim filed by a acditol

10

pursuant to Rule 3002 01 Rule 3003(e}, shall supasede the

II

proof filed Iry the debtor or tr ustee.

COMMIITEE NOTE
The rule is amended to confonn to § SOl (c) ofthe Code. Under
that provision, the debtor or trustee may file proof of a clcim if the
creditor fulls to do so in a timely fashion. The rule previously
authorized the debtor and the trustee to file a claim as early as the day
after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under § 341 (a).
Under the amended rule, the debtor and trustee must wait until the
creditor's opportunity to file a claim has expired. Providing the
debtor and the trustee with the opportunity to file a claim ensures that
the claim will participate in any distribution in the case. This is
particularly important for claims that are nondischargeable.
Since the debtor and trustee cannot file a proofofclaim until after
the creditor's time to file has expired, the role no longer permits the
creditor to file a proofofclaim that will supersede the claim filed by
the debtor or trustee. The rule leaves to the courts the issue of
whether to pennit subsequent amendment ofsuch proofof claim.
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Other changes are stylistic.

*****
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
No changes were made after publication. The Advisory
Committee concluded that Mr. Van; AlIsburg's suggestion goes
beyond the scope of the published proposal. Consequently, the
Committee declined to adopt the suggestion but may consider it in
greater detail at a future meeting.

Rule 3005. Filing of Claim, Acceptance, or Rejection by
Guarantor, Surety, Indorser, or Other Codebtor
I

(a) FILING OF CLAIM. Ifa creditor does not timely file

2

has not filed a proofofclaim under putsuant to Rule 3002tiU

3

or 3003(c), an~ entity tbatisofmaybe liable with the debtor

4

to that creditor, or who has secured that creditor, may; may

5

file a proofofthe claim within·30 days after the expiration of

6

the time for filing claims prescribed by Rule 3002(c) or Rule

7

3003(c) whichever is applicable, execute and £ilea proofbf

8

claim in t:he,name of the Cleditol, ifk:nown; or ifnnknown;in

9

the Gntit,'s own name. No distribution shall be made on the
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10

claim except on satisfactory proofthat the original debt will

11

be diminished by the amoWlt of distribution. A ploof of .

12

claim tiled b, a aeditol pms~t to RnJe 3002 or 300~(e)

13

shall sttperSede the ploof of claim filed pursuant to the fU'St

14

sentence of this subdivision:

IS

*****
COMMIITEE NOTE

The role is amended to delete the last sentence ofsubdivision (a).
The sentence is unnecessary because if a ~tor has filed a timely
claim under Rule 3002 or 3003(c), the codebtor cannot file a proofof
such claim. The codebtor, consistent with § 501 (b) ofthe Code, may
file a proof of such claim only after the creditor's time to file has
expired. Therefore, the role no longer pennits.the creditor to file a
superseding claim. The rule leaves to the courts the issue ofwhether
to permit subsequent amendment ofthe proofofclaim.
The amendment conforms the role to § 50"1 (b) by deleting
language providing that the codebtor files proof ofthe claim in the
name of the creditor.
Other amendments are stylistic.

*****
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Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
(a) The reference on line 2 of Rule 3005 to "Rule 3002 or
3003(c)" was changed to read "Rule 3002(c) or 3003(cr' to
make it parallel to the language in RUle 3004.

(b) The phrase £~le a proof of the claim" from line 7 of the
proposed rule was moved up to line 4 of the proposed
amendment immediately after the word "-'may'. This makes
the stIUcture of Rules 3004 and 3005 more consistent.
Rule 4008. Dismal ge and Reamr matioD Heal ing Filina:
of Reaffirmation Agreement

1

A reaffirmation agreement shall be filed not later than 30

2

days after the entry of an order pting a dIscharge or

3

confinning a plan in a chapter 11 reorgmrization case of an

4

individual debtor. The court. for cause, may extend the time,

5

and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Not

6

more tban 30 days following the entry of. order granting or

7

den,ing a discharge, or confirnting a plan in a ehaptet II

8

reorganization ease concerning an indi"9idual debtor and on

9

not less than 10 da)s notice to the debtor and the tI ustee, the

10

court may hold a hearing as pro vided il~ § 524«1) of the €ode.
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11

A motion try the debtor for applo"al of a Ieaffirmation

12

agreement shall be filed bebe Of at the heazmg.
COMMITTE~NOTE

The rule is amended to establish adeadlineforfiling reaffirmation
agreements. The Code sets out a nwnber of prerequisites to the
enforceability of reaffirmation agreements.
Among those
requirements are that the a~ents be entered into prior to the
discharge and that they be filed with the court. Since the parties must
make their agreement prior to the entry of the discharge, they will
have at least 30 days to file the agreement with the court Requiring
the filing of reaffirmation agreements by a certain deadline also
serves to inform the court of the need to hold a bearing under
§ 524(d) whenever the agreement is·, not. accompanied by an
appropriate declaration or affidavit from couDsel for the debtor.
The rule allows any party to the agreement to file it with the court.
Thus, whichever party has a greater incentive to enforce the
agreement usually will file it In the event that the parties fail to
timelyfile the reaffirmationagreement, the role grants the court broad
discretion to permit a late filing.

The role also is amended by deleting the provisions formerly in
the rule regarding the timing of the reaffirmation and discharge
hearing. Instead, the rule leaves discretion to the courts to set the
hearing at a time appropriate for the particular circumstances
presented in the case'and consistent with the scheduling needs ofthe
parties.
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*****
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
No changes were made after ..publication. The Advisory
Committee considered the public comments and concluded that the
role should allow post discharge filing ofreaffinnationagreements
notwithstanding the issues raised in the public comments. In
particular, the Committee recognized the problems that can arise if
the reaffinnation agreement is not filed until 30 days after the
discharge is entered. Nevertheless, the post-discharge filing of the
reaffinnation agreement should not itselfrequirethe reopening ofthe
case, so the prior action of closing the case should not be too
problematic. The filing of a reaffinnation agreement without a
declaration or affidavit by counsel for the debtor will infonn the court
that a hearing must be ~ scheduled, but a~ may not require a
reopening of the case.

The Advisory Committee considered the timing ofthe filing and
selected thirty days after the discharge for several reasonS. Most
significantly, the timing of the entry of the discharge is subject to
local practice, and in many districts the discharge order is entered
quite early in a case. The debtor and creditor who are parties to the
reaffinnation agreement may not know when the order will be
entered, and ifthe agreement is made before that time, it should still
be enforceable even if it takes a bit longer to accomplish the filing of
the agreement with the court. Moreover, the fairly short time after the
entry ofthe discharge that is allowed for filing the agreementshould
not delay the proceedings generally, and it should· bring whatever
applicable issues need to be addressed to the attention of the
bankruptcy court in a timely fashion. Nothing in the rule as amended
would prevent the clerk from closing the case as expeditiously as
under current practice. Finally, any delay in the closing of the case
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should not postpone collection efforts of creditors because
§ 362{c)(2)(C) ofthe Bankruptcy Code would already have operated
to dissolve the stay ofactions against the debtor.
Rule 7004. Process; Service ofSummons, Complaint

1

(a) SUMMONS; SERVICE; PROOF OF SERVICE.

2

(1) Except as provided in Rule 7004(a)(2), Rule 4(a),

3

(b), (c)(t), (d)(l), (e)-G), (l), and em) F.R.Civ.P. applies in

4

adversary proceedings. Personal service under pmsuant to

5

Rule 4{e)-G> F.R.Civ.P. maybe made by any person at least

6

18 years ofage who is not a party, and the summons may be

7

delivered by the clerk to any such person.

8

(2) The clerk may sign. seal. and issue a summons

9

electronically by putting an us/" before the clerk's name and

10

II

including the court's seal on the summons.

*****
COMMITTEE NOTE

This amendment specifically authoriz~ the clerk to issue a
summons electronically. In some bankruptcy cases the trustee or
debtor in possession may commence h~dreds of adversary
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proceedings simultaneously, and permittingthe electronic signingand
sealing of the summonses for those proceedings increases_ the
efficiency of the clerk's office without any negative impact on any
party. The rule only authorizes electronic issuance ofthe summons.
It does not address the service req~ents for the summons. Those
requirements are set out elsewhere in Rule 7004, and nothing in Rule
7004(a)(2) should be construed as authorizing electronic seIVice of a
SununOIlS.

*****
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
No changes were made after publication.
Rule 9006. Time
1

*****

2

(f)ADDITIONAL TIME AFTER SERVICE BY MAIL

3

OR UNDER RULE 5 (b)(2)(C) or (D) F.R.CN.P. When

4

there is a right or requirement to do some act or undertake

5

some proceedings within a prescribed period after service of

6

a notice or otber paper and the notice or paper other than

7

process is seI ted and that service is by mail or under Rule 5

8

(b)(2)(C) or (D) F. R. Civ. P., three dayS shall be are added to
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9
10
11

afterthe prescribed periodwould otherwise expire under Rule

9QQ6(a).

* * * *.*
COMMIITEE NOTE

Rule 9006(t) is amended, consistent with a corresponding
amendment to Rule 6(e) ofthe F.R. Civ. P., to clarify the method of
counting the nwnber ofdays to respond after service eitherby mail or
under Civil Rule 5(b)(2)(C) or (0). Three daYs are added after the
prescribed period expires. If, before the application ofRule 9006(f),
the prescribed period is less than 8 days, intervening Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded from the calculation under
Rule 9006(a). Some ilIustJ:ations may be hell?ful.
Under existing Rule 9006(a), assuming that there are no legal
holidays and that a response is due in seven days, ifa paper is filed on
a Monday, the seven dayresponseperiod commences on Tuesday and
concludes on Wednesday ofthe next week. Adding three days to the
end of the period would extend it to Saturday, but because the
response period ends on a weekend, the response day would be the
following Monday, two weeks after the filing of the initial paper. If
the paper is filed on a Tuesday, the seven-day response period would
end on the following Thursday, and the response time would also be
the following Monday. If the paper is mailed on a Wednesday, the
initial seven-day period would expire nine days later on a Friday, but
the response would again be due on the following Monday because
of Rule 9006(t). If the paper is mailed on a Thursday, however, the
seven day period ends on Monday, eleven days after the mailing of
the service because ofthe exclusion ofthe two intervening Saturdays
and Sundays. The response is due three days ~ater on the following
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Thursday. If the paper is mailed on a Friday~ the seven day period
would conclude on a Tuesday~ and ~e response is due three days later
on a Friday.
No other change in the system ofcoooting time is intended.
Other changes are stylistic.

*****
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
The phrase "would otherwise expire under Rule 9006(aY' was
added to the end of the role· to clarify further that the three day
extension is to be added to the end of the~od that is established
under the counting provisions' of Rule 9006(a). This also maintains
a parallel construction with Civil Rule 6(e) in which the same
addition to the role was made after the public comment period.

*****
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B. PrelimiIl31)' Draft of Proposed Amendments to
BankroptcyRules 1009.2002.4002.7004. and 900J. and
Schedule I ofOfficial Fonn 6.
The Advisory Committee recommends that the Standing
Committee apprOve the foDowing preliminary draft ofproposed
amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms for
publication for comment.

.
1. Synopsis ofPreliminary DraftofProposedAmendments to
Bankruptcy Rules 1009. 2002, 4002. 7004, and 9001. and Schedule
I ofOfficial Form 6.

.**.*
(b) Rule 2002(g) is amended by adding a new subdivision
(g)(4) that authorizes entities and notice providers to
agree on the manner and address tq which service may be
effected. The amendment is intended to facilitate notices
to creditors that operate on a national basis, although the
rule allows such agreements by any entitywith any notice
provider. A related amendment to Rule 9001 defines
notice providers.

• *.**
(e) Rule 9001 is amended to add a definition of notice
provider to the role. The definition is to be read in
conjunction with the proposed amendment to Rule
2002(g).

*****
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2. Text oj Prelimmary urafl

0J~rroposea 4menu,,,,::.TI~

JV

Rules . .. 2002 and 9001 .•..

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE·

*****
Rule 2002. Notices to Creditors, Equity Security Holders,
United States, and United States Trustee··

*****

1
2

(g) ADDRESSING NOTICES~

3

(1) Notices required to be mailed under Rule 2002 to

4

a creditor, indenture tntstee, or equity security holder shall be

5

addressed as such entity or an authorized agent has directed

6

in its last request filed in the particular case. For the purposes

7

of this subdivision -

"New material is underlined; matter to be omitted is lined through.
- The amendment to Rule 9001should be considered in tandem with the proposed
amendment to Rule 2002. Rule 9001 as proposed to be amended is set out at the
end of this section of the report.
.
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8

(A) a proof of claim filed by a creditor or

9

indenture trustee that designates a mailing address constitutes

l O a filed request to mail notices to that addresst unless a notice

11

ofno dividend has been given under Rule 2002(e) and a later

12

notice of possible dividend under Rule 3002(c)(S) has not

13

been given; and

14

(B) a proofofinterest filed by an equity security

15

holder that designates a mailing address constitutes a filed

16

request to mail notices to that address.

17

(2) If a creditor or indenture trustee has not filed a

18

request designating a mailing address under Rule 2002(g)(1)t

19

the notices shall be mailed to the address shown on the list of

20

creditors or schedule ofliabilities, whichever is filed later. If

21

an equity security holder has not filed a request designating a

22

mailing address under Rule 2oo2(g)(I), the notices shall be

23

mailed to the address shown on the list of equity security

24

holders.
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25

(3) Ifa list or schedule filed under Rule 1001 includes

26

the name and address ofa legal representative ofan infant or

21

incompetent person) and a person other than that

28

representative files a request or proofofclaim designating a

29

name and mailing address that differs from the name and

30

address ofthe representative included in the list or schedule)

31

unless the court orders otherwise) notices under Rule 2002

32

shall be mailed to the representative included in the list or

33

schedules and to the name and address designated in the

34

request or proofofclaim.

35

(4) Notwithstanding Rule 2002(8) (ll - 0), an entity

36

and a notice provider may agree that when the notice provider

31

is directed by the court to give a notice. the notice provider

38

shall give the notice to the entity in the manner agreed to and

39

at the address or addresses the entity supplies to the notice

40

provider. That address is conclusively presumed to be a

41

proper address for the notice. The notice provider)s failure to
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42

use the supplied address does not invalidate any notice that is

43

otherwise effective under applicable law.

44

*****
COMMITTEE NOTE

A new paragraph (g)(4) is inserted in the role. The new paragraph
authorizes an entity and a nOtice provider to agree that the notice
provider will give notices to the entity at the address or addI:esses set
out in their agreement. Rule 9001(9) sets out the definition of a
notice provider.
The business ofmanyentities is national in scope, and technology
currently exists to direct the transmiss.~on of notice (both
electronically and in paper fonn) to those entities in an accurate and
much more efficient manner than bysending individual notices to the
same creditor by separate mailings. The role authorizes an entity and
a notice provider to determine the manner ofthe service as well as to
set the address or addresses to which the notices must be sent For
example, they could agree that all notices sent by the n9tice provider
to the entity must be sent to a single, nationwide electronic or postal
address. They could also establish local or regional addresses to
which notices would be sent in matters pending in specific districts.
Since the entity and notice provider also can agree on the date ofthe .
commencement ofservice under the agreement, there is no need to set
a date in the role after which notices would have to be sent to the
address or addresses that the entity establishes. Furthermore, since
the entity supplies the address to the notice provider, use of that
address is conclusively presumed to be proper. Nonetheless, if that
address is not used, the notice still maybe effective if the notice is
otherwise effective under applicable law. This is the same treatment
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given under Rule SOO3(e) to notices sent to governmental units at
addresses other than those set out in that register ofaddresses.
The remaining subdivisions ofRule 2002(g) continue to govern
the addressing of a n~tice that is not .sent pursuant to an agreement
descn1>ed in Rule 2002(gX4).

Public Comment on Proposed Amendment to Rule 2002:
No comments were received on the proposed amendment
Changes Made After Publication and Comment:

No changes since publication.

****.
Rule 9001.

General Def'mitions

*****

1

2

(9) "Notice provider'~ means any entity approved by

3

the Administrative Office ofthe United States Courts to give

4

notice to creditors under Rule 2002(g)(4l.

5

(l.Ql

m "Regular associate

U

means any attorney

6

regularly employed by, associated with, or counsel to an

7

individual or firm.
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Ull tt6) "Trusteen

8
9

a chapter 11 case.

J0

@

I'KU\..CUUnJ:.

includes a debtor in possession in

fH1 "United States trustee" includes an assistant

11

United States trustee and any designee of the United States

12

trustee.

COMMIITEE NOTE
The role is amended to add the definition ofa notice provider and
to renumber the final three definitions in the rple. A notice provider
is an entity approved by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts to enter into agreements with entities to give notice to
those entities in the fonn and manner agreed to by those parties. The
new definition supports the amendment to Rule 2002{g)(4) that
authorizes a notice provider to give notices under Rule 2002.
Many entities conduct business on a national scale and receive
vast nwnbers ofnotices in bankruptcy cases throughout the country.
Those entities can agree with a notice provider to receive their notices
in a fonn and at an address or addresses that the creditor and notice
provider agree upon. There are processes c~ently in use that
provide substantial assurance that notices are not misdirected. Any
notice provider would have to demonstrate to the Administrative
Office ofthe United States Courts that it could provide the service in
a manner that ensures the proper delivery ofnotice to creditors. Once
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts approves the
notice provider to enter into agreements with creditors, the notice
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provider. and other entities can establish the relationship that will
govern the delivery of notices in cases as provided in Rule
2002(g)(4).

Public Comment on Proposed Amendment to Rule 9001:
No comments were received on the proposed amendment.

Changes Made After Publication and Comment:
No changes since publication.

*****
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SECTIONF

Chapter 11 Changes Under the
New Bankruptcy Act
I

Introduction

While the bulk of changes which were brought on by the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("2005 Act") on April 20, 2005 primarily
impact Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases, a significant amount of changes were made to Chapter
11 practice. This outline is to discuss the various issues which will arise with the changes to
Chapter 11 law.

II

Filing of Petition Issues
Amendments to 707(b)(4)(C) and (D) and Section 319 of the 2005 Act:

III

A

In the event a Chapter 11 case converts to a Chapter 7 case and the
Chapter 11 Debtor's Counsel files the Chapter 7 Schedule, the
requirements of 11 U.S.c. §§ 707(b)(4)(C) (reasonable investigation of
circumstances giving rise to the debtor and that the petition is "well
grounded in fact") and (b)(4)(D) (the attorney certifies that the attorney
"has no knowledge after inquiry that the information in the schedules filed
with such petition is incurred") will apply.

B

Potentially more troubling is Section 319 of the 2005 Act where Congress
would in effect extend 11 U.S.C. § 707 (B)(4)(C) to Chapter 11 Petitions
and Schedules, through a modification of Bankruptcy 9011.

•

Question: What is reasonable inquiry for 1,500+ page Schedules in complex
Chapter 11 cases?

Pre-Packaged Legislation: Amendments to 11 U.S.c. §§ 341 and 1125:

The existence of pre-packaged Chapter 11 has been recognized and implicitly approved
by the 2005 Act by two separate amendments:
A

First, 11 U.S.C. § 341 has been amended to permit, after motion by a party
in interest and notice and hearing, the Court to order the U.S. trustee not to
hold a meeting of creditors and equity security holders in a case where
"the debtor has filed a plan as to which the debtor solicited acceptances
prior to the commencement of the case."

B

Second, new 11 U.S.C. § 1125(g) specifically permits pre-bankruptcy
solicitation of plan acceptances if such solicitations comply with
"applicable bankruptcy law."

• Question:

Exactly what non-bankruptcy law governs solicitation of
acceptances of a proposed plan of reorganization in an unfiled Chapter 11
case?
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IV

Issues Involving Professionals in Chapter 11 Cases.

Although numerous major changes were made to consumer cases involving
professionals, few changes were made to Chapter 11 which directly impact Chapter 11
professionals. The most important changes include:

V

A

11 U.S.c. § 101(14). Changes to the definition of disinterested person.
The change to this section removes investment bankers and attorneys for
investment bankers from the statutory definition of "disinterested person."
This means that Courts will be given discretion in determining whether
investment bankers are disinterested for purposes of retention as
professionals under 11 U.S.c. § 327. One impact of this change will be to
overrule significant portions of In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 44
F.3d 1310 (6 th Cir. 1995).

B

11 U.S.c. § 330. This section is amended to specifically allow Courts to
consider whether (1) a person is a board certified Bankruptcy professional
or (2) has "demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field" in
awarding fees.

C

11 U.S.c. § 328. This provision was amended by the 2005 Act to clarify
that a Bankruptcy Court can approve professional fees on a fixed or
percentage fee basis.

Plan Exclusivity Issues.
A

•

11 U.S.C. § 1121. Section 411 of the 2005 Act significantly alters the
debtor's exclusivity rights under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §
1121 (d) is modified to require that exclusivity for the filing of a plan shall
not be extended beyond "18 months after the date of the Order for Relief'
and exclusivity for obtaining confirmation of a plan shall not be extended
beyond "20 months after the date of the Order for Relief' in this case.
Further, § 1121 (e) is amended to limit exclusivity on the filing of a plan to
180 days in small business cases and require the filing ofplan and
disclosure statements within 300 days of the filing.

Question: What impact will this have on Court discretion to control both the
order and the pace of hearings on competing plans and disclosure
hearings?

VI

Motions to Appoint Trustees or Convert the Case.

In light of the increasing emphasis on corporate governance issues, it is not surprising
that the 2005 Act made substantial changes to issues related to the conversion of a Chapter 11
case to a Chapter 7 case or for the appointment of an examiner or trustee.
A

11 U.S.C. § 1112 -- Conversion or Dismissal. This section is modified in
a number of ways by the 2005 Act. First, subsection (b) is modified to
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remove the United States Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrators from the
statutory list of parties that can file an 11 U.S.C. § 1112 motion. It is
unclear why this change was made and may lead to significant litigation.

•

Question: Is the removal of U.S. Trustee and Bankruptcy Administrators in
11 U.S.C. § 1112 consistent with the expansion of the U.S. Trustee's
duties in small business cases and under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(e)?

Second, subsection (b) was also amended to change the ultimate burden of
persuasion test for conversion or dismissal of 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2) by now
requiring conversion or dismissal if a movant establishes cause, unless the debtor
establishes "unusual circumstances" which must be specifically identified by the
Court and which establish that conversion or dismissal is not in the best interest of
the debtor's estate.
The debtor or other party in interest may also escape conversion or dismissal of a
Chapter 11 by showing there is a reasonable likelihood a plan will be confirmed
within a described time and there was a reasonable explanation for the act or
omission which constituted the case.
Third, new 11 U.S.c. § 1112(b)(4) expands what might constitute cause.
B

11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(3). This section is added to specifically provide that
if grounds to convert or dismiss a case under 11 U.S.c. § 1112 exist, the
Court may instead appoint an examiner, if the Court concludes the
appointment of an examiner is in the best interests of the estate.

C

11 U.S.C. § 1104(e). Finally, subsection (e) is added to 11 U.S.C. § 1104
to require the U.S. Trustee's office to move for the appointment of a
trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) if there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that debtor's current management (or former management that
appointed the debtor's chief executive or chief financial officer) have
participated in "fraud, dishonesty or criminal conduct." This section does
not in any way directly change the Court's analysis for the appointment of
trustees or examiners.

•

Question: How far does the "appointment" taint go (i.e., CFO appointed by a
CEO who was appointed by a suspect board)?

VII

Lease and Executory Contract Issues.
A

11 U.S.C. § 365. The 2005 Act makes numerous changes to this section:

First, the 2005 Act eliminates defaults arising from non-monetary obligations in
unexpired leases of real property from the list of defaults to be cured if "it is
impossible for the trustee to cure such defaults by performing non-monetary acts
at or after the time of assumption ...." These defaults are primarily going dark
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defaults in leases of non-residential real property, and now will be cured by
payments of "pecuniary losses."

•

Question: How will such pecuniary losses be calculated?

Second, 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) is amended to attempt to overrule a minority
line of cases which held that debtors did not have to cure any non-monetary
defaults in order to assume an executory contract.
Third, the 2005 Act limits the time to assume or reject a lease of non-residential
real property to a maximum of 21 0 days even with Court extensions.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b). As perhaps corollary to the shortening of the time
which the debtor has to assume or reject leases of non-residential real
property, subsection (b)(7) was added to limit the amount of an
administrative claim a landlord could be allowed in the event the debtor
decides to reject a previously assumed lease to the two years of the
monetary obligations due under the lease after the rejection, excluding any
penalty provision and claims related to failure to operate provisions.

B

VIII

Utility Issues.
11 U.S.C. § 366 was amended to:

•
IX

1

Require that only certain forms of "assurance of payment" would
satisfy the requirement of 11 U.S.c. § 366;

2

expand a utilities right to terminate services post-petition;

3

limit the matters a Court can consider in awarding "assurance of
payment;" and

4

grant utilities setoff rights in security deposits provided to them by
debtors "without notice or Court order."

Question: Does this change pre-empt the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362?

Reclamation Issues.
A

11 U.S.c. §§ 503(b)(9) and 546. The 2005 Act amended 11 U.S.C. §§
503(b)(9) and 546 to expand and clarify reclamation rights of creditors.
The key changes to reclamation issues are:
1

Clarification that rights of reclaiming creditors are subject tot eh
prior rights of creditors with a security interest in the goods sought
to be reclaimed (11 U.S.c. § 546(c)(1));
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2

establishment of a time (45 days) in which the debtors must have
received the goods prior to bankruptcy (11 U.S.C. § 546(c)(1));

3

expansion of the notice periods for making reclamation claims (11
U.S.c. § 546(c)(1)(A) and (B));

4

permitting the seller to obtain a ninth (9 th) level administrative
expense under 11 U.S.c. § 503(b)(9) for goods received by the
debtor within 20 days before the bankruptcy filing; and

5

eliminating old § 502(c)(2).

Unsecured Creditor Committee Issues.
A

11 U.S.C. § 1102(a). New 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(4) clarifies Bankruptcy
Court jurisdiction over Committee membership by providing that a
Bankruptcy Court can direct the U.S. Trustee to change the membership of
a Committee in order to "ensure adequate representation."

B

11 U.S.c. § 1102(b). New U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3), however, greatly changes
access to information which a Committee has in a bankruptcy case by
providing that a Committee shall:
1

Provide access to information;

2

to creditors who:

1

hold claims of the kind represented by the Committee; and

ii

are not appointed to the Committee.

•

Question: What about privileged information?

•

Question: What about confidential information?

•

Question: When and under what circumstances must the information be
provided?

Automatic Stay Issues.
A

11 U.S.c. § 362(b) -- Exceptions to the Automatic Stay. Significant
amendments were made to the statutory exceptions to the automatic stay,
including:
1

Expansion of domestic relations exceptions (§ 362(b));

2

exception for financial participants (§§ 362(b)(6) and (b)(7));
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withholding from wages to pay certain retirement loans (§
362(b)(19»;

4

acts to enforce liens in real property where stay relies was granted
in a prior bankruptcy case (§ 362(b)(20» or the debtor was
ineligible for relief (§§ 362(b)(20) and § 362(c»;

5

certain eviction actions (§§ 362(b)(22) and (b)(23»;

6

any transfer not avoidable under both 11 U.S.c. §§ 544 and 549 (§
362 (b)(24»;

7

certain securities investigations and actions (§ 362(b)(25»;

8

certain tax setoffs (§ 362(b)(26));

9

certain setoffs under master netting agreements (§ 362(b)(27»);

10

certain acts to exclude debtors from participation in Medicare and
other Federal healthcare programs by HHS (§ 362(b)(28»;

B

11 U.S.C. § 362(d). The 2005 Act makes significant changes to the time
for stay relief in single asset real estate cases (§§ 362(d)(3». 362(d)(4» is
added and provides for stay relief in "serial filing" bankruptcy cases.

C

11 U.S.C. § 362(e). Subsection 362(e)(2) is added by the 2005 Act and
provides that the automatic stay will terminate 60 days after a motion is
filed unless:

•
XII

3

1

The Court makes a final decision during the 60-day period; or

2

the 60-day period is extended by the agreement of all parties or the
Court for good cause shown, as described in the Court's findings,
extends the 60 days for a specific period of time.

Question: What is a "Final Decision?"

Avoidance Actions.
A

11 U.S.C. § 547. The 2005 Act made several changes to the preference
statute, including:
1

The ordinary course defense of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) was
amended so that the defense would be established if it was either:
(1) made in the ordinary course of business between the parties, or
(2) was made according to ordinary terms of the industry;

2

placing a floor of$5,000.00 on business preferences (§ 547(c)(9»;
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3

increasing the time for perfection of a transfer from 10 to 30 days
under § 547(e)(2);

4

transfers made under repayment schedules created by approved
non-profit budget and credit counseling agencies (§ 547(h)); and

5

yet another attempt to fix the Deprizio problem (§ 547(i)). See
Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.
1989).

11 U.S.C. § 548. The Federal Fraudulent Conveyance Statute was
amended to significantly expand the causes of action which can be
brought under its provisions. Among the changes made by the 2005 Act
are:
1

An increase of the time covered by 11 U.S.C. § 548 from one year
prior to the bankruptcy to two years prior to the bankruptcy;

2

including certain key employee payments as avoidable transfers
(§ 548(a)(1)(B)(iv));

3

excepting certain payments to master netting agreement
participants, or financial participants from the provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 548; and

4

providing a 10-year look back period for avoiding transfers to
certain self-settled trusts or similar devices made with the actual
intent to hinder, defraud or delay any creditor.

28 U.S.c. § 1409 - Venue Issues. The 2005 Act further limited nonconsumer preference actions by requiring such actions involving less than
$15,000.00 be brought only in the U.S. District Court for the District
where the defendant resides.

Anti-KERP Changes.
See attached Exhibit A.

XIV

Other General Chapter 11 Changes
A

Protection of Warehouseman's liens 11 U.S.C. § 546 is amended to
protect these liens from avoidance under 11 U.S.c. § 545.

B

Courts are directed to hold status conferences to move cases to resolution.
11 U.S.C. § 105(d).

C

Section 419 of the 2005 Act requires the Judicial Conference to propose
amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules to require debtors to provide
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infonnation related to the profitability of closely held corporations
controlled by debtors.

XV

D

11 U.S.C. §§ 531, 704 and 1106 are amended by the 2005 Act to establish
duties for debtors who are Retirement Plan Administrators.

E

11 U.S.C. § 363 is amended to provide limits on the sale of assets held by
Not-for-Profit Corporations.

Small Business Legislation
A

Definitions: The 2005 Act adds two definitions to the Bankruptcy Code:
11 U.S.C. § 101(51C) which defines small business cases and 101(51D)
which defines small business debtors as persons engaging in commercial
or business activities (excluding persons whose primary business is
owning or operating real property) which has aggregate non-contingent
liquidated debts of not more than $2,000,000.00 and either no creditor's
committee is appointed or it is an inactive committee. Further, small
business debtor status is now mandatory not elective.

•

Question: Is there now a strange incentive of smaller debtors to increase debt
prior to filing to escape small business treatment?

B

11 U.S.C. § 308. New Section 308 of the Bankruptcy Code places
significant additional reporting requirements on small business debtors.

C

11 U.S.c. § 1116. This new section of the Bankruptcy Code imposes
seven separate duties on either the debtor-in-possession or a small
business debtors chapter 11 trustee.

D

11 U.S.C. § 1121. This section limits the exclusivity period in small
business cases to 180 days and requires any plan and disclosure to be filed
within 300 days. These time periods can be extended (along with a related
time period in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) only if:

E

1

the debtor, after notice to all parties, demonstrates that the court
will confinn a plan within a reasonable time;

2

the court establishes a new deadline; and

3

the order extending the time is signed before the existing deadline
expires.

11 U.S.c. § 1129. The 2005 Act added subsection (e) to 1129 and
requires the court to confinn any plan that complies with the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code and was filed in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §
1121 (e) not later than 45 days after it is filed unless an extension is
granted.
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F

11 U.S.C. § 1125 and Section 433 Form Plan. The requirements of 11
US.c. § 1125 are reduced by the 2005 Act. First, a Court may dispense
with a disclosure statement if the plan itself provides adequate information
1125(f)(1). Second, even if a disclosure statement is required 1125(f)(2)
provides that such a statement may be submitted on a standard form to be
proposed and approved as provided for by section 433 of this 2005 Act.

G

28 U.S.C. § 586(a). Finally, the 2005 Act greatly expands the duties of
the US. Trustee in small business cases. Of particular interest, is the US.
Trustee's duty to move for conversion or dismissal under 11 U.S.C. §
1112 in appropriate cases. However, the US. Trustee has been removed
from the list of parties which can file the Motion.

Individual Chapter 11 Issues

One of the major areas of change in Chapter 11 practice involves the representation of
individuals of Chapter 11 proceeding.
A

11 U.S.c. § 1115. The most important change in individual Chapter 11
practice comes with the enactment of 11 US.C. § 1115 which makes postpetition income property of the estate in addition to the property set forth
in section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.

B

Domestic Support Obligations. The 2005 Act eliminates most issues
related to the dischargability of debts arising from divorce and other
related proceedings by making all such debts nondischargeable (except for
11 US.C. § 523(a)(15) debts in Chapter 13 cases) see 11 U.S.c. §
523(a)(5) and (a)(15). This legislation has an important impact on
individual Chapter 11 cases as a significant percentage of individual
chapter 11 cases heretofore involved marital or child support obligations.
Among the key'domestic relation changes are:

C

1

Definition of Domestic Support Obligations. 11 U.S.c. §
101(12A)

2

Establishment of Domestic Support Obligations as the highest
priority administrative expense. 11 US.C. § 507(a)(1)'

3

Requirement of the timely payment of Domestic Support
Obligations as a condition of confirmation. 11 US.C. § 1129.

4

Most Domestic Support Obligations are now accepted from the
provisions of the automatic stay. 11 U.S.c. § 362(b)(2)

11 U.S.C. § 548. Two changes were made to this provision which impact
individuals' chapter 11 debtors.
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1

11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(B)(ii)(IV) was added which makes certain
payments to insiders made under employment contracts, not in the
ordinary course of business, avoidable.

2

11 U.S.c. § 548(e) was added to greatly expand the ability of
debtors to avoid transfers of assets to self settled trusts as
fraudulent conveyances.

D

11 U.S.C. § 1127. The 2005 Act added subsection (e) to 1127 and
provides for a "Chapter 13 like" ability to modify their chapter 11 plans
post-petition based upon, among other things, changes in the debtor's
post-confirmation income.

E

11 U.S.C. § 1141. The 2005 Act makes several important changes to the
effect of a discharge in individual chapter 11 cases to make Chapter 11
discharge provisions closer to a "Chapter 13 like" model.

F

11 U.S.C. § 1146. Section 1146 was amended by eliminating the special
tax provisions relating to individual debtors of former 1146(a) or 1146(b).

XVII Healthcare Bankruptcy Issues

See attached Exhibit B.
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US BANKRUPTCY

KERPS - Should we or shouldn It we?
BY ANTHONY H.N. SCHNELLlNG AND CARL H. YOUNG, III

ey Employee Retention Programs ("KERPS") have become
a very controversial subject lately. Senator Kennedy recently
indicated his desire to see an amendment offered and passed to the
bankruptcy reform bill that has been working its way through the
United States legislative process for several years. This amendment
would seek to severely limit the ability of bankruptcy courts to allow
payments to employees and executives of companies in Chapter 11
during a bankruptcy to encourage them to stay and work through their
employers' issues. It would effectively shift the burden of proof to
recipients of such programs. The amendment would require a judge to
find that recipients of such payments in future were qualified to receive
KERP treatment because they had offers to leave at comparable or
greater compensation levels, were likely to accept such offers and were
essential to the survival of the bankrupt entity and its reorganisation.
While there is nothing wrong with heightened scrutiny of such programs, the concept that a critical employee must find a better job, be
willing to take it and destroy the employer's chance of reorganisation
by doing so before a court can grant him or her added compensation to
cover the risk of staying with a bankrupt company is absurd. It is like
using an elephant gun to kill a gnat.
KERPS like everything else associated with the restructuring process
go through cycles. Very popular today, indeed thought of in many
turnaround management company circles as an essential part of the
restructuring process, they were virtually unheard of before the early
1990s.
Before their introduction, managements of failed or failing companies, more often than not offered reductions in their own compensation
when asking employees to suffer lay-offs or take significant pay cuts
to support an enterprise's ability to reorganise. In that era, banks and
major creditors routinely asked what management's commitment was
to the restructuring before committing their funds, granting waivers or
extending additional credit to a troubled company.
Philosophically, this is the position that Senator Kennedy would look
back to, much as we look back to the golden days of our youth when
things were always better than they are today. However, we cannot
and should not legislate in a vacuum to correct trends which will more
than likely reverse themselves as abuses are recognised by the public
at large and objected to, unless they genuinely can achieve their stated

K
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goals, by secured lenders and creditors' committees and rejected by the
courts as over-reaching and inappropriate uses of debtor funds.
It is clear that the impetus behind Senator Kennedy's proposed
amendment and much of the current public discomfort with KERPS
comes from the significant recent abuses in the KERP process. From
the 1990s forward there was a gradual recognition that, when companies failed in good economic times, it was difficult to retain qualified
and often critical personnel because good jobs are always available to
the top performers. In order to hold key middle management and senior
executives who could make a real difference to a troubled enterprise's
restructuring efforts, turn-around consultants and other professionals
active in this field began to develop compensation programs designed
to create golden handcuffs for the key players in an organisation. These
programs were designed to reduce the risk of staying with a bankrupt
entity for the employees a debtor really needed to retain. Such programs required little in return for significant additional payment guarantees than that the recipients stick around to assist in the restructuring
work. It was assumed that, because the programs were severely limited
in scope to cover only the top performers, the recipients would necessarily benefit their employer by their continued superior performance.
These plans were quite different from previous practice and were not
easy to sell to the major external constituents at the banks and on the
creditors' committees.
Over time, very gradually, the whole nature of employee compensation in the context of the bankruptcy arena changed. No longer were
KERPs offered primarily in situations where a strong job market
mandated special treatment to keep top performers. KERPs became a
fixture in many bankruptcy cases because employees read about these
plans and pushed hard to have them put in place regardless of whether
there were replacement jobs widely available to them. Failure to
implement some form of KERP plan presented serious risks to debtor
employers who ignored their work force.
The first significant excesses that crept in related to the breadth of
KERP plans. They began to be less focused and became a way to
pay large numbers of employees what was in effect a "bonus" not an
incentive to stay and produce. Then senior executives began demanding inclusion in such programs at the outset of a restructuring as a
condition of staying. Because it takes time to evaluate management
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..This amendment would seek to severely
limit the ability of bankruptcy courts to
allow payments to employees and
executives of companies in Chapter 11."

quality, turn around managers were forced to acquiesce and design and
recommend such plans before they had an opportunity to assess which
executives should be shown the door instead of being compensated for
staying at a company they may well have brought to its knees by their
own actions or lack of actions.
Indeed as time went on the plans became more and more top-heavy
and were designed to benefit incumbent management. While key
employees in the rank and file were still included in KERP plans, at
the dawn of the 21st century, the lion's share of the benefits went to
the top guys. This culminated in the excesses seen in 2000-2004 in
which high status staff at companies like Enron were able to organise
substantial payments for themselves at the expense of more junior staff
and personnel who were substantially overlooked. Indeed at Enron,
many such payments were actually paid out at the beginning of the
bankruptcy case and the employees who received them then left for
greener pastures with the KERP money they had been paid to stay and
see their employer through its bankruptcy.
These excesses have led courts to alter the playing field in several
significant and meaningful ways. KERP orders, which used to be
routinely approved as first day orders, designed to approve critical
measures to keep a company in business, are now routinely deferred
until a creditors' committee can be appointed and can review their
terms and conditions. Indeed, today most bankruptcy professionals

caution debtor management not to be too hasty to come forward
with a KERP plan lest they appear greedy to judge and creditors
alike. Plans today stand very little chance of getting approved if
they are perceived as top heavy and compensate senior management
too highly. Plans which focus on the rank and file have a much better chance of being approved with or without objection from other
creditors. Secured creditors are reluctant to carve out money for
plans which don't have some objective measure for triggering payment - usually tied to a time period or a specific result the secured
creditors wish to see achieved. As a result, successful KERP plans
today frequently require performance against objective standards,
release of employee claims which dilute other creditors' recoveries,
satisfaction of specific time requirements during which the recipient
is required to benefit the debtor by his or her work and presence or
some combination of all of these criteria.
Despite earlier excesses, it would appear that the marketplace has
been able to mandate sufficient changes to the approval process for
KERP plans to once again drive employees to do what they were
originally supposed to do when the first KERP plans were introduced - produce top level performance with some certainty that the
employee's risk in staying with a troubled entity has been reasonably
covered.
The real question today is not whether KERPs are sometimes reasonable and appropriate. The marketplace and the courts are seeing
to it that they are both reasonable and appropriate before approving
them. Therefore, we believe that an amendment like the one Senator
Kennedy has proposed to the new bankruptcy bill would be harmful
if offered and passed. If passed it would substantially de-rail the difficult process of enticing employees to continue with an employer
through a bankruptcy proceeding. Passage of such an amendment
would remove from bankruptcy professionals a key tool for motivating critical employees just when the excesses of the process have
already been identified and largely eliminated.
The more difficult question is how to get employees to return to
the days when they felt it incumbent on themselves to sacrifice some
of their own compensation to induce other constituents in a troubled
situation to step forward and rescue their company? A return to those
"golden days" would signal a profound shift in human nature for the
better which it is hard to contemplate being effectively mandated
by legislation.•

Anthony H.N.SchneUing and Carl H.Young,1II are managing directo" at Bridge AssocialesllC.
They can be contacted on +1 (212) 207 4710
or by emait 3.lchnelling@bridgellc.com and cyoung@bridgelk.com
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Much of the commentary on the pending bankruptcy
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legislation has focused on consumer bankruptcies.

ABI World

However, several provisions of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
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2005, S. 256 (the "Act"), are specifically targeted to
health care bankruptcies. If it becomes law, as is widely expected, the legislation will
provide an exception to the automatic stay for government action to suspend a
debtor from participation in the Medicare program or any other federal health care
program. Additionally, the legislation would place new burdens on health care
debtors by providing procedures for disposing of patient records, closing of a facility
and transferring patients. The legislation also prOVides for the appointment of a
patient advocate ombudsman. However, the amendments also have the salutary
effect of recognizing patients as an important constituency in any health care
bankruptcy.

I. Health Care Business is Now Defined
For the first time, the Act attempts to create a Bankruptcy Code definition of a
health care business. Section 1101 of the Act provides that a health care
business:
A. means any public or private entity (Without regard to whether
that entity is organized for profit or not-for-profit) that is
primarily engaged in offering to the general public facilities and
services fori. the diagnosis or treatment of injury, deformity, or disease;
and
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ii. surgical, drug treatment, psychiatric, or obstetric care; and
B. includes1. anyI. general or specialized hospital;
II. ancillary ambulatory, emergency, or surgical treatment
facility;
III. hospice;
IV. home health agency; and
V. other health care institution that is similar to an entity
referred to in subclause (I), (II), (III), or (IV); and
2. any long-term care facility, including anyI. skilled nursing facility;
II. intermediate care facility;
III. assisted living facility;
IV. home for the aged;
V. domiciliary care facility; and
VI. health care institution that is related to a facility referred
to in subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V), if that
institution is primarily engaged in offering room', board,
laundry, or personal assistance with activities of daily
living and incidentals to activities of daily living.
I. Health and Human Services Exception from the Automatic Stay
Section 1106 of the Act provides a new exception to the automatic stay by adding
to the list of stay exceptions under Bankruptcy Code §362 the following:
28. under subsection (a), of the exclusion by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services of the debtor from participation in the Medicare
program or any other Federal health care program (as defined in
Section 1128B(f) of the Social Security Act pursuant to Title XI or
XVIII of such Act).
It appears that the primary intent of the amendment is to allow the Department of

Health and Human Services expanded debt collection powers against a health care
debtor. The provision appears to be derived from a bill introduced by Sens. Charles
Grassley (R-Iowa) and John Breaux (D-La.) in the 106th Congress, called the
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"Home Health Integrity Preservation Act of 1999," which sought to modify the
Social Security Act. Sen. Grassley-who also sponsored the new bankruptcy billstated that the purpose of the 1999 Act was "to make it harder for all Medicare
providers, not just home health agencies, to avoid penalties and repayment
obligations by declaring bankruptcy." 145 Congo Rec. S750, S756 (daily ed. Jan.
20, 1999) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

II. Restrictions on Health Care Debtors and Trustees/Protection of Patient Interests
Sections 1102 through 1105 of the Act place a greater burden on trustees and
debtors-in-possession in health care bankruptcies. These provisions came out of
one of the failed predecessors to the current legislation, known as the "Business
Bankruptcy Reform Act, S. 1914." Senate Bill 1914 was developed, inter alia, in
response to the increasing number of failures within the health care industry and
sought to protect the interests of current and former patients of a reorganizing or
liquidating health care business. See Nancy A. Peterman, Intensive Care:
Protecting Patients' Rights in Health Care Bankruptcies, 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 10
(1998) (analyzing Senate Bill 1914 and concluding that its provisions were critical
to protecting the: rights of patients in health care bankruptcies).

A. Disposal of Patient Records
Section 1102 of the proposed legislation adds a new §351 to the Bankruptcy
Code, containing specific provisions for the disposal of patient records in a
bankruptcy case. The new section provides:
a health care business commences a case under chapter 7, 9,
r 11, and the trustee does not have a sufficient amount of funds
pay for the storage of patient records in the manner required
nder applicable federal or state law, the folloWing requirements
hall apply:
The trustee shallA. promptly publish notice, in one or more appropriate
newspapers, that if patient records are not claimed by the
patient or an insurance provider (if applicable law permits
the insurance provider to make that claim) by the date
that is 365 days after the date of that notification, the
trustee will destroy the patient records; and
B. during the first 180 days of the 365-day period described
in subparagraph (A), promptly attempt to notify directly
each patient that is the subject of the patient records and
appropriate insurance carrier concerning the patient

F'19

records by mailing to the most recent known address of
that patient, or a family member or contact person for that
patient, and to the appropriate insurance carrier an
appropriate notice regarding the claiming or disposing of
patient records.
2. If, after providing the notification under paragraph (1), patient
records are not claimed during the 365-day period described
under that paragraph, the trustee shall mail, by certified mail,
at the end of such 365-day period a written request to each
appropriate federal agency to request permission from that
agency to deposit the patient records with that agency, except
that no federal agency is required to accept patient records
under this paragraph.
3. If, following the 365-day period described in paragraph (2) and
after providing the notification under paragraph (1), patient
records are not claimed by a patient or insurance provider, or
request is not granted by a federal agency to deposit such
records with that agency, the trustee shall destroy those
records byA. if the records are written, shredding or burning the
records; or
B. if the records are magnetic, optical, or other electronic
records, by otherwise destroying those records so that
those records cannot be retrieved.

B. Administrative Expense Claims
Section 1103 of the Act modifies §503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to add, as a
new administrative expense, the actual and necessary costs and expenses of
closing a health care business, including the required manner for disposing of
patient records and transferring of patients:
8. the actual, necessary costs and expenses of closing a health
care business incurred by a trustee or by a federal agency (as
defined in Section 551(1) of Title 5) or a department or agency
of a state or political subdivision thereof, including any cost or
expense incurredA. in disposing of patient records in accordance with Section
351; or
B. in connection with transferring patients from the health
care business that is in the process of being closed to
another health care business...
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C. Appoinbnent of Ombudsman as Patient Advocate
Section 1104 of the Act adds a new §333 to the Code and requires the
appointment of an ombudsman within 30 days of the commencement of any
health care bankruptcy case, to act as a patient advocate. The appointment is
not required if the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of
patients under the specific facts of the case. The duties of the ombudsman
are to monitor the quality of patient care and report to the court every 60
days regarding the quality of patient care. If the ombudsman believes that
the quality of patient care is declining significantly or is otherwise being
materially compromised, he or she must report to the court immediately upon
making that determination. The ombudsman maintains any information
relating to patients as confidential and may not review confidential patient
records without court approval and restrictions. Compensation is to be at the
expense of the estate pursuant to an insertion in §330(a)(l) of the Code. The
new Code section reads:
333. Appointment of patient care ombudsman

1. If the debtor in a case under chapter 7, 9, or 11 is a
health care business, the court shall order, not later than
30 days after the commencement of the case, the
appointment of an ombudsman to monitor the quality of
patient care and to represent the interests of the patients
of the health care business unless the court finds that the
appointment of such ombudsman is not necessary for the.
protection of patients under the specific facts of the case.

2.
A. If the court orders the appointment of an
ombudsman under paragraph (1), the United States
Trustee shall appoint one disinterested person (other
than the United States Trustee) to serve as such
ombudsman.
B. If the debtor is a health care business that provides
long-term care, then the United States Trustee may
appoint the State Long-term Care Ombudsman
appointed under the Older Americans Act of 1965 for
the state in which the case is which the case is
pending to serve as the ombudsman required by
paragraph (1).
C. If the United States Trustee does not appoint a State
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Long-Term Ombudsman under subparagraph (8), the
court shall notify the State Long-term Care
Ombudsman appointed under the Older Americans
Act of 1965 for the state in which the case is pending,
of the name and address of the person who is
appointed under subparagraph (A).
b. An ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall1. monitor the quality of patient care provided to patients of
the debtor, to the extent necessary under the
circumstances, including interviewing patients and
physicians;
2. not later than 60 days after the date of appointment, and
not less frequently than at 60-day intervals thereafter,
report to the court after notice to the parties in interest, at
a hearing or in writing, regarding the quality of patient
care provided to patients of the debtor; and
3. if such ombudsman determines that the quality of patient
care provided to patients of the debtor is declining
significantly or is otherwise being materially compromised,
file with the court a motion or written report, with notice
to the parties in interest immediately upon making such
determination.

c.
1. An ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall
maintain any information obtained by such ombudsman
under this section that relates to patients (including
information relating to patient records) as confidential
information. Such ombudsman may not review confidential
patient records unless the court approves such review in
advance and imposes restrictions on such ombudsman to
protect the confidentiality of such records.

2. An ombudsman appointed under subsection (a)(2)(B) shall
have access to patient records consistent with authority of
such ombudsman under the Older Americans Act of 1965
and under non-federal laws governing the State Long-term
Care Ombudsman program.

D. Duty to Transfer Patients
Section 1105 of the Act adds to the duties of a trustee or debtor-in-possession
a requirement to use all "reasonable and best efforts" to transfer patients from

\
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a health care business debtor that is closed, to a health care business or other
entity in the same general vicinity that provides substantially similar services
and maintains a reasonable quality of care. Section 1105 provides:
IN GENERAL.-Section 704(a) of Title 11, United States Code,
as amended by Sections 102, 219, and 446, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
12. use all reasonable and best efforts to transfer patients
from a health care business that is in the process of being
closed to an appropriate health care business thatA. is in the vicinity of the health care business that is
closing;
B. provides the patient with services that are
substantially similar to those provided by the health
care business that is in the process of being closed;
and

C. maintains a reasonable quality of care.

onclusion
Ithough the primary focus of the debate over the proposed bankruptcy legislation has
een on consumer bankruptcy, there are plenty of changes in store affecting health
are bankruptcies. Patients' rights proponents may laud the protections Title IX of S.
56 provides, while trustees and debtors-in-possession may be concerned over the
urdensome nature of the new law. Counsel for health care trustees and debtors will
eed to learn the details of the new provisions, as the amendments take effect for
ases commenced 180 days after the date of enactment.
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